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Of all the crises that Rome experienced during its long and illustrious history, arguably none 
was greater than the accumulation of external and internal conflicts during the third century 
CE. Most scholars date this crisis from the accession of Maximinus Thrax in 235CE, yet the 
processes that chipped away at the Augustan system of stable imperial authority were set 
into motion years earlier. In particular, the years between the accession of Commodus in 
180CE and Gordian III in 238CE saw increasing authoritarian rule, demographic change and 
economic instability. During this time, Rome hosted a dramatic escalation of politically 
motivated violence, including riots, demonstrations, street battles, vandalism and repeated 
performances of popular justice rituals, as the city’s main political actors, the emperor, 
urban plebs, Senate, and Praetorian Guard, made public claims against each other using 
both established and innovative forms of collective action. The extreme was arrived at 
238CE in the form of a revolutionary situation: a deep split in the control of the imperial 
regime’s coercive means during which every actor’s interests were at risk, prompting many 
of them to mobilise for action. Such extra-institutional, political activity is the hallmark of 
'contentious politics,’ which will be the focus of this dissertation. 
 
The clustering of collective action in Rome during this period tells us much about political 
engagement and exchange, and how shifting conceptions of imperial legitimacy and the 
polarisation of collective identities framed both support and resistance for imperial regimes.  
While previous works have shed valuable light on how social networks, political 
relationships and the symbolism of urban spaces aided mobilisation and the performance of 
Roman collective behaviour, the structures, processes, and mechanisms by which people 
publicly collaborated are less understood. This thesis seeks to identify and assess those very 
structures, processes, and mechanisms that facilitated the escalation of contentious political 
interaction in Rome between 180-238CE. Three key concepts form the basis of this study’s 
analysis: the formation and evolution of political actors, the political opportunity structures 
that both facilitated and constrained urban contentious behaviour, and the social and 
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Ancient Rome experienced a variety of crises over its long and illustrious history. As Olivier 
Hekster, Gerda de Kleijn, and Daniëlle Slootjes argue, crises were integral not only for the 
creation of Empire, but also for numerous structural changes along the way. The transition 
from Republic to Principate was one such watershed, and the so-called ‘third-century crisis’ 
that precipitated the transformation of the Principate to the Dominate of Diocletian was 
another.1 Arguably, however, it was the third century that accommodated a greater number 
of detrimental socio-political outcomes. Most scholars date the ‘third-century crisis’ from 
the accession of Maximinus Thrax in 235CE, yet the processes, structures and mechanisms 
that chipped away at the stable continuity of the Augustan system of imperial authority 
were set into motion decades earlier. 
 
Despite being long overshadowed by the turmoil of the later third century and the relative 
stability and prosperity of earlier years, the years between the accession of Commodus in 
180CE and Gordian III in 238CE are a worthy topic of research. It was a period of increasing 
authoritarian rule, demographic change and economic instability. As a result, Rome hosted a 
dramatic escalation of politically motivated violence from the late second century onwards. 
If we begin at the apex of political power, of the fifteen recognised emperors between 180-
238CE, twelve were assassinated. Only Septimius Severus indisputably died of natural 
causes. Four emperors met their fate at the hands of the Praetorian Guard, and three others 
by soldiers. There were also more usurpations in the three decades between 192-222CE 
than in the preceding two centuries. Four emperors lost civil wars, and other incumbents 
had to fight off numerous challengers.2 Instability and conflict were not restricted to the 
corridors of power either. Among the wider population, collective action also increased 
significantly. Riots, demonstrations, street battles, vandalism, and repeated performances 
 
1 Hekster, Kleijn, and Slootjes (2007) 3. 
2 Those killed by praetorians: Pertinax, Elagabalus, Pupienus and Balbinus. Those killed by soldiers while on 
campaign: Caracalla, Alexander Severus and Maximinus Thrax. Defeated in a civil war: Didius Julianus, 
Macrinus, and Gordian I and II. Potential usurpers/challengers: Pescennius Niger, Clodius Albinus (Severus); 
Seleucus, Uranius, Gellius Maximus (Elagabalus); L Seius Sallustius, Taurinus, Ovinius Camillus (Alexander); 
Magnus, Titus Quartinus (Maximinus Thrax). 
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of popular justice rituals make the period a fertile ground for an investigation into questions 
of power and urban social dynamics.  
 
The beating heart of these socio-political changes was the city of Rome. Politics begins with 
conceptions of place, and the Empire’s territorial extension aside, Rome as urbs remained 
the preeminent landscape of power.3 Fundamentally, the urban environment constituted 
and structured social, political, and cultural life, often simultaneously. Rome’s temples, fora, 
monuments, streets, and spectacle spaces were repositories of lived experience intertwined 
with imperial ideologies that offered mnemonic cues for the city’s communities. As such, 
urban space was inherently political and open to contestation by different groups. What 
happened within the capital, therefore, had a greater impact on collective identities, 
memories, and ideologies than similar events elsewhere. 
 
Given the significance of Rome and its built environment, the clustering of collective action 
within the city tells us much about political conflict, engagement and exchange, social and 
spatial routines, and the identities that framed both support and resistance. What made the 
collective behaviour of this period so consequential was that it was, for the most part, 
politically motivated activity that went beyond institutional bounds. The city’s main political 
actors, the emperor, urban plebs, Senate, and Praetorian Guard, made public claims against 
the government and each other using both established and innovative forms of collective 
action. Such extra-institutional, political activity is the hallmark of 'contentious politics,’ 
which will be the focus of this dissertation. A great deal of work on the Roman political 
environment and associated collective action has been principally concerned with the 
actions of those who held power but since ordinary people often initiated episodes of 
contentious action, such a narrow focus risks missing the essential drama and mechanisms 
of political interaction.4  It is true that there have been some fundamental studies 
conducted on Roman collective behaviour that accounts for the activities of both powerful 
and subaltern groups. However, most of these have concentrated on the Late Republican 
era or Early Imperial period, an understandable focus given the relative plethora of source 
 
3 Therborn (2006) 509. 
4 Hanagan, Page Moch, and te Brake (1998) ix. 
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material.5 In contrast, despite frequent references to the urban violence of the late second 
and early third centuries CE, a focused analysis of Roman collective behaviour during this 
time has been remarkably neglected.6 Cyril Courrier's mammoth work concludes on the 
death of Domitian, and there is to date no comparable sociological study on a turbulent 
period that demands further investigation. Moreover, while previous works have shed 
valuable light on how social networks, political relationships and the symbolism of urban 
spaces aided mobilisation and the performance of Roman collective behaviour, specific 
questions are left unanswered without a more comprehensive interdisciplinary approach. 
For example, how did civilians, soldiers, and political elites frame and perceive opportunities 
to act in situations that could be personally risky? Why did political actors prefer some types 
of collective action over others, and why would action be taken in some cases but not 
others despite ongoing or worsening socio-political issues? The processes and mechanisms 
by which people publicly collaborated are thus less understood in the Roman context. This 
thesis seeks to identify and assess those very structures, processes, and mechanisms that 









5 For instance, the political engagement of the plebs urbana with the city’s political apparatus has received 
excellent treatment. Millar (1998), and Mouritsen (2001) have provided insightful analyses of the nature of 
popular participation in Republican politics. The studies of Lintott (1999), Brunt (1966), and Vanderbroeck 
(1987) have a strong emphasis on the political violence of the late 50s BCE. Yavetz (1969) examined the nature 
of the emergent relationship between the Julio-Claudians and the urban plebs but did not specifically address 
sociological and psychological aspects of plebeian collective behaviour. Recent research by Magalhães de 
Olivera (2012), and Courrier (2014) has proven more fruitful. Magalhães de Olivera’s study on the urban plebs 
of Late Roman African cities incorporated archaeology, epigraphy, papyri, legal sources, and Christian texts to 
conclude that collective behaviour was a process of political negotiation with authorities, and thus an 
expression of the populace’s broader socio-economic and political expectations. Courrier examined the 
composition and collective culture of the urban plebs in Rome between 133BCE-96CE, determining that urban 
collective identities remained politicised under the Flavians, whilst also marking the importance of spatial and 
economic sub-groups as effective mobilisation units for political action and collective behaviour.   
6 Ménard's 2004 study of public order between the second and fourth centuries CE, including a detailed 
discussion of violent collective action, is an exception. 
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(i) Connecting Roman collective behaviour and contentious politics 
Collective behaviour includes a vast range of social actions, but for the purposes of this 
study, the analysis has been restricted to the public, political interactions between 
emperors, members of the imperial administration, senators, soldiers, and civilians.  
To that end, I have identified a phase of escalating political contention between 180-238CE 
from a database I have compiled containing 358 episodes of collective action between 
78BCE-238CE.7 The data identifies political actors, patterns of contentious activity,  and 
often the spaces used for contentious performances over centuries of social and political 
change, which provides a useful comparative base for the events of the late second century 
onwards. This dataset clearly shows a distinct acceleration, and then decline of contentious 
behaviour between 180-238CE in particular, which can best be interpreted as a cycle. Sidney 
Tarrow defines a protest cycle as a phase of conflict across the social system of higher 
frequency and intensity than average, with rapid diffusion of collective action from more 
mobilised to less mobilised sectors, the creation of new or transformed collective action 
frames and discourses, and intensified information flows and interaction between 
challengers and authorities.8 What this means is that those living in Rome during this period 
witnessed, and in many cases were participants in, a spiral of contention. A succession of 
claim-making threatened the interests of previously inactive political actors, and thus 
provided opportunities for them to make their own claims. The extreme was arrived at 
238CE in the form of a revolutionary situation: a deep split in the control of the imperial 
regime’s coercive means during which every actor’s interests were at risk, prompting many 
of them to mobilise for action.9 
 
To that end, three key concepts form the focus of this study's analysis: the formation and 
evolution of political actors in Rome, the political opportunity structures that both 
facilitated and constrained urban contentious behaviour, and the performances, repertoires 
and physical spaces that defined Roman collective action. In order to assess politically 
oriented collective action, this study uses the work pioneered primarily by Charles Tilly, 
Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam, as a starting-point for its conceptual framework. 
 
7 See Appendix. 
8 Tarrow (1998) 142.  
9 Tilly (2006) 44. 
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Contentious politics is an approach centred on public collective action that is political and of 
a non-institutional form. The three main components of contentious politics, interactions, 
claims, and governments, have proximate effects such as the reorganisation of social 
relations, re-alignments of relationships between participants, changes in the character of 
repression, and changes or displacements which occur as a consequence of the realisation 
of claims. Together, they produce political and social effects beyond the immediate 
outcomes of collective activities.10    
 
The vast literature on contentious politics speaks to the importance of the topic, yet 
research in this field has focused mainly on contemporary issues, side-stepping contention 
from different times and regime contexts. Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam view contentious 
politics as an interdisciplinary field, stating that ‘our principal goal is to encourage a crossing 
of the various boundaries—disciplinary, historical, geographic, and between different forms 
of contention—that divide the field of contentious politics.’11 Applying this framework to 
the ancient Roman context is, therefore, precisely the type of historical analysis that Tilly, 
Tarrow and McAdam envisaged. However, applying an interdisciplinary scaffold necessitates 
the setting of clear markers that are uniform and cohesive across different periods. For 
instance, to define political culture, a critical component of contentious politics, we need to 
have a sense of the collective processes by which people attributed meaning to the events 
and issues that intruded on their everyday lives. Moreover, we cannot provide a 
comprehensible model without detailing the contentious events that took place within the 
broader socio-political environment. This research, then, will not only provide fresh insights 
into Roman political identities, but it will also anchor political contention within a wider 
sociological and historical framework, contributing to a broader understanding of 






10 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009) 263; Tilly (1997) 51. 
11 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009) 260.  
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The public performance of political contention is only one part of the puzzle. In his ground-
breaking work on the moral economy of the eighteenth century CE English crowd, E.P 
Thompson argued that focusing on the most explosive types of collective action (i.e., riots) 
as demarcative events runs the risk of obscuring the broader political context of these 
protests.12 To be sure, it was not just rioting and violence that emperors and their imperial 
administration had to worry about. The public jeers and contempt for Didius Julianus and 
Macrinus, for example, precipitated the fall of both emperors as vividly portrayed by 
Herodian in the first instance, and Dio in the second.13 In other words, relatively innocuous, 
non-violent claim-making could produce outsized effects. Why this would be so when power 
was an asymmetrical reality has much to do with how conceptions of collective identity 
were closely intertwined with cultural norms and expectations and with the specific nature 
of Rome’s built environment. The boundary between ‘public’ and ‘private’ space and 
discourse was a permeable one, and when the ‘hidden’ strands of identity and informal 
communication were realised in the open, it was the tip of an iceberg of formed resistance. 
James Scott's concept of ‘hidden transcripts’ for instance provides insight into the ‘invisible’ 
discourses that underpinned popular resistance and participation in contentious politics. He 
notes that ‘most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in the overt 
collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast 
territory between these two polar opposites.’14 The established practices actors usually 
employ in off-stage social settings, including rumour, gossip, and rituals are the hidden 
transcripts that are the loci of both political support and resistance.15 What this means is 
that official discourse and action could be re-interpreted and independently framed by local 
communities, generating specific grievances and opportunities for collective claim-making. 
 
Associated with Scott’s transcripts is the centrality of Rome’s civic spaces to significant 
socio-political processes. Space and time together form the ethical horizon of the political 
and politics, which in Nigel Thrift’s estimation, is a latent world that creates both contextual 
background and provides the means to produce foregrounds.16 ⁠ Diane Favro points out that 
 
12 Thompson (1971) 76-136. 
13 Hdn 2.7.2-3, 2.7.5; Cass. Dio 79.20. 
14 Scott (1985) 136. 
15 Scott (1992) 137. 
16 Thrift (2006) 561. 
  7 
the stage-like nature of imperial public spaces encouraged the populace to see themselves 
as active participants in the urban landscape, and the importance of space in Roman 
political contention can be summed up in two key points. 17  First, the cultural implications 
of space contribute to the formation of political actors, because it provides people with 
categories to make assessments of what battles are worth fighting for, whom to cooperate 
with, and whom to contend against.18 Besides, when contention is a deliberate act of 
conflict, those who engage in such collective action are likely to try and manipulate, defend 
or subvert places that contain symbolic meanings for them and those they are contending 
against. Second, the physical aspects of public sites shape social interaction and mobility, 
which in turn shape the types, possibilities, and consequences of contention. The vast 
capacity of Rome's spectacle spaces encouraged mass contention and formation of 
collective identities and memories that guided communal action and promoted 
performances that were more likely to be successful. The Circus Maximus, for example, was 
a crucial site for contentious performances. Its religious, social, and political aspects meant 
that it contained overlapping conceptions of place that allowed the emperor and his 
subjects to reaffirm social hierarchies, but it also provided an ability for audiences to 
subvert and break down these power structures. As the third century dawned, it was 
increasingly used in innovative ways, and become a symbolic location for popular 
resistance. As contention diffused in spatial and social terms, other spaces such as the 
praetorian castra, streets, and even the Curia became locations for conflict as the 
relationships between Rome’s political actors broke down. Space, place, and time were 
therefore integral to the processes by which the political was formed and reckoned. 
 
As such, spatial analysis will provide a deeper understanding of the practice of urban 
contentious behaviour. Performative political protest had long been an integral part of the 
Roman psyche, and it was embedded in the dynamic interactions between actors and the 
spaces in which they protested. It is these interactions that will constitute the focus of the 
analysis, not protest per se.19  As contentious politics encompasses not just rioting and 
public displays of defiance but also other forms of non-institutional activity including non-
 
17 Jaeger (1997); Favro (1996). 
18 Nicholls (2009) 80.  
19 Kriesi (2015) 2. 
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violent and permitted forms of collective behaviour, the inclusion of a spatial lens will allow 
for a broader analysis of the collective processes by which Romans attributed meaning and 
significance to changing social and political conditions.  
 
A reasonable question at this juncture might be, why is contentious politics relevant?  One 
could argue that popular collective action and contentious politics had long been a feature 
of urban Roman politics. However, contention has extensive socio-political consequences. 
As Tarrow points out, ‘cycles of protest are the crucibles in which moments of madness are 
tempered into the permanent tools of a society's repertoire of contention.’20  In other 
words, the cumulative effects of contention generated new social actors and identities and 
propelled the emergence of once-hidden beliefs into new public transcripts. What lay 
behind the expression of contentious politics also reveals much about Rome’s political 
actors. For a group to act collectively, identity is crucial. Identities help shape perceptions of 
the world and how issues are accordingly framed as just or unjust, and the extension of 
collective action frames and the politicisation and polarisation of collective identities is a 
fundamental driver of political conflict examined in this study. The expression of such beliefs 
and perceptions in a new language was anchored in new or adapted social networks 
constructed during periods of intense activity. From the point of an imperial regime, these 
new transcripts and identities must either become institutionalised or be repressed to 
retain authority.21  Each of these outcomes, as Tarrow argues, ‘implies an indirect and a 
mediated effect on political culture, which is why we need to look beyond great events and 
crises to the cycles of protest they trigger in order to observe their effects.'22  
 
The study of the outcome of contentious politics is, thus, exceptionally complex. In terms of 
the causes of political conflict, both endogenous and exogenous factors played dual roles in 
generating opportunities for collective action. For those who lived in Rome and were 
dependent on a thriving urban economy, repeated grain shortages, unemployment, war, 
disease, and other natural disasters had an enormous impact.  Also, since Rome was the 
political and cultural heart of the Empire, instability affected its population 
 
20 Tarrow (1993) 284. 
21 Zolberg (1972) 206. 
22 Tarrow (1993) 301. 
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disproportionately. The emperor was the chief patron of the city, and his relationship with 
its inhabitants was a symbolic, performative one that linked all urban political actors 
together as a polity. Consensus was a two-way street: political actors accepted legitimacy 
claims in return for the provision of social goods, a ‘moral economy,’ that in essence defined 
their identity. However, as the Praetorian Guard and broader military assumed greater 
power as regime members, traditional power dynamics shifted. Continuous external 
threats, civil wars, and universal citizenship sparked comprehensive changes in military 
recruitment patterns that eventually led to a noteworthy increase in the power of ethnic 
networks in the Roman army, particularly during military campaigns.23 Shifts in these 
relationships, environments and structures in turn affected how issues and events were 
framed, whether claims were accepted, how civic spaces were used, and how contention 
was performed. Together, these strands offer a more profound understanding not only of 
the late second-early third-century political environment, but also of the networks, 
identities, perceptions, and cultural norms that bound Rome’s inhabitants, plebeian, 
senator, and soldier alike, as performers on the urban political stage. 
 
(ii) Scope and structure 
The scope of this study is restricted by both time and space to activity in Rome from the sole 
accession of Commodus in 180CE to that of Gordian III in 238CE. First, it was during 
Commodus’ reign that political contention began to spike. Likewise, after Gordian III’s 
accession, claim-making decreased precipitously, although the source material becomes 
exceedingly sparse and unreliable from 238CE onwards: Herodian concludes here; Dio 
earlier during the reign of Alexander Severus in 229CE. After this point, as Kemezis notes, 
‘we are at a loss to understand in complete detail the stormy history of the century's middle 
and later decades.'24 As the third century progressed and the Empire creaked under the 
pressures of constant invasion and warfare, emperors spent less and less time in Rome. The 
city had lost its place as the Empire’s political apex long before Constantine moved the 
capital to Constantinople in 330CE. Therefore, while 238CE is not a definitive date as such, it 
was the end of an era when contention between the plebs urbana, soldiers, Senate, and 
emperor took place face-to-face with such far-reaching consequences. Second, this study 
 
23 Speidel (2016) 359. 
24 Kemezis (2006) 2. 
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focuses on contention performed in Rome. While contention was performed elsewhere in 
the Empire (notably in other large metropoles such as Alexandria or Antioch), Rome was the 
symbolic and political heart of the Empire, and while its population may have only 
constituted a tiny proportion of the Empire, the emperor had to retain control of the city 
and the majority of its political actors to secure legitimacy.  
 
A detailed picture of the cyclical nature of late second-early third century CE contentious 
politics will be built up across four chapters that unfold in chronological order. The first part 
of Chapter One is dedicated to introducing the key concepts and definitions of contentious 
politics that will support the analysis of collective behaviour in the following chapters. The 
second section will establish clear links between theory and evidence, offering a detailed 
analysis of the imperial political system and its political actors. The demonstrable 
connections between legitimacy and moral economy, spectacle spaces and contentious 
performances, and the underlying power of hidden transcripts before 180CE will provide a 
comparative framework for later chapters.  
 
Chapter Two investigates how exogenous factors and regime change provided opportunities 
for ‘early risers' to make contentious claims under Commodus. A sharp escalation of 
political conflict in 193CE shifted political opportunity structures, allowing the deployment 
of collective action frames and innovative mass protests around questions of imperial 
legitimacy and justice, although Septimius Severus provided a period of normalisation and 
containment in terms of collective action. His decision to favour the military, however, 
weakened senatorial and popular legitimation structures, making it harder for his successors 
to apportion state resources and retain the support of one group without losing the 
consensus of others.  
 
Chapter Three maps the formation of opposing civilian and military collective identities after 
the death of Severus. As the old equilibrium between the Senate, military, urban plebs, and 
emperor was replaced with a military dictatorship, the hierarchies, norms, and identities 
attached to the previous status quo also shifted. Each political actor faced additional threats 
or opportunities depending on which side of the power equation they occupied. Some 
mobilised to either expand or protect their benefits, and collective identities, and the 
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boundaries that separated groups from each other became more salient as a result. The 
second part of this chapter will analyse the violent outcomes of these framing and identity 
processes that included a politicisation of separate civilian and military identities.  
 
Chapter Four details how the themes identified in the preceding chapters converged to 
produce the violent and innovative contention of 238CE. Collective action framing, new 
legitimacy claims, and shifts in opportunity structures all played vital roles in opening 
political space for new and independent centres of power. A constructed contrast between 
soldier and civilian, ‘barbarian’ and Roman led to an outpouring of hidden transcripts and 
violent contention as opportunities opened for resistance. In the space between opposing 
identities where only one group could emerge victorious, each traditional claimant-object 
pairing – emperor-people, Senate-people, people-praetorians – turned violent in what 
ultimately became a zero-sum game.  
 
Chapter Five contains a brief overview of the key developments associated with the late 
second-early third century contentious cycle, in which urban claims shifted substantially 
from mostly contained contention to entirely transgressive forms of collective action 
including the riot. Although the increase in rioting can be attributed in part to changing 
political opportunity structures, three related processes also contributed: the declining 
frequency of imperial consensus rituals, the autocratic, closed and militaristic nature of 
early third century regimes, and changes in claimant-object pairs. Secondly, the sustained 
nature of the interaction between the people and the regime and other political actors 
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(iii) Sources 
The three most important literary sources for the late second and early third centuries CE 
are Cassius Dio, Herodian, and the Historia Augusta. Although the exact period covered by 
each narrative differs, all three at least cover the period between the accession of 
Commodus in 180CE and the end of Alexander Severus’ reign in 235CE. As much of the 
epigraphical and numismatic evidence, although useful, forms part of the official script and 
therefore reflects the aims and ideologies of each imperial regime, the literary sources 
remain our best available evidence for the contentious events of the time. Together, Dio 
and Herodian provide corroborating accounts of substantial political change driven by 
conflict among Rome’s main political actors. As Andrews has noted, the seeming 
corroboration of two contemporary narratives is a rare phenomenon at any point in the 
ancient world, and their shared outlook has therefore been highly influential regarding 
modern evaluations of the period.25  
 
 A second-generation senator, Dio had a successful political career including two consulships 
in 205/6 and 229CE. His eighty-book Roman History covered events from Rome’s foundation 
down to his second consulship in 229CE. Unfortunately, most of what we have is only 
preserved in epitomes by Byzantine monks John Xiphilinus and John Zonaras in the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries respectively.  A separately preserved manuscript (the Codex 
Vaticanus) however gives us nearly all of Book 79 and the start of Book 80, covering the rise 
and fall of Macrinus and parts of the preceding and following reigns.26 Dio’s perspective is 
instrumental, as he was an eyewitness to many of the events in his later books. He stresses 
his diligent approach in gathering accurate information: 
 
I also will narrate events from this point, or as many of them as is necessary, just as 
they became known to the public (ὥς που καὶ δεδήμωται), whether as they really 
happened or some other way (εἴτ’ ὄντως οὕτως εἴτε καὶ ἑτέρως πως ἔχει). In 
addition, however, something of my own opinion will be added where possible, from 
the great amount that I have read, heard and seen (ἀνέγνων ἢ καὶ ἤκουσα ἢ καὶ 
 
25 Andrews (2019) 15, 191. 
26 Kemezis (2006) 12. For a summary of the state of preservation of Dio, see Millar (1964) 1-4.  
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εἶδον) that allows me to form a judgement over and above the general rumour 
(μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ θρυλούμενον)27  
 
Dio’s proximity to imperial politics has led to his reputation as a reliable witness, but his 
narrative cannot be adequately understood without appreciating how strongly he self-
identified as a member of the senatorial order.28 In Dio’s eyes, the Senate and the continuity 
and tradition it stood for were the essential parts of what it meant to be a Roman.29  He also 
displays an anti-military bias, not surprising given the rise of soldiers at the expense of the 
old senatorial guard, and his struggle with the Praetorian Guard near the end of his public 
career. 
 
We only have one surviving work from Herodian: his eight-book history that covers events 
from the death of Marcus Aurelius to the sole accession of Gordian III in 238CE.30  Unlike 
Dio, we have little exact information regarding Herodian’s career. The only clue Herodian 
directly provides is that he was involved ‘in imperial and public service.’ It is usually agreed 
that he was not a senator and was therefore probably employed in the lower tiers of the 
imperial administration.31 Like Dio, he claimed to have been an eyewitness to some events 
and was hostile to the ascendency of military power.32 However, if Dio was concerned with 
the senatorial experience of contentious social change, Herodian's focus was on the 
changing dynamics of imperial power, and the conspiracies, conflicts and crises that shaped 
the political landscape. For instance, he expands narrative time around the political events 
he sees as pivotal. Book 2 is almost wholly concerned with the few months of extreme crisis 
 
27 Cass. Dio 53.19.6. 
28 Clifford Ando's comments are representative of current historiographical attitudes when he describes Dio as 
‘a remarkably well- placed observer,’ and ‘a diligent researcher', who proves himself to be ‘an exceptionally 
clear-headed and percipient observer of imperial government.’ Ando (2012) 19; Andrews (2019) 12. 
29 Kemezis (2006) 8.  
30 For the debate on composition date: see Kemezis (2006) 240-244; Sidebottom (1997) 271-276 (including an 
extensive bibliography on earlier discussions of the date). Polley (2003) rebuts Sidebottom's dating. 
31 Hdn. 1.2.5; Ward (2011) 6. Alföldy (1989) 255-63, argues that Herodian was most likely from western Asia 
Minor and lists other posited backgrounds (Greek, Egyptian (Alexandria) and Syrian) with further bibliography. 
For the western Asia Minor view, see also Whittaker (1969) xxvi- vii. 
32 Hdn. 1.1.3, 2.15.6. Herodian claims that he only uses corroborated evidence (historia), and deliberately 
contrasts his evidence to the historia (1.1.1) of writers who incorporate muthos in order to generate pleasure 
and a reputation for education (paideia). Several times Herodian explicitly connects the soldiers with tyrannis 
(e.g. 2.5.1, 2.6.2, 7.1.3). 
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in 193CE; most of Book 7 and all of Book 8 are devoted to the events of 238CE. In contrast, 
the first decade of peaceful rule under Severus is hurried through in a few sentences.33   
Criticism of Herodian has long been the norm.34  Whether it is warranted depends on how 
one intends to interpret the information and viewpoints he espouses. Quellenforschung 
dominates the modern studies of Herodian, and while it is clear that he used Dio on a 
variety of occasions, he also had independent source material and eyewitness evidence.35 
Furthermore, while Dio's narrative is instrumental in reconstructing government policy and 
the position of elites, contentious politics, as we shall see, is most often generated by the 
unofficial script. ‘It is said’ (legousi, phasi) frequently occurs in Herodian's descriptions of 
events, and his incorporation of rumour and opinion helps us to reconstruct the hidden 
transcripts that propelled popular political contention.36 
 
There are also significant temporal and spatial elements of Herodian's narrative unremarked 
on by Dio that reveal essential information on how contentious episodes unfolded in the 
city. In sections where the narrative expands, the actions of many political actors and their 
movement through and within Rome's civic spaces are described in detail. Alföldy perhaps 
sums up the value of Herodian's work the best when he states that his history, 
‘notwithstanding his lack of exactness in reporting facts, is our best source for the views of 
the lower social groups about history in the mid-third century.’37 Certainly, for the later 
years under consideration, Herodian is to be preferred. Dio spent much of Severus 
Alexander’s reign away from Rome and was not an eyewitness to events that occurred in 
the city. His history also finishes at the beginning of Alexander’s Parthian campaign around 
 
33 Andrews (2019) 195; Hidber (2007) 210. Chronological span of each book: Book 1=13 years; Book 2=6 
months; Book 3=17 years; Book 4=7 years; Book 5=5 years; Book 6=13 years; Book 7=3 years; Book 8=approx. 
3 months.  
34 Hohl (1954) 5, dubs Herodian ‘the Levantine wind-bag;’ Šašel Kos (1986) 282 calls him a ‘mediocre recorder,’ 
while Echols (1961) 6, claims his history is ‘repetitive and derivative.’ Nor has Herodian’s historical analysis 
fared any better, with Kemezis (2014) 24, describing it as ‘superficial and banal,’ and Sidebottom (1998) 2812, 
pronouncing Herodian’s understanding of history as ‘neither profound nor original...[but] at least it is 
coherent.’ The most extensive summary of recent responses to Herodian is found in Hidber (2006) 45-71. 
35 Sidebottom (1998) 2780-2, 2786. Herodian claims to have used material such as the speeches and writings 
of Marcus Aurelius (1.2.3), the writings of those who wrote about Marcus Aurelius (1.2.5), and the 
autobiography of Severus (2.9.4). 
36 See Whittaker (1969) xxxii-xxxv for a good discussion on Herodian’s use of rumour, material evidence and 
eye-witness information. 
37 Alföldy (2014) 95. 
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229CE.38 Herodian may be particularly hostile towards Maximinus, but considering that he 
was likely resident in Rome during his reign, his bias may reflect lived experience as much as 
his obvious prejudice against ‘barbarians.’ His vivid narrative of these years is therefore a 
probable eyewitness account of what was a culmination of long-simmering social tensions 
between rich and poor, Senate and plebs, and soldier and civilian.   
 
The third source, the Historia Augusta, is a series of thirty imperial lives beginning with 
Hadrian and ending with Carus and his sons (around 285CE). It claims to be the work of six 
different authors writing under Diocletian and Constantine, although most scholarship now 
agrees that it is the work of one author writing in the latter half of the fourth century.39 The 
unreliability of this work is well-noted; Syme dubbed it, ‘without question or rival the most 
enigmatic work that antiquity has transmitted.’40 While some of the Lives appear to be 
mainly fiction, those covering Hadrian through to Caracalla appear to be based on reliable 
source material, like the lost imperial biographies of Marius Maximus.41 Fabricated 
documents, and dubious detail aside, the problems with the Historia Augusta are in Ward’s 
opinion, ‘nowhere near as numerous as the proposed solutions.’42  It is the most complete 
Latin source for the period, and it is useful where there is supporting literary or 







38 Cass. Dio 80.1.2: ‘Thus far I have described events with as much accuracy as I could in every case, but for 
subsequent events I have not found it possible to give an accurate account, for the reason that I did not spend 
much time in Rome.’ 
39 Syme (1972). For recent scholarship on the SHA, see Savino (2017); Rohrbacher (2016); Thomson (2012). 
40 Syme (1971) 1. 
41 Kulikowski (2007) 244-256; Barnes (1978). 
42 Ward (2011) 8-9. 
43 Hekster (2008) 8: Recent finds of coins minted by the usurper Domitian II who had, until these coins were 
found, been thought to be a fabrication of the Historia Augusta (Gall. 2.6) show that one can also be 
overcautious.  
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Chapter 1: What are they shouting about? Contentious politics and 
Rome 
 
Theoretical framework  
 
Whether one looks at a cheering crowd, demonstration, riot, civil war, or revolution, the 
mechanisms and processes behind each are similar across both culture and time. We can 
compare episodes within the Arab Spring of the early 2010s, the anti-slavery movement in 
18th century England, and the political violence of Late Republican Rome, and while each 
may indeed have had very different goals and outcomes, there are still clear parallels 
between them. Each time frame contained clustered episodes of public contention by 
networks of ordinary people who utilised existing forms of collective action and created 
new ones by taking advantage of political opportunities, space, and collective identity to 
advance their claims.44 
 
The literature on the causes of collective action offers two broad theories: one grievance-
based, the other political-processes. Grievance-based theories posit that it is perceived 
grievances related to political or economic factors such as structural inequality that create a 
gap between expectations and reality that generate resentment and feelings of solidarity 
and thus cause ‘justice seeking’ collective action.45 Political-process theories, on the other 
hand, contend that perceived grievances are a more or less permanent feature of the 
political landscape and cannot fully explain why collective action occurs in some places and 
times, but not others. Instead, these theories attribute variations in collective behaviour to 
the political environment, opportunities and resource availability.46 That does not mean we 
should understand perceptions of opportunity and grievance as two mutually competing 
categories, but political-process theory can provide a clearer framework for explaining how 
grievances can be translated into collective action. Contentious politics is a political-process 
theory that also accounts for the role that grievances, emotion and identity play in political 
conflict. It is defined by Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam as; ‘public, collective, episodic 
interactions among makers of claims when a) at least some of the interaction adopts non-
 
44 Tilly and Tarrow (2015) 4. 
45 Taydas, Enia, and James (2011) 2631. 
46 Shadmeh (2014) 621. 
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institutional forms, b) at least one government is a claimant, and object of claims, or a party 
to the claims, and c) the claims would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the 
claimants.’47  
 
Essentially, a claim is an irregular form of public political interaction between a claimant and 
object that includes verbal or physical action as part of the conscious articulation of the 
claim. Claims run the gamut from the positive and optimistic (cheering, throwing flowers, 
singing) to the negative and potentially destructive (defacing, attacking, cursing). 
Non-institutional interaction describes public claim-making where at least some participants 
involve themselves for the first time as political actors and/or employ some innovative form 
of collective action.48 Routine politics such as voting or non-competitive elections within an 
authoritarian regime are institutionalised, regular components of a political system, so 
contentious politics encompasses the behaviour that falls outside these boundaries.49 A 
publicly presented petition by people who do not usually identify themselves as political 
actors is an example of an episodic, non-institutional, and thus contentious, form of political 
interaction. Contentious politics, then, brings together three important elements of every-
day social life: contention, collective action and politics. Separately, these three elements 
can be inconsequential and routine but when they converge, they take on great significance. 
 
Claims can also be categorised as contained or transgressive. Contained contention occurs 
when established political actors employ recognisable and permitted means of interacting 
with their government. Depending on the time and place, such contention encompasses 
many different forms of interaction, such as acclamations, pro-government rallies or even 
certain forms of protest. In general, though, contained forms of claim-making usually 
neither rock the boat nor elicit significant governmental change. Transgressive contention, 
on the other hand, falls outside of an institutional framework and occurs when at least 
some parties employ innovative collective action, a term that includes claims, objects, new 
political actors, methods of collective self-representation or means that are either 
 
47 Tilly (2006) 121. For the evolution of the field and related approaches, see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2009) 
7-14. 
48 Tilly and Tarrow (2015) 5; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 7. 
49 Gomza (2014) 56.  
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unprecedented or forbidden by the regime in question.50 It is important to note that 
contentious politics often overlap with conventional forms of political expression, and 
undoubtedly most episodic, non-institutional political interaction falls under the umbrella of 
contained contention. However, it is episodes of transgressive contention that are 
understood as being crucial in significant short-term political and social change, principally 
because transgressive contention often arises from existing forms of contained contention 
(and thus shapes future behaviour), and because it is almost always a response to 
governmental threats, opportunities, and constraints.51 
 
(i) Regimes, frames, and opportunity 
In order for contentious politics to occur, there needs to be some relationship that exists 
between claimants and their government. These relationships hinge on the type of access 
that a political actor has to a government and its resources: for instance, polity members 
who enjoy routine access have a different location in a political setting than other political 
actors who lack routine access and other structural advantages.52 Thus, a government must 
negotiate different relationships with groups that it claims to represent, and the recurrent 
interactions between each constitutes a regime.53  The form that a regime takes is highly 
variable – Aristotle in his Politics enumerated at least six different types, and although he 
restricted his discussion of political contention to revolutions, he saw regimes as having 
their own characteristic forms of contention.54 It is worth noting Aristotle here even if only 
in passing, for his and Plato’s conception of political systems loomed large in Graeco-Roman 
thought: the notion of a ‘mixed constitution’ in terms of Rome’s political system occupied 
Polybius and Cicero centuries later.55 Such categorisation and dissection gave later imperial 
regimes a form of guidance, for no emperor wanted his rule to be perceived as tyrannical. 
Nevertheless, while traditional concepts of governance supplied many of the entrenched 
means by which rulers and subjects engaged in contentious politics, regime type still 
 
50 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 7-8. 
51 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 8. 
52 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 12. Another category: outside actors (groups or individuals, including 
other governments, that are outside the jurisdiction of the government), is not applicable to the period 
covered in this study. 
53 Tilly (2006) 19. 
54 Arist. Pol. 3.7; Tilly (2015) 424-5. 
55 Pl. Lg. 3.680a3-e4, 681c7-d5, 681d7-9, 683a4-8. Mixed constitution: Pl. Lg. 4.756e-757a; Polyb. 6; Cic. Rep. 
1.54, 3.46-7. 
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strongly affected its rulers’ approach to generating and controlling claim-making, 
particularly of the transgressive variety.56 Political regimes differ not only in the types of 
political actors and relationships they encompass but also in the degree to which any 
particular individual, the ruler, has power. In Imperial Rome, power was personalised, and 
executive power concentrated.57 Access to the corridors of power was highly dependent on 
who the emperor was and whether he preferred to rule cooperatively or in a more closed, 
autocratic fashion. The arbitrary and potentially restrictive nature of imperial politics meant 
that any successful claim-making by Roman political actors relied on three key mechanisms: 
framing, repertoires of contention, and political opportunity structures.  
 
Framing is a process by which political actors locate, identify, and label issues that are 
important to them. For example, one section of a population may view an issue or event as 
unjust, another group may view it in opposite terms, and often how something is framed 
has much to do with existing expectations of how authorities should behave. Truth is less 
important than perception, and the privileging of one particular perspective over another is 
an integral part of power relations. Furthermore, the meanings that people attach to 
specific events are, as Janis Grimm argues, above all discursively mediated and thus 
traceable in their effects through an analysis of contentious discourses.58 As the diagnostic 
and prognostic abilities of a recognisable frame, such as justice, not only identifies a 
problem and offers a solution, it can redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously 
seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable. Successful framing can, therefore, motivate 
collective behaviour since a perception of injustice can inspire individuals to act collectively 
in response to the threat.59 Framing theory also shows how grievance and opportunity, 
public and private are inextricably linked by acknowledging how culture and emotion can 
drive mobilisation in conjunction with resource availability and opportunity. 
 
 
56 Tilly (2006) 20. 
57 Márquez (2016) 62. 
58 Grimm (2016). 
59 Khawaja (1993), 47-71; Benford and Snow (2000) 615; Snow and Benford (1992) 137. In Snow and Bedford’s 
conceptualisation, framing ‘refers to an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out 
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of 
actions within one’s own present or past environment.’ 
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Consequently, how frames and grievances are articulated as collective action is grounded in 
the lived experience and memory of participants. In any given time and place, contention is 
a product of learned, culturally grounded performances. Theoretically, there is an infinite 
array of actions and spaces a collective could employ in the making of claims, yet people 
tend to stick with a limited number of performances that are known and able to be 
executed by participants and are considered culturally acceptable and expected behaviours 
by the rest of society.  Episodes of contention create a history – a collective memory – of 
interaction between parties providing each with information about the propensities and 
tactics of the other. Therefore, effective claim-making relies on a recognisable relation to its 
setting, including framing, existing social relations, and previous uses of that form of claim. 
This ‘script’ of recognisable action defines a contentious performance, and its repetition 
between the same claimant-object pairs, like the theatre, is a repertoire that defines the 
nature of that contention in time and space. Accordingly, a repertoire is simultaneously a 
cultural and structural concept, involving not only what people do during episodes of 
contention, but how they know what to do and what others expect them to do, which 
restricts most claim-making to established repertoires and performances.60 
 
How groups of people draw on repertoires depends on the flexibility of available 
performances – repertoires can be weak, strong, rigid, or even non-existent.61 What 
identifies the relative strength of a repertoire is the familiarity of a past performance and 
the likelihood that such a performance will be repeated in a similar situation. Certainly, 
concessions by a government to a specific action make it easier for actors to press claims 
using a similar method.62 Since a repertoire varies by time, place, social class, the issue 
under contention and the reasons that bring a crowd together, it can tell us much about the 
social, economic and political context and the interests of involved groups, as collective 
claim-making has a coherent relationship to both the social organisation and routine politics 
attached to the physical environment.63 This relationship also means that contention can 
transform alongside political and demographic changes. Tilly’s general argument is that in 
 
60 Tarrow (1998) 32.  
61 For a discussion of repertoire strengths, see Tilly and Tarrow (2015) 15. 
62 Tilly (2006) 39, 57. 
63 Tilly (2006) 51. 
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regimes with relatively stable governments, strong, flexible repertoires prevail, but during 
periods of political, economic or social crises, we can expect to find a degree of innovation 
in claim-making performances.64 In fact, even established repertoires can be become 
modular, in that a performance usually confined to a specific claimant object pairing can in 
times of instability be employed against different targets, in different locations, and for 
different issues.65 
 
(ii) Political opportunity structures 
Since a repertoire fundamentally exists because of a shared history between claimants and 
objects, the success or failure of actions rests, in many cases, upon the level of mobilisation 
and organisation of the claimants, the likelihood of repression, and the vulnerability of 
claimants to that repression. Political opportunity structure (POS) is an approach that argues 
that the success or failure of contentious politics is affected by the opening or closing of 
opportunities. Tarrow defines political opportunities as the ‘consistent but not necessarily 
formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or 
discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements.’ 66 The nature of 














64 Tilly (2006) 116; Tilly and Tarrow (2015) 12. 
65 See Wada (2012) 544-571 for a comprehensive discussion. 
66 Tarrow (1998) 54. 
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Fig 1: Political opportunity structures67 
 
Category Increasing Opportunity Increasing Threat 
openness of regime to new 
actors 
regime becomes more open regime closing down 
multiplicity of independent 
centres of power within a 
regime 
increasing divisions among 
elite, new power centres form 
increasing solidarity of 
regime members 
stability of political 
alignments 
rising instability increasing stability 
availability of allies new allies available potential allies disappear 




decisive changes to above acceleration in any of the 
above 
deceleration in any of the 
above 
 
As the table outlines, opportunity structures either inhibit or facilitate collective action by 
expanding opportunities for a group by lowering the costs of action and animating existing 
social networks and collective identities into action around shared issues.68 Changes in 
opportunity structures strongly affect the viability of different performances and 
repertoires: essentially, the character of political contention. Shifting threats and 
opportunities according to political instability, availability of allies, changes in governmental 
openness, and repression, for example, encourages some actions and discourages others.69 
Tarrow neatly sums up this relationship between political opportunity and episodes of 
contentious performances:  
 
People engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and 
constraints change and then, by strategically employing a repertoire of collective 
action, create new opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of 
 
67 Tilly and Tarrow (2015) 59. 
68 Tarrow (1998) 20.  
69 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 43-45. 
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contention…The outcomes of such waves of contention depend not on the justice of 
the cause or the persuasive power of any single movement, but on their breadth and 
on the reactions of the elites and other groups.70 
 
In general, changes in political opportunity structures induce those in power towards more 
rigid repertories and claimants to more flexible ones, as, once a performance gains visible 
effectiveness, it can become a ready model for future events. From a government’s point of 
view, contentious repertoires can have a serious impact on its programme. Repression or 
facilitation of contention either by prescribing, tolerating or forbidding performances 
therefore aids the formation of political opportunity structures, and how a government 
deals with contention obviously depends on its capacity to manage said structures. The 
interrelated network of threats, opportunities, and responses by both claimants and 
governments means that a contentious repertoire is uniquely tied to its context: the social 
and political identities of claimants, the character of the regime, identity and framing 
processes. Repertoires of contention, then, are sensitive not only to learning and innovation 
during times of political crisis, but also to the history, culture, and transformation of 
regimes. 
 
All these factors explain why collective action does not necessarily occur every time political 
actors hold a grievance or an issue is framed as unjust. For example, although there were 
attested food shortages on average every five years during the Republican and early 
imperial period, we only have three explicit references to food riots and sixteen total 
episodes of contention relating to food issues during this time.71 Opportunity structures and 
framing processes provided actors with the ability to mobilise at specific points, while 
threats constrained action at other times. When collective action did occur, extant 
repertoires guided participant’s actions towards those that were culturally understandable 
and thus more likely to be successful. For example, when Republican crowds made public 
claims relating to food issues, they intimidated politicians, threw stones, and occupied 
 
70 Tarrow (1998) 7, 19. 
71 Garnsey (1988) 193-217; Virlouvet (1985) 73-4. 
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symbolic spaces in and around the Forum, actions that mirrored the open air, communal 
political processes of the time.72 
 
As a methodology, contentious politics allows an analysis of collective behaviour to go 
deeper than a mere descriptive discussion. Instead, it provides the means to reconstruct 
narratives of political conflict, a useful tool when dealing with difficult or sparse source 
material. Certainly, by situating collective behaviour, especially subaltern action, within a 
contentious politics framework, we are able to gain a better comprehension of the cultural, 
spatial, and temporal factors that shaped the interaction between political actors, and as a 
result, the ability to relate the resulting narratives to wider historical themes.73 As we shall 
see, urban Rome had specific, recognisable contentious performances and repertoires that 
were reflective of collective memory and identity, regime type, and evolving political 
opportunity structures. While the extensive and diverse field of contentious politics 
encompasses some structures and mechanisms not directly pertinent to the Roman context, 
political contention theory is a valid and appropriate method for analysing the nature of 
collective action in Rome. Having outlined contentious politics as a methodology, the next 
step is to apply the framework to the imperial political system. The constituent components 
of Roman regimes, the cultural importance of legitimacy claims and ‘moral economy,’ and 
the spatial and social templates that formed ‘hidden transcripts’ together motivated and 
shaped many of Rome’s recorded contentious performances. By understanding these 
processes, relationships, and power dynamics, we will be able to identify, categorise and 








72 For instance, physical intimidation: Cic. Har. resp. 22-26; QFr. 2.1.3; Att. 4.1.6-7; Dom. 6-7, 10-16; Cass. Dio 
39.9.2; 39.27.3-29; Plut. Pomp. 48.7, 49.2; Asc. 48C. Stone-throwing: Plut. Cic. 30; Cic. De or. 2.197; Asc. 58C. 
Occupation of space: Cic. QFr. 2.1; Sest. 34, 85, 79-80; Mil. 38; Red. sen. 7. 
73 Hanagan, Page Moch and te Brake (1998) ix-x. 
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Imperial regimes, capacity, and ‘democracy’ 
 
Capital cities are important places; it is where decisions are made, where 
governments are installed and where governments lose their power…[They are] are 
settings of power, exercise and contest… [and] are the centre of political debate 
about what needs to happen in the country [and] where national differences are 
made. As seats of power, capital cities owe their site to the spatiality of power  
– Göran Therborn.74 
 
Understanding who had political power and how it was exercised is vital to explaining how 
political opportunity structures and collective identities worked in the performance of 
contentious Roman politics. The ‘inner core’ of the Empire comprised the city of Rome, 
which housed and was directly governed by a whole set of political bodies and office 
holders. It was the seat of the emperor. The imperial court, Senate, and Praetorian Guard 
were all located there. Despite the vast expansion of its dominions, Rome kept its 
constitutional form as a city state; only Rome was called urbs.75 As the challengers of 69CE 
understood well, obtaining control of the city was the key to controlling the Empire, no 
matter where an emperor may be acclaimed. Accordingly, Rome was the heart of 
contentious politics.  
 
In his Res Gestae, Augustus proclaimed that he had won the consent of all the people 
(consensus universorum), and his political revolution successfully constructed political 
stability as part of a centralised, autocratic regime that appropriated the vast majority of the 
political powers previously held by elite and non-elite alike.76 By the time of the Antonines, 
the emperor had almost complete control of all imperial ceremonies, games, public 
building, and material distributions in the city. Such control can be quantified in terms of 
regime capacity and relative levels of democracy, and as any good Aristotelian would 
expect, both had a profound effect on the quality of Rome’s contentious politics.77 Regime 
capacity is defined as the degree of control a government and its agents exercise over 
 
74 Therborn (2006) 513, 521. 
75 Neumeister (1993) 22.  
76 RG 34. 
77 Tilly (2006) 28. 
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people, activities, and resources within their jurisdiction. Democracy, meanwhile, is 
measured by the breadth and equality of polity membership, and the degree to which the 
collective will of polity members can influence governmental personnel, policy, and 
resources.78 Accordingly, mechanisms such as direct rule, capacity to monitor and repress, 
ability to carry out intended policies, and standardisation of state practices and identities 
will produce a high capacity regime. While the capacity of imperial regimes did fluctuate, on 
the whole, they clustered toward the high end of the spectrum, especially when compared 
to the low capacity nature of the Republic. Each regime’s ability to mobilise labour and 
resources through a centralised administration, maintain domestic order, and standardise 
practices and identities that tied inhabitants together under one cultural umbrella, 
bolstered Rome’s domestic capacity. 79  
 
Capacity can be increased without the outward form of government appearing to change 
drastically, but democracy levels are far more sensitive to tradition and models. The 
Principate was a ‘non democracy,’ in terms of political inequalities, but its reality was 
masked by the retention of some of the oligarchic norms and institutions of the Republic. 
When Augustus formalised his tenure of the Republican power of tribunicia potestas in 
23BCE, he assumed leadership of the Senate and the role as protector of the people. 
Membership of the leading priestly colleges along with the assumption of the title of 
pontifex maximus gave succeeding emperors the right to appoint other pontifices, and 
responsibility for the entire Roman state cult whose collective ritual practices quickly 
became centred upon the emperor and his family. This political and religious power was 
also combined with the emperor’s possession of imperium maius. As chief priest, 
commander in chief, head of Senate, and patron of the plebs, the emperor thus dominated 
all three elements of the old Roman constitution, but this domination was cloaked in 




78 Tilly (2006) 78-9. 
79 Jenkins (1995) 23. He also includes one more variable, international support, a variable more applicable to 
the modern context. See also Márquez (2016) 5-6. 
80 Pollard and Berry (2012) 37-38; Stevenson (2015) 196. 
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The low degree of democracy inherent in imperial regimes remained relatively static over 
the years. Polity membership was restricted, and to a great degree relied upon the 
emperor’s favour. In terms of collective consultation, the relationship between the Senate 
and emperor was publicly one of co-operation and respect. In reality, power was 
concentrated in the hands of the emperor, codified by the time of Vespasian if not earlier. 
The lex de imperio Vespasiani formally provided the emperor with the backdated power to 
do ‘whatever he deems to be in the interests of the commonwealth or in accordance with 
the dignity of Roman affairs, both secular and religious, public and private.’81 To be fair, the 
lex did not innovate or expand the emperor’s powers, but Vespasian’s act certainly codified 
the emperor’s expansive legal authority. By the mid-second century, the long established 
senatorial procedure whereby the emperor would address the Senate, followed by a debate 
then the crafting of a motion and decree had been abandoned.  An inscription detailing 
Marcus Aurelius’ response to a petition reveals there was no deliberation. The emperor put 
forward an omnibus motion, which the Senate immediately approved.82 Real influence had 
long been entrusted instead to counsellors and court insiders who served at the behest of 
the emperor, and the centralisation of all authority, ceremonial and practical, in the hands 
of the emperor was complete. 
 
Modern research has shown that strong capacity tends to enhance regime stability in both 
autocracies and democracies, but what primarily matters in autocracies is who has the 
monopoly on violence.83 In terms of repressive capacity, emperors had active urban military 
and policing units. The imperial bodyguard (equites singulares) looked after the emperor’s 
personal security. The urban cohorts were primarily tasked with policing duties. It was the 
Praetorian Guard, though, who would become the most powerful. Initially, three out of a 
total of nine cohorts, each of approximately five hundred praetorians were stationed in the 
city under the command of one or two prefects who directly answered to the emperor.84 By 
the close of the second century, the size of praetorian cohorts had swelled to fifteen 
 
81 Clause VI: CIL 6.930 and 31207=ILS 244. The only clauses conferring specific powers on the Princeps that do 
not list precedents (clauses III and IV) seem to reflect past imperial practice. See Brunt (1977); Griffin (2000) 
11-12. 
82 Ando (2012) 9. 
83 Andersen, Møller, Rørbæk, and Skaaning (2014). 
84 Nine cohorts were created in 27/26BCE, numbered I-IX. Two prefects were appointed in 2BCE. Southern 
(2007) 115. 
  28 
hundred men, which meant that the soldier-to-civilian ratio in Rome was higher than that in 
most modern cities.85 Augustus may have forbidden the soldiers to wear military dress 
inside the city, but their presence became more visible and forboding under his successors. 
Under Tiberius all praetorian cohorts were housed together in a new castra on the north 
eastern outskirts of Rome, transforming a praefecture that was in Dio’s words ‘until now of 
slight importance’ into one that inspired fear in ‘everyone.’86 Indeed, the Guard’s rapid 
assumption of specialised military tasks and various administrative duties such as assisting 
the vigiles in firefighting, and acting as security at the games allowed them a visible and 
potent degree of power that at times heightened tensions and created conflict with the 
city’s other social groups.  
 
Of course, the rise of the praetorians was inextricably linked with the rise of the army. 
Vespasian dated the beginning of his reign not from 21 Dec 69CE when the Senate 
confirmed him as Augustus, but from 1 July when he was acclaimed by his soldiers in 
Alexandria.87 That is not to say that soldiers were meant to be deployed as a repressive 
force in Rome. Only Caligula and Vitellius used soldiers to repress verbal contention in the 
early imperial period publicly, and their methods were met with hostile incredulity.88 
Nevertheless, the threat of physical violence by an elite military force was apparent not just 
to the average citizen, but also to those with better resources: the violence of 69CE was 
ample evidence that the support of the praetorians was crucial even for candidates who had 
other sources of support.  
 
Why capacity and democracy matters in terms of contentious politics is due to two main 
reasons. First, the ability of imperial regimes to influence the everyday lives of their subjects 
and enforce policy meant they could both generate and control contentious politics. Such 
oversight impacted repertoire content, since a fear of repression, relative levels of regime 
openness, and coherence of polity members all determined which, if any, contentious 
 
85 Fuhrmann (2012) 118 claims that by 6BCE Augustus had 1 soldier per 100 urban residents. To compare, in 
the 1890s, the ratio in Paris was 1/285; Berlin 1/313; and both London and Vienna approx. 1/435. Washington 
D.C in 1998 had a ratio of 1/150. Roman ‘police’ coverage also exceeded that of Singapore and Hong Kong in 
the 1980s. 
86 Tac. Ann. 4.2; Cass. Dio 57.19.6; Bédoyère (2017) 65; Southern (2007) 117.  
87 Omissi (2018) 7. 
88 Cass. Dio 59.28.11; Suet. Vit. 14. 
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performances were worth launching. Secondly, the administrative structures and repressive 
instruments needed to maintain regime capacity meant that those who filled said structures 
and instruments would be consequential political actors. If, however, one does not have full 
control over repressive capacity, independent centres of power can develop, opening 
political opportunities for potential challengers. The establishment of a separate, fortified 
and highly visible praetorian castra meant that the independence and latent power of the 
Guard was now expressed spatially. It also meant that the force was under the direct 
control of their equestrian prefects, an office that quickly emerged as one of the dominant 
administrative and advisory positions in the state. A prefect could assume considerable 
influence over civil apparatus if an emperor was away, indisposed or disinclined to 
personally oversee judicial affairs or other urban matters. Moreover, as the conduit 
between the praetorians and the imperial court, prefects could use their influence with 
both sides to gain personal power and benefits.  
 
Unsurprisingly, as praetorian prefects played intimate roles in the accession or death of 
several emperors (Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Otho, Domitian, and Nerva certainly), their 
soldiers also inserted themselves into the political sphere. They played a decisive role in 
Nero’s death by refusing to accompany the emperor into exile, and their opposition to 
Galba and Vitellius, and support for Otho were pivotal. The mutiny of the Guard in 97CE 
(spearheaded by their prefect Casperius Aelianus), in part to secure the execution of 
Domitian’s assassins was referred to by Pliny as a ‘snatching’ of Nerva’s authority; it was 
surely no coincidence that the ageing emperor officially adopted Trajan as his heir a few 
months later to safeguard his position.89 The actions of the Guard against Nerva also 
demonstrated that the unit had gained a sense of collective identity independent from the 
politics of their prefects. Such independence was a threat to any emperor since his main 
urban repressive capacity could be used by others against him, or it could act as a challenger 
in its own right. It was necessary then, not merely to ‘own’ capacity, but to retain it by 
winning consensus from Rome’s main political actors and consequently establishing a 
legitimate right to control all state resources. Accordingly, while the relatively low 
democracy and high capacity of imperial regimes influenced where and when contentious 
 
89 Plin. Pan. 6.1.  
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politics could be performed in Rome, how the relationships between the city’s main political 
actors were constructed and maintained is a crucial component of understanding how 
political opportunity structures could either facilitate or constrain contention.  
 
Legitimacy, consensus, and the imperial moral economy 
 
As with contentious performances, political opportunity has a strong cultural component 
since opportunities for collective action have two sides: an institutional side which refers to 
the access actors have to the political system and how power is structured and a discursive 
side which refers to the public visibility and legitimacy of political actors and their claims 
and identities. The downside of a restrictive regime is that those denied real access to 
power, and in the case of Rome, the overwhelming majority of inhabitants, must be 
persuaded to cooperate. The discursive strategies of emperors then were crucial in 
constraining opportunities for popular contention. 
 
In the larger political equation, elites and urban troops made up only a small fraction of the 
people resident in Rome. An emperor may have cohorts of praetorians on hand, but Rome 
was a city of approximately one million inhabitants who had a long history of political 
participation. Their acceptance was vital for an emperor to establish and retain control of 
the city and by extension, the empire. Paul Veyne articulated the relationship between 
Rome’s major players as a triangle connecting the emperor, plebs urbana, and Senate, 
although Egon Flaig is closer to the mark in his conception of power relations as a 
parallelogram between emperor, plebs urbana, Senate, and citizen soldiers.90  
Perceptions were everything, and a fine juggling act was needed to win and retain the 
consensus universorum of the city. A constant dialogue developed, both real and symbolic, 
between the emperor and his subjects in which each interacted with each in a highly 
prescribed manner. As part of this communicative process, the emperor dispensed 
specialised benefits in return for public displays of consensus, upon which acceptance 
ultimately rested.91  
 
 
90 Flaig (2015) 89; Veyne (1976) 589-729. 
91 Owen and Gildenhard (2013).  
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Unquestionably, Augustus’ claim to have achieved the total consensus of the citizen body 
compelled his successors to adhere to behaviours considered to be both ‘legitimate’ and 
‘traditional.’92 A mark of his success was that the legitimacy of his Principate was not 
contested during the first three centuries of imperial rule. Even when an emperor was 
overthrown, the autocratic system remained undisturbed. This sense of legitimacy that 
underpinned the regime as a whole can be termed as diffuse support. Generally viewed as a 
continuum, when diffuse support is strongly held, people feel themselves as an integral part 
of the political system and believe it has a rightful claim to their loyalty.93 Such support is 
critical – a large body of theoretical research conducted since the 1960s suggests a strong 
association between diffuse support for the governmental system and political stability.94 
 
The Principate as a political system was thus considered legitimate by all its participant 
actors, but there is an important distinction to be made between the enduring legitimacy of 
the imperial office itself, and the acceptability of the person who occupied it.95 Legitimacy 
has long been understood as the uncontested right to govern, and the ability to do so 
without the possibility of this right being revoked. The emperor’s subjects could only bestow 
this right, and the military, Senate and urban plebs all expressly declared their consent as 
part of the accession process.96 Acclamation by troops was the first and most politically 
important act of legitimacy, followed by the legal bestowal of powers by the Senate and 
finally, the approval of the populace. Despite their role in the accession process, the Senate 
and people in reality had little say in who would be emperor; their acclamations were an 
acknowledgement of a decision already made by soldiers. 
 
This was only the first step, however; legitimacy had a finite shelf life. In a practical sense, it 
could best be understood as a quality of the relationship between an emperor and his 
subjects, centred around popular expectations that his regime served a common good or at 
least met cultural norms of how power should be exercised. Whenever an emperor lost his 
 
92 For an excellent discussion on this topic, see Lobur (2008). 
93 Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and Sniderman (1975) 3; Easton (1975) 445; Seligson (1983) 3. 
94 Seligson (1983) 1.  
95 This is a distinction made by Egon Flaig who differentiates between the secure legitimacy of the imperial 
system and the ‘acceptance’ each emperor had to win from his subjects. Flaig (2015) 82. 
96 Flaig (2015) 82, 85. 
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‘right to rule’, that right was not taken away from him by the decision of an institution; he 
lost the acceptance of Rome’s political actors by being unable to craft or maintain 
persuasive legitimacy claims. The influential research of Max Weber has been the starting 
point for much of our understanding of legitimacy theory. His framework for understanding 
legitimacy revolves around three types of authority claims that a regime had to employ to 
acquire broad acceptance: tradition, positive proclamation, and personal charisma.97 More 
recently, Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel have elaborated on Weber’s criteria, 
identifying six types of claims, five of which are applicable to the Roman context: 
foundational myth, ideology, personalism, procedures, and performance.98 A foundational 
claim rests upon a ruler, elites, and associated parties acknowledging their roles in the state 
building process. Ideology-based claims derive from narratives regarding the justice of a 
given political order. Personalism is akin to Weber’s conception of charisma in that personal 
leadership qualities legitimise a ruler’s authority, but von Soest and Grauvogel also view the 
discursive mechanisms that emphasise a ruler’s centrality to notions of national unity, 
prosperity, and stability as a crucial component of personalism claims. Procedure based 
claims rely on the following of rule based mechanisms for the transition of power, while 
performance claims are based on the relative success a ruler has in fulfilling the 
expectations of his main constituents.99  
 
Imperial legitimacy claims encompassed many, if not all, of von Soest and Grauvogel’s 
criteria. The employment of foundational myth, ideology, and the personal characteristics of 
each emperor were celebrated in architecture, coinage, and art. As commander in chief, 
religious leader, ultimate patron, and apex member of the social order, the emperor 
occupied an office created from and nourished by traditional ideologies and hierarchies. 
Likewise, the performance aspect of legitimacy went hand in hand with personalism. As 
Andrew Wallace-Hadrill has so amply demonstrated, while some emperors articulated their 
social distance from the rest of the city through ceremony, most attempted to bridge this 
gap by acting the part of the civilis princeps, thereby retaining a sense of continuity with the 
 
97 Weber (1962), 81-83.  
98 von Soest and Grauvogel (2017) 290. The sixth claim, international engagement, is more applicable to a 
modern or globalist context. 
99 von Soest and Grauvogel (2017) 290-291. 
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ideals of a Republican past that still lingered in collective memory. Such civility reinforced 
the traditional social hierarchy through its acknowledgement by the emperor and 
strengthened his autocracy by implicitly grounding his persona to the existing social 
structure.100 In particular, the imperial title of pater patriae that positioned the emperor as 
a father wielding absolute authority, was firmly rooted in traditional conceptions of 
hierarchy. Indeed, Andreas Alföldi essentially views the title of pater patriae as a legitimacy 
claim that placed Rome’s citizens under a child’s obligation to his father.101 This sense of 
obligation, directly rooted in the concept of pietas, had to be bolstered by providing each of 
Rome’s major political actors with specific benefits. The social prestige and public deference 
accorded to the Senate along with expanded opportunities to seek distinction via higher 
office for its members earned their base consensus. Although the institutionalised co-
operation of the political elite constrained political opportunities and ensured a relatively 
stable political environment, their tiny size and lack of collective resources meant that 
senatorial consent and compliance could not entirely grant the regime the legitimacy it 
needed to rule. The consensus of the praetorians and the urban plebs was far more critical. 
 
The chief mechanism to earn and retain the loyalty of the Guard and wider military was 
through the gifting of a donativum at the beginning of each reign. Unsurprisingly, this cash 
payment was set according to Augustan standards. Augustus left his praetorians 1,000 
sesterces in his will, which ensured the Guard’s loyalty to his successor Tiberius. Over the 
years (and after some contested regime transitions), the size of donativa increased. By the 
time of Marcus Aurelius’ accession in 160CE, praetorians could expect a whopping payment 
of 20,000 sesterces.102 As the most elite of the empire’s troops, praetorians also received 
benefits above and beyond the ordinary soldiery. Their pay was double that of the urban 
cohorts and almost three times that of an average legionary.103 Each praetorian had the 
same rank as a centurion in the regular army, as they had the privilege of carrying a 
 
100 Wallace-Hadrill (1982) 47, 48. 
101 Stevenson (2015) 189, 196; Alföldi (1971). 
102 Although Marcus Aurelius did refuse to give a donativum to the soldiers after the victorious battle against 
the Marcomanni (Cass. Dio 71.3.3). 
103 Bédoyère (2017) 275. Based on the figures supplied by Tacitus, Dio and Suetonius among other attested 
sources (Tac. Ann. 1.17; Cass. Dio 67.3.5; Suet. Dom. 7), Bédoyère calculates that praetorians received 750 
denarii per year (in quarterly instalments) versus 225 denarii for legionaries, and 375 denarii for the urban 
cohorts. 
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centurion’s vitis.104  Later, when emperors found themselves cash poor, the Guard was 
often given gifts in kind; food, rations, clothing, and other goods in order to retain their 
support. The Guard interpreted these benefits as a tacit recognition of their position as a 
consequential political actor as their response to Galba’s actions demonstrates. During his 
adventus in 68CE, the new emperor stated that he would not pay the expected donativum 
to the rest of the assembled soldiery. His declaration that he enrolled troops, not bribed 
them earned the instant enmity of the soldiers. Without their support, Galba’s reign only 
lasted seven months. 105 On the surface, the uproar generated by Galba’s refusal to pay may 
appear to be one of money, but Plutarch’s narrative highlights that the soldiers were more 
angry about the precedent that the emperor’s refusal could set and what this would mean 
in terms of political consequences. After all, if future emperors decided not to bestow 
largesse, then the praetorians and the broader army would no longer be a recognised 
political heavyweight.106 Their donatives had been enshrined as a military tradition, and 
therefore formed part of an emperor’s foundational and performance based legitimacy 
claims for the Guard and the empire’s other soldiers. 
 
How to earn the consensus of the most numerically superior group, the plebs urbana, was 
more complex. They may have lost their direct involvement in the political process with the 
removal of their ability to elect magistrates, but what they could still lay claim to was the 
privilege attached to their residence within the Empire’s spiritual and political heart. As part 
of their ancient patrimony, the city’s plebs urbana could collectively claim to be 
representative of the Roman citizen body as a whole, and they expected unique benefits 
over and above those living elsewhere. It was they who directly participated in the political 
process during the Republican period, and they continued to benefit from their physical 
proximity to the institutions and personnel of government, including the emperor. The 
provision of certain social goods for the urban plebs was viewed as a right, and Augustus 
took care not only to preserve the benefits the population had received under Republican 
governance but extended them in his guise as Rome’s chief patron. Non democratic regimes 
often keep food and fuel prices artificially low through subsidies and price controls, and the 
 
104 Cass. Dio 55.24.8: vitis=ῥάβδος. 
105 Suet. Galb. 16; Tac. Hist. 1.5. 
106 Flaig (2015) 96-7. 
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cornerstone of the emperor’s patronage was the continued provision of the free grain dole 
(frumentaria), and oversight of the open market. Although there was no systematic 
organisation of the imperial food supply, most emperors took their role of overseer 
seriously, making structural improvements to the supply chain and annona system.107  
 
Like the military, the urban populace also received cash payments (congiaria). These were 
usually far less substantial than those given to the praetorians, and were not necessarily 
given to symbolise the transfer of power, but rather to mark special festivities such as the 
emperor’s birthday, a triumph or coming of age (tirocinium) of an imperial heir.108 Just as 
the largesse distributed to the soldiers was meant as recognition of their position, so too 
the congiarium: the cash gift had its antecedents in the allotments of oil – congius – 
distributed to the plebs by triumphatores in Republican days.109 Successive emperors 
followed the Augustan model of benevolence through the spatial and temporal expansion 
of leisure, regular congiaria, the provision of water and grain supplies, and extensive urban 
building programmes. For example, Vespasian’s undertakings for Rome’s residents faithfully 
followed Augustus’ template: diligent oversight of the grain supply, gifts, lavish games and 
entertainments funded from the emperor’s pocket, and the construction of civic buildings 
that linked the Flavians to the legitimacy and topography of the Julio-Claudian regime.110 In 
one anecdote Suetonius records that a mechanical engineer had invented a device that 
could transport heavy columns quickly and cheaply. Vespasian gave the man a considerable 
reward but refused to use the contraption, declaring that he must feed his people 
(plebiculam).111 His role as the city’s principal patron meant ensuring ongoing employment 
opportunities so that ordinary people could eat and enjoy the perks of being a resident in 
 
107 For example, Claudius promoted winter sailings for grain ships, and attracted traders by offering privileges 
(Suet. Claud. 18). Nero organised an Alexandrian fleet (Sen. Ep. 77.1). Trajan promoted state purchases which 
eased the annona (Plin. Pan. 29). See Garnsey (1988) 223, 233-235; Rickman (1981) 77-78, 85-6. 
108 Tacitus and Suetonius both note the distinction between the donativum and the congiarium (Tac. Ann. 
12.41: ‘donativum militi, congiarium plebei;’ Suet. Ner. 7: ‘...populo congiarum, militi donativum’). By the 
second century the term congiarium was replaced by the term liberalitas. Claudius gave the people 300 
sesterces in 44CE and 51CE in comparison to the 15,000 he promised the Guard on his accession. This sum 
appears to have become the custom. Nonetheless, 300 sesterces at the time could buy 4 amphorae (275 litres) 
of wine, 600 one-pound loaves of bread, or 70 bushels (560 litres) of corn: no doubt extremely welcome for 
many ordinary city dwellers. Bennett (1997) 60. 
109 Bennett (1997)  60-2. 
110 There has been much discussion regarding Vespasian’s deliberate attempts to link his regime with that of 
the Julio-Claudians. See Boyle (2003).  
111 Suet. Vesp. 18. 
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the capital. Of all the benefits of urban residence, the provisions of lavish shows and 
spectacles was perhaps the most important. Each emperor was expected to put on 
gladiatorial fights, hunts, theatrical performances and chariot racing to such an extent that 
the festival calendar ballooned from 77 days under Augustus to nearly 160 days under 
Claudius.112 One of Marcus Aurelius’ advisors, Marcus Cornelius Fronto, reminded his 
emperor of the centrality of the shows, employing Trajan as an exemplum: 
 
The emperor did not neglect even actors and the other performers of the stage, 
circus, or the amphitheatre, knowing as he did that the Roman people are held fast 
by two things above all, the corn dole and the shows; that the success of a 
government depends on such amusements as much as more serious things; neglect 
of serious matters entails the greater loss, neglect of amusements the greater 
discontent; food largesse is a weaker incentive than shows; by largesses of food only 
the proletariat on the corn register are conciliated singly and individually, whereas 
by the shows the whole population is key in good humour.113 
 
Providing regular, generous spectacles was, therefore, the primary socio-economic 
showpiece of the emperor-urban plebs relationship, and was fundamentally, a transactional 
bid for legitimacy. The formation of an imperial cult and its incorporation in public 
ceremony could similarly be viewed as a common cultural construct that formed part of the 
performative, reciprocal moral contract between emperor and subject that was grounded 
firmly in the context of participant’s horizons of expectation.114  As the games and festivals 
simultaneously invoked religious, political, and social tradition, they were tangible offerings 





112 The packed festival calendar was a persistent problem, and periodic purges were required under Caligula, 
Claudius and Domitian. Due to spiralling imperial expenses, Marcus Aurelius sponsored legislation in 177CE to 
control expenditure on games and reduced the number of festival days to 135: CIL 2.6278=ILS 5163; Futrell 
(2006) 48. 
113 Fronto Ep. 2.217. 
114 Gordon (2011) 41. I envisage the imperial cult here as the practice of worshipping an emperor without 
implying there was a unified cultic practice. 
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(i) Contention and the imperial moral economy 
Certainly, the expansive measures that emperors took to satisfy urban soldiers and civilians 
demonstrate that maintaining legitimacy required constant output, and a multifaceted claim 
was almost wholly dependent on the fulfilment of certain value expectations. Of course, the 
idea that common goods should be distributed from ‘above,’ was part of a long established 
electoral tradition of providing free gifts to potential voters, and the euergetism of 
Hellenistic elites and monarchs. Plutarch observed that ‘rulers serve god for the care and 
preservation of men in order that, of the excellent gifts which god bestows on mankind, 
they may distribute some and safeguard others.’115 This obligation was also covered to 
some extent by pietas, which covered an emperor’s fulfillment of the duties owed not just 
to the gods, but to anyone, including one’s subjects. Pietas was of central importance to 
Romans and had long been recognised as a powerful tool in rendering actions as morally 
legitimate.116 Emperors who claimed the title of pater patriae were explicitly representing 
themselves as a familial entity providing for the best interests of his subjects. Macro politics 
mirrored micro politics, and while the emperor was obligated to provide for his ‘family’, the 
bonds of interdependence that were part of the obligations of pietas meant that his 
‘children’ had reciprocal obligations to obey and support his power and position.   
 
How the obligations and expectations embedded in the shared virtue of pietas operated in 
practical terms can be explained using the concept of ‘moral economy.’ A theory developed 
by E.P Thompson, James Scott, Eric Wolf, and Scott Migdal among others as a way to explain 
collective behaviour in peasant economies, moral economy literature has evolved over the 
past few decades to incorporate exchange relationships and behaviour not necessarily 
limited to market economics.117 Although Thompson’s original model posited moral 
economy as the ‘popular consensus as to what were legitimate and illegitimate 
practices’ with regards to food access, as Norbert Götz  points out, the restricted historical 
context and meaning of moral economy in Thompson’s usage is not inherent in a term 
joining two concepts as general as ‘moral’ and ‘economy.’ 118 A broader conception, where 
 
115 Plut. ad Princ. 3. 
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the semantic weight shifts from the noun (economy) to the adjective (moral) has been 
promoted in recent years. Didier Fassin argues it is the ‘production, distribution, circulation 
and use of moral sentiments, emotions and values, norms and obligations in social space’ 
that are the main constituents of moral economy.119 In a similar light, Thomas Arnold 
refocuses the concept in light of the constitutive, communal, and nested properties of social 
goods, that is, the objects and qualities whose ‘possession or consumption confers some 
kind of benefit and satisfies human needs and wants and therefore are symbols of collective 
culture.’120  
 
Given their nature and meaningfulness, social goods are sources for shared notions of 
legitimacy, and any threat or attack on those social goods undermines the acceptability of a 
government. People in response could frame collective action as a legitimate defence of 
communal goods that made up one end of the reciprocal relationship with the emperor.121 
Therefore, on a wider level, moral economy encompasses the notion that the 
commonwealth should be justly distributed, a notion that is ‘embedded within the wider 
social environment and institutions and is therefore deeply coloured by non-economic 
considerations.’122 In this vein, I will term the relationship between the urban plebs and 
emperor that revolved around the obligations of pietas, that is, access to social goods and 
the reciprocal performance of universal consensus as the ‘imperial moral economy.’  
 
This set of obligations and expectations was fundamental in terms of legitimacy and political 
interaction. For example, while imperial regimes could broadly rely on diffuse support, they 
also needed to cultivate specific support, that is, support derived from performance and 
outputs by the emperor and his administration. Although diffuse support tends to be more 
durable and stable because it is derived from deep seated cultural norms, specific support is 
contingent on shared evaluations of government performance and is prone to short term 
fluctuations in response to political, social and economic factors.123 Hence, if specific 
support fell, so too did the perceived legitimacy of a regime. In von Soest and Grauvogel’s 
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conception, the more pronounced the legitimation process, the more likely it will 
strengthen collective identities, elite cohesion, and overall feelings of community and 
solidarity. Although economic exchange occurred (and indeed became an expectation), 
citizens could not live on congiaria, beneficia and frumentationes alone. Through the 
emperor’s provision of a catalogue of social goods, Roman collective identity was performed 
and reaffirmed, a process that affected how, why, and where actors made claims against 
the imperial regime.   
 
The imperial moral economy reinforced the privileged position of Rome’s population in the 
empire’s hierarchy, and the attached set of obligations and expectations barely changed 
from Augustus to the time of Marcus Aurelius. By fulfilling these expectations, an emperor 
could make a multifaceted claim that drew upon Roman conceptions of foundational myth, 
ideology, performance, and personalism. An emperor who neglected Rome’s moral 
economy weakened the contract and the reciprocal nature of the relationship meant that 
the plebs’ end of the bargain – a conferral of consensus, and thus regime legitimation – 
could potentially be withdrawn. Successfully maintaining legitimacy claims, on the other 
hand, not only enabled successive imperial regimes to maintain their entitlement to rule, 
especially under pressure, but it also shaped how they were able to implement their rule.124 
The benefits embedded within the imperial moral economy drastically altered political 
opportunity structures by reducing the multiplicity of potential rivals for power, and closing 
down avenues for new political actors to make claims except at the times and places 
dictated by the emperor. It was by shutting down previous openings and meeting the social 
and material obligations of a great ‘king’ that Augustus could claim that he had consensus 
universorum for his personal rule.   
 
The compact between the Praetorian Guard and the emperor took a similar shape. Their 
conferral of legitimacy was the most important, and in terms of cash outlay, it was 
expensive to maintain. Kenneth Harl estimates that while Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus 
bestowed 30 million denarii on at least 150,000 urban plebeians and 43.5 million on their 29 
legions, they spent 76.6 million denarii on the praetorian and urban cohorts. In total, the 
 
124 von Soest and Grauvogel (2017) 289; von Soest and Grauvogel (2015) 2. 
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two emperors spent 150 million denarii on donatives, consuming 29% of the treasury left by 
Antoninus Pius, a figure that did not include games and war expenses.125 Although 
expensive, lavish donativa, and a constant supply of benefits sufficed for the Guard in 
contrast to the matrix of social goods demanded by the populace. In short, the reciprocal 
exchanges of the imperial moral economy ensured consensus and a sense of harmony and 
goodwill (eunoia), which constrained transgressive contention. Plutarch, Dio Chrysostem, 
Herodian, Philostratus and the author of Ps.-Aelius Aristides’ Eis Basilea all emphasised that 
cultivating eunoia was an essential defining characteristic of Hellenistic kingship, a reflection 
of both Isocratean tradition and Augustan ideology.126 In Herodian’s narrative, Marcus 
Aurelius praises the eunoia of his subjects as the true foundation of imperial power, warning 
that ‘bodyguards are not enough protection for a ruler unless he has the goodwill of his 
subjects,’ and ‘people who are bound to their emperor through eunoia will not rebel unless 
driven to by ‘violent, arrogant treatment.’127 The words of the former emperor, even if 
apocryphal, confirm what sociologists and historians have found time and again across 
different times and cultures: a coercive regime type enjoys little popular legitimacy. Consent 
once earned was durable but to a point. Due to Rome’s long history of public claim-making, 
conceptions of legitimacy and consensus were attached to the public, ritualised 
communication between emperor and plebs. This meant that when grievances emerged, or 
when Rome’s political actors wished to communicate with their emperor, they were 
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From consensus to subversion: contentious practices in the early imperial 
period 
 
(i) Imperial repertoires and consensus  
Roman contentious performances were sensitive not only to learning and innovation during 
times of political crisis, but also to the history, culture, and transformation of Rome’s 
regimes. Just as imperial legitimacy claims were predicated in part on a sense of continuity 
with the past, how, where and when actors performed contentious politics from the late 
second century CE onwards owed much to the city’s long history of collective political 
participation.  
Republican political culture has been described as one of spectacle with key urban spaces 
acting as theatres of power.128 Open air assemblies, funerals, triumphs, festivals, trials and 
lawsuits, and electioneering activities were an amalgamation of religious ceremonial, public 
performance and displays of power and social stratification, resulting in a visual spectacle of 
both communal and individual performance in what Keith Hopkins describes as a ‘stately 
and protracted dance.’129 Approval or disapproval was communicated via a show of hands, 
shouting, or proffered suggestions. As Cicero observed, ‘[resolutions] are not based upon 
considered votes or affidavits nor safeguarded by an oath, but produced by a show of hands 
and the undisciplined shouting of an inflamed mob.’130 
 
Mass verbal participation was, therefore, a recognisable performative template, and 
contentious performances and repertoires closely mirrored the form of institutional politics, 
reimagining traditional concepts of political communication. The politics of imperial Rome 
was far different from that of the Republic, but previous interactions and repertoires 
supplied much of the concrete means by which emperor and citizens engaged in 
contentious politics.131 To be sure, the conception of the Republic as an almost mythical 
period of democratic government was arguably a creation of the imperial period, and 
Augustus and his successors employed Republican ideals and rituals in their design and 
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justification of their own regime styles.132 It is no wonder then that many of the same 
routines that made up Republican politics were retained, recycled and redeployed in the 
imperial period. Imperial repertoires can be grouped into four main categories: physical 
contention (riots and demonstrations); written contention (including graffiti, the circulation 
of libels and the defacing, destruction or erection of statues); verbal contention and 
demonstrations at the spectacles, and popular justice rituals. Some were simply a 
continuation of Republican patterns like the food riot and the circulation of written 
contention. Others like the shouting of acclamations at the theatre, lethal popular justice 
rituals, and the delivery of demands and petitions to the emperor were adaptations or 
innovative re-fashionings of old, established repertoires. These changes as we would expect 
reflected regime change, and the preference for new political spaces that encouraged some 
actions, discouraged others and allowed people the opportunity to modernise known 
scripts.133  
 
It was Cicero who famously remarked that there were three places in which the opinion and 
inclination of the Roman people could be truly determined: the contiones, comitia, and the 
games.134 Each location could hold large crowds meaning that scale and intensity of feeling 
could be measured on a visual and aural level. The continued centrality of large public 
spaces for mass audiences, and the physical and verbal forms of contention that lent 
themselves so well to the emotive atmosphere of community events – if not voting, then 
the shows – meant that we can see strands of Republican contention threaded through later 
contentious episodes. Civic spaces had long been political and were locations intended for 
mass audiences and active participation; how people made claims would continue to be 
shaped by such spatial routines and memories. For example, during the Republican era, the 
theatres were inherently political spaces. Audiences would make their feelings known 
directly to the politicians present who used the theatre themselves as a sounding board. 
Cicero claimed that for politicians who were guided by popular opinion and rumour, 
applause at the theatre seemed like immortality and hissing, death.135 With the effective 
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suppression of the assemblies as a space for dialogue between the populace and 
government, theatres, circuses and amphitheatres became the city’s principal sites for 
contention. Alongside the spectacles, traditional religious festivals and imperial ceremonies 
such as the triumph and the adventus/profectio processions also became central 
components of the performative side of imperial regimes. 136 
 
When contention occurred at these spaces, it received the regime’s attention. The Roman 
games not only had the potential to reach a far larger percentage of the population than 
their modern day equivalent, the packed festival calendar also meant that there were many 
opportunities for interaction; Paul Veyne estimates that emperors in the first century CE 
spent about a fifth of their time at the theatre, circus or amphitheatre.137 Of the city’s 
spectacle spaces, the Circus Maximus was the largest man-made structure in the Empire. 
Juvenal once complained that ‘all Rome today is in the Circus,’ and no other building could 
accommodate an audience on such a scale, which could be as high as 25% of Rome’s free 
population on any given race day.138  To put these percentages into perspective, soccer 
teams in the English Premier League played 19 home matches in the 2016/2017 season. Of 
all the London teams combined, the total average audience for one day’s match was 
214,967 people, which equates to 2.44% of London’s population. Manchester’s two premier 
teams hosted an average of 129,309 people per home fixture, which if we divide by the 
population of Manchester proper is a figure of 25.26%. If we take the population of the 
larger urban area into account, daily attendance only equates to 5.07% of the population.139 
The reach of the Roman games was thus demonstrably greater than their modern 
equivalents, and the spatial and social routines attached to the Circus had a high saturation 
level amongst the urban populace. Such scale also made the Circus a showpiece of tradition 
 
136 For the increase in frequency and splendour of Augustan games: Suet. Aug. 43. Augustus’ revival of 
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and power: as Pliny observed, it was a ‘fitting place for a nation that has conquered the 
world.’140  
 
The vast scale and frequency of imperial spectacles allowed audiences to visually and 
emotionally picture themselves as ‘the people,’ a conceptualisation that depended in part 
on collective memories of popular sovereignty. It also promoted the public performance of 
mass politics, which in turn encompassed the conventional sub areas of political behaviour 
and public opinion.141 What this meant was that these time-spaces, although under the 
nominal control of the emperor, could embrace multiple political views and claims. 
The expression of such views and claims was primarily informal and verbal in nature, a 
repertoire that included acclamations, singing, rhythmic applause, and direct 
communication with the emperor. Acclamations ranged in complexity from simple clapping 
or shouted words, to more elaborate titles or phrases that could be chanted or sung. 
However, a recognisable repertoire of rhythms and stock phrases made it relatively simple 
for a large number of people to deliver the same message together like modern day soccer 
chants.142 Like requests and petitions, imperial acclamations often constituted one side of a 
two way discussion, a call-and-response pattern that had its roots in Republican practices of 
flagitatio and convicium. 
 
 As an arena for political negotiation, demands, requests, and petitions were regularly 
conveyed to the emperor by audience members. Josephus describes how the urban plebs 
would come ‘with great alacrity into the [Circus]… and petition their Emperors in great 
multitudes, for what they needed. Who usually did not think fit to deny them their requests: 
but readily and gratefully granted them.’143 Many of these requests were seemingly trivial in 
nature; a demand for the manumission of gladiator or actor, the restoration of a previously 
expelled senator, the return of a well-liked statue, or a request for a man eating lion to be 
brought to the games. However, demands were made for more serious matters like the 
execution of criminals or gladiators or calls to fix grain prices or tax issues. Sometimes, a 
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crowd would call for the execution of a prominent official; in 68CE, a theatre crowd 
demanded that Galba punish Nero’s hated prefect Tigellinus. Similar demands were made 
to punish Sabinus and Atticus under Vitellius, and a theatre crowd called for the pardon of 
Augustus’ daughter Julia.144 These requests were expected to be met, and communication 
was meant to be direct: the use of heralds were frowned upon as was calling for silence 
since both did little to bolster the projection of the emperor’s civilitas.145 Tiberius allegedly 
stopped going to the shows to avoid being compelled to submit to audience demands, and 
Hadrian felt obliged to circulate an explanation around the Circus on a placard as to why he 
could not meet the crowd’s demand to manumit a charioteer.146 
 
From the imperial side of the equation, emperors could use the spectacle spaces to 
advertise their imperial munificence. Lavish shows, lotteries, prizes, and exhibitions 
proclaimed the greatness of  Rome, and its emperor, but occasionally emperors refused 
entirely to play along.147 Caligula opposed ‘absolutely everything’ demanded of him at the 
spectacles and even took to arresting spectators who refused to applaud for his favourite 
actors. There were ramifications for not keeping the regime’s side of the bargain, however. 
Galba’s refusal to accede to audience demands to punish Tigellinus led to an outbreak of 
rioting in the city’s theatres, circuses, streets and fora quelled only by Otho’s fulfillment of 
the original demand.148 Galba, Tiberius, and Caligula all lost popular support, and Galba and 
Caligula had to deal with theatre demonstrations, rioting and public expressions of 
disapproval at the shows partly because they did not address collective demands for 
redress.  If the emperor did not fulfil his role as benefactor and recipient of popular 
petitions, then he was not fulfilling the moral contract that underpinned his legitimacy and 
contention often arose as a result. 
 
144 Manumission of charioteers: Cass. Dio 57.11.6. Gladiators: Mart. Spect. 29.3; Gell. NA 5.14.1. Crowd 
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Plut. Galb. 17.2-4. Grain supply: Suet. Aug. 41; Tac. Ann. 2.87, 12.43. Tax issues under Nero: Tac. Ann. 13.50. 
Executions/pardons: Tac. Hist. 3.74;  Plut. Galb. 17.2-4. Exchanges between the audience and emperor: Suet. 
Tit. 8, Dom. 4; Trajan: Cass. Dio 68.7.3; Hadrian: Cass. Dio 69.6.1. Demand for statue to be returned from 
Tiberius’ private apartments back to the public baths where it originally stood: Plin. HN 34.19. 
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Verbal contention was not just restricted to spectacle spaces. Acclamations were often 
shouted as the emperor passed through streets or at imperial ceremonies like the adventus. 
Pliny described how parents would teach their children acclamation formulas as they waited 
to view the emperor.149 The Senate and praetorians also used the form as a legitimising 
ritual. The form of some chants and acclamations, however, were specific to the city itself. 
When Nero compelled some rustic Italians to praise his theatre performance at sword point, 
their ignorance of acclamation formulas and rhythmic clapping disrupted the applause of 
the rest of the audience.150 While some chants and rhythms were rehearsed and official 
(Nero’s claquers even had specific applause types),151 verbal contention was often a by-
product of collective identity. Inscriptions from the public auditoria at Aphrodisias suggests 
that blocks of spectacle seating could be assigned or taken by collegia: neighbours, fellow 
cult or trade members would chant and applaud together.152 True control of the crowd by 
the authorities was thus a pipe dream, as the shouts of such groups were not restricted to 
the official script, but were also expressions of popular culture and identity that were part 
of the city’s hidden transcripts. 
 
Each shouted petition or acclamation was both an enactment of the ability of the urban 
plebs to legitimise an emperor, and their own views of the world, just as soldiers acclaimed 
their choice of imperator, and the Senate passed decrees conferring imperial powers as 
their own consensus rituals. The imperial moral economy set levels of expectation and 
entitlement that helped shape contentious repertoires. As residents received social goods 
because of their spatial proximity to the fount of imperial power, they reciprocated through 
ritual displays of consensus that publicly reinforced regime legitimacy. However, it is clear 
that political contention was hardly ever a black and white scenario. Consent rituals 
channelled contention into a controlled format, but the licentia afforded to the shows 
permitted an element of behaviour that would not be tolerated elsewhere. If we accept the 
fulminations of Tertullian, Augustine or Cassiodorus, Roman crowds would act in a far worse 
manner at the games than they would in everyday life, which meant that these time-spaces 
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were potential moments of vulnerability for the political order, and could be used as 
symbolic resources of collective action for would be challengers.153 The spectacle verbal 
repertoire was thus strong but flexible since it could be used to demonstrate either support 
for or resistance to the imperial regime, and as one of the only available outlets for mass 
collective expression, emperors usually tolerated the vast majority of contention, lest 
grievances were expressed in more threatening ways or spaces. When contention was a 
deliberate act of conflict, however, those who engaged in such collective action were likely 
to try and manipulate, defend or subvert the spaces that contained symbolic meaning for 
them or those they were contending against. In other words, the same places and forms of 
collective claim-making used in permitted or tolerated contention were also used to 
transmit more transgressive claims.  
 
(ii) Rome and her ‘hidden transcripts’ 
The spectacles were the central element in the web of communication, which instantiated 
the position of the emperor in the body politic.154 The subversion of this time-space, 
therefore, not only threatened the high politics of the imperial court and Senate but 
political and social order as a whole. James Scott argues that domination can only be 
sustained by continuous reinforcement, maintenance and adjustment. The spectacle rituals 
of consensus were a part of that reinforcement and maintenance and comprised what Scott 
calls the ‘public transcript:’ the conventional and ritualised public interaction between ruler 
and ruled.155  
 
There was another side to the open and stylised forms of dialogue practiced at the shows 
and imperial ceremonies. If subordinate discourse in the presence of power holders was a 
public transcript, then discourse that took place away from direct observation of the regime 
was a ‘hidden transcript.’ These transcripts employed many of the same speech patterns, 
gestures and practices utilised in the public domain, but were instead used to subvert, 
contradict and deny the dominant discourse.156 Hidden transcripts primarily reflected lived 
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reality and non-elite collective identities. If we define collective identity as an individual’s 
connection with a broader community, and perception of a shared status or relation, 
understanding how such identities were formed and reinforced separate from the dominant 
discourse will provide a better understanding of how and when the urban population 
mobilised to make contentious claims, in what manner, and why.157 Coming together for 
games and festivities was an obvious way for Romans to assert a collective voice. Although 
the built environment influenced how Rome’s communities interacted with each other and 
positioned themselves as members (or non-members) of the polity, those same spaces were 
still subject to local conflicts over ownership, meaning, and use that at times clashed with 
ideologies imposed from above. Spaces within the temporal confines of festivals were 
explicitly sites under the emperor’s direct control, but as Ngugi wa Thiong’o observes, ‘the 
more open the performance space, the more it seems to terrify those in possession of 
repressive power.’158 Enormous crowds meant personal risk was lowered for individuals 
within an audience, and any potential transgressive contention would be witnessed by 
many, spreading a message of resistance quickly throughout the city. 
 
Rome’s authorities also had to consider how festivals and spectacles acted as ‘free spaces’ 
for the population. Sara Evans and Harry Boyte define free spaces as spatial and temporal 
havens that typically take the form of a wide range of associations such as public rituals, 
taverns, clubs, cooperatives, and communes that serve to foster deep and assertive group 
identities.159 Charles Tilly, however, offers a broader definition: 
 
[Free spaces are] geographic areas where contentious claim making gains protection 
from routine surveillance and repression because of terrain, built environment, or 
legal status, […] segregated institutions in which legal privilege, organizational 
structure, social composition, or governmental neglect permits otherwise forbidden 
conversation and action, […] public occasions on which authorities tolerate or even 
encourage large, extraordinary assemblies in selected sites, thus providing 
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opportunities for both airing of generally forbidden claims and access to large 
audiences for those claims.160 
 
Significantly, Tilly’s parameters include not only small, local sites of popular culture but 
crucially, large scale public occasions. Considering the high frequency of festivals and 
spectacles, most of which drew large crowds, Rome was host to a wide variety of free 
spaces despite the inherent element of surveillance and control at these spaces.  
Hayagreeva Rao and Sunasir Dutta suggest that large gatherings and processions are liminal 
spaces that heighten emotions and allow the ‘communication of voices and meanings that 
challenge existing interpretations of hierarchy, justice and convention, enabling people to 
undertake collective action.’161 The carnivalesque nature of many of Rome’s religious 
festivals temporarily permitted acts of sanctioned deviance, and provided multiple time-
spaces where dominant authority structures could be challenged, and political opportunities 
recognised.  Aside from the emotional pull of a large crowd, the intrinsic structure of the 
rituals associated with spectacle space threatened social order by removing audience 
members from their ordinary spatial routines, and by temporarily rendering power relations 
transparent, therefore making the maintenance of social structure reliant on collective 
action.162 Also, given that the performative aspect of the moral contract between emperor 
and plebs was one of face to face communication: when the pulvinar or imperial box was 
empty, spectacle spaces could operate more as free spaces than sites of power. 
 
 It is no coincidence then, that when Romans took advantage of public free spaces, they 
made use of the same rituals and repertoires used to make demands upon the regime. 
Audiences demonstrated their hostility to Caligula by deliberately refusing to applaud for his 
favoured performers, instead cheering for those he disliked. They also walked out of the 
theatres in protest of the emperor’s delatores.163 Vitellius used force against circus fans 
whom he believed deliberately insulted the Blues faction in contempt of himself and in 
anticipation of a change of rulers.164 Claudius had to issue an edict reprimanding theatre 
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crowds who shouted insults at the consul P. Pomponius Secundus and other members of 
the elite.165 Galba was mocked by a theatre audience who finished singing the chorus from 
an Atellan farce about a stingy old man, presumably meaning the emperor.166 In these 
cases, as with audiences who presented demands, an emperor had two choices. He could 
tolerate dissent, or he could repress it. Caligula and Vitellius both chose the latter, but it 
proved costly in terms of public opinion.   
 
The culture and mass crowds associated with the spectacles provided free space for the 
airing of transgressive claims, but not all claims were made in such a theatrical manner. The 
existence of less dramatic contentious performances demonstrates that we should 
understand political contention as a continuum between public confrontations and hidden 
subversion, since transcripts of resistance were part of everyday social life and routines.167 
As the definitions by Evans, Boyte and Tilly have outlined, the free spaces created in local 
community spaces allowed people in the course of their daily routines to discuss 
information that was relevant to them, and this information, for the most part, was unable 
to be manipulated or controlled from above. Scott contends that ‘if the social location par 
excellence of the public transcript is the public assemblies of subordinates summoned by 
elites, then the social location par excellence for the hidden transcript lies in the 
unauthorised and unmonitored assemblies of subordinates.’168 It was within the social 
spaces where like-minded people gathered that social, political, and economic dialogue took 
place and where grievances could be safely aired. Rome’s bars, streets, crossroads and club 
meetings were information exchanges where ordinary people engaged in political debate.169 
Authorities had long been well aware of the link between the discourse that occurred within 
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these local networks and potential contention. Night meetings were considered the core of 
plebeian organisation in the early Republic, with coetus nocturnus allegedly banned by the 
Twelve Tables.170 Collegia were brought under the control of the Senate and emperor, and 
although sanctioned associations were given legal protection from the second century CE 
on, collegia illicita continued to exist, concerning authorities.171 Tiberius for instance, 
banned the sale of baked goods in taverns; Claudius went further, closing taverns where 
collegia met and banning the sale of meat and hot water. Nero reiterated the ban on meat, 
allowing only pulses and vegetables to be served.172 Trajan meanwhile turned down Pliny’s 
request for a fire fighting collegium in Nicomedia because, ‘we must remember that it is 
associations like these which have been responsible for the political disturbances in your 
province, particularly its towns. If people assemble for a common purpose, whatever name 
we give them and for whatever reason, they soon turn into a political club.’173 Each example 
demonstrates that emperors took steps to disrupt or at least assert control over local social 
networks and the free spaces in which they gathered. 
 
Certainly, the free spaces that the authorities worried about mainly hosted non-elite 
communities, and the sources identify these very groups engaging in transgressive collective 
action during the turmoil of the Late Republic and early imperial years. Trades, often highly 
specialised, made up a sizeable portion of the urban market economy, and their collegia and 
other localised social networks played a significant role in many people’s ordinary lives. 
Approximately 700 inscriptions from Rome and the existence of at least 500 types of 
association attest to their social importance, and just as collegia functioned as ready-made 
structures for political mobilisation in the Late Republic, there is no reason why they would 
not, given their ongoing prominence, continue to play a similar role in the second and third 
centuries.174 This assumption is strengthened by the recurrent references to artisans and 
shopkeepers (tabernarii, opifices, technites, cheirotechnai) participating in demonstrations 
and riots.175 Although shopkeepers, collegia members, neighbourhood groups, and artisans 
 
170 Twelve Tables 8.26; Nippel (1995) 28. 
171 Suet. Iul. 42.3; Aug. 32.1. After the deadly riots in Pompeii in 59CE, a lex de collegiis likely stipulated that all 
associations had to have senatorial/imperial authority to operate: CIL 4.2193=4416. 
172 Suet. Tib. 34, Cass. Dio 60.6.-7; Suet. Ner. 16; O’Neill (2001) 232. 
173 Plin. Ep. 10.34. 
174 Liu (2013) 353-354. 
175 E.g. Cic. Dom. 89, Mil. 91, Flac. 8; Asc. 33-34; Sall. Cat. 50; Cass. Dio 40.49.2-5; App. BC 2.22, 4.19. 
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cannot be viewed as a distinct class, these groups still shared identities generated and 
reinforced at the lower levels of the city landscape. Solidarities engendered through 
participation in voluntary associations like collegia, vici associations, sodalitates or 
apprenticeship networks are evidenced in no small part to how they described each other as 
amici subaediani (friends and construction workers), convivae marmorarii (mates and 
marble workers) and comestores (eating companions).176 Being part of a vicus with its 
shared social, religious, and economic spaces (since many lived where they worked) also 
meant that neighbourhood free spaces operated as firm cultural and political boundaries. 
The link between spatial proximity and identity has been observed in other urban 
environments; Roger Gould for instance demonstrated in his study of the Paris Commune 
that collective identities based around neighbourhood played a much more critical role in 
motivating people to collective action than class.177 Identity, then, was often a product of 
accumulated biographical and spatial experiences, which in turn facilitated place-based 
solidarities.178 
 
In terms of political contention, the close associations between local social networks, free 
spaces, and the creation and circulation of hidden transcripts meant that these groups 
possessed strong structures that could facilitate mobilisation. As Tilly notes, mobilised 
crowds ‘often consist not of living, breathing individuals but of groups, organisations, 
bundles of social relations and social sites such as occupations and neighbourhoods.’179 
Collegia and some vici associations, for example, had established hierarchies that provided 
leadership and organisational structure as an effective mechanism for mobilisation, and 
since many non-elite urbanites were integrated and organised in such separate but flexible 
communities, they were able to merge and support contention around common issues 
easily. As the research shows, the organisation of an episode of contention corresponds to 
the degree of pre-existing organisation, and the stronger and more cohesive the pre-existing 
organisation, the more coherent and successful mobilisation. The civic order offered by 
these associations also gave those who were elsewhere defined by inferiority and exclusion 
 
176 Toner (2015). 
177 Gould (1993), (1995); Nicholls (2009) 79. 
178 Gieryn (2000) 481. 
179 Tilly (2003) 32. 
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an alternative not tied to the public transcript. In other words, rather than being seen as a 
deliberate mirroring of elite hierarchies, local social networks should be seen as more 
independent and representative of hidden transcripts than official ideologies.180 
 
Imperial regimes also had to try to control more transient urban sub groups who acted as 
carriers of hidden transcripts and as mobilisers of contention.181 For example, pantomime 
actors were a prominent lightning rod for subversive undercurrents. As mimes did not speak 
on stage and were a relatively small social group, their ability to organise and lead 
contentious behaviour rested on their connections with larger groups. They were well 
organised with their own collegia, and attracted loyal partisans and factions that seem to 
have been organised by street and region that also included many equites and senators.182   
Pantomimes instigated at least three major theatre riots during Tiberius’ reign, and their 
ability to mobilise supporters and play a part in transgressive contention meant they were 
regularly expelled from the city, as were philosophers, astrologers, and magicians. The latter 
two groups were banned at least 8 (and perhaps up to 11) times between 139BCE and 
175CE, Ulpian claiming that they were so often targeted ‘because they practice[d] base arts 
against the public peace and the imperium of the Roman people.’183 
 
Circus factions were also a potential ‘stirrer of the masses.’ There were four factiones, but 
the Blues and Greens had the most ardent fan bases, including emperors.184 The ties 
between the imperial house and the circus factions (emperors funded their operations) 
meant that that the relationship between the populace and the emperor was perhaps most 
 
180 Verboven (2007). 
181 Scott (1992) 123: Scott argues that carriers of hidden transcripts are ‘likely to be as socially marginal as the 
places where they gather…Actors, acrobats, bards, jugglers, diviners, itinerant entertainers of all kinds might 
be said to have made their living in this fashion.’ 
182 Pantomime factions: Suet. Tib. 37.2, Ner. 16.2; Tac. Ann. 1.77, 13.25, 13.28. 
183 Mos. et Rom. legum. coll. 15.2.1-3. Tiberius expelled all pantomimes and faction leaders from the city in 
23CE claiming that they were ‘formenters of sedition against the state’ (Cass. Dio 57.21.3; Suet. Tib. 37.2; Tac. 
Ann. 4.14). Caligula allowed the pantomimes to return fourteen years later, but fighting between their factions 
in 56CE led Nero to expel them once more, and restrictive measures were taken against them by both 
Domitian and Trajan (Tac. Ann. 13.25, 14.21; Suet. Ner. 16, Dom. 7). For expulsions of astrologers and 
magicians, see Ripat (2011). 
184 According to Tertullian, there were originally just two factions, White and Red, but later expanded to four 
(De spect. 9). Domitian created two further factions, the Purples and Golds, but these disappeared after his 
death. Vitellius and Caracalla both supported the Blues while Caligula, Nero, Domitian, Verus, Commodus, and 
Elagabalus were all fans of the Greens. Unsurprisingly, Marcus Aurelius notes in his Meditations (1.5) that he 
was a partisan of neither. 
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intimate and politically loaded at the Circus than at Rome’s other spectacle spaces. That is 
not to say that the circus factions themselves were as potentially subversive as other 
popular figures or networks. Alan Cameron convincingly argued in his 1976 study on the 
circus factions of Rome and Byzantium that the factiones were first and foremost sporting 
bodies rather than political cheerleaders, and rivalry (including rare outbursts of violence) 
between supporters was usually a non-political issue.185 As Nero found out, deploying a 
5,000 strong squad of young equestrians as claquers only elicited a reluctant participation 
from the rest of the audience.186 A group may lead a chant, but at a venue as vast as the 
Circus Maximus, any mass chants or protests needed buy in from a sizeable number of 
people, not just those paid to do it. As self-selecting groups, popular figures all courted 
celebrity to some extent, since fame brought a clientele. Customers and factions could 
become powerful mobilising groups, especially when bound together through shared 
outlook and identities. The more their leading figures were subject to repression, the more 
they could publicly embody anti-authoritarian attitudes. An emperor had little to worry 
about in terms of contained contention that featured previously established actors 
employing culturally embedded claim-making methods. But issues and grievances framed 
and circulated in private, and then publicly articulated by those who had independent social 
influence represented infrapolitics that could directly challenge a regime and its public 
transcript.  
 
The centrality of social networks, leadership, and hidden transcripts in the performance of 
Roman contentious politics should not, therefore, be underestimated. None of these 
structures or processes were a uniquely Roman phenomenon; the role of trade guilds and 
other more informal associations of artisans and shopkeepers figure prominently in 
contentious urban politics across a wide variety of cultures and times.187 What we do not 
have in the later source evidence (in contrast to the Republican material) is specific 
 
185 Cameron (1976). 
186 Tac. Hist. 1.72; Suet. Ner. 20.3; Cass. Dio 62.20.3-5. 
187 For example, the involvement of trade networks and their constituents in protest, violent or otherwise, are 
found in the formative years of the French Revolution and the sans-culottes: Skocpol and Kestnbaum (1990) 
14-27; protests in modern-day Turkey: Gemici (2003); political agitation in Italian city-states during the twelve 
and thirteenth centuries CE: Tarrow (2004); urban collective action in Victorian and Edwardian England: 
Hosgood (1992); the Stamp Act riots in eighteenth-century CE Boston: Morgan and Morgan (1995) 128; and 
anti-elite, anti-state agent rioting in fourteenth century CE China: Rowe (2003) 318.  
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descriptions of the sub groups that made up claimants.188 Both Dio and Herodian use 
generic descriptors like demos, plethos, and occasionally the more pejorative ochlos to 
describe popular participation in collective action; terms that should be taken as a reflection 
of the writer’s moral or social stance rather than as an explicit identifier.189 It is therefore 
difficult to state with certainty who was involved in the majority of contentious incidents in 
the second and third centuries. Yet, if we take into consideration the long history of popular 
sub groups in politics, and authorities’ ongoing attempts to control their spaces and 
structures, we can infer the same or similar building blocks were the conduits through which 
mass mobilisation could occur. Any continuity or lack thereof with performances in later 
years provides important context and clues as to who participated and why, in the absence 
of detailed information. 
 
(iii) Subversion in practice: Roman popular justice, and violent contentious 
repertoires 
The ability of ordinary Romans to reaffirm collective identities in their free spaces, local 
social networks, and through the circulation of hidden transcripts enabled them to mark out 
political identities and opinions that were separate from the dominant discourse. The 
importance of these spaces and forms of contention and communication lay in their 
mobilising abilities. Free spaces created and nurtured shared beliefs that could strengthen 
and organise a community response in the face of crisis or uncertainty, and these beliefs 
could shape public dialogue. As Scott explains, ‘off stage’ discursive practices ‘continually 
press against the limit of what is permitted on stage, much as a body of water might press 
against a dam.’190 Much of what was discussed ‘off stage’ was framed according to lived 
experience. The discourse of justice in particular was a product of subordinate communities 
who created their own codes, myths, heroes, villains and social standards separate from the 
public transcript, and was also reflective of framing processes within those communities. 
 
 
188 In contrast, there is a long list of describers for non-elite participants in Republican politics including: plebs, 
multitudo, populus Romanus, equites, hippeis, ochlos, plethos, demos, politai, homilos, polloi, libertinorum et 
servorum manus, gladiatores, fugitivii, cives imperiti, cheirotechnai, falcarii, tabernarii, opifices, servitia, xenoi, 
monomachoi, therapontes, improbi, homines, milites, stratiotai, hopla, liberi, servi, egentes, tota Italia and 
omnes ordines. Earley (2009) 24. 
189 This is also the conclusion of Yavetz (1969) 7.  
190 Scott (1992) 196. 
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The idea of justice was relatively flexible in the Roman context in part because of its social 
structure that allowed for different modes of interpretation and definition depending on a 
person’s social position. Where the concept of justice (iustitia) was solid was in the 
standards of an emperor’s conduct. Unsurprisingly, this concept was connected to an 
emperor’s expected pietas: when Seneca urged Nero to rule as pater patriae in accordance 
with a policy of clementia and iustitia, he was urging his protégé to act as a Stoic ‘good 
king.’191 In a similar manner, Marcus Aurelius deemed justice to be the virtue ‘upon which 
all others depend.’192 In terms of Roman autocracy, the ideal that a ‘good’ emperor should 
submit to the laws that he was technically freed from was a central premise for many 
thinkers of the time. Dio Chrysostom posed the question; ‘for whom is a sense of justice 
more important than for the one who is above the laws?’193 Septimius Severus 
acknowledged the centrality of this concept for his subjects, publicly declaring that 
‘although we are not bound by the laws, nevertheless we live in accordance with them.’194  
 
The enduring appeal of justice as an imperial virtue was thus tied to an emperor’s 
performance claim, which by extension applied to the obligations laid out in the city’s moral 
economy. Given this cultural intertwining of legitimacy, obligation, and justice, it is 
understandable to see why so many examples of hidden transcripts performed publicly as 
transgressive contention revolved around ordinary people’s conceptions of justice. Violent 
forms of popular justice were utilised far back in Republican days. Stone throwing 
(lapidatio), organised recitation of chants (flagitatio), and more serious acts like property 
destruction (occentare) and lynching were originally viewed as a citizen’s right to ‘self-help’ 
in executing the law or punishing those who transgressed against the community. While 
such acts were meant to be sub legal and exacted as a community rather than political 
ritual, the deliberate and targeted use of lapidatio, occentatio, and flagitatio by Publius 
Clodius Pulcher during the Late Republican era against his senatorial enemies weaponised 
the forms and dragged them into the political arena. Clodius’ ability to successfully evoke 
 
191 Buckley (2013)134. 
192 Noreña (2009)  272-3; Marc. Aur. Med. 11.10.4. See also 3.6.1, 5.12.2, 6.47.6, 50.1; 7.54, 7.63.1, 8.39, 
10.11.2, 11.1.5, 12.1.2– 4, 12.15; Aristid. Or. 35.8, 15, 17;  Pan. Lat. 3.21.4, 4.1.5, 6.6.1, 7.3.4, 11.19.2. 
193 Dio Chrys. Or. 3.10 (trans. Noreña). Justice is also invoked as a royal virtue at 1.45, 2.26, 2.54, 3.7, 3.32, 
4.24; Noreña (2009) 272-3. 
194 Birley (1999) 165 n.19.  
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injustice as a frame through popular justice rituals contributed significantly to the escalation 
of popular dissent during the 50s BCE, as each performance aggravated the ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ divide between each side, and boosted Clodius’ contrived identity as a popular 
leader. 
 
Non-violent forms of popular justice included the posting of written contention such as 
libelli or graffiti, and the chanting of verses, curses, and nicknames. Christer Bruun’s 
compiled list of 130 nicknames from the beginning of the Principate to the mid-third CE 
indicates that we are dealing with a significant phenomenon, even though non-literary 
sources contribute very little.195 The public reaction to Agrippina’s murder in 59CE, for 
example, included the circulation of libels, rumour, curses, and insults directed towards 
Nero; his statues were graffitied with ominous threats and, later, verses were spread 
regarding his role in the Great Fire. Suetonius notes that Nero was unusually tolerant of the 
vast amount of lampoons and verses posted on city walls or transmitted orally, although 
Vitellius was not so easy going.196 As Rome was liberally festooned with the statues of 
prominent men, the statues themselves often became the focal point for either symbolic 
protest or celebration, a tradition that also went back to the Republican era.197 The statuary 
of popular emperors and members of the imperial family could be applauded and 
garlanded. Unpopular figures would be graffitied or destroyed, like those of Nero’s wife 
Poppea at the same time as statues of Octavia were carried to the Forum and temples and 
garlanded with flowers by a cheering crowd.198  
 
On occasion, a collective quest for justice took on a far more independent, ritualised, and 
violent garb. Three significant episodes of popular justice occurred at the Gemonian Steps 
during the imperial period that reinforce how the symbolism of civic spaces could be 
contested, appropriated and subverted for claim-making purposes. In 20CE, while the 
Senate was deliberating the alleged crimes of Cn. Calpurnius Piso, a crowd shouting that 
 
195 Bruun (2003) 88. 
196 Suet. Ner. 39, 45, Vit. 14.4; Cass. Dio 62.16.1-22..  
197 Commemorative statues and altars were erected in the compita of M Marius Gratidianus in 85BCE: Cic. Off. 
3.80; Plin. HN 33.46, 34.2. Statues was also erected to honour T Seius: Plin. HN 18.4; likewise with the Gracchi: 
Plut. C. Gracch. 18.2. 
198 The crowd had heard reports that Nero was planning on bringing Octavia home from exile: Tac. Ann. 14.61. 
68.1, Ps-sen. Oct. v.669-689, 780-799. 
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‘they would take the law into their own hands,’ dragged Piso’s statues to the stairs and 
smashed them.199 In 31CE, a crowd anticipating the formal condemnation of Sejanus 
dragged his statues to the stairs and smashed them in view of the man himself.200 In 69CE, 
popular pressure forced Vitellius to hand over his urban prefect Flavius Sabinus to a crowd 
who killed and mutilated him and dragged his headless body to the stairs. Here, Tacitus 
explicitly notes that the plebs claimed that they had the right to kill Sabinus (ius caedis).201 
The emperor’s indecisiveness that left Rome exposed to the potential brutality of 
Vespasian’s troops was a breach of his moral contract with the plebs, who quickly turned 
against him.  A day later, Vitellius himself was dragged half naked from the imperial palace 
by forces loyal to Vespasian through a gauntlet of jeering plebs to the steps where his 
corpse was mutilated, dragged by a hook and thrown into the Tiber while soldiers paraded 
his head around the city.202 The Gemonian Steps, hook, and Tiber were all symbolic choices 
that aped official uses of each space and ritual. The administration used the steps for ritual 
punishment.203 Mutilation, exposure, use of a hook, and disposal via the Tiber also had 
overt links with traditional execution. By appropriating the forms and spaces used for 
official, civic punishment, participants legitimised the people’s right to exact justice on 
behalf of the community. In a closed, autocratic regime, this was a powerful form of 
contention against the regime. 
 
None of these contentious performances were legal, but they had ideological weight. The 
goal of each episode was to draw a crowd, elicit a strong emotional response, and implicitly 
legitimate the nature of the claim by aggravating the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide based on 
collective identities and methods of plebeian agitation and self-help from the early 
Republic.204 Given the divisiveness that could fester in the aftermath of competing justice 
frames, most examples of popular self-help were tolerated and even celebrated by regimes 
after the act. When tensions ran high after the death of Germanicus, the Senate officially 
congratulated the plebs for erecting statues in his honour; in the decree against Piso, the 
 
199 Tac. Ann. 3.14; see also Suet. Calig. 2. 
200 Cass. Dio 58.11.3-5; Juv. 10.58-67. 
201 Tac. Hist. 3.74. Tacitus claims it was ‘the lowest plebeians’ (sordida pars plebis) who demanded the 
punishment of Sabinus. 
202 Suet. Vit. 17; Cass. Dio 64.21.2–22.1; Tac. Hist. 3.85. 
203 See Barry (2008)  
204 Kelly (2103) 418. 
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plebs are congratulated for their threats to lynch Piso and for allowing themselves ‘to be 
controlled by our princeps.’205 Repression was the only other option, and against a mobilised 
urban populace, the risks were great. Thus, the foundation of the popular justice repertoire 
was intimately connected to and reinforced by the city’s hidden transcripts. The emperor 
may have controlled the public transcripts that provided the official markers that made up 
what it meant to be Roman, but the discourse of the city’s free spaces and social networks 
bound people together in shared experiences and environments that at times ran counter 
to sanctioned dialogues and identities. The execution of popular justice, circulation of 
written contention, creation of popular heroes and villains, and the public demonstrations 
and rioting that made up transgressive popular contention were all linked by the same set 
of expectations and obligations that defined and animated the relationship between the 
emperor and the urban population. That publicly communicated relationship provided 
parameters for the performance of the public transcript of legitimacy and consensus, and 
also provided the practices and methods for the city’s hidden transcripts. Together with 
political opportunity structures, these cultural constructs made up the nuts and bolts of 
contentious practices in Rome during the first two centuries of the imperial period.  
 
(iv) Public versus private: the spatial aspects of contentious politics 
The spatial makeup of urban Rome also had a vital impact on contentious behaviour. If we 
follow Edward Soja, we can pivot spatial thinking around three key ideas: (i) that we are all 
spatial, temporal and social beings: (ii) that space is socially produced and thus able to be 
changed socially; and (iii) that the spatial shapes the social as much as the social shapes the 
spatial.206 Transgressive contention, free space, subaltern social networks, and hidden 
transcripts were, therefore, all linked and shaped by the urban built environment. The 
availability of free spaces and the communication and relationships that existed within them 
increased the ease with which potential resistance could be formed, organised, and acted 
upon, while also providing a measure of cover against regime repression. Moreover, the 
product of these spaces and networks could affect how other, seemingly unrelated spaces 
would be perceived and used, since transgressive contention often disrupts existing spatial 
routines, and has a hand in reorganising or dramatising public space. So, when hidden 
 
205 s.c de Pisone lines 155-58, from Rowe (2002) 85. 
206 Soja (2008) 2. 
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transcripts emerged into public spaces, they often adopted or subverted official scripts, 
acquiring the symbolic significance of that space or spatial routine. The inherent power of a 
location endowed by routine political life could, then, be wrested away, or at least 
contested by claim-makers, demonstrating that a feedback loop existed between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ space, and hidden and official transcripts.207 Indeed, the contrast between the 
neighbourhood spaces of ordinary people, and the spaces inhabited by Rome’s other 
political actors was stark. The imperial palace complex on the Palatine, the fortified 
praetorian castra lying behind the city’s ancient agger, and the Curia all represented 
different scenarios of power, which meant they could potentially be viewed as contestable, 
contentious locations. In short, the symbolic geography and spatial patterns of Rome 
mattered in the practice of contentious politics. The built environment shaped meaningful 
itineraries for public displays of resistance. When spaces were deliberately used as 
emblematic monuments for the dramatisation of popular demands, each instance laid down 
new histories, altering the spatial routines, collective memories, and symbolic value of each 
location. As a consequence, although Romans had well-established contentious repertoires, 
a cycle of contention (which naturally includes an upswing of transgressive behaviour) 
modified the lived experience and the memories upon which future urbanites constructed 
their own identities. 
 
Conclusion: Roman contentious politics 
 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the theoretical concepts that underpin contentious 
politics and how those concepts could be applied to the Roman context. Fundamentally, 
contentious politics is the public component of the multifaceted relationships between 
political actors. In the course of participating or observing contention, people learn what 
interactions prove fruitful as well as the locally shared meaning of those interactions. When 
collective claim-making clumps together according to previous successes and cultural 
norms, performances become repertoires. Repertoires draw on the collective identities and 
social networks that make up everyday life. From these identities and social ties emerge 
both collective claims and the means for launching them. Changes in these localised 
 
207 Tilly (2000) 138-9. 
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identities and interactions combined with cumulative contentious experiences and regime 
intervention produce incremental changes in contentious performances.208  
 
Imperial Rome was by definition a ‘non democracy’ regardless of the parading of Republican 
ideologies by autocratic emperors. Relatively high regime capacities, restricted political 
access, and a small and usually stable elite made up the main components of the city’s 
political opportunity structures. Whether actors mobilised successfully for contentious 
purposes was dependent on the opening up or closure of these structures, and whether 
they mobilised at all was dependant not merely on grievances, but on how situations and 
issues could be framed as unjust and liable to change.209 The nature of imperial regimes 
carved out particular positions for the city’s main political actors. The emperor relied upon 
the Praetorian Guard for its repressive capacity, the co-operation of the Senate, and the 
acceptance of the vast numbers that made up the plebs urbana for his social and political 
legitimacy. In return, each group expected certain benefits that recognised their status. The 
social goods that made up the imperial moral economy held the parties together, and the 
people would participate in mass consensus rituals that mirrored old Republican political 
forms. Politics was thus a public, performative affair. However, because of the capacity of 
imperial regimes and restricted access to the institutional side of politics, the importance of 
hidden transcripts and free space in Roman contention should not be overlooked. For an 
opportunity or threat to be recognised, it must be visible to potential challengers and 
perceived as an opportunity. How an issue is framed away from the eyes of authorities 
becomes an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilisation of previously 
inactive or new political actors.210 Within those free spaces, local social networks who 
shared collective identities and lived experiences circulated their own unofficial information 
that combined with extant social structures to simplify and enable mass mobilisation around 
common issues. Roman contention, both contained and transgressive, depended on 
collective attribution developed through social constructs influenced by collective action 
frames generated and shared by local networks.211  Understanding these patterns and 
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mechanisms provides valuable insight into how a cycle of contention began to gain 
momentum after 180CE, as many of the structures, processes and performances discussed 
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Chapter 2: The beginning of a contentious cycle 
 
When Marcus Aurelius died in 180CE, Herodian tells us that the emperor was mourned by 
soldier and civilian alike, acclaimed as ‘Kind Father,’ ‘Noble Emperor,’ ‘Brave General,’ and 
‘Wise, Moderate Ruler.’ When his son Commodus was killed little over a decade later, 
people rushed to the altars and temples to give thanks, shouting ‘the tyrant is dead!’ ‘The 
gladiator is slain!’ and ‘other blasphemies more scurrilous.’212 The contrast between the 
seemingly spontaneous claims on behalf of father and son could not be more obvious. What 
motivated the change in public opinion was not entirely the fault of Commodus though. 
Exogenous factors combined with a marked shift in regime policy offered political 
opportunities for political actors to challenge the new administration, a process that in turn 
initiated a cycle of contention. Traditional verbal and physical contentious repertoires such 
as popular justice, food riots, and acclamations continued to be employed, but these 
performances were innovated upon and performed by new political actors as contention 
diffused into new social groups and spaces. Commodus’ reaction to contention early in his 
reign exacerbated underlying grievances held by Rome’s civilian population, which helped to 
diffuse contentious behaviour across a broad section of the populace. Then, the violent 
regime transitions of 193CE profoundly undermined long-held notions of imperial 
legitimacy. Only Septimius Severus found a way to contain the escalation of collective action 
by realigning political opportunity structures that hindered potential challengers, and by re-
establishing strong legitimacy claims through his careful attendance to the city’s moral 
economy. Severus may not have been loved like Marcus Aurelius, but his governance was 
stable enough to temporarily dampen the acceleration of contentious activity, which would 
escalate after his death and find its apogee in the destruction and violence of the events of 
238CE. 
 
This chapter aims to explain how this cycle of contention came into being: how grievances, 
opportunity structures, political actors, and the interaction between successive regimes and 
repertoires between 180-193CE generated political space and the performative templates 
for events that were to unfold decades later. The first section will focus on two issues from 
 
212 Hdn. 1.4.8, 2.2.3. 
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Commodus’ reign that contributed to the later escalation of contention: the socio-economic 
effects of the Antonine Plague and other exogenous factors, and the activities of ‘early riser’ 
challengers who employed persuasive collective action frames to draw in new political 
actors. The second part of this chapter will concentrate on the political opportunities 
opened up by the competing interests of the Senate, urban plebs, and Praetorian Guard in 
the wake of Commodus’ assassination, and how those opportunities facilitated the diffusion 
of contention across the wider urban community, the employment of innovative 
performances, and the formation of new boundaries between groups.  
 
The early imperial era was one of population growth and economic expansion, and popular 
contention remained at reasonably low, static levels apart from some isolated spikes during 
transitional years or times of dearth: 69CE saw both for example. That is not to say the era 
was entirely politically stable. Of Augustus’ ten immediate successors, six were overthrown, 
but, except for the Year of the Four Emperors, these were a result of palace coups rather 
than contentious politics.213 Nevertheless, Rome experienced relatively few episodes of 
political contention between 96-180CE, a continuation of the socio-political stability re-
engineered by the Flavians after the tumultuous end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. Amid 
example of collective violence, only Aurelius Victor mentions a food riot sometime during 
Antoninus Pius’ reign, when a crowd (a plebe Romana), motivated by rumours of a grain 
shortage, threw stones at the emperor.214 Aside from this episode, contention was mainly 
confined to the consensus rituals of the spectacle spaces and participation in imperial 
ceremonies. The adventus and reditus ceremonies in particular became more important as 





213 Turchin and Negedov (2009) 211.  
214 Aur. Vict. Caes. 152.9. Perhaps in connection with this disturbance, the Historia Augusta mentions that 
Antoninus relieved a shortage of grain, wine and oil during his reign (Ant. Pius 8.11); Rowan (2013) 222. Kyle 
Harper’s data for wheat prices in Egypt show an increase for 150CE, which may indicate that there were food 
shortages around this time (Harper 2016). 
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However, after the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180CE, political contention in Rome 
escalated. The graph below presents the frequency of contentious performances between 
the first and early third centuries:  
 




We can best interpret the urban political contention that occurred between 180-238 CE as a 
cycle. Contentious cycles begin when demands for social or political change are made by 
‘early risers:’ well-placed claimants whose demands are usually narrow and group-specific. 
Their focused claims demonstrate the vulnerability of authorities to challenge, thus creating 
political opportunities for others to engage in claim and counter-claim making. As a cycle 
progresses, contentious activity increases as conflict heightens across the social system, and 
collective action diffuses into different spaces, social groups, and forms. Finally, a cycle 
declines when political opportunities decrease, either because demands have been met, or 
through exhaustion or repression.216 As far as we can tell from the source material, 
contention in Rome declined precipitously after the momentous events of 238CE, 
suggesting that political activity entered a period of exhaustion after the extreme violence 
and destruction of that year. Together, the acceleration and deceleration of contentious 
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activity combined with the diffusion of collective action suggests that we are dealing with a 
cyclical phase of political conflict. Tarrow argues that the most distinctive aspect of 
contentious cycles is not that an entire society will necessarily rise up, but that the actions 
of early-risers triggers diffusion, extension, imitation, and reaction among actors who are 
usually more quiescent and have fewer resources to engage in collective action.217 The 
outcome of a protest cycle then, is less significant in terms of the bigger picture than the 
social and political changes that accompany contentious processes, particularly diffusion. 
Indeed, a crucial property of diffusion is scale shift, a concept that relates not only to the 
spread of contention, but its shift to levels of the polity, which draws in new opponents, 
potential alliances, and different institutional settings.218 This process would be significant 
even if it were an outcome of early riser action alone, but Rome experienced a multitude of 
external pressures from the mid-second century, which aided the diffusion process. 
 
Furthermore, protest cycle theory suggests that, while endogenous aspects of the political 
environment like political opportunity structures are vital for the emergence and 
development of popular contention, exogenous factors also have a major role to play. The 
social impact of disease or natural disasters, for example, can have significant effects on 
political mobilisation, for certain sorts of claims to be advanced, and for particular strategies 
to be employed over others. Rome had long weathered numerous natural disasters, be it 
fire, flood, or famine. Whether contention resulted depended on how a regime responded 
to the expectations of the populace, and existing political opportunity structures.219 
Accordingly, uncertainty and instability generated from a combination of endogenous and 
exogenous factors provided opportunities for claim-making (and explains why contention 
would not break out in the absence of endogenous opportunities). The combination of both 
factors would also threaten established groups like the political elites, leading to increased 
competition among claimants for political space.220 The origins of the late second century 
contentious cycle can thus be found in the convergence of external factors alongside regime 
response. 
 
217 Tarrow (1998) 205. 
218 Tarrow (1998) 205. 
219 Meyer and Minkoff (2004) 1457-8. 
220 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2006) 66. 
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Exogenous factors during the late 2nd century CE 
 
The first two centuries of the imperial period witnessed strong demographic and economic 
growth and stability. Building activity, trading, and manufacturing peaked in the early 
second century, and the imperial financial position was sound: Antoninus Pius left a surplus 
of 2.7 billion denarii, the last reported until the fifth century.221 However, the 
historiographers of the day believed that the sole accession of Commodus in 180CE marked 
the beginning of a period of instability, violence, and decay. Dio claimed that he was divinely 
inspired to write of the ‘struggles’ following the death of Marcus Aurelius, when ‘our history 
now descends from a kingdom of gold to one of iron and rust, as affairs did for the Romans 
at that time.’222  His contemporary Herodian was likewise stirred to write an eight-book 
history spanning the years 180-238CE. In his words: 
 
If we were to compare this period with all the time that had elapsed since the 
Augustan Age, when the Roman Republic became an aristocracy, we would not find, 
in that span of almost two hundred years down to the time of Marcus Aurelius, 
imperial successions following so closely; the varied fortunes of war, both civil and 
foreign; the national uprisings and destructions of cities, both in the Empire and in 
many barbarian lands. We would not find the earthquakes, the pollutions of the air, 
or the incredible careers of tyrants and emperors (1.1.4). 
 
Modern debate on whether there really was a ‘third-century crisis’ and if so, from when it 
should be dated continues, but if we side-step the contemporary penchant for parsing 
‘crisis’ versus ‘transformation’ or ‘structural change,’ there is still ample evidence that the 
time period highlighted by Dio and Herodian was one of growing economic, political and 
social instability, particularly in Rome.223 In the mid-third century, Cyprian, the bishop of 
Carthage, wrote to Demetrianus, the proconsul of Africa to defend his fellow Christians from 
accusations that their refusal to worship the gods caused ‘all the events which shake and 
 
221 Harl (1996) 94.  
222 Cass. Dio 72.36.4. 
223 For a discussion of the crisis of the third century (or in some views, a non-crisis), see many of the 
contributions in Hekster, de Kleijn, and Slootjes (2007). See also Alföldy (1974); McMullen (1976); Alföldy 
(1989); Strobel (1993); Potter (2004), and Drinkwater (2005). 
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oppress our world.’ In his defence, Cyprian describes the effects of a shifting climate, 
hunger, war, and disease, and laments the breakdown in integrity, justice, and discipline.224  
The bishop’s treatise was a reaction to recent anti-Christian imperial policies.225 However, 
there is evidence that the climate began to deteriorate during the latter half of the second 
century.  A warm, wet, and stable climate known as the Roman Climatic Optimum had 
graced the Republican and early imperial periods. From the mid-second century until 
approximately 400CE (a period known as the Roman Transitional Period), the weather 
worsened. Economic expansion and population growth had necessitated the employment of 
more marginal land that was the first to falter when the climate destabilised. Galen 
observed an ‘unbroken succession’ of famines in the mid-160s, and it is essential to bear in 
mind that the social burden associated with such environmental shocks are usually 
disproportionately borne by the lower levels of a social hierarchy.226 
 
The economic situation that Cyprian describes is also corroborated by inscriptional and 
archaeological evidence. The chronology of dated wood and a reduction of metal content in 
the Greenland ice cap all point to a decline in industrial activity from the mid-second 
century. Debasement of imperial coinage, meanwhile, precipitated a slide towards rampant 
inflation, and the outbreak of the Antonine Plague between 165-180CE reversed previous 
demographic growth trends, creating conditions of insecurity and instability throughout the 
Empire.227  Most scholarship agrees that the plague was severe enough to impact both rural 
and urban economies, the army, imperial finances, and even the spiritual values of many of 
the Empire’s inhabitants. For those living in Rome, the plague undoubtedly had a severe 
impact. The most likely culprit, smallpox, is a directly transmitted respiratory disease mainly 
spread by direct and prolonged face-to-face contact between people. Urban risk factors of 
overcrowding, poor housing, and sanitation meant that the plague would have quickly 
spread through insulae, vici, and thermae, disproportionately affecting those with the 
poorest housing and endemic health conditions.228 Littman and Littman postulate that, even 
 
224 Cyprian: Ad Dem. 253-5, from Hekster (2008) 130-131. 
225 An edict of Trajan Decius obliged all inhabitants of the Roman Empire to sacrifice to the gods. 
226 Galen: De alim. 6.749–750. For the scientific data on ancient climate change, see McCormick, Büntgen, 
Cane, Cook, Harper, Huybers, Litt, Manning, Mayewski, More, Nicolussi, and Tegel (2012) 169-220; Harper 
(2017); Izdebski, Mordechai, and White (2018) 291. 
227 Hekster (2008) 32. 
228 For smallpox, see Zelener (2012).  
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if the average death rate in the Empire was at the low end of approximations, the mortality 
rate in Rome could have been 10% higher than in less densely populated areas, suggesting 
that at least 100,000 people in Rome died from the plague alone between 165-180CE, a 
significant percentage of the population, immigration notwithstanding.229 Casualties were 
so high in the city that the Historia Augusta claims that bodies had to be removed by the 
wagon-load.230 Like mortality rates, the economic impact of the plague years has been a 
source of much debate, although most agree that the epidemic disrupted the normal 
functioning of the Roman economy. As mortality rates remained higher than usual for many 
years, the amount of leased agricultural land, army diplomas (and documents in general), 
inscriptions, and coin and brick production all hit persistent lows throughout the early years 
of Commodus’ reign. Drops in air pollution, mining activity, shipwrecks, and manufacturing 
and construction also point to a systemic economic downturn in the late second century.231  
 
The scale of the plague unquestionably had the potential to stimulate political contention by 
eroding urban privileges and placing heavy pressure on the emperor to deal with the 
ongoing economic and social effects of the crisis. Certainly, when an economy suffers a 
downturn, any regime is vulnerable to challenge, especially one with depleted resources. In 
other words, economic crises can generate political crises, and issue-specific opportunities 
are often dependent on a broader background of economic and social issues.232 Likewise, a 
disaster on the scale of the Antonine Plague can affect how a population perceives the 
government and its response. As Olsen argues, such a disaster can ‘strip away layers of 
semantic, symbolic, and process cover to provide clear insights into the nature, priorities, 
and capabilities of authorities, governments and entire regimes. They are deeply, deeply 
 
229 Littman and Littman (1973) 55. Total mortality rates differ significantly between scholars. More recent 
estimates have narrowed the range to between 10-30%. See Bruun (2003a) 426; Rathbone (1990), and Gilliam 
(1961). It is accepted that Egypt could have suffered a population loss of 20–30%. For example, Elliot (2016) 9-
10 notes that Roman Alexandria had a population density upwards of 50,000 people per square kilometre, and 
a correspondingly high mortality rate. There is, then, no reason why urban Rome's mortality rates would have 
been much different, given that it was the same disease.  
230 SHA Marc. 13.5. 
231 Cass. Dio 71.2.4; Amm. Marc. 23.6.24, and Eutr. 8.12 note the severe demographic impact of the plague. 
Most of the economic data comes from Roman Egypt where prices suddenly doubled between 160-190CE, the 
only significant change between 45-274/5CE, although it should be noted that other socio-economic factors 
also contributed to Egypt's demographic and economic changes during this period. See Jongman (2007); Bruun 
(2007); Duncan-Jones (1996); Scheidel (2002); Greenberg (2003), and the contributions in Lo Cascio (2012). 
232 Kousis and Tilly (2005). 
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political.’233 While the collective trauma attached to the effects of the plague impacted 
Rome’s communities in a myriad of ways, that was not the only exogenous factor of the 
period. Famine, disease, rebellion, and military setbacks were a feature of nearly every 
reign, but Marcus Aurelius (and Lucius Verus) were unlucky enough to have to deal with 
several of these issues simultaneously and on a larger scale than before. Aside from the 
plague, the emperors had to deal with conflict with Parthia; instability in Britain, Raetia, and 
Upper Germany;234 a catastrophic flood that caused damage and severe famine in Rome,235 
as well as wars with Marcomanni, Quadi and the Iazyges among others that would last for 
fourteen years. Disturbances in Egypt, Spain, Lusitania, and a short-lived rebellion by Avidius 
Cassius in 175CE added to Marcus Aurelius’ woes. Dio alludes to the unique conditions of 
the time, noting that the emperor ‘did not meet with the good fortune that he deserved, for 
he was…involved in a multitude of troubles throughout practically his entire reign.’236 
Undeniably, the sources illustrate a real emotional response to the cascade of crises. Lucian 
of Samosata describes oracles promising ‘infallible aid’ through verses that frightened 
people would write over their doorways as a charm against the plague.237 A man and his 
associates continually made speeches from the wild fig-tree on the Campus Martius 
declaiming that the end of the world was near.238 The city’s anxieties over the concurrent 
Marcomannic war were such that Marcus Aurelius had priests perform both venerable 
Roman and foreign religious ceremonies to purify the city and placate its inhabitants.239  
 
How the socio-economic effects of these crises were framed by the urban populace would 
dictate whether lived experience would be politicised, either in the direction of regime 
reinforcement or in the direction of political contestation. Marcus Aurelius and his advisors 
were frequently absent from Rome, providing elites with opportunities to seek out 
 
233 Olsen (2008) 167. 
234 Birley (2000) 122; SHA Marc. 8.7.  
235 SHA Marc. 8.4-5. Because both Verus and Marcus are said to have taken active part in the recovery, the 
flood must have happened before Verus' departure for the east in 162CE as it appears in the biographer's 
narrative after Pius’ funeral has occurred. Aldrete argues a date in autumn 161 or spring 162 is probable, and 
given the normal seasonal distribution of Tiber flooding, the most probable date was probably spring of 162CE. 
See Aldrete (2007) 30-31.  
236 Cass. Dio 72.36.3.  
237 Luc. Alex. 36. 
238 SHA Marc. 13.6. 
239 SHA Marc. 13.1-3. According to tradition, the ancient purificatory ceremony ordered by Marcus was first 
celebrated in 399 BCE in order to ward off the plague (Livy 5.13.5-6). 
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influential allies. The regime’s repressive capacity was also lower than usual given that the 
majority of the emperor’s man-power was engaged elsewhere in the Empire. In this case, 
however, the judicious leadership of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus closed opportunities 
and prevented grievances from festering. The co-emperors safeguarded the city’s food 
supplies, ratified new laws on burials and tombs, conducted funeral ceremonies for the 
indigent at public expense, and provided spiritual leadership for the frightened populace. 
Imperial possessions were auctioned to avoid tax increases, while Rome’s lavish games 
continued.240 The absence of popular contention suggests that the epidemic was primarily 
experienced as a consensus crisis that increased the political capacity and legitimacy of the 
regime. As a concerned ‘father’ to his flock, the demonstrable pietas of Marcus Aurelius 
meant that he maintained his end of the moral contract with the people despite such severe 
challenges. That is not to say that grievances and social stresses were inconsequential. Any 
perceived change in imperial policy could prompt contention, notably if the relationship 
between the regime and urban political actors underwent adverse change. The goodwill 
Marcus Aurelius had built up meant that Rome had high hopes that Commodus would take 
after his father. Unfortunately, the sharp shift in regime outlook under the son affected 
dynamics between the emperor and the urban populace, providing fertile conditions for a 
contentious cycle to open. 
 
The ‘early risers’ of Commodus’ reign 
 
The sole accession of Commodus in 180CE triggered contention as the regime change 
shifted political opportunity structures. Those in Rome who had lived under Marcus Aurelius 
had weathered multiple storms, but his governance had met the expectations of most of 
Rome’s political actors, proving that exogenous factors do not cause contention on their 
own. Past events, experiences, and fears, however, become part of collective memory. Like 
trust, acceptance and good-will are fragile settings, and the inability or unwillingness of 
Commodus to follow his father’s cooperative model of governance positioned early risers to 
take advantage of new opportunities for action that in turn provided templates for others to 
follow.  
 
240 Grain supply: SHA Marc. 11.3, 5. Burial laws: 13.4-6. Spiritual support: 21.6. Games: 17.7, 23.4-5. Imperial 
possessions: Cass. Dio 72 fr.2; SHA Marc. 17.4-5. 
  72 
Second-century emperors maintained the senatorial order’s close ties with the imperial 
court and guarded their position at the top of the social pyramid. The Historia Augusta 
claimed that no-one showed the Senate more respect than Marcus Aurelius who ‘always’ 
attended meetings when he was in Rome, and even entrusted the order with judicial duties 
that were previously the emperor's prerogative. He also relied on an inner circle of advisors 
and almost always involved a consilium of eminent senators for significant decisions.241 
Commodus initially retained many of his father’s former advisors but soon took an 
adversarial approach to the Senate, and increasingly relied on imperial freedmen and 
favourites instead of senatorial heavyweights. The breakdown in the traditional relationship 
between the Senate and emperor and the closing down of the imperial regime posed a 
threat to elites who now found themselves in the position of outsiders. Years earlier, former 
amici of Lucius Verus shut out after their patron’s death likely supported Avidius Cassius’ 
rebellion in 175CE, demonstrating that such men were prepared to defend their position by 
challenging their emperor.242 Now, courtiers, faced with a similar threat from Commodus 
took the same approach. Together with disgruntled members of the imperial familia and 
administration, they helped three separate early-riser groups to launch public claims against 
the administration in the first half of the decade. 
 
The first contentious act took place in 182CE shortly after Commodus’ triumphal return to 
Rome.243 The basic details align in all three main sources: Commodus’ sister Lucilla, together 
with her husband's nephew Quintianus and her probable kinsman Marcus Ummidius 
Quadratus Annianus, arranged to have Commodus assassinated as he entered the 
Colosseum. Unfortunately for the conspirators, Quintianus announced to Commodus before 
stabbing him that the act had been commissioned by the Senate, allowing enough time for 
the imperial bodyguard to step in and thwart the attack.244 By presenting the assassination 
attempt as one sanctioned by the Senate, the conspirators not only intimated the plan had 
 
241 SHA Marc. 10.1-9, 22.3; Eck (2009) 103. 
242 Birley (2000) 190-1. Many of these connections would still be active in the Senate in 175CE, but none had 
graced the consular fasti after the death of Lucius in 169CE, and none were included among the comites 
augusti in 175/6CE for the eastern tour. 
243 Hekster (2002) 52 dates the conspiracy somewhere between 181 and the end of 182CE; Grosso (1964) 146-
7 places at the date as late 182CE. Whittaker (1969) 37 argues that the date of the plot is fixed by the title Pius 
taken by Commodus afterward the plot. As this title first appears on the 7th Jan 183CE (CIL 4.2099.12), 
Whittaker concludes the plot must have been in 182CE. 
244 Hdn. 1.8.4: ἀμφιθεάτρου; Cass. Dio 73.4.4: ἐς τὸ θέατρον τὸ κυνηγετικὸν; SHA Comm. 4.3. 
  73 
influential supporters, they also drew on collective memory to frame their claim as a just 
act. The performance had two obvious precedents; the assassination of Julius Caesar by a 
posse of senators in 44BCE, and that of Caligula by senators and members of the Praetorian 
Guard in 41CE. Undoubtedly, Quintianus’ act was meant as a reminder of the Senate’s 
fundamental but long-dormant role to safeguard the state against tyranny, and therefore 
meant to convince others that the claim was legitimate and not some grubby attempt at 
usurping imperial power. Accordingly, what began as an internal power struggle was 
transformed into a collective claim and act of transgressive contention against the emperor. 
 
In response, Commodus initiated an extensive round of purges. Eminent senators, military 
commanders, members of the imperial family, former amici and close friends of Marcus, 
and the praetorian prefect Taruttienus Paternus were all executed. Rumours also circulated 
that Commodus wanted to kill the venerable urban prefect Aufidius Victorinus.245 With the 
most powerful of the old guard gone, the now sole praetorian prefect S. Tigidius Perennis 
effectively operated as head of state.246 The threat posed by a hostile prefect and emperor 
team resulted in another act of contention in the mid 180s. Unlike the Lucilla conspiracy, 
who and what engineered the fall of Perennis differs markedly in Dio and Herodian’s 
accounts. According to the former, Perennis was lynched by mutinous troops who marched 
from Britain to protest the prefect’s management of their affairs.247 In contrast, Herodian 
claims that Commodus was pressured into executing his first minister in part because of a 
contentious episode at a theatre performance during the Ludi Capitolini, when a man 
dressed as a philosopher addressed the emperor from the stage to warn him of the threat 
posed by Perennis.248 Most scholars prefer Dio’s version of events, although it is unclear 
 
245 The Historia Augusta provides a long list of those caught in Commodus' net after the failed attempt (Comm. 
4.8-11). See also Cass. Dio 73.5.1-3; Hdn. 1.8.8. Victorinus: Cass. Dio 72.11.1-2. Garzetti (1961) 532-3 sees the 
executions in two distinct waves: the first was the actual conspirators and the second wave was directed at the 
prominent and successful. The execution of Paternus also likely came later, ostensibly for his decision to have 
Commodus' favourite, the freedman Saoterus, executed by the frumentarii, because of the people’s ‘aversion’ 
of the emperor on account of the freedman, ‘whose power the Roman people could not endure,’ but more 
likely because his power threatened court insiders like Perennis (SHA Comm. 4.5). 
246 Although Perennis was a hold-over from the administration of Marcus Aurelius (his name is recorded in the 
Tabula Bansitana of 177CE), he appears to have been Commodus' personal choice for prefect. 
247 Cass. Dio 73.9.2-3. The soldier’s anger, if true, rested upon the punishments handed down for their 
insubordination. Whether their claims of potential usurpation were a ready excuse to rid themselves of the 
head of military affairs or whether this story was a transmission of rumours doing the rounds in Rome is hard 
to say; as Brunt observes, Xiphilinus’ abbreviated account is hardly intelligible: Brunt (1973) 174. 
248 Hdn. 1.9.4. This would provide a more or less exact date of 15 October 184CE. See Whittaker (1969) 53, n.3.  
  74 
why Herodian’s narrative should be less plausible than Dio’s story that 1500 legionaries 
made a long and unsanctioned trip from Britain to personally denounce Perennis.249 We 
should not discount either, but Herodian's version does account for the evident political 
tensions of the time (that are also noted by the Historia Augusta).250 Perennis was 
unpopular with Rome’s elites. He enthusiastically supported Commodus’ adversarial 
approach towards them, and the prefect’s replacement of senatorial commanders with 
equestrians also allegedly caused outrage.251 In addition, instability in Britain, Germany, and 
Gaul saw rebellions both from within the imperial military apparatus and from outsiders, 
while substantial fortification activities in Lower Pannonia and Mauretania Caesariensis 
suggest that the frontier areas were also unstable.252 These developments, combined with 
reports of military unrest provided an opportunity to stage a public claim against a regime 
indirectly under siege.  
 
If Quintianus’ performance at the Colosseum was meant to echo the Senate’s historical role 
as guardians of the state, the Ludi Capitolini episode referenced two aspects of popular 
politics: the subversive role of philosophers, and the role of the theatre as a traditional site 
of contention. Herodian claims that the man who addressed Commodus wore the 
characteristic garb of an itinerant Cynic. While philosophers filled a public role as carriers of 
hidden transcripts, Cynics in particular were noted for their contempt for authority and 
ability to stir up popular feeling. Tacitus believed that no Roman emperor could tolerate 
‘that breed of men who were notorious for betraying the powerful and deceiving the 
hopeful.’253 Under Vespasian, two Cynic philosophers returned to Rome and like ‘barking 
dogs,’ tried to stir up the masses by denouncing Titus’ mistress Berenice in the theatre even 
though all philosophers were previously supposed to have been expelled.254 They also 
 
249 For those who prefer Dio, see Potter (2004) 90-91; Hekster (2002) 63; Alföldy (1989a) 101. Garzetti (1961) 
536 is more sceptical, arguing that it is ‘difficult to believe the absurd number quoted for the curious 
delegation, as it would also seem sensible to reject the far-fetched details given by Herodian, who among 
other things attributes the downfall of Perennis to a totally different cause, namely the discovery of disloyal 
plans of the son who held command in Pannonia.’ 
250 See n.245 above. 
251 Hdn. 1.8.2; SHA Comm. 6.2. The replacement of senatorial commanders with equestrians was not new, but 
an acceleration of a policy pursued by Marcus Aurelius.  
252 Hekster (2012) 5-6; Cass. Dio 73.9.2a; CIL 11.6053. 
253 Tac. Hist. 1.22. 
254 Crook (1951) 170; Suet. Vesp. 13; Cass. Dio 65.13, 65.15.5, 66.12.2; Yavetz (1988) 138. 
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continued to plague future emperors: Dio informs us that Caracalla held a particularly bitter 
hatred for Aristotelian philosophers, even wanting to burn their books.255 
 
The philosopher's display not only fit his performative role as a subversive truth-teller, but it 
also referenced the earlier tyranny theme articulated by Quintianus. Instead of Commodus 
playing the role of tyrant, the philosopher pointed to the danger of the prefect's tyranny, 
telling the emperor that ‘the sword of Perennis is at your throat.’256 This was a clear allusion 
to the Sword of Damocles and its victim, the young tyrant Dionysius II of Syracuse. The 
emperor, having closed down his regime, was meant to understand by the performance 
that he was now at the mercy of a too-powerful prefect.257 Usually, contentious repertoires 
are specific to relational contexts; that is, a repertoire emerges out of the contentious 
relationships between particular powerholders and claimants.258 The tyrant framing, along 
with the employment of a subversive philosopher figure was a recognisable repertoire 
enacted by those who wanted to challenge the emperor directly. In this case, though, the 
target was Perennis, which indicates that the repertoire had shifted. Instead of remaining a 
contextual claim aimed at the emperor, it now embraced a new target, purpose, and the 
involvement of new social actors. The repertoire was becoming modular. 
 
This change is significant because the rise of a modular repertoire is associated with 
contentious cycles. Studies have shown that a modular repertoire will emerge when early 
claimants can demonstrate the effectiveness of their contention in such a way that 
following claimants will appropriate similar forms and imagery.259 The repressive tactics of 
previous emperors had demonstrated that the public pronouncements of philosophers, on 
an imperial stage no less, had a profound effect on public opinion. This performance was 
not only meant to persuade Commodus, but the audience as well. Indeed, Herodian claims 
that everyone present at the theatre suspected the philosopher’s words were true  
(although they pretended otherwise).260 Moreover, the location ensured that the act would 
 
255 Cass. Dio 78.7.3. 
256 Hdn. 1.9.4. 
257 See Cicero’s discussion of the Dionysius and the Sword of Damocles: Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5.21. Herodian did like 
to use the cliché of looming danger (e.g 6.8.6, 7.5.5). 
258 Wada (2012) 545. 
259 Wada (2012) 545-6; McAdam (1995); Tarrow (1993). 
260 Hdn. 1.9.5. 
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be understood as a political claim. This performance probably took place at the Odeon 
specially constructed for the ludi by Domitian in 86CE.261 It had a capacity of nearly 11,000 
people, ensuring reports of what occurred would quickly circulate.262 There had been little 
theatre contention after 69CE, but the space was regaining its contentious atmosphere. 
Commodus had earlier banished the pantomimes after they alluded to his debaucheries on 
stage.263 The combination of a philosopher figure with the theatre space and an audience 
guaranteed that the claim would be shared collectively, and its message amplified.  
 
Participants in contentious politics learn how to match performances with local 
circumstances and to modify performances in the light of their effects.264 The real threat of 
retribution compelled the claimants to employ an indirect and persuasive claim instead of a 
risky physical attack. Also, since it was customary for the emperor to present the prizes for 
the cultural elements of the games, Commodus’ attendance was expected. Logistically, the 
theatre was one of the few places where somebody could hope to address the emperor 
personally, since Commodus by this point was restricting his public appearances and all 
messages were passing through the hands of Perennis first.265  Cultivating potential allies 
from the watching crowd and utilising the public nature of the theatre to petition an 
increasingly inaccessible emperor was a clever use of symbolic imagery and space, as 
Commodus could not ignore what effectively was a public petition. Transgressive though 
the philosopher’s performance was, it still put pressure on the emperor to address the claim 
and the articulated threat, lest he appear weak or unwilling to engage with his subjects. As a 
result, Perennis and his sons were executed, and Commodus rescinded a number of the 
prefect’s measures, confirming that popular opinion still mattered, despite the closed 
nature of the regime.266 
 
261 Both the Odeon and the stadium for the athletics shows were still regarded as two of Rome’s finest 
buildings in Ammianus Marcellinus’ time (6.10.4).   
262 The Regionary Catalogues give a capacity of 10,600 for the Odeon. Coarelli, Clauss, and Harmon (2014) 296. 
263 SHA Comm. 3.3. 
264 Tilly (2008) 18. 
265 SHA Comm. 5.1. 
266 SHA Comm. 6.4. Commodus’ actions after the removal of Perennis point to his fear of insubordination both 
abroad and in Rome. For example, several senators were hastily rehabilitated. Pertinax was sent to subdue the 
British legions in 186CE, and Commodus took to keeping the children of provincial governors’ hostage in Rome 
(SHA Pert. 3.5-9; Hdn. 3.2.4). 
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In Herodian's narrative, a third claim was launched shortly after the Perennis affair.267 
Despite the fall of the powerful prefect, the fundamentals of Commodus’ regime had not 
changed. The emperor’s chamberlain, the freedman Cleander, took Perennis’ place as chief 
minister. Relations with the Senate had not improved, and in Gaul and Iberia, a deserter 
called Maternus led a band of criminals on a plundering rampage in what the Historia 
Augusta calls the bellum desertorum.268 In response, Commodus organised a military 
operation. Maternus shifted his activities to Italy and decided to attack Commodus during 
the Hilaria festival. However, Maternus was betrayed by one of his men and executed, 
Commodus conceding a public thanksgiving, and the people a public celebration for the 
emperor’s safety.269 Although there is some evidence to support the historicity of the 
bellum desertorum, it is not unreasonable to feel a degree of cynicism regarding Herodian’s 
tale, although there is some evidence that there was an attempt made on Commodus’ life at 
the festival.270 A new type of hilaritas coin was issued in 187CE, and, given that this coin 
type was relatively rare, its appearance around the same time as the alleged plot is unlikely 
to be a mere coincidence.271 Commodus also increased the size of the praetorian cohorts 
and his personal bodyguard, and began spending most of his time at his estates outside 
Rome.272 The same year, in what was a standard imperial response to a crisis, Commodus 
also promised the plebs largesse as thanks for their loyalty.273  
 
If we accept Herodian’s narrative, the spatial aspects of the episode, as with the earlier two 
events, are noteworthy. The historian explicitly mentions the lavatio portion of the 
ceremony as the time-space for the attack. As the emperor would accompany the stone of 
 
267 Herodian claims that the Maternus episode happened ‘shortly after’ the Perennis affair (1.9.10). An 
inscription on a writing tablet from Rottweil, which appears to mention the suppression of the revolt, has a 
date of 12 August 186CE that provides a terminus ante quem for this event: Grünewald (2004) 124-5.  
268 SHA Pesc. Nig. 3.4; Hdn. 1.10.1-3. The Maternus rebellion may well have been a precursor or forerunner of 
the Bagaudae. See Drinkwater (1984); Thompson (1952). For more on the bellum desertorum, see Alföldy 
(1971). 
269 Hdn. 1.10.5, 1.10.7. Herodian claims that the Hilaria was a festival that allowed participants to disguise 
themselves as any character no matter how important or exclusive. 
270 Alföldy, Hohl, and Grünewald believe the entire episode is a fiction: Alföldy (1971) 375; Hohl (1954) 17-19; 
Grünewald (2004) 46-7. On the other hand, Grosso considers the episode to be plausible as does Kaiser-Raiß: 
Grosso (1964) 235-8; Kaiser-Raiß (1980) 35-6. 
271 RIC 3, No. 150-1, 497-8. 
272 Hdn. 1.11.5. 
273 Hdn. 1.10.7. Cass. Dio 73.16.2; SHA Comm. 16.8. Duncan-Jones’ compilation of imperial congiaria shows 
that Commodus increased his per year and per capita expenditure by at least 56% on Marcus Aurelius, 
Antoninus Pius or Hadrian’s distributions (Duncan-Jones 1998, 248-250). 
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the Magna Mater down the Via Sacra, a parade would follow displaying imperial treasures, 
while spectators were allowed the license to dress up and ‘play the fool.’274 Any logistical 
advantage due to the carnival atmosphere would pale in comparison to the emotional 
impact on those witnessing an attack on the emperor as he performed his sacred duty. Such 
an act during a ceremony that served to reaffirm the collective, civic identities of the 
populace, surrounded by the tangibles of imperial power, would be an act of violent 
contention against the state in general. The Maternus episode may reflect rumours spread 
after the Hilaria to explain Commodus’ behaviour post-festival or to explain a deepening 
sense of political instability. Even if the story was amplified or even staged by Commodus to 
explain his subsequent behaviour, the very idea that an outsider would dare attack the 
emperor during a religious ceremony inside his capital demonstrates just how isolated and 
vulnerable Commodus appeared to others. Coinage issued in 186-187CE depicting a healthy 
working relationship between the emperor, the army, and the Senate suggests that 
Commodus was engaging in a series of tactical counter-moves in order to dampen down 
perceptions of weakness and division.275  
 
The actions of the early riser claimants created uncertainty and communicated to Rome’s 
urban communities new possibilities for the conduct of contentious politics. Contention was 
initiated by actors who had the most institutional leverage, followed by action taken by 
groups increasingly distant from the state and increasingly less endowed with institutional 
influence or other resources.276 Of course, the contention of early risers is only crucial if 
something of consequence develops from their actions. The cognitive framing introduced by 
the initial claimants provided the ideational and interpretative anchoring necessary for the 
development of an insurgent consciousness around issues perceived as illegitimate but 
subject to change through group action.277 When a serious crisis emerged, the cognitive 
frames used by the early risers were able to be used by others to interpret events and 
provide possible solutions. In other words, their efforts opened up the institutional barriers 
 
274 Hdn. 1.10.5. The lavatio took place on the 27th March, the day before the Megalesia began.  
275 Coins with Commodus and the Senate: BMC IV, 730, 732, 811-812, 814, 822. Commodus in the middle of 
four soldiers with the legend FID EXERCIT: BMC IV, 725, 729, 805. 
276 McAdam and Sewell (2001) 99. 
277 Petrova (2010) 148; McAdam (1995) 231. 
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through which the claims of other actors could pour.278 Therefore, whether disaster would 
be experienced as a community crisis (as in Marcus Aurelius’ time) or as failure of 
government was dependent on the conceptions of justice coaxed into being during the early 
years of Commodus’ reign. 
 
Crisis and conspiracy: the Cleander riot of 190CE 
 
Around 190CE, a particularly virulent outbreak of plague, and severe food shortages hit 
Rome.279 Dio claimed that the return of the plague was ‘the greatest of any of which I have 
knowledge,’ with two thousand people often dying in Rome in a single day. Herodian 
observed that the suffering was especially severe in Rome because of its high population 
density.280 A large number of immigrants constantly flowing into Rome could partly explain 
why the outbreak was so severe since surviving a smallpox infection confers immunity upon 
an individual. It was not just the poor who suffered either: the epidemic was so severe that 
Cleander appointed twenty-five consuls that year. Dio, Herodian, and the Historia Augusta 
all depict this as a money-making venture by the avaricious freedman, but it is more likely 
that the plague had killed so many senators that multiple consuls needed to be appointed to 
ensure a sufficient number remained to take up essential administrative proconsular 
positions.281 
 
The accompanying famine also appears to have been serious. There are indications that 
Egyptian grain supplies remained unstable after the original plague pandemic tapered off. In 
186CE, Commodus organised a state-owned grain fleet to bring supplies from North Africa 
(classem Africanam), which was supposed to be useful ‘in case the grain supply from 
Alexandria were delayed.’282 This would be an unusual step since it was imperial practice to 
rely on (and encourage) private merchants to carry out the importing of grain. Moreover, 
the Historia Augusta notes that Commodus made matters worse by ordering ‘a general 
 
278 Tarrow (1998) 167. 
279 Hdn. 1.12.3. He claims that the plague and famine occurred at the same time. Dio states that the famine 
struck first, followed by the ‘pestilence’ (73.14.1). The Historia Augusta does not mention the plague at all, 
only the famine (Comm. 14.1). Whittaker (1964) claims the plague/famine occurred in 190CE, a date that I will 
adhere to. 
280 Cass. Dio 73.14.3;  Hdn. 1.12.1. 
281 Cass. Dio 73.12.4; SHA Comm. 6.9-10; Hekster (2012) 237. 
282 SHA Comm. 17.7. 
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reduction of prices, the result of which was an even greater scarcity.’283 It seems ensuring a 
stable food supply had been an on-going issue for Commodus’ administration – it could 
explain why the emperor suspended the alimenta – but the situation appears to have got 
drastically worse in 190CE. The cumulative effect of both disasters within a short time-frame 
had a significant impact on the urban population. Dio alludes to the city’s social anxieties at 
this time, describing a conspiracy theory that circulated around the city: 
 
Then, too, many others, not alone in the city, but throughout almost the entire 
Empire, perished at the hands of criminals who smeared some deadly drugs on tiny 
needles and for pay infected people with the poison by means of these instruments 
(73.14.4).  
 
Such a scenario sounds implausible: Dio relates an almost identical account that occurred 
during the reign of Domitian, Livy a tale from the fourth century BCE.284 The point, however, 
is that such conspiracy theories were circulating and undoubtedly believed by many. On the 
one hand, such stories fulfil a cognitive need to explain the unusual and deal with collective 
trauma by translating undefined anxieties into focused fears.285 On the other hand, as 
conspiracies are essentially hidden transcripts, Dio’s description indicates that marginal 
discourse had been propelled into the public sphere.286 Why the appearance of this type of 
unofficial information is significant is that conspiracy theory tends to centre on the principle 
of cui bono – who benefits from the present situation, and perhaps more importantly, who 
is to blame?287 Commodus had shown a distinct lack of leadership, fleeing to Laurentum 
when the plague arrived, and he was still absent when the famine hit.288 Unlike Marcus 
Aurelius, who took authoritative measures to deal with the effects of the Antonine Plague, 
and who provided both spiritual and temporal leadership, Commodus, apart from his 
disastrous market intervention, had left the city to fend for itself. 
 
 
283 SHA Comm. 14.1. Fixing grain prices was an unusual measure; the last intervention was by Nero in 64CE 
(Tac. Ann. 15.39).  
284 Cass. Dio 67.11.6; Livy 8.18.4-8.  
285 Moore (2005) 5. 
286 Landes (2006)  
287 Landes (2006) 
288 Hdn. 1.12.2.  
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The emperor’s moral and physical absence allowed hidden transcripts to diffuse amongst 
the population, and a satisfactory answer to both questions (who benefitted and who was 
to blame?) was found. Conspiracy theories usually target socially marginal figures, and 
Commodus’ powerful minister Cleander fit the brief. As an ex-slave and foreigner, Cleander 
was an ideal target at which to funnel grievances against the regime. Although he acted the 
part of the aristocratic politician, constructing baths and other civic amenities in Rome and 
elsewhere in the Empire, he had powerful enemies in the Senate, and the populace ‘hated 
and despised’ the minister.289 What followed demonstrates that contextually specific and 
subjective conspiratorial perceptions framed the regime’s failings, and made the imperial 
freedman directly responsible for the food shortages. Dio suggests that Cleander was 
deliberately set up by imperial officials. Herodian, meanwhile, claims that the freedman 
created the problem by buying up grain for later distribution. Either way, both versions infer 
that the circulation of rumours regarding Cleander’s management of the annona generated 
the impetus for claim-making. Famine and plague combined made this new conspiracy a 
narrative that justified aggressive action, for the direr the conspiracy, the more liberated the 
response that is considered legitimate by its ‘victims.’290  
 
The result was a diffusion of contention in both social and spatial terms during the Cerealia 
festival.291 Initially, theatre audiences launched verbal protests, blaming Cleander ‘for all 
their hardships,’ a performance that confirms the re-emergence of the theatre as a 
contentious space.292 Dio does not mention the theatre protests, but only one grand, 
organised demonstration at the Circus Maximus followed by a march to Commodus’ estate: 
 
There was a horse-race on, and as the horses were about to contend for the seventh 
time, a crowd of children ran into the Circus, led by a tall maiden of grim aspect, 
who, because of what afterward happened, was thought to have been a divinity. The 
 
289 Cass. Dio 73.12.5; Hdn. 1.12.4-5. Enemies in the Senate: SHA. Comm. 6.11-7.1. 
290 Landes (2006). 
291 The Cerealia was an eight-day festival in April that began with ludi scaenici and culminated with ludi 
circenses. See Ov. Fast. 4.494, 4.620; Tac. Ann. 15.53. 
292 Hdn. 1.12.5. Whittaker and Birley among others follow the Historia Augusta's line that Cleander's move 
against Arrius Antoninus, the proconsular governor of Asia, and the African faction in the Senate precipitated 
the riot in 190CE, but there is no evidence that Arrius, let alone Burrus or Aebutianus were especially popular 
with the urban population. SHA Comm. 7.1; Whittaker (1964) 352-3; Birley (1999) 78. 
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children shouted in concert many bitter words, which the people took up and then 
began to shout out every conceivable insult; and finally, the throng leaped down and 
set out to find Commodus (who was then in the Quintilian suburb), invoking many 
blessings on him and many curses upon Cleander (73.13.3-4). 
 
As the Cerealia celebrated the grain goddess Ceres, the link between the festival and the 
current famine would have been evident to all, especially since the festival was celebrated 
in mid-April, at least a month before the grain ships arrived in Rome when supplies would 
be at their lowest.293 Dio’s description certainly suggests the initial demonstration was 
organised, and there were links between pantomime and circus factions that could have 
been used to facilitate the logistical side of the initial protests.294 However, a crowd cannot 
be forced into making collective claims on such a large scale. Crowd dynamics certainly play 
a part, but spectators must choose to act on their own opportunities and grievances. 
 
The opening contention, as with the theatre protests, followed the established verbal 
repertoire for the Circus. The children’s chanting of ‘many bitter words’ were likely negative 
acclamatory formulas known to the crowd as Dio uses the same phrasing (πολλὰ καὶ δεινά) 
to describe the synchronised insults uttered by the Senate and people together after 
Commodus' death.295 However, since the emperor was not present at the races, the 
audience took the protest to him at his holiday villa, which was over 8km away. A protest 
march was an innovative form of Roman contention. Crowds would often flock some way 
out of the city limits for adventus/profectio ceremonies, but concerted movement through 
and beyond urban spaces was almost always state-sponsored. Along the way, they 
continued to use verbal formulas from the Circus (blessings for Commodus, curses for 
Cleander) that advertised a cohesive message and provided a sense of legitimacy to both 
participants and observers. The complex form of collective locomotion demonstrated the 
significance of the issue as it required extensive interaction among at least some of the 
participants, indicating that a collective identity had formed around the issue of Cleander.  
 
 
293 Earliest possible arrival of the Egyptian grain ships would have been May. See Rickman (1980a) 267. 
294 See Roueché (1993) 31-43. Graffiti at Aphrodisias links pantomime performers with particular factions. 
295 Cass. Dio 74.2. 
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The aim of the protesters was to air their grievances to the emperor in person, as they 
would do at the shows. Commodus had been restricting his public appearances of late. 
Usually perhaps, contention at the shows would have continued regardless, but the 
collective trauma of the Antonine Plague had been re-awakened by the latest outbreak, and 
the framing of the crisis as a regime issue forced protesters to adapt the usual circus 
repertoire. Certainly, the transfer of the protest from the Circus to Commodus’ private 
space transformed what was a usually tolerated form of communication into a transgressive 
and potentially dangerous one. This latent danger was confirmed in what happened next. 
Once the protesters arrived, they ‘raised a fearful din’ demanding Cleander’s execution. In 
response, the freedman sent out a detachment of soldiers to deal with the crowd. Dio uses 
the vague phrasing ‘some soldiers’ (στρατιώτας τινὰς), but Herodian specifies that it was the 
imperial cavalry (οἱ βασίλειοι ἱππειs), almost certainly the equites singulares who were 
under Cleander’s command.296 This scenario makes sense since the equites singulares could 
cut off the marchers as they proceeded along the Appian Way by coming along the vicus 
Sulpicicius, a direct road from their castra.297 
 
Despite sustaining injuries and fatalities from the cavalry, the crowd refused to disperse, 
reassured by its size and by the supportive presence of other soldiers who were present but 
who stood by instead of actively repressing the demonstration. Whittaker suggests that 
Dio’s use of δορύφορος to describe the soldiers indicates that they were praetorians 
presumably summoned by Cleander, their nominal commander. However, it makes more 
sense that it was the urban cohorts, not the praetorians who were on hand. Urban troops 
manned the Circus and surrounding streets during the festivities and would have reached 
the villa far quicker than a detachment of praetorians who would have to be summoned 
from their camp over 11km away.298 Moreover, when describing the following violence, 
Herodian claims that it was the city troops (οἱ τῆς πόλεως) who came to the aid of the 
people and that the urban cohorts despised the equites singulares, which may be why they 
 
296 Commodus had previously bestowed the title a pugione (‘Master of the Dagger’) on Cleander that gave him 
unofficial control over the Praetorian Guard and the equites singulares. See Whittaker (1969) 76, n.1. 
297 Whittaker (1969) 79, n.3. 
298 Cass. Dio 73.13.5; Whittaker (1969) 351. G.P.S. data indicates that the distance from the praetorian castra 
to the Villa Quintili was 11.3km. This route would take an ordinary person almost 2 ½ hours walk. A soldier's 
march would be quicker, but there would have been a substantial delay if Cleander summoned them after the 
arrival of the crowd. 
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did not join in actively repressing the demonstration.299 Unimpressed with the power 
Cleander had over their position, the Guard and its prefect (who was subsequently 
executed) may have decided to drag their feet when the freedman summoned their 
support.  
 
In Dio’s account, the violence was limited to the area around the imperial villa. In Herodian’s 
version, the crowd broke under the onslaught of the cavalry and headed back to the city 
where a prolonged battle broke out in its narrow, winding streets: 
 
The people were unable to withstand the assault, for they were unarmed men on 
foot fighting against armed men on horseback. And so they fell, not only because the 
cavalry attacked them and trampled [them with their] horses, but also because they 
were overwhelmed by the sheer weight of their own numbers, and many died in the 
pile-ups. The horsemen pursued the fugitives right to the gates of Rome and 
slaughtered them without mercy as they attempted to force their way into the city. 
When the people that had stayed behind in the city saw the horror of what had 
happened, they locked the doors of their houses and climbed onto the roofs, from 
where they pelted the horsemen with stones and tiles. The cavalry began to get a 
taste of their own medicine because there was no-one to fight with at close quarters 
and the people were hurling things from a safe distance….A large number were killed 
on either side before the urban cohorts, who hated the cavalry, came to the rescue 
of the people (1.12.7-9). 
 
What was a demonstration and localised skirmish between protesters and troops became in 
Herodian’s words a ‘civil war.’300 It has been suggested that Herodian’s narrative is a re-
working of Thucydides 2.4.2, but roof tiles and the accompanying stones that held them 
down frequently served as projectiles in Roman urban conflicts.301 Certainly, rulers 
understood what damage tiles could do: Dio tells us that Caracalla had his troops occupy 
 
299 Hdn. 1.12.9. 
300 Hdn. 1.13.1 
301 E.g. Cass. Dio 48.9.4-5; Tac. Hist. 3.71. See Barry (1996) 73-4 for further examples of tile throwing and urban 
warfare in the Graeco-Roman world. 
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city rooftops before massacring the residents of Alexandria in 216CE.302 Tiles were an 
effective and dangerous weapon, but expensive to replace and were therefore only used in 
times of real emergency. The impassioned defence of the city against well-armed soldiers 
reflects the fact that those involved saw themselves under attack by outsiders to their 
community and its ideals, just as in war.303 Herodian has Commodus’ sister Fadilla articulate 
this sense of invasion in an apocryphal aside, telling her brother that ‘our own people (i.e., 
the soldiers) are doing the sort of thing we never expected to happen to us at the hands of 
any barbarian.’304 As with the earlier theatre performance, Commodus was expected to 
acquiesce to, or at least acknowledge the demands made by the protesters who had 
congregated outside his villa. Violent suppression of the protesters interfered with the 
people’s right to communicate with their emperor, and therefore broke the implicit and 
long-standing agreement that emperors would tolerate this type of collective claim-making.  
Commodus’ reluctance to ‘play the part’ at the Circus, and his inability to lead the city 
through pestilence and famine had put so much pressure on a traumatised population that 
they had had to resort to an innovative and transgressive use of space as a way of 
articulating their demands. The invasion of city streets by the imperial cavalry, however, put 
protesters in the position of having to physically defend their neighbourhoods, homes and 
families, and the spatial and social diffusion of the conflict forced the populace to prioritise 
their local collective identities over their obligations to their emperor. 
 
(i) Popular justice 
As the urban population gained the upper hand over the equites singulares and received the 
support of the urban cohorts, two things happened. Commodus realised the danger and 
ordered Cleander’s execution and gave his body to the crowd.305 The hidden transcripts that 
had fuelled conspiracy theories demanded a resolution of the injustice that the freedman 
essentially personified. If Cleander had been executed in response to the initial 
demonstration at the imperial villa, the crowd might well have gone home satisfied, but the 
violence inflicted by the emperor’s soldiers amplified this sense of injustice. Commodus had 
 
302 Cass. Dio 78.22.2. 
303 Barry (1996) 60-61.  
304 Hdn. 1.13.2. Dio has Commodus’ mistress Marcia rather than his sister warn him (73.13.5). 
305 Cass. Dio 73.13.6; Hdn. 1.13.3. 
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finally listened, and the crowd now acted as extra-legal enforcers of a justice originally 
denied. In a re-enactment of the treatment meted out to Vitellius, Sabinus and Sejanus 
decades earlier, a crowd paraded the hated minister’s head, dragged his body through the 
streets, and mutilated his corpse before consigning the body to the sewer. As with Tiberius’ 
right-hand man, Cleander’s children and known associates were also subjected to the same 
indignities.306 The enactment of this violent popular justice ritual was a performative 
response that articulated the damage inflicted upon the crowd by the emperor and his 
administration, and a hated freedman was an ideal scapegoat. Positive perceptions of 
Marcus Aurelius’ response to disaster were lodged in recent memory, and the stark contrast 
between father and son’s regimes made the situational framing clear and explicit.  
 
Passing a public sentence upon Cleander using symbolic, recognisable actions gave a sharp 
definition to the political identities at play, the boundaries between the two parties and the 
relations between and within those boundaries.307 It was also a competitive display that 
signalled the capacity of the urban plebs as a collective entity to resist the repressive 
capacity of the emperor's troops. By acquiescing to the scapegoating of his favourite and 
allowing the assembled populace the political space to exact their own justice, the emperor 
was able to preserve his regime's legitimacy. In fact, although Commodus expected 
additional violence, the people welcomed him back into the city after the riot, escorting him 
to the palace with a procession.308 Their privileged ability to communicate face-to-face with 
the emperor was reconfirmed, and since it proved successful, the crowds could retire with 
the knowledge that the emperor understood his end of their compact. The scale of the 
Circus protest, which was the most severe bout of urban collective violence in over a 
century, posed a serious threat to Commodus’ regime despite a rapid demobilisation 
afterward. During the initial early riser performances, audiences had remained passive. In 
the case of the Circus protest, what had initially begun as a stylised performance, was 
quickly amplified by large numbers of spectators who identified with existing but previously 
non-salient collective identities. The progression of contentious performances from 
 
306 Tac. Ann. 5.9. 
307 Tilly (2003) 84. 
308 Hdn. 1.13.7. 
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Colosseum, theatre, and Circus to the streets thus illustrates the widening edges of 
contention in the latter part of the 180’s in both social and spatial terms.  
 
Such a scale-shift meant that Commodus needed to reimpose imperial authority over the 
contestable Circus space. He did this through a symbolic colonisation of the arena that 
reinforced his domination of the socio-spatial order.309 Not only did Commodus personally 
participate in the games, but he also harnessed the huge popularity of the chariot-races in 
the last years of his reign. Dio comments that he held many races at the Circus, not 
necessarily for religious reasons, but to enrich the faction leaders and delight the 
populace.310 Through this programme, Commodus was able to reassert control by viewing 
his subjects from the middle of ‘his’ arena. With no military glory to advertise and no real 
power base in the Senate, the emperor’s divine legitimation as Commodus-Hercules 
appropriated the power of these institutions and reconstituted them in his own form.311 As 
Hekster comments, ‘Commodus’ behaviour created an extreme form of reciprocity. Rather 
than being an anonymous inspector, the emperor was there to be looked at. Those who 
were subjects could see to whom they were subjected, and what he did to merit his position 
at the top.’312  In essence, the emperor’s personal stewardship of spectacle space 
theatralised its contentiousness, and by doing so, he could overcome the latent threat of 
the location and constrain opportunities for contention. Commodus’ employment of an 
unabashedly populist platform also was an attempt to deflect long-standing grievances 
away from his regime, the reversal of the usual SPQR to PSQR on inscriptions is a case in 
point.313 However, this policy had another effect. It reinforced the symbolic significance of 
the Circus space as contestable, contentious space, which would have implications in the 
future. Furthermore, Commodus’ amplified performances of consensus and reciprocity 
lifted the bar both for himself and future emperors.  
 
 
309 Martin and Miller (2003) 152. 
310 Commodus' personal participation in the games: SHA Comm. 11.10-12, 12.10-12, 15.3; Cass. Dio 73.17.2-3. 
Increased frequency of chariot races: SHA Comm. 16.9; Cass. Dio 73.10.2, 73.16.1. 
311 Cass. Dio 73.15.2; Hdn. 1.14.8. 
312 Hekster (2005) 169. 
313 In 191CE it was noted in the Actis Urbis that the gods had given Commodus to the Populus Senatusque 
Romanus. On the so-called bronze of Lascuta, the usual order has also been changed (CIL 2.5041). 
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The violent conflict of 190CE was a culmination of multiple strands of contention that had 
been building through the initial years of Commodus’ reign. As the emperor closed his 
regime around socially marginal favourites and increased repression, the resulting instability 
of socio-political alignments created political opportunities. Early risers offered an 
alternative discourse that allowed contention to diffuse into new social and spatial sectors 
and forms. These conditions fostered the perception that actors had an opportunity to 
engage in independent action in order to address the injustices caused by Commodus’ poor 
moral leadership at a time of social crisis.314 The street battle and the popular justice meted 
out to Cleander’s corpse, family and friends was a predictable result, given the emergence 
of hidden transcripts into the public sphere. 
 
Exogenous factors were a principal driver of contentious action, but only because the 
regime response was deemed insufficient. A second shock illustrates this point. A 
devastating fire swept through Rome in 191CE, and the sources all describe a clustering of 
portents and prodigies during this time, yet Commodus’ response was to ritually re-name 
the city, legions, grain fleet, Senate, and the populace after himself.315  As crowds had done 
in protest at Caligula’s behaviour, residents stayed away from his extravagant games from 
‘shame and fear.’316 Non-attendance of the games, and the recording of omens show that 
resistance remained, although it had reverted to more passive subversion.  A decrease in 
active contention was expected given Commodus’ theatrical appropriation of the city’s 
spectacle spaces, and his emergent megalomania, but the hidden transcripts that mobilised 
crowds against Cleander continued to circulate. Only now, people believed that the divine 
were conspiring against Rome and its people, and their displeasure, in Herodian and Dio’s 





314 Diani (1996) 1056. 
315 Fire: Hdn. 1.14.2; Cass. Dio 73.24.1-2. Portents: Hdn. 1.14.1; Cass. Dio 73.24.1; SHA Comm. 16.1-3. Legions: 
Cass. Dio 73.15.2. Fleet: SHA Comm. 12.7. Senate: Cass. Dio 73.15.6. The people: SHA Comm. 15.5.  
316 Cass. Dio 73.20.2; Hdn. 1.15.7. Caligula: Cass. Dio 59.13.5, 13.7. 
317 Hdn. 1.14.7: ‘with so many disasters befalling the city in rapid succession [the people] no longer looked with 
favor upon Commodus they attributed their misfortunes to his illegal murders and the other mistakes he had 
made in his lifetime.’ 
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193CE: From crisis to coup—who legitimises the emperor? 
 
The assassination of Commodus, accomplished behind closed doors on New Year’s Day 
193CE was no contentious performance, yet the opportunity for such action was mainly 
predicated around popular discontent in Rome.318 Commodus’ legitimacy was largely based 
upon a strong procedural claim that recognised his dynastic rights, and the traditional roles 
and ideological expectations of the populus, Senate and army.  However, if those roles 
changed, the parties in question still had to accept extant claims, or else they would 
weaken. The emperor’s actions, especially in the last eighteen months of his reign, had 
begun to pick away at some of the foundational basis of his authority. The Senate’s place as 
a political actor had been downgraded, as selected courtiers and the Praetorian Guard were 
elevated in its place. The emperor’s relative lack of success in fulfilling the expectations of 
his main constituents weakened his performance claim. It is also clear that the discursive 
mechanisms that the emperor employed to emphasise his centrality to notions of imperial 
strength and unity, a crucial component of a personalism claim, had not been widely 
accepted.  
 
Commodus may have attempted to ‘coup-proof’ his regime through his close association 
with the Guard, but the erosion of his legitimacy claims provided an opportunity for insiders 
to attempt what those involved in the Lucilla conspiracy had failed to do almost a decade 
earlier. An assassination by court members was neither legitimate nor just, however, and 
new claims had to be constructed by potential imperial candidates. The conspirators had 
picked a replacement that they hoped would be amenable to Rome’s political actors. This 
choice was questioned however, as was the next. Competing imperial claims created an 
unstable political environment where those involved assessed and tested extant boundaries 
as shifting opportunity structures affected the viability of different contentious 
performances. This conflict, in turn, aided the diffusion of political contention to include 
 
318 Dio and Herodian present the murder as an ad hoc response by the courtiers Laetus, Eclectus and Marcia to 
the discovery of their names on the emperor’s hit-list, but more realistically, it was the result of a well-planned 
conspiracy: see Hdn. 1.17.5-7; Cass. Dio 73.22.1-4. Lena Gerling’s research has also demonstrated that 
widespread public discontent, especially when occurring in urban centres, can act as a trigger of coups d'état 
in autocratic regimes by opening a window of opportunity for leadership removals by the ruling elite: Gerling 
(2017) 1-36. 
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new political actors and object pairings; processes that shaped the forms, dynamics, and 
trajectories of urban collective action during 193CE. 
 
Fundamental to the instability of that year was the question of who and by what means 
imperial candidates could establish real authority. The differing outcomes that followed the 
assassinations of Caligula, Nero, and Domitian indicate that whichever group managed to 
take control of immediate events, be it the Senate in the case of Nerva, or the Praetorian 
Guard in the case of Caligula, they could shape the political environment to best suit their 
interests. The conspirator’s choice of emperor was the elderly senator Publius Helvius 
Pertinax. As the current praefectus urbi and serving consul ordinarius of 192CE, Pertinax had 
a high profile with soldiers, politicians and urban plebs alike thanks to his civil and military 
achievements.319 He was considered an ‘exceedingly gentle and considerate’ prefect 
compared to his predecessor. His leadership of the urban cohorts who protected civilians 
from the imperial cavalry in 190CE would have endeared him to the broader population and 
may have signalled his pragmatic approach to potential supporters.320  
 
In the absence of any dynastic claim, Pertinax and his supporters had to establish a robust 
procedural basis for his accession that required the active involvement of the Senate, 
praetorians, and urban plebs. The procedure governing an imperial accession was not 
derived from any specific legal or constitutional rules. Rather, a relatively standardised 
accession ritual arose in which praetorians, then Senate, and finally the people proclaimed a 
new emperor by acclamation. The main functions of the procedure were to create or 
maintain stability through the orderly recognition of Rome’s political groups and to create a 
sense of legitimacy and consensus. For example, following the assassination of Caligula in 
41CE, Claudius was taken first to the area Palatina to be acclaimed as emperor by a group of 
praetorians before being taken to their camp where he was acclaimed a second time. On 
Nero’s accession, the Praetorian Guard acclaimed the emperor in the Palatium and then in 
their castra, with the Senate formalising the investiture in the Curia afterwards.321 Otho was 
 
319 Hdn. 2.1.4; Cass. Dio 74.4.  
320 SHA Pert. 4.3. 
321 Claudius: Joseph. AJ 19.162, 216-217, 223, 226; Suet. Claud. 10. Nero: Tac. Ann. 12.69; Suet. Ner. 8; Arena 
(2007) 327, 330-331. 
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declared emperor in the castra, before addressing the Senate the following day (after the 
murder of Galba).322 Nerva, who rose to power in similar circumstances to Pertinax, was 
acclaimed by the praetorians in the hours after Domitian’s assassination, who were quickly 
offered the expected donativum before the emperor’s official investiture by the Senate.323 
Commodus had already been raised to the position of co-emperor in 177CE, but he still 
followed the basic procedure of imperial accession on his father’s death, delivering an 
adlocutio and promising a donativum for the troops, before entering the imperial palace, 
and then finally addressing the Senate.324 Such a process underlined the primacy of the 
Guard. Their support needed to be secured before a candidate could fulfil his traditional 
obligations to the Senate. Whether an emperor could retain and strengthen his initial claim 
depended on diffuse support from all three groups, but in general, legitimacy was almost 
always bestowed by the politically powerful, and the people’s role was less important in the 
regime transition process. These power dynamics, however, were actively challenged as 
Pertinax approached the rites of accession. 
 
(i) The legitimacy claims of Pertinax 
Given the uncertainty that accompanies any coup, Pertinax had to carefully construct 
legitimacy claims that would be accepted by all three political actors. The literature on 
coups suggests that ordinary people can indirectly influence power dynamics between 
emperors and elites as the ability of conspirators to remove a ruler successfully depends on 
there being enough public discontent with the incumbent to condone regime change.325  
Senatorial and public support for both the coup and the new emperor was expected, but 
whether the Guard supported the change was unclear. Pertinax followed accepted protocol 
by addressing the praetorians first in their castra, but the uncertainty was such that he went 
there directly on the night of Commodus’ assassination in order to receive their 
acclamation. Such haste indicates that the imperial candidate and his supporters expected 
resistance. Trusted men were sent out to spread the news that Commodus was dead and 
that Pertinax was on his way to the praetorian camp to take command of the Empire. The 
 
322 Tac. Ann. 1.36; Plut. Otho 1.1; Suet. Otho 7.1; Cass. Dio 64.5a, 8. 
323 Collins (2009) 100-101.  
324 Hdn. 1.5.1-8, 1.7.3, 1.7.6. 
325 Sudduth (2017) 1795. 
  92 
news mobilised crowds who poured into the streets, temples, and altars to celebrate. Most 
of the crowd quickly rushed to the praetorian camp, fearing that the soldiers would be 
reluctant to accept the new emperor. Herodian states that the people were already inside 
the camp before Pertinax and his entourage even arrived, which strongly suggests that time 
was allowed for a crowd to mobilise as an insurance policy in case the soldiers proved 
reluctant to recognise Pertinax as emperor. Neither Dio’s brief epitome nor the Historia 
Augusta mentions the role of the populus in the nocturnal drama although both concur that 
the praetorians were initially unwilling participants.326 Dio’s snobbish comment that the 
plebs at this time were not only ‘gaining a reputation for boldness of speech’ but also 
wanting to ‘indulge in wanton insolence’ makes more sense if they had forced the 
praetorians to submit to their choice of emperor than if they were merely celebrating the 
demise of a tyrant. Also, given the mode of popular contention utilised against Cleander and 
later interactions between praetorians and civilians at or near their castra, Herodian’s 
version is credible.327 
 
Political mobilisation by night was unusual and reserved for moments of real crisis and 
urgency.328 Many people would have been out celebrating before the New Year festival the 
following day, which would have allowed the free circulation of the news put out by 
supporters of Pertinax, but the imminent meeting at the camp was perceived as an urgent 
situation. This transformation of what was an indefinite situation to one that was tangible 
reaffirmed extant collective identities within which mobilisation could take place.329 
Also, the gathered crowd had some distinct advantages over the soldiers despite a disparity 
in resources. First, the crowd seems to have been extremely large: Herodian says ‘all the 
people’ (πανδημεὶ) mobilised at the camp.330 Likewise, communal sounds of a mass moving 
through the streets would have created an emotional zero-sum game in which the 
noisemakers gained confidence as their listeners experienced fear. The narrative makes no 
 
326 Cass. Dio 74.1; SHA Pert. 4.5-8. 
327 Cass. Dio 74.2. 
328 For example, crowds mobilised at night to sing for Germanicus when rumours of his death reached the city 
(Suet. Calig. 6), and when Caligula fell ill, ‘the people hung about the Palatium all night long…’ (Suet. Calig. 14; 
Cass. Dio 59.8.3). 
329 On the day of the New Year festival the Romans went out of their way to greet each other and exchange 
gifts (Hdn. 1.16.2). For nocturnal festival activities, see Suet. Iul. 37, Aug. 31, Calig. 18, 54, 57, Dom. 4; Mart. 
12.57. 
330 Hdn. 2.2.5. 
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mention of any forced entry. Although the castra had no ditch, it still had walls at least 4.5m 
high, so the Guard let the crowd in willingly, most likely because they were cowed by the 
arrival of such a large, nocturnal crowd immediately after the assassination of their 
benefactor.331  
 
Analysis by economists from Harvard and Stockholm University has found that mass 
protests have a major influence on politics, not because large crowds send a signal to policy-
makers, but because protests get people politically activated.332 Thus, participants had not 
just learned from the Cleander riot that the pressure of a large crowd was an effective 
tactic, but it had also introduced new political actors into the fray. The memory of that 
successful contentious performance diffused across Rome’s social networks and was applied 
to a new space, socio-political context, and claimant-object pair, providing those who 
mobilised in support of Pertinax with information about the potential consequences of their 
interaction with the Guard.333 Confronted with such numbers inside their camp, the 
praetorians could either acquiesce or use violence against a civic body that was many, many 
times larger than their forces at a time when the political succession was unclear. Indeed, 
the soldiers conceded ‘not because they were equally enthusiastic but because they were 
compelled by the great crowd, and were themselves few in number and unarmed.’334 Their 
capitulation thus reinforced for the participants that their belief that a non-violent 
repertoire on a large scale could be successful against powerful opposition. With the 
immediate crisis at the castra successfully attended to, soldiers and civilians together 
brandishing laurel branches escorted the emperor to the imperial palace.335 This would 
usually be the responsibility of the soldiers alone as a daytime procession, but the active 
participation of the crowd along with their earlier intervention qualified such action as 
innovative, even transgressive contention. The active participation of the crowd was as 
much an attempt to redress the growing power differential between soldier and civilian as it 
was about the accession of a new emperor. 
 
331 Busch (2007) 327-8. 
332 Madestam, Shoag, Veuge, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011). 
333 Tarrow (1993) 286; Tilly (2008) 16. 
334 Hdn. 2.2.1-2.2.8, 2.2.9. Dio only offers that Pertinax ‘betook himself secretly to the camp.’ (74.1) 
335 Hdn. 2.2.10. An escort to palace with laurel branches was the custom when the praetorians escorted the 
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(ii) Legitimation and popular sovereignty 
Pertinax needed to establish legitimacy and reinstate political stability. His relationship with 
the Praetorian Guard was tenuous at best, so the support of the Senate and urban plebs 
was essential. The restoration of a collaborative government, and the precepts of justice 
and moral economy formed the backbone of new imperial policy. Following the procession 
from the praetorian camp, Pertinax quickly convened a Senate meeting. Interestingly, they 
may have met at the Temple of Concord. Concordia was meant to represent the political 
harmony of Rome’s citizenry so it may have been a deliberate choice by Pertinax.336 The 
new emperor was extremely deferential, offering a conventional resignation that recognised 
the traditional authority of the body. Presented with a fait accompli though, the Senate 
dutifully added its acclamation, voting the emperor all the usual titles including that of pater 
patriae.337 The immediate bestowal of this title may have been a tacit acknowledgement 
that the pietas owed to the emperor by his subjects should be a response to a claim 
understood as legitimate rather than compelled obedience, and therefore an implicit 
rejection of Commodus’ authoritarianism.338 Indeed, in his senatorial address, Pertinax 
promised a return to an institutionally constrained regime, an approach that exploited the 
traditional narrative that regarded collaborative government as a just political order. The 
Senate’s continued cooperation was ensured by a series of political reforms that reoriented 
the regime’s stance back to the civilis princeps model of rule. Pertinax  ‘always’ attended 
and actively participated in Senate meetings, and mixed with senators socially, both 
practices discontinued by Commodus. Established senatorial hierarchies were enforced.339 
The emperor swore the traditional oath that he would not put any senator to death, and to 
indicate his  ‘democratic’ outlook, Pertinax assumed the venerable title of princeps senatus 
as per ancient practice.340 Caillan Davenport remarks that ‘the ideological facade was 
 
336 Okoń (2014) 48. The Historia Augusta (Pert. 4.9) claims that it was too early to find an attendant to open 
the Curia. Cass. Dio 74.1 places the senatorial meeting at the Curia, so either the Historia Augusta is wrong, or 
the Senate may have reconvened once the Curia had been opened. Given that the Temple of Castor may have 
been utilised for two further emergency meetings (Severus Alexander’s accession in 222CE, and on the deaths 
of Gordian I and II in 238CE), as well as the earlier meeting after the death of Nero, it is probable that it was 
chosen on this occasion also. 
337 Cass. Dio 74.2; SHA Pert. 4.11, 5.5-6; Hdn. 2.3.3-4. Pertinax accepted the title of pater patriae on the day 
that he was declared Augustus, the first emperor to do so.  
338 Charleswoth (1943) 2. 
339 Precedence was given to those who had served as praetor over those who had merely been adlected: SHA 
Pert. 6.10, 9.9. 
340 Cass. Dio 74.5. 
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impressive…Like his predecessor Nerva, who was still being proclaimed a century after his 
death as the spiritual godfather of the Antonine and Severan dynasties, Pertinax understood 
how to utilise the ideologies of the past.341   
 
Pertinax expanded this ideology claim over the coming weeks, reversing unpopular aspects 
of Commodus’ rule, and attending to the precepts of the imperial moral economy. Where 
the former employed repression and populism, the new emperor’s policy was one of 
conciliation, moderation, and justice. Treason trials were abolished, informers banished, 
and the stigma removed from the previously accused. Customs tariffs were repealed, and 
Italian farmers given fallow land and tax immunity. The congiarium promised by Commodus 
was paid, and careful attention was given to the grain-supply. A fixed sum was set aside for 
public works, highway repairs, salary arrears for imperial officials, and the nine years’ 
alimenta arrears.342 Such economical management and consideration for public welfare was 
in Dio’s words ‘everything that a good emperor should do,’ while Pertinax’s ‘consistent and 
deliberate imitation of Marcus’ reign,’ according to Herodian, ‘delighted the older people, 
and won the goodwill (eunoia) of the others without difficulty.’343  
 
These policies established Pertinax’s ideological and foundational claims to legitimacy. It 
was at the same time, a shrewd approach to shared governance. Modern research has 
demonstrated that leaders who accede to a measure of elite restraint are more likely to die 
in their beds of old age than leaders who reject such control.344 In contrast to Commodus’ 
policy, Pertinax at least paid lip service to the idea that he was nominally accountable to the 
Senate and urban population in accordance with implicit cultural norms. The co-optation of 
the Senate as a body meant there were few incentives for senators to mobilise in 
opposition, an important consideration since there were better-connected senators than 
the son of a freedman. Meanwhile, the just distribution of resources to the urban plebs 
restricted opportunities for popular contention. That is not to say that Pertinax had ceded 
the emperor’s powers to other political actors. His symbolic gestures were an attempt to 
 
341 Davenport (2006) 35.  
342 SHA Pert. 6.8, 7.1-5, 9.2-3; Hdn. 2.4.8; Cass. Dio 74.5. 
343 Hdn. 2.4.2. 
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channel grievances into the institutionalised forms of political contention that had 
predominated during the majority of the Flavian and Antonine periods.345  
 
Pertinax may have established a good relationship with the Senate and urban plebs, but the 
new regime offered few real benefits to the Praetorian Guard. It is telling that one of the 
emperor’s first official measures was a decree ordering the praetorians to curb their 
‘arrogant treatment’ of the people.346 Arrogance may have been a rather mild rebuke 
considering that Pertinax’s decree expressly forbade the use of axes (dolabra), presumably 
used by soldiers to break down doors and help themselves to people’s possessions.347 While 
this decree would have been popular with the plebs, it was a clear sign to the Guard that 
the privileged position they had held under Commodus was under threat. The Historia 
Augusta claims that the praetorians planned on replacing the emperor as early as the third 
day of the new reign, and there was also some opposition to Pertinax’s accession within the 
Senate and imperial household.348  Separately, they may not have had the opportunity or 
resources to challenge the popular Pertinax, but one event provided both. It appears that 
Pertinax was planning on reorganising the Praetorian Guard by placing the unit under the 
command of his father-in-law, the new praefectus urbi Flavius Sulpicianus.349 This 
development may have precipitated a change of heart for the praetorian prefect Laetus, 
who mobilised the Guard by punishing soldiers in Pertinax’s name. Physical repression was 
the last straw, and a group of soldiers stormed the palace, indirectly aided by staff who left 
all the entrances open. In an echo of Quintianus’ attack on Commodus, Dio tells us that a 
lone soldier attacked Pertinax first, exclaiming; ‘the soldiers have sent you this sword.’350 
 The assassination was comparable to that of Commodus a mere three months earlier, but 
the political actors involved had changed. It is true that Laetus and others were actively 
conspiring, but the mobilisation of 200-300 praetorians and their corresponding course of 
action was an in-house decision as subsequent events reveal. Once the emperor was dead, 
 
345 Schock (2004) 31. 
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the praetorians cut off his head, fastened it on a spear and carried it through the city back 
to their camp.351  
 
There are two important elements to the praetorian’s execution of Pertinax. First, the use of 
a spear (hasta) was emblematic of the core function of the Guard, but it also had a broader 
significance. Verrius Festus’ definition ‘hasta summa armorum et imperii est’ demonstrates 
that the spear was viewed as a potent symbol of sovereign power – indeed Andrew Alföldi 
argues that multiple imperial writers conceptualised the spear almost as an active ruler.352 
The use of such a weapon then, was not just one of practicality, but a lesson in the Guard’s 
ability to wield executive power. Second, we can see a strong parallel between the 
praetorian’s actions, and those of the crowd that paraded Cleander’s corpse through the 
streets. In other words, the soldiers had appropriated a popular justice ritual. By doing so, 
they ‘legitimised’ their collective violence as a just act of self-defence. There was a 
precedent for their behaviour: the praetorians did virtually the same thing in 69CE when 
they killed Galba and paraded his head on the end of a spear.353 This time, however, they 
made this display public, tying it to the popular justice meted out to Cleander and his 
associates. Popular justice by ordinary people usually ‘served as a context for the symbolic 
disciplining of the elite by the masses.’354 Such collective behaviour represented the hidden 
transcripts of subaltern groups. The Praetorian Guard held a great deal of power as regime 
members under Commodus rather than subjects or challengers. Through their use of space 
and ritual, the praetorians made the popular justice repertoire modular and transformed 
their assassination of Pertinax into a public, contentious claim. It was a powerful political 
statement for the Guard as a collective, meant to both persuade and intimidate Rome’s 
other political actors.  
 
Dio succinctly summed up the failure of Pertinax’s brief tenure, observing that the emperor 
‘failed to comprehend…that one cannot with safety reform everything at once, and that the 
restoration of a state, in particular, requires both time and wisdom;’ still a primary tenet of 
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modern-day change management. This was not just a political succession but a regime 
change. Regime change requires suitable opportunities, but such opportunities also tend to 
intensify divisions within a regime and embolden oppositional forces.355 Overnight the 
Praetorian Guard went from a privileged position to one of political insecurity. In response, 
they manufactured an opportunity by exploiting the temporary weakness of the imperial 
system. Their rapid reaction to the potential threat bypassed Pertinax’s attempts to forge 
legitimacy, and his reign ended a mere three months after his accession. 
 
(iii) ‘Bought’ legitimacy: Julianus, the Praetorian Guard and the escalation of 
popular contention 
The deposition of an emperor so soon after a similarly brutal transition had a significant 
impact on political opportunity structures by increasing instability and by impacting civilian-
military relations. Given the populace’s active role in Pertinax’s accession, it would be 
expected that his murder would provoke a reaction from them. Indeed, as rumours of 
Pertinax’s assassination raced through the city, the praetorians barricaded themselves in 
their camp as a mob in the ‘grip of unreasoning fury’ ran about the city looking to take 
revenge on the assassins.356 The Praetorian Guard had rejected a regime that hinted at a 
return to the ‘good old days’ for the people, but their fury was not just based on recent 
events. Pertinax’s decree proves that the Guard had revelled in the power that Commodus’ 
dependence brought, although the mistreatment of civilians by soldiers was not just 
restricted to his regime. Indeed, the arrogant violence of soldiers was universally 
recognised. Epictetus warns that if a soldier wanted your mule, it was best to give it to him. 
If you refused, the soldier would take it anyway and you would receive a beating as well.357 
An edict from the prefect of Egypt in the early second century complained of the insults and 
abuse that private citizens had to bear from a greedy and unjust army, while in his last 
satire, Juvenal described the power a soldier could wield over the urban populace:358 
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Let me first deal with the benefits enjoyed by all soldiers, 
Not the least being that no civilian will dare to assault you, 
Rather if he’s beaten himself, he’ll give out that he wasn’t, 
Reluctant to show the praetor his missing teeth, the lumps 
On his face, the black swollen bruises… 
… It’s easier to find a false witness against a 
Civilian than one who’ll tell a truth that reflects badly 
On a military man’s honour, and his superior status (16.7-11, 32-34). 
 
The opportunism of the praetorians had escalated under Commodus and showed that the 
emperor had lost the ability to enforce the constraining boundaries that limited the 
behaviour of urban political actors. Violence inflicted by governmental agents was a justice 
issue, and by privileging his soldiers over the populace, Commodus threatened the strong 
connective structures between regime and subject that affirmed imperial legitimacy. The 
closer security apparatus is to the centre of power, the more probable it is that repression 
could be employed on the population because coercive agents can extract enhanced 
resources and status by applying oppressive measures on behalf of the emperor.359 This 
threat entrenched perceptions of injustice among the populace, and encouraged the 
development of oppositional identities. It also explains why crowds massed at the 
praetorian camp the night of Pertinax’s accession, since there was a pre-existing belief that 
the soldiers would try to impede any restoration of a traditional regime. Pertinax’s murder 
only confirmed these perceptions. 
 
 A military coup had negated the people’s role in legitimating the emperor, and the mood in 
the city was once of defiance.360 Crowds gathered to chant: ‘with Pertinax in control, we 
lived secure, we feared no one. To a dutiful father! To the father of the senate! To the 
father of all good men!’361 The sentiments of the triple repeat echo a crowd’s cries of ‘salva 
Roma, salva patria, salvus est Germanicus’ after rumours of Germanicus’s recovery made 
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their way around Rome in 23CE. In both cases, the highly emotional and spontaneous 
reaction reflected the belief that each man’s death was a community crisis, for the 
communal articulation of pietas was directly linked to the welfare of the state (salus 
publica). The Guard was also supposed to owe the emperor pietas since they had sworn an 
oath to him, and their rejection of this oath and the common good exacerbated the already 
highly contentious civilian-soldier relationship, activating collective identities through which 
rumours could spread and mass mobilisation could take place. At least a full day passed 
before calm finally settled over the city. Despite widespread agitation, no attack on the 
praetorian camp materialised, which allowed the Guard to begin negotiating with potential 
imperial candidates.362 Our sources present the infamous ‘auctioning of the empire’ by the 
soldiers to the highest bidder as a low point of urban Roman politics.363 As he had done with 
Otho, Dio presented the successful applicant, Didianus Julianus, as a man who shamefully 
bought his way to the imperial purple. His offer of an enormous donativum of 25,000 
sesterces was larger than Marcus Aurelius’s gift of 20,000 and considerably more than 
Pertinax’s offer of 12,000.364 The Historia Augusta also comments that Julianus promised 
that he would restore Commodus’ good name as a not so subtle hint that his regime would 
model that of their former master.365  
 
As Flaig argues, the giving of a donativum was a symbolic gesture that cemented the 
affective bond between an emperor and his troops.366 Negotiating the size of a donativum 
before an acclamation, however, made a mockery of the standardised sequence of events 
that made up the procedural basis of a legitimacy claim. It also made the emperor appear 
subservient to the Guard since he had to buy their support rather than earn it through 
virtue and position.367 Julianus did attempt to follow protocol by addressing the Senate 
immediately after winning the support of the Guard, yet his speech offended many. He 
offered no recusatio imperii, instead committing the faux pas (in Dio’s eyes at least) of 
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praising himself as the best man for the job.368 The result was that Julianus managed to 
alienate both the plebs and Senate within hours of his accession. 
 
The first episode of popular contention occurred as the newly acclaimed emperor made his 
way to the Curia. Reflecting the urgency of the transition, this procession like that of 
Pertinax took place at night. In stark contrast to Pertinax who was accompanied by the 
people as well as the imperial troops (without arms), Julianus proceeded under heavy 
guard. The gathered crowd made their opposition known by refusing to offer the customary 
congratulations, instead shouting curses at the emperor.369 The hostility was less about 
Julianus the man, than the fact that he had made an alliance with the despised Guard, 
cutting the people and Senate out of the accession process. As a consequence, opposition to 
the new emperor could be framed around multiple injustices, providing strong incentives 
for ordinary people to protest. Without a doubt, the massing of nocturnal crowds reveals 
that the city was not just well-informed but also mobilised for action. Nor did they disperse 
after the night’s events. The following day, groups gathered to discuss the goings-on where 
people spoke their minds openly and were ‘getting ready to do anything.’370 Herodian notes 
that many believed that Julianus had bought the empire, and even the more sympathetic 
Historia Augusta notes that negative rumours about the emperor swirled ‘from the very first 
day.’371 These gatherings suggest that Rome’s hidden transcripts were facilitating 
mobilisation for political purposes. Although the sources do not specify where people 
gathered, we can speculate that the usual spaces for social interaction were employed. 
Ammianus Marcellinus records that groups of people often gathered (circulos multos 
collectos), in the fora, compita, the streets, and other meeting-places to discuss affairs. In 
fact, the fevered discussions regarding Julianus’ accession could be described as circuli, that 




368 Icks (2014) 93. 
369 Hdn. 2.6.13; Cass. Dio 74.12. 
370 Cass. Dio 74.13.2. 
371 SHA Did. Jul. 3.8; Hdn. 2.6.13. 
372 Amm. Marc. 28.4.29; O’Neill (2001) 96-97.  
  102 
A type of non-elite discourse, circuli often formed at moments of crisis (including during the 
night), and were recognised as a venue for venting anger and planning popular action.373 
The Life of Probus explicitly links the circulus with political action in an incident where 
soldiers gathered to discuss (per multos circulos) who should be the next emperor, with 
their acclamation of Probus shortly after.374 They were, therefore, highly political and 
represented currents of dissent. It is also no coincidence that carriers of hidden transcripts 
like astrologers, fortune-tellers, and philosophers were known to have found audiences 
in…vulgi circulis.375 Our source’s descriptions of groups of people exchanging rumours and 
information in public spaces are noteworthy then, not just because they represented hidden 
transcripts, and thus widely-held beliefs and opinions, but also because they showed that 
people were continuing to mobilise and plan. Crowds had recently occupied the praetorian 
castra, and the processional route to the Curia. Such diffusion of the spatial and temporal 
elements of contention means that a diffusion of political actors was also taking place. The 
greater the diffusion, the higher the number of individuals affected, a strong predictor of 
continued mobilisation and contentious behaviour.  
 
Indeed, when Julianus arrived at the Curia to conduct a sacrifice, an assembled crowd ‘as if 
by preconcerted arrangement’ yelled curses and launched a shower of stones.376 Stone-
throwing (lapidatio) was an old Republican popular justice custom. It was meant to 
intimidate and was a symbolic means of articulating the rights of the people to exact justice. 
The practice was rarely used in the imperial period though, and only in times of serious 
conflict with the regime. For example, stones were thrown at Claudius during the food riot 
of 51CE, a crowd threatened to stone the Curia during the Pedanius Secundus debate in 
61CE, and stones were thrown at Antoninus Pius during a food riot.377 The attack on 
 
373  Livy 34.37. Linking circuli with anger: Livy 7.12, 32.20. Tacitus (Agr. 43) noted that on the death of Agricola, 
the vulgus gathered in the Forum and formed circuli to discuss the politically sensitive issue (per fora et 
circulos illocuti sunt). See O’Neill (2001) 97-104. 
374 SHA Prob. 10.4. 
375 Porphyrio on Hor. Sat. 1.6.114. As this passage shows, circuli often had at their centre a circulator; someone 
around whom a crowd will gather. Astrologers, magicians, and philosophers certainly fit this bill. See also Pers. 
1.134; Sen. Ep. 29.7. 
376 Cass. Dio 74.13.3; SHA Did. Jul. 4.2-4. Herodian does not explicitly describe this episode but does describe 
the people cursing Julianus bitterly and taunting him for his continuous and disgraceful debauches whenever 
he appeared in public (2.7.2). 
377 Claudius: Tac. Ann. 12.43, Suet. Claud. 18. Pedanius Secundus: Tac. Ann. 14.42-44; Ant. Pius: Aur. Vict. Caes. 
152.9. The attack on the Senate house in 61CE was also an example of occentare; an old popular justice 
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Julianus, so reminiscent of popular contentious performances of the Late Republic, was both 
symbolic and practical as an intimidation tactic and was a visible and recognisable means of 
articulating the rights of the people to exact justice.378 Julianus offered a congiarium in 
appeasement but was loudly rebuffed, and as he attempted to return to the Capitol, the 
assembled crowd blocked his way. This action prompted the emperor to order an attack.379 
Dio claims that a significant number were wounded and killed in many parts of the city, 
indicating that Julianus’ repressive measures went further than mere crowd control. In 
response, the people reacted as following; 
 
[the people] seized arms and rushed together into the Circus, and there spent the 
night and the following day without food or drink, shouting and calling upon the 
remainder of the soldiers, especially Pescennius Niger and his followers in Syria, to 
come to their aid. Later, exhausted by their shouting, by their fasting, and by their 
loss of sleep, they separated and kept quiet, awaiting the hoped-for deliverance 
from abroad (74.13.5). 
 
Although both Herodian and the Historia Augusta mention protests at the Circus, Dio’s 
narrative is far more detailed since he was probably an eye-witness to the unfolding events. 
He describes the official news of Julianus’ accession being brought to him personally, 
Julianus’ speech to ‘us’ senators, and in a comment that rings genuine, describes how the 
‘surrounding buildings echoed back the shout[s of the crowd demonstrating in the Forum] in 
a way to make one shudder.’380  
 
The intervention of a mobilised crowd to protect the accession of Pertinax supports the 
notion that the people believed they had long-standing albeit dormant rights to be involved 
in the process of legitimising an imperial candidate, and Julianus’ bargain with the Guard 
 
tradition advertising the infamy of an individual with shouted chants, founded on the tradition of attacking an 
individuals’ house with fire. See Lintott (1999) 8-9 for discussion and Republican examples. See also Cic. De 
rep. 4.12; Plaut. Most. 587, Pseud. 556, 1145. 
378 As the opening lines of Ovid’s poem Nux reveals (Ps-Ovid Nux 1-2). Examples of lapidatio in the Late 
Republic: Cic. de Or. 1.197, Off. 2.49, Sest. 62, Mil. 41, 43, Sen. 7, Pis. 28, Att. 4.1.6-7; 4.3.3, Fam. 5.17.2, Dom. 
6-7, 10-18; Asc. 30C; Plut. Cat. Min. 28.2; Cass. Dio 37.43.3. 
379 Cass. Dio 74.13.3; SHA Did. Jul. 4.6. 
380 Cass. Dio 74.12, 74.13.4. 
  104 
and subsequent repression fuelled perceptions that his regime was illegitimate. If lapidatio 
was employed as a communal self-help mechanism, the deliberate occupation of the Circus 
transmitted a more sophisticated and symbolic message of power that framed the 
performance as an overt challenge to existing power differentials. Praetorians were 
recognised political actors and an essential part of the accession process, yet their murder 
of Pertinax, who was regarded by the public as legitimate, and their backing of another 
candidate for personal gain undermined their role as legitimators and by extension, the 
legitimacy of Julianus himself. The new emperor could not immediately establish any strong 
ideological, foundational or procedural claims as a result. His repressive response at what 
was meant to be a consensus ritual demonstrated that he could not forge a personalism 
claim based around expected civic qualities. Indeed, rather than construct a working 
relationship with the people, Julianus exacerbated tensions by loftily announcing that he 
would not assist the populace since they would not affirm their consensus.381 The emperor 
was unequivocal; he would not seek the acceptance of the population. Instead, he would 
safeguard his position through his direct dependence on the Guard and their repressive 
capacity. 
 
The Circus Maximus had long been a site for the articulation of both public and hidden 
transcripts and its use at night in the absence of racing or usual ritual made it defiantly free 
space. The successful anti-Cleander demonstration three years earlier provided a template 
for contention at that site, and, in each incident, the space was used as an affirmation of 
plebeian collectiveness. In a spatial sense, this challenge was actioned differently. In the 
Cleander riot, the Circus was a permeable container of contention; it generated cohesion, 
which then facilitated movement through other urban spaces. Those who protested against 
Julianus utilised the Circus as an impermeable barrier, spatially affirming a clear political 
position for those present. Moreover, in contrast to the open Forum and streets where 
Julianus’ soldiers could attack with impunity, the built structure of the racetrack provided a 
measure of physical security for the protesters. It was a place where they could use the 
strength of their numbers and the Circus walls as an effective defence from the well-trained 
Praetorian Guard. Additionally, the use of the night as a new and politically charged time-
 
381 Cass. Dio 74.13.5. 
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space was a significant development. Both Pertinax and Julianus’ official accessions took 
place at night and people mobilised in real time. The use of the Circus at night also broke 
usual social and spatial routines. Although they occupy the same physical areas, the night 
spaces used by protesters used darkness to pursue transgressive and counter-hegemonic 
goals. Robert Williams argues that night spaces incorporate the myriad tensions of the social 
processes that constitute them, and ‘because of its transgressive meanings and societally 
harmful uses, darkness threatens to de-territorialize the rationalising order of society.’382 Of 
course, Julianus and the praetorians had attempted to use night as a cover for their own 
transgressive actions, and the urban populace responded in kind. Central to disruptive 
actions is innovative behaviour which, as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly argue, ‘incorporates 
claims, collective self-representations, and adopts means that are either unprecedented or 
forbidden within the regime in question.’383 Innovation and political instability go hand in 
hand, and the Circus demonstration was the result of a ruptured moral economy, 
consequential shifts in political opportunity structures and a large uptick in general feelings 
of uncertainty. The protesters had ‘emplaced’ their claim by establishing it among the 
symbolic associations of the occupied time-space, while issuing a challenge to their 
opponents. Julianus’ only options were to either violently invade the Circus and further 
damage his reputation or allow the subversion of the space to continue, thus demonstrating 
his weakness in the face of such a defiant challenge.  
 
Moreover, the occupation of the Circus indicates the crowd favoured a non-cooperative 
approach, one that would avoid bloodshed whilst signalling to potential allies that the 
emperor did not have the consensus of the city. At the same time, the population’s refusal 
to cooperate lowered the value of seizing power for the praetorians. If large numbers of 
people refused to cooperate, the punishment cost for each person was small, while the risks 
for the vastly outnumbered Guard increased regardless of their training and resources.384  
As news arrived that there were two more potential challengers, Septimius Severus in 
Upper Pannonia and Clodius Albinus in Britain, public opposition to the regime continued to 
grow, further exposing the vulnerability of Julianus and his backers.   
 
382 Williams (2008) 518. 
383 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 8. 
384 Sutter (1999) 131, 136. 
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(iv) The Augustan model: Severan legitimacy 
The mass protests under Julianus offered opportunities for challengers. Pescennius Niger 
may have been popular, but Severus moved first, making a lightning-quick march on Rome. 
As he bore down on Rome with his hardened Pannonian legions, Severus wrote to the city’s 
leading men and had his agents post placards up around the city. Severan supporters also 
intercepted the proclamations and letters Niger sent to the people and Senate proclaiming 
his own accession.385 The strategic control of both formal and informal communication 
networks demonstrates that Severus understood how crucial rumour and material forms of 
contention were during a crisis. Rumour filled both informational and psychological needs 
and would spread when people were fearful, angry, or uncertain about what was going on. 
Julianus had put the Praetorian Guard in charge of the city’s defences, but their unpractised 
hands, let alone their ability to withstand an invading force, drew the derision of the 
populace.386 If Rome believed that Severus and his forces held a stronger position than 
Julianus, such views were boosted by the authority of written communication. Those who 
hung around porticoes, shops, temples, and compita exchanging news could be directly 
influenced by the posting of pro-Severan libelli in and around those spaces. It is no accident 
that when Severus finally occupied the city in early June, he billeted his soldiers in the very 
temples, porticoes and other spaces where people would gather in circuli.387 In other words, 
the city’s hidden transcripts and written contention seemed more trustworthy than the 
public transcript put out by the regime. 
 
With a lack of official information regarding the other challengers creating a crisis of 
confidence, Severus could present himself as a potential ally to those opposed to the 
current regime. Nonetheless, the city feared both his intentions and his Pannonian troops, 
an understandable reaction given the last time a general marched on Rome was 69CE. 
When news was deliberately circulated that Severus and his troops had already secretly 
entered the city in disguise, Rome panicked.388 The populace proclaimed Julianus a coward 
 
385 SHA Sev. 6.8. 
386 The Guard had not seen action since the Marcomannic War ended in 180CE: Cass. Dio 74.16.2-3; SHA Did. 
Jul. 5.9-6.1; Hdn. 2.11.9. 
387 SHA Sev. 7.2-3. 
388 Hdn. 2.12.2. There may have been an infiltration from an advance guard. However, it is more likely that 
supporters circulated the news that Severus was already in town in order to quash any popular opposition to 
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and Niger a hesitant sloth. The praetorians, terrified at the thought of fighting battle-
hardened barbarian legions, quickly followed Severus’ written orders and had Pertinax’s 
murderers arrested. The staff of the imperial palace deserted, and the people tore down the 
senatorial decrees. There was nothing left for the Senate to do but capitulate. Julianus was 
sentenced to death, and Severus named emperor.389 
 
Julianus’ regime had evaporated in a matter of days. If Pertinax’s main mistake was 
attempting to change power differentials too quickly, Julianus’ mistake was to ape the 
Commodian model of a repressive, closed-regime type without establishing real authority 
first. Commodus at least had inherited strong legitimacy claims. Julianus, on the other hand, 
began his reign with little credibility and was unable to construct legitimacy claims derived 
from any other source other than the Praetorian Guard. The corrupt bargain struck between 
Julianus and the Praetorian Guard not only bypassed popular sovereignty, it was also 
framed as an unjust travesty of the usual legitimacy process, which in turn opened up 
opportunities to challenge, resist, and deny the construction of a new, military-backed 
regime. As the concept of imperial legitimacy and justice took on new meaning, this cultural 
construct was tested through acts of popular contention and entered the political culture in 
a more pliable form.390  Severus had taken possession of Rome without encountering any 
real resistance. If he wanted his reign to last longer than his immediate predecessors, he 
would have to settle multiple claims. Once a pattern of coups has begun, they tend to 
continue until a sufficiently skilful leader manages to domesticate the military or 
consolidate power in his own person. Indeed, one of the best predictors of the risk of a coup 
is another recent coup, since, as Samuel Finer has noted, ‘the claim to rule by virtue of 
superior force invites challenge; indeed it is in itself a tacit challenge to any contender who 
thinks he is strong enough to chance his arm.’391 Three violent transitions in six months 
alongside the first capture of Rome by a military commander in 124 years reinforced the 
instability of the political environment. The people were energised, the praetorians 
dangerous, and both groups had shown themselves capable of making vehement 
 
the advancing main guard. In any event, Severus made his grand entrance into the city after Julianus’ 
execution. SHA Sev. 6.6: ingens trepidatio. 
389 Cass. Dio 74.17.3-5; Hdn. 2.12.6; SHA Did. Jul. 8.6-9, Sev. 5.9-10. 
390 Tarrow (1993) 286. 
391 Finer (1962) 17-18; Márquez (2016) 113. 
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contentious claims against the regime. The treasury was empty, and a costly civil war 
loomed. Severus had to address the claims of not only Niger and Albinus but also the 
competing claims of the city’s political actors. Military occupations are always unpopular 
and require no small measure of moral justification. Dio presents Severus’ spectacular 
adventus as a ceremony of affirmation with soldier, pleb and senator alike celebrating their 
good fortune, but a perhaps more accurate summation of the city’s reaction was that of fear 
and panic. Crucially, Severus defused immediate tensions by departing the city shortly after 
his accession, taking his occupying forces with him.392 Despite his absence, the new emperor 
still needed to establish authority over the city’s constituent actors. He was enormously 
successful, primarily through shutting down political opportunity structures, establishing 
multiple legitimacy claims, and by meeting the obligations of the imperial moral economy.   
 
Severus’ initial focus was to construct ideological and procedural claims tailored to those 
affected by the policies of Julianus and Commodus. His first act was to cashier the 
Praetorian Guard for breaking their oath to Pertinax, banishing them sans clothes and 
equipment from the city.393 Ideologically, this strategy allowed Severus to avoid any 
impression that he was buying the troops’ loyalty, and their brutal dismissal reminded all 
that they were meant to be the protectors of emperors, not the makers of them. Instantly, 
Severus had redressed the power imbalance between the Guard and Rome’s other political 
actors. Next, Severus tackled the cultural and material expectations of the civilian 
population. Pertinax was declared a god and was given a lavish public funeral. Dio, who was 
a participant in the ceremony, described how Severus, now styled Lucius Septimius Severus 
Pertinax, gave the laudatio for the traditional and reverential ceremony. The funeral gave 
some credence to the emperor’s claimed intention of modelling his regime on that of 
Pertinax, and by extension, Pertinax’s exemplar, Marcus Aurelius. Indeed, this connection 
was made more explicit after the defeat of Niger when Severus announced himself to be the 
son of Marcus.394 Pertinax’s deification was also an act of pietas that reconciled Severus 
with the gods and offered a measure of concord for the city. A congiarium and shows were 
 
392 Hdn. 2.14.5. Severus needed to attend to Pescennius Niger, who had been proclaimed by his troops at 
Antioch. 
393 Hdn. 2.13.2-11; Cass. Dio 75.1; SHA Sev. 6.11. 
394 Birley (1999) 105; Favro and Johansen (2010) 24. 
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provided for the people, and the public benefits supporting the imperial moral economy 
were assiduously managed. In particular, the supply and distribution of grain that was so 
problematic for Commodus and Pertinax was reorganised for greater efficiency. Severus 
forbade the practice of adareatio (the payment of taxes in cash) for Egyptian peasants 
whose grain was needed to supply Rome. He also merged the frumentationes and cura 
aquarum into a single office, at around the same time that the construction of aqueduct-
powered flour mills took place on the Janiculum Hill. These improvements meant that the 
grain-dole could now be distributed as a flour ration, reducing the impact of corruption and 
hoarding on open market prices.395 The Historia Augusta claims that Severus was the first to 
institute a free daily oil allowance, although it is more likely that he incorporated oil 
transport and distribution networks into the annona system.396 Streamlined supply chains 
meant plentiful supplies for the population: we do not hear of any shortages during Severus’ 
reign, and a surplus equivalent to seven years’ tribute, or 75,000 modii per day was held in 
the city’s granaries at the time of the emperor’s death in 211CE.397  
 
A stabilised food supply reflected well on the regime, and a return to some semblance of 
economic steadiness also generated significant political capital. Although Severus was 
forced to debase the coinage in order to pay for his wars, a lag in price and wage increases 
enabled the government to reap net surplus revenues that exceeded the short-term effects 
of inflation, providing a sense of recovery for Rome’s inhabitants.398 Such benefits were the 
material aspects of a new narrative affirming the righteousness of the new regime. 
Undeniably, Severus’ ideological claims were inextricably connected to his pursuit of 
procedural legitimacy. Injustice undermines legitimacy, but even a government not initially 
viewed as legitimate could achieve stability if it produced just norms. The just nature of a 
properly functioning moral economy went hand in hand with the new regime’s traditional 
approach to law and social order. When resident in Rome, Severus would spend mornings 
holding court, allowing litigants and advisors the opportunity to speak freely. 399 He also 
 
395 Taylor (2010) 201-2. 
396 SHA Sev. 18.3; Broekaert (2011) 620. 
397 Taylor (2010) 209; SHA Sev. 8.5, 23.2.  
398 The denarius was reduced in fineness to about 46%. As Harl (1996) 126-7 notes, the immediate effect of 
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399 Cass. Dio 77.17.1-2; Hdn. 3.10.2.  
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promised the end of confiscations without trial and the use of informers and took the 
traditional oath not to execute senators. Law and order meant stability, but it also 
represented something more: the re-building of societas civilis, a citizen-state held together 
by justice and existing for the mutual benefit of the community.  
 
Foundational myth and Severan control of public space 
 
To be clear, Severus’ reimaging of a rejuvenated citizen-state was part of an agenda to cloak 
his increasing authoritarianism within a cultural and legalistic framework.400 A vital part of 
this agenda was to create, manipulate and control public space in order to bolster imperial 
legitimacy and boost regime capacity. In terms of legitimacy, Severus claimed his 
entitlement by invoking the past by instituting the largest building imperial programme in 
Rome for many years. Buildings and temples damaged by the fire of 191CE were restored or 
rebuilt, and new construction projects begun.401 Although the Severan redevelopment of 
the city was not on the same scale as Augustus’ programme, it still followed the Augustan 
tradition of employing urban architecture as a means of establishing regime legitimacy by 
fostering the perception that the emperor alone created Rome’s newfound peace and 
prosperity.402 Severus’ re-fashioning of the visual environment was a deliberate 
manipulation of collective memory, and was aimed at addressing the anxieties many 
Romans were beginning to feel about the centrality and stability of their city. 
 
Augustan ideology went further than mere bricks. The Secular Games of 204CE, a rare and 
spectacular religious festival, was a conscious imitation of those put on by Augustus in 
17BCE.403 Even the triumphal arch erected in 203CE to celebrate victory over the Parthians 
honoured Severus for the same achievements trumpeted by Augustus in his Res Gestae, and 
was symbolically located diagonally opposite the arch erected to celebrate Augustus’ 
 
400 Wallace-Hadrill (1982) 43.  
401 The construction and repair programme included the Templum Pacis, Bibliotheca Pacis, Porticus 
Margaritaria et Piperitaria, Templum Divi Vespasiani, Aqua Claudia, Templum Herculis et Dionysii, Pantheon, 
Septizodium, and the Porticus Octaviae.  
402 For an excellent overview of the Severan building programme, see Gorrie (1997). 
403 The surviving fragments of the commentarii of the ludi saeculares held by Augustus and Severus make it 
clear that Severus modelled his celebration on that of Augustus. For the preserved fragments, see Pighi (1965) 
107-119, 137-175. See also Birley (2002) 155-160; Barnes (2008) 264. On the Secular Games, see Rantala 
(2017). 
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diplomatic success over the Parthians two centuries earlier.404 By fusing his achievements 
with those of Augustus, Severus could insert himself into Augustan tradition and Rome’s 
collective memories of grandeur and glory. At the same time, the combination of myth and 
architecture created Severan foundational myth and ideological legitimacy claims. Both 
stressed societal order, the transcendental nature of the regime, and most importantly, the 
centrality of the people in the state-building process that legitimated an emperor’s rule.405 
This last point also suggests that Severus was not only aware of the latent power of a 
politically activated populace, but also of the grievances regarding their position that had 
festered during the latter years of Commodus’ rule, and the few short months of Julianus’ 
reign. 
 
(i) The Septizodium 
The Severan building plan had yet another purpose. Asserting robust legitimacy claims was 
imperative, as an emperor who provided social goods affirmed the rights and identities 
grounded within the bounds of Roman collective identities. Moreover, it was those 
collectives that constituted sites for the realisation of popular claim-making and political 
participation.406 Severus was aware of the potential for mass mobilisation. He had been 
quick to control unofficial and official information channels before his accession, but 
controlling the city’s public spaces was another matter. The most contentious space, the 
Circus Maximus, could only be controlled through physical force. Severus’ solution was to 
provide new or refurbished public spaces in which he could shape the collective experiences 
and memories attached to them. The placement and design of one building in particular, the 
Septizodium, demonstrates how the emperor attempted to redirect attention away from 
the Circus and create new spatial routines associated primarily with his regime. A large and 
lavishly decorated nymphaneum, the Septizodium was constructed on a prominent site on 
the Palatine Hill.407 Charmaine Gorrie has noted that Severus created a sizeable artificial 
terrace on the Palatine extending in the direction of the Circus. This terrace substantially 
 
404 The inscription states that the Senate and people of Rome set it up ‘on account of the restoration of the 
Republic and the extension of the Empire of the Roman People by their outstanding justice at home and 
abroad:’CIL 6.1033 = ILS 426.  
405 von Soest and Grauvogel (2017) 289.  
406 Soysal (2004) 1. 
407 Ammianus Marcellinus describes the Septizodium as an operis ambitiosi nymphaenum (15.7.3). 
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enlarged the plateau on the top of the hill where the Septizodium was located. As Gorrie 
points out, the Septizodium ‘seems to have been intended to create an imposing façade for 
the hill when viewed from the Circus Maximus;’ visually advertising a Severan presence 
above the track.408 The Septizodium was also located at a busy urban hub. The Via Appia 
through the Porta Capena terminated here, as did the streets that flanked the Circus and 
Palatine. This meant that it quickly became a popular meeting place: during Ammianus 
Marcellinus’ time, the nymphaneum was still a locus celebris and leisure space for the urban 
plebs.409 With one prominent building, Severus was able to create new space and social 
routines directly linked to his dynasty and promise of stability and renewal. The Septizodium 
shifted attention away from the contentious routines of the Circus and reminded spectators 
of the power that loomed above them, more important at a time when the pulvinar and 
imperial palace were not occupied by the emperor. The Severan presence could be 
maintained through new social routines, rather than empty buildings. 
 
 Furthermore, Severus increased the regime’s repressive capacity. He doubled the size of 
the praetorians and expanded the ranks of the urban cohorts and vigiles.410  Hélène 
Ménard believes that the vigiles in particular now had close links with the regime. Their 
barracks were restored along with the praetorian camp, and the prefect of the vigiles in 
193CE was none other than the emperors’ soon to be right-hand man Gaius Fulvius 
Plautianus, whom Dio claimed later became so powerful that he occupied the real position 
of emperor.411 Severus also better defined the powers of the praefectus urbi, especially 
around the prefect’s responsibility for keeping the peace. Ulpian records that the prefect 
had to station soldiers (milites stationarii) at the spectacles to maintain order and ‘to keep 
himself informed of all that goes on.’412 The prefect also had the power to prosecute 
members of illicit collegia, could banish anyone from the city and the spectacles and forbid 
them their trade or business; the latter suggests a deliberate targeting of the transient 
urban sub-groups who acted as carriers of hidden transcripts and as mobilisers of 
 
408 Gorrie (2001) 663. 
409 Amm. Marc. 15.7.3-4; Gorrie (2001) 664. 
410 Bédoyère (2017) 221. Herodian 3.13.4 says Severus quadrupled the garrisons, most likely an exaggeration. 
411 Cass. Dio 76.14.1, 15.1; Hdn. 3.10.6-7; Sablayrolles (1996) 51-53; Ménàrd (2004) 61. 
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contention— actors, magicians, philosophers, and other prophets.413 By controlling the 
visual and spatial narrative of the city, and restoring economic and political stability, the 
emperor could confidently proclaim himself as restitutor Urbis.414 Not only did Severus’ 
building programme and capacity provide spatial control, but his deliberate invocation of 
Augustan ideology also allowed him to employ mythologised versions of the past as an 
instrument of politics in the present. As the late Edward Said wrote, ‘collective memory is 
not an inert and passive thing, but a field of activity in which past events are selected, 
reconstructed, maintained, modified, and endowed with political meaning…. Memory and 
its representations [therefore] touch very significantly upon questions of identity, of 
nationalism, of power and authority.’415 The reconstruction of collective memory helped to 
diffuse potential contention around conflicting discourses between elite, plebeian, and 
soldier. Instead, they could all identify and be part of a shared political culture that 
recognised the regime as the ideological descendant of Rome’s first emperor. 
 
(ii) The Circus Maximus  
 We would expect the Severan regime’s repressive capacity and ability to control public 
space as a constraining factor in terms of transgressive contentious politics. A string of 
victories against internal and external enemies also provided Severus with the political and 
economic resources to pursue coherent policies and to meet the expectations of Rome’s 
political actors.416 An absence of famine, plague, or other major social catastrophes also 
meant there were no real exogenous factors that could imperil Rome’s new prosperity, 
although civil war did foster anxieties. As we have seen, changes in opportunity structures 
strongly affect the viability of contentious repertoires.417 Expanding political opportunities 
and competing legitimacy claims allowed the performance of innovative collective action 
under Pertinax and Julianus. The contraction of these opportunities and expanded spatial 
control under Severus meant that public claim-making returned to established, contained 
contentious repertoires. Indeed, only two instances of public claim-making are recorded 
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from Severus’ reign. Both employed traditional acclamatory formulas and took place at the 
Circus Maximus. The first occurred at the last races before the Saturnalia of 195CE. Niger 
had been defeated, but Severus had to turn his attentions to Albinus immediately. 
According to the eyewitness account of Dio, the prospect of another civil war motivated an 
audience to: 
 
indulge in the most open lamentations… I, too, was present at the spectacle, since 
the consul was a friend of mine, and I heard distinctly everything that was said, so 
that I was in a position to write something about it. There had assembled, as I said, 
an untold multitude and they had watched the chariots racing, six at a time (which 
had also been the practice in Cleander’s day), without applauding, as was their 
custom, any of the contestants at all.  But when these races were over, and the 
charioteers were about to begin another event, they first enjoined silence upon one 
another and then suddenly all clapped their hands at the same moment and also 
joined in a shout, praying for good fortune for the public welfare.  This was what 
they first cried out; then, applying the terms ‘Queen’ and ‘Immortal’ to Rome, they 
shouted: ‘How long are we to suffer such things?’ and ‘How long are we to be 
waging war?’ And after making some other remarks of this kind, they finally shouted, 
‘So much for that,’ and turned their attention to the horse-race. In all this they were 
surely moved by some divine inspiration; for in no other way could so many myriads 
of men have begun to utter the same shouts at the same time, like a carefully 
trained chorus, or have spoken the words without a mistake, just as if they had 
practised them (76.4.2-6). 
 
The second episode took place much later around 205CE when an audience took up a chant 
regarding the now all-powerful Plautianus: ‘Why do you tremble? Why are you pale? You 
possess more than do the three.’418 Dio claims he was amazed that so many people could 
carefully synchronise an applause-and-chant routine, yet both performances were based 
upon recognisable rhythmic chants. Calling Rome ‘Queen’ and ‘Immortal’ for instance, 
followed a well-known laudatory formula. The second part seems to have been an 
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improvisation of a petition often shouted at emperors at the games, or what was a typical 
response to lousy entertainment at the shows.419 The Plautianus chant, meanwhile, was a 
basic triple repeat and relatively easy for large numbers to deliver the same message 
together.420 That the only contentious episodes that we know of during Severus’ reign 
occurred at the Circus, demonstrates its continued centrality in popular politics. Public 
criticism was risky, given the increased capacity of the imperial regime: the mockery of 
Plautianus, for example, belied the fear that the prefect engendered among ordinary people 
and senators alike.421 Thus, the tactical shift from destructive and confrontational forms of 
contention that carried high personal risk to the large-scale Circus mode allowed audience 
members to subsume their identities into an anonymous (and safe) collective. Indeed, given 
that each act was only an indirect rebuke of Severan policy allowed participants to sidestep 
the dangers associated with targeting the emperor personally.  
 
The return to permitted, contained contention may be evidence that Severus’ expanded 
spatial and social control of the Circus and associated spaces constrained transgressive 
contention. On the other hand, we must also consider that the collective memories 
generated by multiple subversive contentious performances at the Circus were independent 
of Severan constructions of identity, and the site had been re-signified multiple times as a 
place of popular power over and above imperial hegemony. In both cases, Severus did not 
attempt to repress or restrict such modes of collective claim-making, although he took 
evidence of discontent seriously. After the first incident, he moved Legio II Parthica to Mt 
Alba, a mere 19km from Rome. As the legion had never been permanently stationed in Italy, 
we should view this move as a direct response to the demonstration.422 After his defeat of 
Albinus, the emperor had the challenger’s head displayed to the city on a pole and 
instigated a wave of repression against eminent senators and supporters of Albinus. He 
even defended Commodus (now his divine ‘brother’) in a fiery speech in the Senate.423 Yet, 
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Severus’ careful cultivation of the imperial moral economy meant that he could not directly 
punish his citizens without forfeiting the façade of benevolence.  
 
The relative safety of the Circus as a contentious space ensured that it remained Rome’s 
primary site for collective political participation, even when overt resistance dwindled under 
Severus. Not only that, because of its centrality in the preceding years of conflict, it had also 
become an essential symbol of the memorial heritage of the urban community. Of course, 
the mere act of gathering a large crowd together strengthens the relational and symbolic 
solidarities of that group. Indeed, the mere act of putting oneself in a prominent position 
and occupying it is an act of claiming to be part of ‘the people,’ or the ‘opposition’ or any 
other special interest group.424 Moreover, what had happened in a place will, through the 
accumulation of collective memories, inform the character of the space as an outcome of 
that action. In other words, contention transforms the political significance of both places 
and spatial routines, which means there is an important feedback loop between place and 
action.425 Thus, the Circus Maximus had become a true lieu de mémoire; a site that 
represented, popular culture, hidden transcripts, urban collective memories, and Roman 
identity.426 As a free space and site of memory, the Circus was a safe location for the airing 
of hidden transcripts. Certainly, the contentious performances under Severus support this. 
Both sets of acclamations represented collective perceptions of Severan policy. Despite 
imperial surveillance and manipulation of civic spaces, the civil war and the outsized 
influence of Plautianus were evidently debated on street corners, tabernae, and private 
homes. The use of acclamations as a performance of hidden transcripts thus demonstrates 
that subaltern politics continue to flourish despite a drop in open contentious politics during 
Severus’ reign. The Circus had become an institutionalised accretion to the repertoire of 
popular collective action, and the flexibility and strength of the acclamatory repertoire 
meant it was still able to be safely deployed under a more authoritarian regime.427 It is 
important to note that while the sentiments expressed at the Circus were undoubtedly the 
distilled product of hidden transcripts, there was another, implicit message attached. Both 
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instances were meant to remind the emperor of the pleb’s strength as a corporate entity. As 
a consequence, the relationship between collective identity and the Circus was reinforced, 
demonstrating that the multiplicities of space remained a powerful factor in Roman popular 
politics. 
 
The diffusion of contention between 180-211CE 
 
Contentious cycles rarely develop exponentially, as spirals of opportunity do not work in the 
same ways for different political actors during the entire length of a cycle.428 The 
contraction of political contention during the vast majority of Severus’ reign must be 
understood as a process of re-stabilisation and re-routinisation of interaction patterns 
between regime members, in that the relationships between actors regained a measure of 
stability.429 The resumption of stable political relations may, at first glance, suggest that the 
protest cycle initiated during Commodus’ reign, had been extinguished with a successful 
coup. Undeniably, there are significant parallels between the events of 193CE and those of 
69CE. Both years hosted a series of coup attempts, praetorian violence, popular ‘justice’ 
enacted by both soldiers and civilians, and a march on Rome by a challenger’s legions. While 
there are definite similarities, the protest cycle initiated by the early risers of Commodus’ 
time sparked spatial and social diffusion of contention. Conflict heightened across the social 
system in 193CE, as innovative, confrontational and violent performances increased.  
According to Kolins Givan, Roberts, and Soule, ‘diffusion is heavily conditioned by political 
agency, and is a creative and strategic process marked by political learning, adaptation, and 
innovation: it is not simply a matter of political contagion or imitation.’430 We know 
diffusion happened because of the scale of protests after 190CE. Even under Severus, 
popular contention remained a mass affair, proving that many people continued to act in 
concert. Dio’s amazement that such a large crowd could chant together has more to do with 
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Diffusion was, therefore, a crucial development because it made future mass contentious 
events more likely, since the actions of each political actor evolved in response to the 
actions of the others.431 In Oliver and Myers’ words, this action-reaction scheme created 
‘one large coevolving environment in which the characteristics and actions of any actor is 
constrained and influenced by the characteristics and actions of all other actors in the 
environment.’432 The behaviour of the emperor, civilians, Senate, and military provided a 
clear path for each constituency to follow, and as new political actors joined, politics 
became less about special interests and more about protecting cultural norms. Social 
diffusion also relies on the work of social networks and informal communication channels, 
for when ideas or actions are diffusing, it is by the exchange of information that actors 
become linked.433 As far as we can tell, mobilisation for every instance of contention was by 
informal word of mouth rather than official channels. The source material provides no real 
hints as to what social networks, if any, made up the composition of the protesting crowds. 
However, the repeated references to the circulation of rumour and informal communication 
indicate that local networks of family, friends, neighbourhood, and trade groups likely acted 
as mobilising units for each assembly. 
 
Spatial diffusion also took place during these years. The occupation of spaces that were 
previously uncontested (like the praetorian castra) or used in different ways to perform 
contention (like the Circus Maximus) questioned existing norms and political order by 
challenging previously legitimate uses of those spaces. As collective action spread to these 
new sites and times, those who protested displayed their commitment to collective action, 
and the impact of their performances increased accordingly.434 The incorporation of new 
sites of contention went hand in hand with collective action framing. The murder of Pertinax 
and the ‘auctioning’ of the Empire were viewed as unjust usurpations of the people’s voice, 
which drew in new actors and helped to form new political identities. Since repertoires and 
frames are transmitted through interpersonal contact, and claim-making tactics and 
interpretive frames interact in complex ways, they can be adapted or modified by new 
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political actors as they diffuse.435 The mass nature of the conflict at the praetorian camp and 
Circus occupation demonstrated that people who may never have participated in 
transgressive contention before felt compelled to join in. In earlier periods, most 
contentious activity arose from the spectacles, where people had already congregated. In 
contrast, much of the contention of 193CE took place at night or in new spaces. Normal 
rhythms of life were disrupted in the name of claim-making, reinforcing the innovative 
quality of the political contention.  
 
Innovation was not just restricted to the participation of new political actors. A shift in 
political opportunity structures as a result of rapid changes in political contexts offered 
stimuli to rapid originality in contentious performances.436 Confrontational contention took 
over from contained forms. New types of contention were introduced aimed at either 
obstructing political processes or communicating claims through the transgressive 
occupation of space. Established repertoires became increasingly modular as collective 
action diffused across a wide range of social and geographical space and was adapted to a 
variety of political conflicts.437 This shift in space and outcomes can be seen in the 
development of mass protest between 190-193CE. Diffusion has direct consequences, for 
when protest diffuses horizontally from one site to another, it enlarges the scope of 
contentious politics.438 While the successful outcome of the Cleander riot provided an 
action template for protesters to follow, its primary goal was still conventional: to force 
face-to-face communication with the emperor. Once Commodus acquiesced, the people 
renewed their consensus. The occupation of the Circus in protest at the military regime of 
Julianus was more radical. It was no coincidence that popular discontent was performed at 
that location, where imperial legitimacy and social consensus were supposed to be affirmed. 
Yet, no two-way discourse was sought. Through a dramatic reimaging of imperial space, the 
protesters advertised that the consensus relationship between themselves and the emperor 
was broken and thus, Julianus’ legitimacy. As the Guard used their collective strength and 
political power to intervene and force regime change, their actions put them in direct 
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conflict with the people, which solidified the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ boundary between each 
group. The subsequent creation and performance of this new claimant-object pair explains 
some of the spatial and social diffusion of discontent as the praetorian camp became a new 
site of contention. 
 
Conceptions of legitimacy and justice laid the foundations of much of the conflict of 193CE. 
Neither Pertinax nor Julianus could successfully establish legitimacy claims with all of 
Rome’s political actors. Severus, on the other hand, could. By adjusting the composition and 
size of his urban forces and providing his soldiers with additional benefits, the emperor 
reasserted his control over the military and gained significant capacity as a result.  
Severus’ deliberate and consistent policy of presenting himself as a second Augustus 
appealed to a part mythical, part historical base of political unity and was a message that 
resonated with multiple political actors. Many contemporaries could have reasonably 
believed that Severus had inaugurated a new Augustan age, and those who may have 
remained unconvinced could be persuaded instead by his charismatic leadership as 
repeated military victories contributed to Rome’s glory.439 After escalating contention under 
the three previous emperors, the re-establishment of stability, preservation of traditional 
political structures, the assertion of Roman power overseas, and the emperor’s provision for 
an orderly dynastic succession did much to rectify the impact of Severus’ contentious 
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Chapter 3: Collective identity and evolving perceptions of imperial 
justice 
 
…nothing is more terrifying than a military force exercising dominant power and 
driven by uneducated and irrational forces. (Plut. Galb. 1.4) 
  
Although Severus was able to contain conflict, his military monarchy unbalanced the 
‘parallelogram’ linking emperor, praetorians, Senate, and urban plebs. Despite nearly two 
decades of relative calm, four violent regime transitions occurred during the following ten 
years. Employment of new and transformed frames of meaning, symbols and ideologies, 
performances, and repertoires point not only to a continuity with the past and the cyclical 
nature of Roman contention, but also the emergence of new grievances, collective 
identities, opportunities, and threats. 
 
The lavish week-long public funeral accorded to Severus in 211CE (closely resembling those 
for Augustus and Pertinax) demonstrated the extent to which the emperor had succeeded 
in reconstructing consensus.440 His peaceful death from old age was, however, the last 
afforded to an emperor until Diocletian. Within months of their joint accession, Caracalla 
had his brother Geta killed. Caracalla then met his end while on campaign in 217CE, at the 
hands of one of his soldiers. The reign of Caracalla’s erstwhile Praetorian Prefect Macrinus 
lasted little more than a year before he too was deposed. A new boy-emperor, Elagabalus, 
occupied the throne for only four years before the Praetorian Guard rioted in 222CE, killing 
the emperor, his mother, and other court insiders. Civilians and soldiers then joined 
together to lynch imperial administrators. This alliance quickly broke down and in 223CE, 
when the most extreme violence Rome had experienced since 69CE erupted into a three-
day street fight between the praetorians and the populus. After so many years of stability, 
how had the political environment deteriorated to the point of armed conflict between two 
of Rome’s major political actors? For a start, many of the same disputes that plagued the 
city in the early 190s re-emerged: the influence and impact of the emperors’ repressive 
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capacity, deteriorating relationships between elite actors and the imperial regime, and a 
waxing and waning attendance to the moral economy all remained unsolved issues.  
 
The years 212-222CE also saw the rise of other factors that directly contributed to the 
outbreak of political conflict in the city. As the Principate transformed into a true military 
dictatorship, the hierarchies, norms, and identities attached to the previous status quo were 
affected. The issue after Severus’ death was that there was no real legitimacy claim for a 
military monarchy as such that appealed to non-soldiers. Without any legitimising myths or 
ideologies to bolster the new political arrangement, the dependence of Severus’ successors 
on the military, and the privileged status of the Praetorian Guard was perceived as injust by 
other actors.441 As the military gained in power and identity, competing civilian identities 
developed as people saw themselves as the ‘losers’ under the new regime type. 
Accordingly, collective identities underwent a process of politicisation. In the case of the 
Praetorian Guard, their self-awareness as the most dominant political actor in Rome led 
them to assert their identity in more tangible ways. In response, civilian identities also 
underwent a process of politicisation, culminating in a triangulation of adjacent power 
struggles, and an escalation in political contention.442 
 
(i) The evolution of a military collective identity  
After Severus, the evolution and subsequent polarisation of civilian and military identities 
was a primary driver of the collective violence that erupted in Rome in 222-223CE. 
In terms of mobilisation for contentious purposes, collective identity can be demarcated by 
three core elements: the salience of shared characteristics, an awareness of a shared 
grievance, and opposition to the dominant order that are all conjoined within a collective 
action frame.443 These factors, salience, awareness, and opposition, were interpreted within 
a frame that provided context and clear parameters for actors to interpret the activities and 
status of others, and thus by extension, their own sense of identity. This process also 
facilitated the creation or hardening of social boundaries between groups based on 
subjective perceptions of differences that resulted from unequal political access and 
 
441 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 326. 
442 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 322, 329. 
443 Au (2017) 2. 
  123 
resource distribution.444 As we have seen, strong legitimacy claims were an effective way of 
tying Rome’s political actors together under an umbrella of collective identity. 
Consequently, when claims were universally accepted, political contention was constrained 
as the claimant-object pairings of emperor-urban plebs, emperor-military, and emperor-
Senate were all contained within the same identity boundaries. As the emperor and his 
regime were the primary addressees of claim-making, those claims almost always included 
statements about the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of regime policies, institutions, and 
actors.445 Thus, provided an emperor could maintain his legitimacy claims across all groups, 
opportunities to redraw or deactivate these boundaries were limited. This constraining 
effect, though, did not extend to different claimant-object pairs or the shifting perceptions 
defining the boundaries that separated one group from another. The continued isolation of 
imperial regimes from their traditional allies among the political elite left emperors highly 
dependent on military support. In particular, the overtly pro-praetorian stance of Caracalla 
reactivated long-simmering tensions between civilians and soldiers that led to the formation 
of a master frame based on perceptions of injustice. In addition, highly salient social 
boundaries and identities also provided new avenues for political contention.  
 
The root of these new identity issues was Severus’ pro-military policies. Realistically, 
Severus cannot be given all the credit for the development of what was now a military 
monarchy: the conscription of ‘barbarian’ recruits, new military strategies, centralisation of 
imperial administration and a more open career path for the talented rather than just the 
socially connected had begun years earlier.446 Notwithstanding his ability to extract the 
broad acceptance of Rome’s political groups, Severus was clear by what means imperial 
power should now be sustained. On his deathbed, he exhorted his sons Caracalla and Geta 
to, ‘be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and scorn all other men.’447 It may seem like a 
straightforward manifesto, but Severus had spent years cultivating a more diffuse, and 
hence enduring, support with the military. The dynastic transmission of power, whether 
biological or through adoption, held particular appeal for soldiers, as the accession of rather 
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unsoldierly candidates like Claudius, Elagabalus, Gordian III, and Valentinian II shows.448 
Severan policy was to restore and reinforce this norm. As early as 195CE, Severus had 
proclaimed himself to be the son of Marcus Aurelius, brother of Commodus, grandson of 
Antoninus Pius, and great-great-grandson of Nerva.449 When Caracalla was seven, Severus 
changed his name to Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Less than three years later, again following 
Antonine precedent, Severus proclaimed Caracalla as co-emperor, Geta as Caesar. The 
emperor also deified Commodus, who remained a popular figure among the troops.450 
These forged associations with the venerable Antonine name provided Severus with a 
dynastic claim that was universally popular with the troops. Another strategy to encourage 
military loyalty was ritually to increase the visual and symbolic interaction between emperor 
and soldier. The acclamatio, adlocutio and sacramentum ceremonies encouraged fidelity, 
but these were one-off occurrences. So, Severus expanded the various ways in which he and 
his wider family were linked to the army. Julia Domna was honoured both as Mater 
Augusti and Mater Castrorum. Military standards (signa militaria) were profoundly symbolic 
of a unit’s collective identity, and Severus ensured that emperor-worship replaced the cult 
of the standards. Neil Faulkner argues that such steps indicate that the imperial cult was 
assuming central ideological significance in military ritual. 451  
 
While Severus provided relatively moderate donativa (at least in comparison to the 
payments of Marcus Aurelius and Julianus), he doubled military pay and introduced the 
annona militaris. Now, soldiers were provided with rations and other resources without the 
cost being deducted from their pay as was the previous standard, giving the recipients more 
cash in their pockets. In addition, Severus granted soldiers the right to wear the gold rings 
that indicated equestrian rank, and possibily also the ability to marry legally whilst 
serving.452 Such innovations were likely aimed at increasing recruitment after multiple wars 
and the Antonine Plague had taken its toll on active numbers.453 However, such social 
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benefits taken together with the substantial financial rewards on offer were also an 
essential ideological step designed to acknowledge the military’s elevated socio-political 
position.454 A hundred years earlier, Pliny minimised his description of Trajan’s donativum, 
and indeed the significance of the military in general, in favour of an extended discussion of 
the much larger congiarium provided for the plebs.455 Severus, and Caracalla after him, 
changed this stance. Mark Hebblewhite points out that both emperors ‘were more willing 
that any emperor before them to publicly acknowledge and even celebrate their role as the 
providers of praemia militiae. In turn, this affected how the army viewed this function of the 
emperor.’456 Undoubtedly, these developments indicate that Severus was cultivating diffuse 
rather than specific support from the troops. The Empire’s military was now diverse (in both 
ethnic and geographical terms) and powerful and the obedience bounded by the traditional 
concept of pietas was perhaps less robust than a soldier’s view of virtus as an essential 
imperial quality. Providing an enhanced social status, victories, material benefits, and 
inserting imperial imagery further into the social and spatial routines of soldiers created 
new cultural norms and therefore a strong basis for diffuse support. If Severus could claim 
to be Pius Felix Invictus, then his soldiers could certainly say the same.457 
 
An enhanced socio-economic status had a positive impact on military collective identities.   
Collective identity among the troops had always been strong. Any group that shares pain, 
privation, and a standardised, collective working environment tends to form resilient and 
cohesive social bonds. Now, soldiers had more money, privileges, and opportunities for 
social mobility. A positive self-identity, even pride, borne from the emperor’s recognition of 
their vital supporting role generated feelings of solidarity and a more unified sense of 
identity. In particular, the Praetorian Guard, the most elite component of the Roman 
military, already had a well-developed sense of collective identity. When Severus replaced 
the entire Guard in 193CE, he restocked its ranks with soldiers from his Illyrian legions. 
These men had lived and served together for many years before arriving in Rome and were 
a comprehensive unit before their promotion. The Guard’s role and spatial separation from 
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the city already differentiated them from the civilian population, but the new Pannonian 
troops appeared more ‘foreign’ than the previous incumbents of the praetorian castra. Dio’s 
comment that the new recruits were nothing more than ‘a throng of motley soldiers most 
savage in appearance, most terrifying in speech, and most boorish in conversation’ seems to 
refer directly to the shift in the ethnic composition of the Guard.458  The paenula cloak, part 
of the everyday praetorian uniform, dropped out of use around this time, suggesting that 
the new soldiers appeared less ‘Roman’ than their predecessors. These visible and audible 
shifts made it easy for the urban populace to infer ethnic stereotypes regarding Illyrian 
savagery, and the poor reputation of the Guard in general among Rome’s inhabitants would 
have only accentuated the trepidation and hostility many felt towards the unit. To be sure 
though, such stereotyping was employed not so much to define the soldiers themselves, but 
the plebs themselves as urban, central characters versus the newcomers from the Empire’s 
peripheries. Anxieties about the people’s role as political actors, and the power shift away 
from Rome as a result of an overt military monarchy framed the new praetorians, like 
Cleander years earlier, as potential scapegoats for the creeping authoritarianism of the 
regime. Any sense of shared community between civilian and soldier was, by this point, 
buried under vast social, political, and economic disparities.  
 
In spite of these developments, Severus’ military reforms did not cause immediate conflict 
in Rome. This was partly due to the emperor’s near-constant campaigning; most of the 
Guard accompanied the emperor abroad, and only a small rump of soldiers near retirement 
age remained. The Guard was thus a small and subdued force in Rome for many years, but 
on the accession of Caracalla and Geta, Severus’ last British campaign was abandoned and 
all remaining praetorians returned to the city. As the structure and stability of Severus’ rule 
mirrored that of Marcus Aurelius, the regime transition to his sons, like that for Commodus, 
was initially smooth. Within a year, however, hopes of harmonious shared rule were 
abruptly dashed. Untethered, Caracalla immediately expanded the military-centric policies 
of his father, a strategy that initiated a swift process of identity polarisation between 
praetorians and civilians. 
 
 
458 Cass. Dio 75.2.5-6. He is exaggerating when he claims that with this change Severus had ‘ruined the youth 
of Italy, who turned to brigandage and gladiatorial fighting in place of their former service in the army.’  
  127 
The spatial dimensions of imperial injustice under Caracalla 
 
Collective identities can unify groups by drawing connections and a sense of solidarity with 
one another, but how collectives view themselves and others is central to most conflicts. 
The people and Senate understood only too well that the political environment had shifted 
in favour of the praetorians and the broader military. This shift had also been articulated 
spatially. The praetorian castra and the imperial palace complex were now the nexus of 
power and authority in the city, not the Curia or Forum. The city’s eyes were attuned to 
movement in and between those spaces as performative, albeit private, spaces, as the 
accession events of Pertinax and Julianus proved. 
 
The Senate had lost substantial ground under Severus. The purge of prominent, pro-Albinus 
senators in 197CE, the gradual replacement of Italians with provincials, and the emperor’s 
overt reliance on his army instead of senatorial advisors all but ruptured the respectful and 
theoretically cooperative relationship that Pertinax had tried to rebuild.459 A striking 
example of the change in relations can be seen on the Palazzo Sacchetti relief, where a 
group of senators is depicted in an audience with Severus, his sons, and imperial councillors. 
While Severus sits on the old magisterial symbol of authority, the sella curulis, the senators 
stand below the emperor, reminding the viewer that the emperor and Senate were not 
equals. Jussi Rantala argues that the relief encapsulates the shift from the old Antonine 
policy of cooperation to a new ideology of a more autocratic regime.460 Senatorial governors 
found their power increasingly undermined by equestrian procurators, and equestrians 
increasingly filled important administrative posts with military experience that answered 
directly to the emperor.461 Equestrian praetorian prefects also accrued substantial legal 
powers and control of the military annona. It was no coincidence, then, that a mere six 
years after the death of Severus, Rome would receive its first equestrian emperor in what 
was a powerful example of shifting power dynamics.  
 
459 Cass. Dio 75.2.1-3, 76.8.4; Hdn. 3.8.6-7; SHA Sev. 13. The Historia Augusta provides 41 names although the 
authenticity of the list is much debated. For a discussion, see Jacques (1992); Rantala (2013) 44. 
460 Hannestad (1988) 68; Rantala (2013) 48. 
461 For example, the new province of Mesopotamia added after the Parthian wars was governed by an 
equestrian rather than a senator. Severus also put the newly created Legiones Parthicae under the command 
of equestrian praefecti as well. Mennen (2011) 142.  
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The dismissal of the customary, advisory role of the Senate in favour of the physical capacity 
of the military had repercussions in terms of urban political opportunity structures. The 
downgrading of the Senate’s position as social leader and regime ally opened up divisions 
within the elite, and usual political alignments became more precarious. Political space 
including physical space previously regulated by long-established socio-political norms was 
now more accessible and contestable for political actors who stepped into the void left by 
the unravelling of the cooperative relationship between Senate and emperor. So, as Rome’s 
built environment hosted new spatial routines and social interactions between actors, the 
political significance attached to each underwent a period of transformation. Similarly, while 
the privileging of the military gave the emperor the ability to repress contention, it also 
reduced the ability of the elite to challenge or make claims upon the government.462  
 
Together, the erosion of established norms made Rome’s political space more contestable. 
Typically, in its most diffuse form, control over the military is sustained by cultivating social 
support outside the army, among core groups that underpin the regime and within society 
at large.463 The downgrading of the Senate left the urban plebs as the only real potential 
civilian force in the city, and, as Severus had demonstrated, military and popular support 
were enough to sustain an emperor’s legitimacy. He understood that a functioning moral 
economy was concerned with notions of justice and reciprocity. He also appreciated the 
close relationship between identity and the built environment, creating and manipulating 
urban space in order to shape identities and routines that were inextricably linked to the 
Severan dynasty and its authority. Caracalla, however, utilised public space in a much 
different way.  He interpreted his father’s words to ‘scorn all other men’ in ways that 




462 That is not to say the traditional urban elites were now powerless. Although the senatorial order lost their 
hold over high-level military and administrative positions, the small and cohesive nature of the order, and its 
close bonds with Rome and Italy remained intact. A core of senatorial families that made up the inner elite 
were able to maintain or even improve their positions during the third century. This tiny nucleus of senatorial 
gentes provided a considerable percentage of ordinary consuls, African proconsuls and city prefects, which 
ensured a measure of continuity for Rome especially in terms of grain supplies and urban policing. See 
Mennen (2011) 79-80. 
463 Brooks (1999) 20. 
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For a start, the new emperor had no intention of ruling in partnership with Geta and had his 
brother murdered a mere ten months after their joint accession. Caracalla immediately 
rushed to the praetorian camp, claiming that he was a victim of a pro-Geta plot.464  Tellingly, 
the emperor focused his pitch less on the ‘justice’ of his brother’s murder, but on the 
specific benefits he could offer the unit. He offered a substantial donativum, but more 
importantly, a public partnership. According to Dio, Caracalla told the hastily assembled 
soldiers; ‘[I want to] live with you, if possible, but if not, at any rate to die with you. For I do 
not fear death in any form, and it is my desire to end my days in warfare. There should a 
man die, or nowhere.’465 Given that this passage directly precedes Caracalla’s address to the 
Senate after Geta’s murder, the arrangement demonstrates that Dio believed that the army 
was the most powerful actor; the Senate a mere formality to be quickly dealt with.466  
However, what is more pertinent here is that Caracalla referenced military identity and 
claimed it as his own imperial persona. His declaration of brotherhood and solidarity was a 
signal to the Guard that their position was set to rise if they accepted his proffered 
partnership. Unsurprisingly, they accepted and proclaimed Caracalla as sole emperor 
although news of what had actually occurred at the palace had filtered out.467 In essence, 
the emperor had ‘bought’ the support of the Guard like Julianus, but praetorian support for 
Caracalla was predicated less on money and more on social and political recognition. In 
193CE, the idea that an emperor could ‘buy’ the support of the Guard was a travesty. The 
Severan system, though, had prepared the ground. Neither Dio nor Herodian offers much 
indignation at what transpired at the camp. Caracalla’s declaration that he would be a 
‘praetorian’ emperor just confirmed the military monarchy built by Severus.   
 
It was evident to the rest of the city that something momentous was happening. Herodian 
claims that ‘consternation seized the people when they saw the emperor speeding on foot 
through the middle of the city in the early evening.’468 As with the urgent movements of 
Pertinax and Julianus during the night of their accessions, this was imperial movement at 
 
464 Cass. Dio 78.3.1-2; Hdn. 4.4.4. The Historia Augusta strikes a more cynical note, claiming the soldiers only 
let Caracalla into the camp after the promise of an enormous donative (Geta 6.1-2). 
465 Cass. Dio 78.3.2. 
466 Ward (2011) 21. 
467 Hdn. 4.4.8. 
468 Hdn. 4.4.4. 
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the ‘wrong’ time of day and in the ‘wrong’ direction. In terms of spatial dynamics, 
Caracalla’s more frenzied dash revealed another truth. The emperor was going to where the 
power was – neither the palace nor Curia, but the praetorian castra. As the populace milled 
and discussed unfolding events, Caracalla ordered the praetorians to immediately collect 
their donative from the deposits and treasuries stored in the city’s temples.469 Large sums 
were held at these locations. The municipal treasury, for example, was located in the 
Temple of Saturn. State funds were stored there, and ordinary Romans deposited their 
valuables there as well as in the temples of Pax, Castor, Mars Ultor, Vesta, and Ops 
Consiva.470 It is doubtful that the soldiers discriminated between state and public funds, or 
even restricted themselves to the agreed donative. Indeed, Herodian claimed that in one 
day Caracalla had ‘recklessly distributed all the money which Severus had collected and 
hoarded from the calamities of others over eighteen years.’471 Where Marcus Aurelius and 
Pertinax sold off imperial possessions to pay the bills, Caracalla commanded his soldiers to 
help themselves from the temples. For all intents and purposes, the people paid the 
praetorians’ donative, not the emperor.472 
 
Aside from the unjust appropriation of public funds, the temple raids were a transgressive 
breach of cultural, social, and spatial boundaries. Temples were focal points in times of both 
celebration and crisis. Along with porticos and altars, temples were where crowds gathered 
on the death of Commodus, and where Severus posted his soldiers. Collegia also met 
regularly in the temples around the Forum when they planned for public festivals.473 
Fundamentally though, temples were sacred space, and while control over these spaces was 
vested in the gods, the community as a whole also had a claim.474 Profound differences 
separated the identities that appeared in more formal, public life, and those that operated 
in routine social existence. Thus, the identities that Romans embodied at consensus 
ceremonies were examples of public or disjointed identities. Embedded identities, on the 
 
469 Cass. Dio 78.3.2; Hdn. 4.4.7. 
470 Hdn. 1.14.3 describes the collective mourning when the Temple of Pax burned during the fire of 191CE 
containing the possessions of many who were made paupers by the conflagration. Castor/Mars Ultor: Juv. 
14.258; Vesta: Plut. Ant. 21.3; Ops: Cic. Phil. 2.37, Vell. Pat. 2.60. See also Bromberg (1940). 
471 Hdn. 4.4.7. 
472 SHA Marc. 17.4-5, Pert. 7.8, 7.11. 
473 Temples: Hdn. 2.2.3, 8.6.7. Collegia: McHugh (2017)13. 
474 Russell (2016) 117. 
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other hand, were the identities based on kinship, friendship, trade, and neighbourhood 
networks. Roman religion had both ‘public’ and ‘private’ forms, which meant that temple 
space, depending on the ritual, could be considered as either.475 Both disjointed and 
embedded identities were part of the spatial experience associated with sacred space, and 
the transgression of these spaces placed both forms of collective identity at odds with the 
regime. Temples were where the community asserted its collective identity, not just on an 
individual level with the gods but as Romans. Caracalla’s actions transformed these spaces 
into contestable, contentious locations. 476  
 
The violation of religious space, public funds, and private possessions impacted relations 
between the city’s political actors. The pillaging of temples by soldiers usually took place 
during times of war, and very rarely by Romans against Roman sites. Our sources condemn 
the looting that took place during the chaos of 69CE, but they also acknowledge that the 
normal order had broken down.477 In this case, the accession of Caracalla (and Geta) was 
uncontested, and Rome had enjoyed many years of peace. The praetorians’ deeds 
combined with the circulation of the news of Geta’s murder framed Caracalla’s inaugural 
acts as manifestly unjust and illegitimate, and the already contentious boundary between 
soldier and civilian was made even more so, since such an attack by power-holders and 
perceived enemies on embedded identities formed the basis for potential new 
grievances.478 In fact, we can identify a bidirectional causal relationship between collective 
identities and grievances, in that collective identity fosters stereotyping processes and 




475 Festus offers a definition of the two: ‘public rites are those which are performed at public expense for the 
populus, and those for the hills, districts, curiae, and shrines, but private rites are those which are performed 
for individual people, families, and clans: Festus 284 Lindsay; in Russell (2016) 102. See also Cic. Har. resp. 14. 
476 Hanagan, Moch, and te Brake (1998) 7, 9. 
477 For instance, Josephus (BJ 4.649) describes the looting and burning of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus 
Maximus by the Vitellians; Tacitus (Hist. 3.33) the looting of the temples at Cremona by Flavian soldiers on 
their way to Rome. See also Cass. Dio 64.17.3; Tac. Ann. 3.71-2; Rutledge (2007) 187-188. Caesar was also 
censured for tearing down the temples on the site of what would eventually be the Theatre of Marcellus, and 
also for appropriating the sacred funds deposited there: Cass. Dio 43.49.2-3. 
478 Tilly (1999) 264. 
479 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 325. 
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A continued disregard for cultural and spatial norms reinforced not only the link between 
identity and grievances, but also the framing of the regime’s actions as unjust and 
transgressive. At about the same time as the temple raids, Caracalla ordered a purge of 
Geta’s supporters (Dio cites 20,000 victims) and prominent administrators.480 Many of the 
executions took place in public, including seemingly ‘safe’ spaces, like the baths and streets, 
even the dining table.481 For instance, Caracalla allowed the Guard to execute their prefects 
Papinian (Aemilius Papinianus) and Valerius Patruinus. The soldiers publicly killed the 
commanders in a highly degrading manner: according to the Historia Augusta, Patruinus 
was killed in front of the Temple of the Deified Pius, and his and Papinian's bodies dragged 
through the streets without any regard for decency.482 Next on the list was Lucius Fabius 
Cilo, Caracalla’s erstwhile tutor and the former praefectus urbi. The praetorians looted Cilo’s 
house, seized him from the baths and dragged him along the Via Sacra. In full view of the 
populace, they tore his clothes off and disfigured his face. The sight of a distinguished 
senator and former soldier dragged along the street stripped and beaten led to an outcry 
not just from the plebs but also the urban cohorts, whom Cilo used to command. It is 
unclear whether the urbaniciani protested because of Cilo’s personal qualities, but Dio’s 
text suggests that they shared the public’s outrage at the praetorians’ degrading and unjust 
actions.483  
 
The reaction of the urban cohorts should not surprise. They had protected civilians from the 
brutal repression of Commodus’ cavalry, and we could speculate that the urbaniciani may 
have intervened to protect civilians from the depredations of rogue praetorians over past 
decades. As with the urban populace and the praetorians, a cultural and geographical divide 
had developed between the urban cohorts and the Guard. The castra urbana by this time 
was separate from the praetorian camp, and as Ulpian emphasises, each unit had a very 
 
480 Cass. Dio 78.4.1. His figures are a likely exaggeration. 
481 SHA Geta 6.3, Cara. 4.4; Hdn. 4.6.1; Cass. Dio 78.4.1.  
482 Cass. Dio 78.4.1; SHA Cara. 4.1-2. The charge against the two prefects is unspecified. 
483 Cass. Dio 78.4.1: ‘The soldiers tore the clothing off [Cilo’s] body and disfigured his face, so that the populace 
as well as the city troops began to make an outcry.’ The Historia Augusta (Cara. 4.6) claims it was the city 
troops who had seized Cilo. The only possible motive for the urban cohorts was that they had a personal 
grudge against their former prefect Cilo, but given his reputation, this seems unlikely. It was the praetorians 
who were in the middle of a very public purge of the emperor’s enemies and who had just pillaged the city’s 
temples. It is implausible that the city troops would join in, particularly against the wishes of the populace. 
Also see SHA Comm. 20.1. 
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different relationship with both the city’s inhabitants and the emperor: the praetorians 
were campaign-hardened soldiers, while the urban cohorts were primarily a police force, 
with a mandate to uphold justice and protect the people.484 The identity and lived 
experience of the two units were thus vastly different, and it is probable that the city troops 
identified more strongly with the rights and collective identities of their fellow city dwellers 
than with the praetorians. Their united front overawed Caracalla 
(τὸν Ἀντωνῖνον καὶ αἰδεσθέντα αὐτοὺς καὶ φοβηθέντα), so much that he intervened and 
shielded Cilo from the soldiers using his cavalry cloak, and the Historia Augusta claims that 
the disorder intensified to the point that the urban cohorts staged a mutiny that the 
emperor had to put down.485 Caracalla’s back down was no small matter either; the 
emperor was wearing military dress in solidarity with the Guard, and he had ordered the 
executions in the first place, yet he was obliged to retreat in the face of loud opposition. He 
even had the soldiers who attacked Cilo executed for their actions in an obvious sop to the 
outraged crowds.486 
 
The butchery of prominent officials and politicians on the streets was an alarming disregard 
of norms. Temples, streets and baths and other civic spaces were primarily utilised for non-
power forms of behaviour: talking, walking, eating, praying, and working. If justice was to be 
executed at these ‘unofficial’ locations, it was meant to be performed by the community in 
defence of their rights. Even when performed by other political actors, popular justice was 
always a claim against the regime. Here, the repertoire’s spatial and performative elements 
were appropriated and subverted by the emperor and his praetorians. At the same time 
though, the verbal contention of the urban cohorts and populace can be interpreted as a 
demonstration of popular justice, and as a defence of the social and spatial norms that were 
being publicly trampled. It was not a ritualistic performance, but the uproar had the effect 
of shaming the emperor into a measure of retreat. The populace would not have their 
temple funds returned, but a message had been sent to the regime nonetheless. 
 
484 A statue base with a dedication to the Genius centuriae by a miles cohortis urbanae, dated 182CE, suggests 
the creation of the urban cohort’s camp in Regio VII as early as Commodus’ reign (CIL 4.217= ILS 2106). The 
urban cohorts may have participated in the Marcomannic War, but the emergency was such that Marcus 
Aurelius recruited gladiators, slaves, bandits, and diogmitai. Ulp. Dig. 1.12.1.12; SHA Marc. 21.6-8; Ricci (2011) 
488, 491.  
485 Cass. Dio 78.4.1; SHA Geta 6.4. 
486 Dio claims it was because the soldiers had not been successful. 
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(i) Framing repression and legitimacy 
The regime’s trespass of what was considered permissible and appropriate made the 
borders between identities visible, and further expanded Rome’s contestable public spaces. 
Potentially, Rome’s streets were now symbolic sites for the articulation of popular rights 
against spatially produced or manifested injustice, and the transgressive use of space also 
provided the populace with a subjective assessment of the threat that the new regime 
posed. 487 Visible injustice allowed the development of a master frame, which is a collective 
action frame that is wide in scope, and is flexible and inclusive enough to be applied by 
actors for a specific cause, and as Robert Benford points out, a master frame can drive 
contention even when political opportunity structures are not immediately conducive for 
action.488 Since effective master frames accord with people’s experiences, values, and belief 
systems, the extensive relationship of conflict between civilians and soldiers provided a 
contextual basis to the souring relationship between the city’s political actors. One of the 
fundamentals of the imperial moral economy was the notion that the empire’s resources 
should be justly distributed. People observed not only the outsized influence of the Guard 
but the open hands of the soldiers into which were poured pay increases, huge donatives, 
and other inducements.489 Nonetheless, some of the key obligations of the imperial moral 
economy were still being met. Severus’ stockpile of grain suggests there were no major 
issues with the frumentationes, and Caracalla’s enormous baths remained under 
construction along with porticos, new streets, and temples. However, where legitimacy and 
conceptions of social justice had previously been in step, the injustice of the emperor’s 
privileging of the praetorians, and his use of military repression meant that the two 
concepts were now distinct. Since moral economy and the underlying diffuse support that it 
generated implies a relational conception of legitimacy, the perceived injustice of the city’s 
new power dynamics impacted how the civilian population viewed the emperor and his 




487 Dikeç (2009) 1; Wikström (2005) 52. 
488 Benford (2013) 1. 
489 Cass. Dio 78.9.1, 78.24.1. 
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Caracalla’s permissiveness towards the Guard was especially unpopular. Shortly after the 
Cilo incident, a Circus crowd protested the privileging of the praetorians and his use of the 
military by chanting in unison; ‘we shall do the living to death, that we may bury the 
dead.’490 Emperors were meant to tolerate collective claims made at the spectacles. 
However, at a subsequent show: 
 
The emperor did something that had never been done before; while he was 
watching a chariot race, the crowd insulted the charioteer he favoured. Believing this 
to be a personal attack, Caracalla ordered the soldiers to attack the crowd and lead 
off and kill those shouting insults at his driver. The soldiers, given authority to use 
force and to rob, but no longer able to identify those who had shouted so recklessly 
(it was impossible to find them in so large a mob, since no one admitted his guilt), 
took out those they managed to catch and either killed them or, after taking 
whatever they had as ransom, spared their lives, but reluctantly (Hdn. 4.6.4-5). 
 
Herodian, of course, is not wholly accurate when he claims that no emperor had done such 
a thing – Caligula and Vitellius were both accused of using soldiers to punish contemptuous 
audiences – but in terms of the last century, such a brutal reprisal against civilian spectators 
was unheard of.491 Violent repression of Circus contention and the indiscriminate theft and 
murder of civilians was yet another spatial expression of imperial injustice, and it revealed 
that the emperor was unwilling to uphold the expectations embedded in popular 
conceptions of libertas and civilitas.492 However, the most problematic aspect, in terms of 
opportunities and grievances, was that Caracalla failed to offer any effective framing that 
could be used to re-interpret his actions as justified and legitimate. Although most research 
represents repression and legitimation as oppositional strategies of political rule, if 
repression against a group can be successfully framed as just, it can actually generate 
legitimacy in the eyes of other actors. Consequently, to decrease the costs of repression and 
reduce the risk of de-legitimisation, autocratic regimes will often put forward discursive 
 
490 Cass. Dio 78.10.3. 
491 Caligula: Cass. Dio 59.28.11. Vitellius: Suet. Vit. 14. 
492 See Wallace-Hadrill (1982) for an excellent discussion on the centrality of civilitas in imperial discourse. 
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justifications for the use of repression.493 Both Commodus and Severus attempted to 
legitimise their repression of the Senate by claiming that purges were needed to root out 
conspiracies. Severus’ message revolved around notions of stability (i.e., repression was 
required to stamp out last remnants of civil war), and the absence of any real backlash from 
other segments of the population suggest that such discursive strategies worked.494  
 
Caracalla’s message on the other hand was that the emperor and the Guard would do 
whatever they liked, regardless of existing norms. The three acts of imperial aggression 
were thus not considered justified, nor legitimate by any section of the population. The 
Circus Maximus was one of Rome’s most important free spaces, and the violence inflicted 
upon its audience threatened its existence as a site for safe mass contention, as well as the 
libertas and civilitas that were components of the cultural work performed there. The city 
refused to accept these violations quietly. Caracalla left Rome shortly afterwards, claiming 
that city life was ‘intolerable,’ indicating that Rome remained in a state of belligerent 
agitation.495 He did not return. Nor was the populace’s subjective perception of Caracalla’s 
repressive strategies inaccurate. In 216CE, the emperor stopped in Alexandria ostensibly to 
visit the tomb of Alexander the Great, but in reality to massacre the city’s young men as 
punishment for their lampoons. Dio records that after the massacre, Caracalla ‘abolished 
the spectacles and the public messes of the Alexandrians and ordered that Alexandria 
should be divided by a cross-wall and occupied by guards at frequent intervals, in order that 
inhabitants might no longer visit one another freely.’496 Alarming accounts of what took 
place there would have filtered back to Rome, confirming that the brutal repression of a 
circus audience was entirely in keeping with the emperor’s modus operandi. Dio also 
observed that during the Alexandrian massacre, ‘even some shrines were despoiled’ by 
Caracalla’s soldiers; an indication that his forces understood that they could transgress 
cultural norms with impunity.497 It is mere conjecture, but if Caracalla did return to Rome or 
 
493 Edel and Josua (2018) 882. 
494 This type of frame, where opponent’s activities are labelled as harmful to the state is what Snow and 
Benford define as a diagnostic master frame. Edel and Josua (2018) 884; Snow and Benford (1992). 
495 Hdn. 4.7.1. 
496 Cass. Dio 78.23.3. 
497 Cass. Dio 78.23.2. 
  137 
directed any further repressive measures at the Circus, it would likely have been contested. 
The alternative was Alexandria and explicit tyranny.  
 
It is not as though Caracalla was ignorant of the close relationship between framing, 
identity, and collective action. For instance, he did attempt to frame his fratricide as an act 
of self-defence, celebrating his ‘safe deliverance’ by issuing the famous Antonine 
Constitution in 212CE. It guaranteed citizenship to nearly all free-born residents of the 
empire and was aimed in part at forging a stronger sense of collective identity and support 
for the emperor in the capital as well as the wider empire.498 In an edict issued shortly 
afterwards, Caracalla ‘wished to render thanks to the gods together with all who were now 
his people and with all others who should join his people.’499 The issuing of the Constitutio 
was meant to be interpreted as an example of the emperor’s pietas, and for his immediate 
urban audience, it offered a reciprocal moral contract. Accepting citizenship forced a tacit 
acknowledgement that a thanksgiving was needed, and Caracalla’s actions were justified. In 
return, the populace would offer their consensus. As the offer of citizenship was universal, 
the expected consensus would be amplified, and Caracalla could shore up his claims to 
legitimacy in the wake of an illegitimate act. Thus, the emperor not only offered an obvious 
quid pro quo in terms of obligations and benefits, but he also subsumed these expectations 
into the social and religious aspects that characterised pietas. The deliberate (but astute) 
manipulation of the familial bonds between an emperor and his subjects was an astute 
move, but unfortunately, the framing of the decree as a example of imperial justice was 
entirely at odds with the behaviour of the emperor and his troops; the humiliating 
treatment of Cilo, imperial tutor and benefactor, was hardly a good example of Caracalla’s 
piety.   
 
The reciprocal nature of the agreement also meant that in return for taxation and 
acceptance, Caracalla would guarantee his new citizens access to the legal system.500 This 
may have been welcome news elsewhere in the empire, but those living in Rome had 
 
498 Ulp. Ad edictum 22. Dio’s claim (78.9.4) that the decree was motivated by Caracalla’s desire to reap a 
massive increase in taxes has been largely dismissed by scholars, although fiscal considerations could have 
been at play. See Imrie (2018) 134 for a brief discussion. 
499 P.Giss. 40, col.1.1-11. 
500 Imrie (2018) 133. 
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already witnessed the execution of imperial justice by soldiers in the street. The promise of 
suffrage did not mesh with existing injustice frames. Part of Severus’ legitimacy claims was 
the successful delivery of traditional values. Natalie Kampen states that Severus’ plans to 
revitalise ‘traditional’ conduct in times of social change had ‘as its deeper goal the 
strengthening of family, class, and community relationships.’501 This worked when emperor, 
familia, and administration adhered to those principles.  Caracalla’s disregard for accepted 
rules of engagement and lack of toleration was a stark contrast with the policy of his father 
who preferred covert spatial control within the bounds of established routines and 
behaviours. If new citizens were already engaged with, and defensive of, traditional Roman 
norms of justice and governance, the Constitutio had just enlarged the base for collective 
claim-making in the city. 
 
On the surface, the change in regime policy from Severus to Caracalla may not seem to have 
been a substantial one. It was Severus who expanded state capacity, menaced the Senate 
and boosted the position of the military. Yet, Severus wielded a scalpel, using repressive 
measures only occasionally against those who posed a direct challenge to his authority, and 
as only one of many strategies used to influence and control Rome’s political actors. He 
tolerated established forms of contention and framed his actions in ways that suggested 
that due process and legalities were followed. Caracalla, on the other hand, was far more 
indiscriminate, employing physical violence as one of his government’s main control 
strategies. The emperor’s proclamation that he was a fellow soldier strengthened already 
robust military identities. For civilians, the regime’s transgressions of social and spatial 
norms threatened their embedded identities, and position as political actors, and without 
framing that presented his repressive acts as legitimate or justified, the opposite became 
the accepted truth. Current political opportunity structures offered more constraints than 
opportunity, but if they shifted, the boundary between civilian and military collective 





501 Kampen (1991) 243. 
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Competing identities under Macrinus 
 
In 217CE, Caracalla was assassinated by a disgruntled evocatus and two praetorian tribunes 
attached to his bodyguard, probably with the connivance of his praetorian prefect Marcus 
Opellius Macrinus who ‘reluctantly’ ascended the throne a few days later.502 From the 
moment of his accession, Macrinus found himself in a bind. He had to construct legitimacy 
claims from scratch, but he could not leave the Parthian campaign launched by Caracalla in 
216CE and travel to Rome to cement his authority. His absence meant that the divergent 
interests and now salient identities of the city’s three political actors came into conflict with 
each other and the regime, offering multiple opportunities for contention. 
 
First of all, Macrinus had to deal with the issue of Caracalla. The urban plebs were delighted 
with news of the regime change. Herodian claims that crowds, presumably at the shows, 
shouted for the new emperor every chance they got and were so hostile to the former 
emperor that his remains had to be smuggled into Rome at night.503 In terms of material 
benefits too, there were hopes that imperial policy would change. As part of the 
celebrations of Caracalla’s death, the people make a list of demands and enumerated all the 
irregular expenditures made from the public treasuries in the hope that these would be 
abolished and that a more balanced approach would follow.504 However, as Macrinus well 
understood, Caracalla was extremely popular with his ‘brother’ praetorians, and the new 
emperor needed their support. He tried to compromise, allowing the populace to vent its 
anger whilst preventing any official sanctions against Caracalla, namely a damnatio, but it 
soon become abundantly clear that the new regime would remain a military monarchy. 
Macrinus curried military support by taking the name Antoninus, and the Guard continued 
to receive the lion’s share of resources.505  The troops were promised a donative of 5000 
denarii each in addition to their first gift of 750 denarii, while the people only received a 
congiarium of a mere 150 denarii per head.506 Next, Macrinus put a man named Flaccus in 
 
502 Cass. Dio 79.5; Hdn. 4.12–13; SHA Cara. 6.6–7.2, Macr. 4.7-8. Both Dio and Herodian claim that Macrinus 
enlisted the evocatus Julius Martialis as the assassin. In the Historia Augusta, Martialis is simply an accomplice 
to the murder.  
503 Hdn. 5.2.3; Cass. Dio 79.9. 
504 Cass. Dio 79.18. 
505 Cass. Dio 79.17.  
506 1000 denarii were given in hand. See RIC IV 67, Cohen 23 (6 Fr.) 
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charge of the annona ( τῶν τροφῶν) who promptly discontinued the frumentationes and 
the distribution of presents at the games given by the major praetors. It may be that 
Caracalla had squandered the vast stockpiles of grain left by Severus leaving the new regime 
with empty warehouses. Discontinuing the grain-dole while the praetorians were still 
receiving the extra benefits (including rations) provided by Caracalla was a reminder that 
the needs of the Guard were more important than the imperial moral economy.507 
 
Dio asserts that military setbacks, the ‘greed and strife’ caused by soldiers, and Macrinus’ 
conciliatory attitude towards Caracalla caused rumblings of discontent in Rome.508 
Unsurprisingly, it appears rumours began circulating that the new emperor planned on 
ruling like his predecessor. The Historia Augusta lists lurid examples of Macrinus’ alleged 
bloodthirsty nature, and states a circus audience member cried out: 
 
Peerless in beauty the youth, 
Not deserving to have as his father Mezentius (Macr. 12.9 )509 
 
For many, Macrinus’ regime now seemed more like a threat than an opportunity. During the 
races held to celebrate the birthday of his heir Diadumenian, another circus crowd 
expressed its discontent: 
 
[it] raised a great outcry, uttering many laments and asserting that they alone of all 
mankind were without a leader and without a king; and they called upon Jupiter, 
declaring that he alone should be their leader and adding these very words: ‘As a 
master you were angry, as a father take pity on us.’ Nor would they pay any heed at 
first to either the equestrian or the senatorial order who were…praising the emperor 
and the Caesar, to the extent of saying… in Greek: ‘Oh, what a glorious day is this! 
What noble rulers!’ and desiring the others, too, to agree with them. But the crowd 
 
507 Cass. Dio 79.22. The reverse of a silver denarius from 217CE displays Annona holding stalks of grain 
alongside overflowing modius and a cornucopia, suggests that Macrinus was eager to advertise the arrival of 
the grain ships from the provinces and the resumption of the frumentaria (RIC IV 26, RSC III 47). 
508 Cass. Dio 79.27. 
509 The lines refer to excerpts from the Aeneid: the first half-line refers to an Arcadian killed by Tolumnius 
(12.275); the second describes Lausus, son of Mezentius (7.654). 
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raised their hands toward heaven and exclaimed: ‘There is the Romans' Augustus; 
having him, we have everything.’ So truly, it would seem, is there innate in mankind 
a great respect for that which is superior and a great contempt for that which is 
inferior; and so the populace thenceforth regarded both Macrinus and 
Diadumenianus as absolutely non-existent, and already trampled upon them as if 
they were dead (Cass. Dio 79.20). 
 
As with the Circus demonstrations under Severus and Caracalla, the shouting appears to 
have been a subversion of traditional imperial acclamations. Instead of asking Jupiter to 
assist the emperor, the crowd instead asks Jupiter to intercede since the emperor was 
unable to lead them.510 The ‘have pity’ formula was also a well-known phrase used in favour 
of defendants or gladiators at the spectacles, indicating that the demonstration, as with 
earlier examples, did not have to be organised beforehand and was likely a spontaneous 
act.511  
 
An episode of mass contention a mere five months into the new reign proved that 
Macrinus’ conciliatory approach towards the Guard had not endeared him to Rome’s 
populace. On the contrary, the privilege of the praetorians had already activated the 
salience of civilian collective identities as people saw their social position downgraded by 
military dominance. The Circus performance also highlighted another development. 
Although the threat of violent repression constrained mass popular contention under 
Caracalla, and despite fears that Macrinus would be no different from his predecessor, 
crowds very quickly utilised the acclamatory repertoire under the new regime. This 
eagerness was due perhaps to the fact that Macrinus was absent from Rome, as were most 
of the praetorians. The reduced risk of repression allowed crowds to utilise the Circus once 
again as a safe free space, and given its scale, the space was able to foster a sense of 
collective empowerment, and arouse intense emotions.512 Significantly, the chants also 
 
510 For imperial acclamations that invoke Jupiter to increase the state/emperor: Ov. Fast. 1.613; ILS 452.3. 
Potter (1996) 136. 
511 Crowds had acclamations that could work in favour of a defendant. In The Martyrdom of Saints Carpus, 
Papylus, and Agonothice 43, 45, the crowd called on the officials to ‘have pity’ for Agonothice. In: Potter (1996) 
141. 
512 Rao and Dutta (2012) 625. 
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demonstrate that the contentious repertoire had become detached from the emperor. 
Where verbal contention used to be part of a two-way, face-to-face interaction between 
spectators and emperor, the long absences of Severus and Caracalla from Rome had made 
this aspect redundant. The repertoire was now moored to the Circus as the city’s principal 
site for popular political protest.  
 
(i) A divided elite? 
An intriguing feature of the anti-Macrinus demonstration suggests that there were 
competing elite perceptions of the new regime. Although Caracalla’s death was no doubt a 
relief for a beleaguered Senate, the accession of Rome’s first equestrian emperor certainly 
rankled Dio. In his view, Macrinus’ elevation was a disruption of the social order and upset 
any remaining sense of concord with the elite classes.513  Dio’s attitude suggests that the 
acclamation of a non-senatorial emperor had the potential to drive identity politics among 
the elite. The political position of the Senate had been substantially downgraded by 
successive emperors, but as members of a social order, senators had to cleave to the 
stereotypes of their class as a bulwark against the enhanced mobility of equestrian officials 
and military men. In fact, perceived polarisation between different groups exceeds actual 
polarisation in terms of policy views if political conflict becomes more salient.514 Therefore, 
as some senators slanted their beliefs towards the stereotype of their class, they became 
more pessimistic about their social and political prospects, and more conservative in their 
outlook, which in turn created more social space between them and the city’s other political 
actors. 
 
The Circus demonstration is illustrative of this process. As Dio’s narrative points out, while 
the general audience shouted, the senatorial and equestrian orders replied in Greek. Like 
the before-mentioned chants, senatorial acclamations by this point had become 
recognisable hymn-like rhythms, based on the recitation of the imperial titles and wishes for 
a long reign, good health, and divine favour. As the extended litany addressed to Commodus 
 
513 E.g. Cass. Dio 79.41. Some scholars have made much of the rise of the equestrian order during the third 
century, as equestrians replaces senators in many administrative and military posts. However, as Mennen 
points out, this is a problematic view because the equestrian order was far more heterogenous than the 
senatorial order: Mennen (2011) 135.  
514 Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019) 3. 
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in 192CE demonstrates, they could be altered as easily as popular acclamatory formulas.515 
Usually, Latin would have been used in official senatorial oratory, so the use of Greek could 
have been a deliberate attempt to use language to constitute themselves as a culturally and 
politically superior group.516 If this was the case, the employment of ‘elite’ language as a 
form of contention was an interesting development. As a rule, verbal contention at the 
spectacles was a popular, non-elite form of contention, since it was an effective way of 
safely presenting a mass, collective claim. Elites, on the other hand, had more direct ways of 
accessing the government, and as ‘insiders,’ did not usually participate in non-
institutionalised, episodic and public manifestations of their political identity. Their 
involvement in this circus demonstration indicates just how much they had been shut out of 
imperial regimes since Commodus. Why elites mounted a counter-demonstration came 
down to opportunity, and those who held high status were conscious of their collective 
interest in preserving their privilege. 
 
 After the hostility of Caracalla, the Senate, in particular, would have looked to ingratiate 
itself with the new emperor through a public demonstration of their loyalty. Considering 
that Macrinus assumed the usual imperial titles for both himself and his son without waiting 
for a senatorial vote, the order needed to win the emperor’s approval, not the other way 
around, if they were to have any chance at reclaiming their former position.517 There may 
have been reasons to feel hopeful; Herodian describes a letter that Macrinus allegedly 
wrote to the Senate in which the emperor promised to restore a collegial relationship with 
the body following the example of Marcus Aurelius and Pertinax. Even if this were an 
invention of Herodian, a Senate that could lead and placate the crowds in the absence of 
the emperor could prove useful. Perhaps then, their use of Greek might have been 
employed to demarcate their chants from that of the rest of the audience. Even if some in 
the audience did not fully understand what was being shouted, it would have been clear 
 
515 The formulas of the senatorial acclamations in SHA Alex. Sev. 6.3, 10.8 for example correspond with those 
by the Acta Fratrum Arvalium for Caracalla and Elagabalus: CIL 6.2086; Arena (2007) 332-333. 
516 Dio and Herodian both understood that Greek remained a cultural marker of Roman elitism: their 
narratives were accessible for Greek audiences of course, but as Scott points out, the assumption that Dio’s 
audience also knew Latin is frequently apparent in his work. Scott (2018) 16. 
517 Assumption of imperial titles: Cass. Dio 78.16.2. For a fuller accounting of Macrinus’ relationship with the 
Senate, see Davenport (2012) 196-202. 
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that they did not agree with the spectator’s chants.518 Consequently, although Macrinus’ 
elevation was evidence to at least some senators that their status remained under threat, it 
was in the best interests of the elite to win the emperor’s favour. Cultural identity was now 
more pertinent than social mobility.519 However, on a practical, if not symbolic level, the 
intervention of the elite failed miserably, since the crowd refuted their Greek chants with 
more shouting, presumably in Latin. The elite’s attempt to perform a public transcript was 
emphatically rejected, and the hidden transcripts of the audience held sway. Severus and 
Caracalla’s determined efforts to downgrade the Senate as a political force meant that their 
collective public stance held far less sway than it would have in previous years. The order no 
longer spoke for the emperor, nor the people. 
 
That is not to say that the elite’s political preferences were homogenous. Macrinus’ refusal 
of the cognomen Pius motivated an unnamed Greek poet to write an epigram that was 
translated into Latin and displayed in the Forum together with the original Greek version. 
The verses were reported to Macrinus at Antioch, who replied in kind. Unfortunately, his 
attempt was considered to have been much worse than the sub-standard Latin translation. 
As a result, the emperor became a laughing-stock in the capital.520 Like the Circus 
demonstration, the posting of verses was an indirect way of communicating with an absent 
emperor. The method, however, suggests elite involvement. If chants were a staple 
repertoire of the masses, then the circulation of verses and epigrams had long been a more 
organised, literate form of resistance: negative verses were circulated about political 
opponents as far back as the Republic.521 Posting written contention in public spaces not 
only ensured a broad audience, it also mimicked and subverted the public transcript. It was 
little wonder that Macrinus felt obliged to respond publicly using the same medium.   
Not only do the verses suggest that not all elites were positive about the new regime, it also 
highlights the role that collective identity played in the performance of contention. Certain 
 
518 Potter (1996) 135. 
519 Hdn. 5.1.8. As Scott argues, since Herodian draws an implicit contrast here between the ‘common’ 
parentage of Pertinax and Marcus Aurelius (and their wise governance) and the hereditary claims of Caracalla 
and before him, Commodus, it is likely that the letter is a fabrication designed to highlight Herodian’s concern 
regarding inherited rule. Scott (2008) 76. 
520 SHA Macr. 11.3-7. 
521 E.g., Suet. Iul. 80; Sen. Suas. 6.9-11; Gell. 15.4.2-3. See also the negative verses circulated about Nero (Suet. 
Ner. 39.2) 
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collectives preferred specific repertoires, and each representative performance created 
visual solidarity among participants. These expressions of identity defined the bonds, 
interests, and boundaries between groups members that facilitated their claims and de-
legitimised others, as the opposing acclamations between elites and non-elites indicate.522 
An alliance between anti-Macrinus groups would have made the protest a more meaningful 
claim, but each group had different outcomes in mind. Those who bewailed the emperor’s 
leadership were looking for charismatic leadership that prioritised justice and order; the 
Senate sought a revival of their political position. The competing identities on display at the 
Circus meant that in the absence of a cohesive urban stance, the military retained the best 
position to make political claims, but the solidification of separate group-based identities 
that played such a crucial role in political change was now out in the open. 
 
(ii) Military identity under threat: the reforms of Macrinus  
In the absence of any real opportunities for other political actors to make tangible claims 
against the regime, the military could continue to dictate imperial policy. Macrinus’ 
approach was one of conciliation and appeasement, but, as history constantly 
demonstrates, a politician who tries to please everyone almost always fails. The emperor’s 
main issue was that he was beholden to the army, a liability that made him unpopular with 
everyone else in Rome. For the praetorians, Severus and Caracalla’s strong support provided 
a further incentive to maintain a boundary between them and other groups, ringfencing 
their privilege and status. Identification as a praetorian had always provided a sense of 
community for its members, but the unit’s revival as an authentic elite corps strengthened 
the bonds between soldiers, whose spatial and temporal routines emphasised the collective 
over the individual. In turn, these community bonds, centred around brotherhood, physical 
valour and masculinity contributed to a system of values, norms, and moral codes that 
informed their socio-political outlook.  
 
The collective unity of the Guard was not the reason for their pre-eminence, of course, but 
it does explain how they became increasingly formidable as political actors. As we have 
seen, Caracalla was extremely popular with the army, but praetorian acceptance of 
 
522 Au (2017) 2. 
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Macrinus may have had less to do with his office than with the unpopularity of the Parthian 
campaign. Caracalla had also recently formed a Scythian bodyguard of freedmen and slaves, 
using them instead of praetorians, a move that could have been interpreted as a threat to 
the Guard’s preeminent position.523 Praetorian reactions to perceived threats indicate that 
coalescing collective identities were becoming an instrument through which regime policy 
could be controlled. Yagil Levy argues that the interplay of two variables determines the 
choice made by soldiers faced with an undesirable situation: the presence of potentially 
subversive soldiers belonging to the same social group; and the group’s social status within 
and outside the military.524 The high status and collective identity of the Praetorian Guard 
gave them the potential to control not just who they legitimised as emperor, but the nature 
of the regime as well. 
 
A demonstration of this burgeoning power took place during Macrinus’ short reign. 
Although the usual donative was promised, the fiscal crisis created by Caracalla’s wars and 
extravagance forced Macrinus into a series of military reforms aimed at saving much-
needed money.525 All privileges granted to existing personnel were preserved, but the pay 
and perks of recruits were reduced back to the levels set by Severus.526 The connection to 
Severan policy and the targeting of recruits only was meant to reassure those already 
serving (and thus benefitting), but the army collectively interpreted the move as a direct 
threat to their position.527 Dio astutely notes that Macrinus may have succeeded with his 
reforms if he had waited until after he had split up the legions and sent them back to their 
posts, as their ability to coordinate a collective response would have been reduced. 
However, the troops were still united in Syria for the Parthian campaign, and as a collective, 
they could discuss the negative implications of Macrinus’ new policies. These discussions 
almost certainly included the emperor’s new treaty with the Parthian king Artabanus V, to 
 
523 Bédoyère (2017) 232-3. 
524 Levy (2017) 192. 
525 Cass. Dio 79.36 details a letter from Macrinus to the urban prefect Marius Maximus claiming that the 
emperor ‘said that the usual pay could not be given to the soldiers on top of the donatives that they were 
receiving (for the increase instituted by Tarutas reached 80 million sesterces annually), but on the other hand 
it could not be given.’ 
526 Cass. Dio 79.12, 79.28. Admittedly, this section is fragmentary; Scott argues that Xilphinus’ epitome should 
be taken to mean Severan pay levels. As Caracalla gave them a raise (Hdn. 4.4.7), this meant that Macrinus 
reduced recruit pay by 50%. Scott (2008) 126. 
527 Scott (2008) 128. 
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whom Rome paid a 200 million sestertii indemnity in return for peace. The war was 
unpopular with the praetorians, but Macrinus’ non-victory over a barbarian enemy did little 
to enhance his reputation with the army. Since the Guard was the premier military unit, 
their understanding of, and reaction to, Macrinus’ reforms would influence how the rest 
would interpret events. 
 
In truth, the strong collective identity that had coalesced around the Guard’s political role 
meant individual praetorians were heavily invested in the well-being of the overall group, 
and a group with such strong identification could incur costs if they remained inactive to any 
potential threat or opportunity.528 Praetorians were on duty at the Circus the day of the 
anti-Macrinus protests, and Dio claims that the protest was ‘one important reason why the 
soldiers despised [Macrinus] and paid no heed to what he did to win their favour.’529 The 
military as a whole was opposed to fiscal reforms, and the Circus demonstration proved that 
Macrinus had few allies in Rome. Unable to garner the specific support of the troops, nor 
tap into the diffuse support an emperor expected from Rome’s populace, Macrinus was 
vulnerable. An opportunity thus opened for Julia Maesa and her wealth to do the talking for 
her son Elagabalus, and the emperor’s military backing quickly melted away. Herodian 
bewailed the bestowal of special privileges upon the troops, directly linking these measures 
to a decline in discipline, and the backlash against Macrinus’s austerity programme 
demonstrated the catch-22 that the social and political elevation of soldiers created.530 
Soldiers pledged co-operation around policies that specifically benefitted them as a 
privileged, stand-alone group, and the transfer of their support could undermine regime 
legitimacy. To be sure, this was not an entirely new development. But the closer 
identification of the military and particularly the praetorians as a distinctive, even superior, 
social group gave them the collective strength not just to act efficaciously to support or 





528 Opp (2012) 77. 
529 Cass. Dio 79.20. 
530 Hdn.3.8.4-5; Hekster (2008) 36. 
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(iii) Identity, and the impact of Rome’s military landscape  
The role that military collective identities played in the fall of Macrinus was substantial, but 
when hostilities commenced between the emperor’s forces and those supporting 
Elagabalus, they took place far away from Rome.531 Those in the city could not see the 
performance of identity politics, only the consequences. Although the majority of 
praetorians who remained with Macrinus fought well, it was their collective discontent that 
had provided the opportunity for regime change in the first place. Urban perceptions of a 
praetorian collective were thus as visible as ever despite the off-stage events taking place in 
Syria. These perceptions were, in part, formed by the spatial dominance of the Guard in the 
urban environment. By the early third century, the number of troops stationed in Rome 
related to the total urban population had risen substantially. Where the soldier-to-civilian 
ratio was approximately was 1:125 under Augustus, and 1:80 under Marcus Aurelius, 
Severus reduced the ratio to 1:45/38.532 Not only were the numbers of soldiers high, they 
were also extremely visible, even when off duty. Only they had the legal right to bear a 
sword in public, and as Pertinax’s decree and repeated complaints from the public indicate, 
soldiers often wielded heavy, knobbed sticks (fustes) as well. Sword belts (baltei) were 
ornamental, with flashy attachments and pendants designed to jangle noisily when one 
walked down the street, advertising a soldier’s political power and social status.533 Baltei 
were potent symbols of military power – to strip a soldier of his belt was to humiliate him, 
as Severus clearly understood in 193CE – so a praetorian’s military belt was as 
representative of his social cultural and political identity as the toga was to a civilian 
citizen.534 The less glamorous stick, however, was a more potent reminder of the repressive 
capacity of the military. Combined with the sound of hobnailed boots on Rome’s 
cobblestones, the fustis and the axe (dolabra) referenced by Pertinax in his decree were 
perhaps most representative of the everyday relationship between soldier and civilian. 
 
 
531 Elagabalus was acclaimed by troops at Raphanae, Syria. Macrinus, meanwhile, was based at Apamea (also 
in Syria). 
532 These ratios are based on an estimated population of 1,200,000. Soldiers include praetorians, equites 
singulares, urban cohorts, vigiles, classiarii, and peregrini. Does not include the 5,000 strong Legio II Parthica 
based at Mt. Alba (22.2km from Rome). See Coulston (2000) 81. 
533 Coulston (2000) 90-91.  
534 Taking a sword belt off a soldier had long been used as a disciplinary measure within the army. See 
Val. Max. 2.7.9; Plut. Luc. 15.7; Suet. Aug. 24. 
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The power and identity of the Guard were also expressed spatially. The ‘changing of the 
guard’ occurred daily, when praetorians paraded from their camp to their various imperial 
postings on the Palatine Hill, a distance of some 2.7km.535 Their castra, meanwhile, had 
become more prominent in recent years. When Tiberius constructed a combined camp for 
the praetorians and urban cohorts in 23CE, it was located in a thinly populated area outside 
the Servian walls. When Aurelian revamped Rome’s defences in the early 270s, he 
integrated the walls of the castra into the new city walls.536 This indicates that the height of 
the camp fortifications had grown substantially from the relatively squat 4.5m walls erected 
by Tiberius, and shows that the camp was now far closer to the urban sprawl. The imposing 
presence of the castra meant that it was used as an orientation point for the populace, as its 
inclusion in the Notitia Regionum Urbis Romae and the Curiosum Urbis Romae suggests.537 
Even the space around the camp was territory associated with the soldiers. The Campus 
Praetorianus was a large parade-ground (c.440 by 280m) used for drilling and formations 
and was surrounded by rostra, shrines, honorific and triumphal monuments, and wine-
shops.538 For the civilian populace then, the imposing castra and spatial routines of soldiers 
represented the power and collective identity of the Guard. Constantine showed that he 
understood this relationship between camp and collective identity when he destroyed the 
camp of the equites singulares after his defeat of Maxentius in the early fourth century. The 
imperial bodyguard, who had remained loyal to Maxentius, had their visible presence 
erased in what was effectively a collective damnatio memoriae.539 
 
What happened within the castra walls was just as crucial in the formation of a praetorian 
identity. Civilians had free spaces, social networks, and collective identities that bound these 
social sites together. Praetorians too had their own free spaces within their camp and 
surrounding locales. They had their own colloquial language (sermo militaris).540 Soldiers 
had shrines (many brought their provincial cults to Rome), collegia, shared working and 
 
535 Dyson (2010) 211. 
536 Suet. Tib. 37; Tac. Ann. 4.2; Busch (2007) 321. Distance between the Palatine Hill and the praetorian castra 
taken from Google Maps (G.P.S). 
537 The castra Misenatium, for example, is delineated on the Forma Urbis, demonstrating its political and social 
importance. Busch (2007) 328, 330. 
538 Coulston (2000) 84; Tac. Ann. 12.36; Plin HN 3.67; Juv. 15.25-6. 
539 See Harries (2012) 119. 
540 For sermo militaris, see Carrié (1993) 127-128. 
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living spaces. Shared routines, spaces, language, and spatial separateness made the castra 
an island of military identity for the soldiers. This common identity combined with repeated 
hostile encounters with civilians created a boundary between them and Rome’s civilian 
population, and the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy was now explicit in both material and 
social form. Moreover, the transgressive and repressive approach of the Guard during 
Caracalla’s reign made this boundary increasingly salient. Although the activation of the 
civilian-soldier boundary had a short-term constraining effect (since the Guard had 
demonstrated its repressive capacity), in the long term, this boundary affected the 
likelihood, intensity, scale, and form of collective violence between the two parties.541 This 
is because political actors are not isolated, discrete beings with fixed attributes, but are 
socially embedded contributors who interact with others and undergo modifications of their 
boundaries and attributes as they interact. Accordingly, distinctive relations and identities 
formed across the soldier-civilian divide, based on past and current interactions. Distinctive 
relations and identities were also formed on each side that became shared representations 
of the zone itself.542  
 
The institutional side of political opportunities – the access political actors had to the 
political system and how power was structured – had been modified by Caracalla and 
Severus’ reshuffling of urban power dynamics. The discursive aspect of political opportunity 
structures meanwhile, the public visibility and significance and political legitimacy of 
political actors, claims and identities, had also undergone a significant shift as the Praetorian 
Guard paraded their new political power. This new tangible authority hardened the 
boundary between civilian and soldier in Rome, and even between the elite and non-elite, 
reconstituting the cultural identities of each group. Since the causal mechanisms of 
contention lie in the social interaction between opposing groups, the evolution of 
boundaries and separate urban identities was a crucial component of the conflict growing 
between the regime and its subjects.543 How space was used and perceived by each group 
was, therefore, an important part of the process of identification and politicisation. In the 
six years since the death of Severus, collective identity and justice framing had become 
 
541 Tilly (2004) 335. 
542 Tilly (2004) 328; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 56. 
543 McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2002) 56. 
  151 
essential components of popular contention. What identity and justice meant to a 
praetorian or civilian in Rome now differed in fundamental ways, meaning that as each 
group fostered its own opposing grievances, stereotypes, and sets of expectations, 
boundaries hardened between them, amplifying the process of identity politicisation.  
 
Collective identity begets collective violence: the riots of 222-223CE 
 
 
(i) Military masculinities and Elagabalus 
The standard narrative of Elagabalus’ reign is one of failed religious innovation and 
scandalous behaviour. Much modern scholarship tends to assign causal significance to 
Elagabalus’ cult activities, yet our three principal sources all agree that the conflict between 
the emperor and the Praetorian Guard that led to Elagabalus’ execution in 222CE was 
directly related to transgressions of sexual and gender norms.544 Such imperial behaviour 
was a long way from the moral tenets imposed by Severus, and Elagabalus’ conduct had a 
negative impact on the Praetorian Guard, whose identity was tightly bound to Roman 
conceptions of masculinity and control. Through ongoing interaction and negotiation with 
other political actors, the praetorians’ cognitive definitions concerning the ends, means, and 
fields of action were also sharpened.545 Their sense of ‘we’ was, to a certain extent, divorced 
from the identities of others in Rome because of the hardening of the social and political 
boundaries that separated them. Nonetheless, while it was the Praetorian Guard who 
forced regime change in 222CE, they were joined by ordinary people who executed their 
version of popular justice against representatives of the administration, and the emperor 
himself. The unlikely partnership between two discordant political groups indicates that 
grievances and tensions were deep-seated and complex. Accordingly, the hostility and 
violence that ensued were reflective of coalescing identities, and the acceleration of socio-




544 See Kemezis (2016) 349-50 for an overview of recent scholarship. 
545 Gawerc (2016) 193. 
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Emperors were now highly reliant on military support, and as Macrinus found, given the 
substantial leverage that the army had, soldiers had growing expectations in terms of access 
and even consultative rights with regards to imperial policy. Elagabalus presented himself as 
a military emperor in the mould of his so-called father Caracalla, but the gap between this 
persona and reality created a crisis for the Praetorian Guard, whose collective identity and 
political position were overtly tied to their patron-emperor. 
 
As with Macrinus, there was an initial outpouring of enthusiasm on the accession of 
Elagabalus in 218CE.546 Plebs, Senate, and soldiers all accepted a teenage priest from Emesa 
as a scion of the Severan dynasty, thanks to Julia Soemias’ declaration that her son was the 
illegitimate son of Caracalla. That this tidy fiction was of prime importance is apparent from 
Elagabalus’ assumption of the imperial name Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, styling himself as 
the ‘son of the divine Antoninus, [and] grandson of the divine Severus,’ even claiming Nerva 
as an ancestor. Declaring himself the blood descendant of the Five Good Emperors revived 
collective memories of bygone days, meaning the new emperor could offer all of Rome’s 
political groups a sound ideological basis to accept his claim.547 Still, Elagabalus’ primary 
consideration in terms of legitimacy was the military. The persistent authority of the 
Severan lineage, which soldiers associated above all with victory and material benefits, was 
foremost in the new regime’s crafting of legitimacy claims.548 Caracalla might have still been 
highly unpopular with the wider population, but Elagabalus (or at least his supporters) 
understood the need to tap into military identities by visibly associating himself with his 
‘father’ and his militaristic identity. Such connections were made early in the conflict 
between the Syrian faction and Macrinus.  When Elagabalus was smuggled into the camp of 
the Syrian-based Legio III Gallica, he was allegedly dressed in the clothes that Caracalla had 
worn as a child: unsurprisingly he was proclaimed at dawn by an enthusiastic soldiery.549 It 
was the soldiers of Legio III who styled the boy as Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, and who then 
persuaded the soldiers sent against them by Macrinus to desert, asking them ‘Why do you 
fight against your benefactor’s son?’550  Caracalla’s popularity amongst the soldiery was 
 
546 SHA Elag. 3.1-3.2. 
547 ILS 467, 5843: ‘divi Antonini filius, divi Severi nepos.’ Nerva: CIL 8.10347; Icks (2011) 12. 
548 Kemezis (2016) 374. 
549 Cass. Dio 79.31; Icks (2010) 332. 
550 Cass. Dio 79.32. 
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undimmed, and Elagabalus’ appropriation of his likeness signalled to the troops that he 
would share the military-centric policies of his ‘father.’ Likewise, the busts of Elagabalus 
bear obvious physical similarities with those of Caracalla. The new emperor affected a 
military haircut and a uniform of trousers, tunic, and mantle also favoured by Caracalla and 
which by this point had become common dress for Roman soldiers.551 Even the new 
emperor’s religion may have appealed. Elagabal, the Syrian sun-god was similar to the 
Roman sun deities Sol Invictus and Mithras, who were both very popular with soldiers.552  
 
 Elagabalus’ coup was built around a fictive relationship with the martial Caracalla, but he 
did not yet have the political and social connections elsewhere in Rome where he could find 
ready allies. Recognising this, the new emperor quickly paid out the enormous donative of 
20,000 sestertii originally promised by Macrinus.553 Letters were dispatched from the 
imperial headquarters, not just to the Senate, which was forced to recognise the honours 
that Elagabalus had already bestowed upon himself, but also to the praetorians and Legio II 
Parthica based at Mount Alba. Dio’s epitome is fragmentary at this point, but we can 
assume the emperor was eager to assure the troops that his regime would be as favourable 
to their collective as that of his putative father.554 Elagabalus’ heavy reliance on the army 
meant that his regime had to reflect the legitimacy claims lodged with the troops in order 
for that support to be reciprocated. However, the praetorians, who provided the emperor 
and his regime with tangible authority in Rome, also had a collective theatre to maintain. 
Their self-definition was not just constructed around their current position as Rome’s most 
powerful political actor, but around the elevation of military might as a crucial aspect of 
imperial leadership. Rome had been at war for more years than anyone could remember, 
and the Empire’s pre-eminence had been built around the conscientious practice of 
manliness (virtus) and by a rejection of a life of effeminacy (vita mollitiae). Unfortunately, 
 
551 Physical representation: See Icks (2011) 63. Military clothing: Dio 79.3.3 notes that Caracalla wore Germanic 
dress (i.e. tunic, trousers and mantle) during his Eastern campaigns like his troops. Elagabalus’ dress of a long-
sleeved, short tunic, a chlamys and trousers with a sash was virtually identical to the military uniform worn by 
the emperor in peacetime. See Dirven (20027) 28-30; Icks (2010) 332, 339-340. 
552 For a discussion and comparison of the three sun cults, see Halsberghe (1972) 117-129. 
553 Macrinus’ offer was 20,000 sestertii to every soldier and a complete reversal of his earlier pay and ration 
cuts. He did not have the time or opportunity to pay. 
554 Cass. Dio 80.2.3. 
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the masculine, military imagery that Elagabalus used to create a close bond with his soldiers 
did not match up with the real Elagabalus. 
 
Political identities aside, a Roman soldier was meant to embody manliness, and of all the 
sites where masculinities were constructed and reproduced, those associated with war and 
the military were the most direct. The essential qualities of a soldier, virtus and disciplina, 
embodied the cultural understandings of how Roman men were expected to behave.555 Just 
as virtus was etymologically connected to vir, the ideal man (and soldier) was meant to be 
physically dominant, controlled, and active. As representatives of the Empire, the public 
image of the Guard and the emperor were supposed to express the very values that gave 
Rome dominion over ‘lesser’ peoples.556 In the past, the personal qualities of emperors had 
previously been rather inconsequential as long as he provided benefits. The unabashed 
effeminacy of Elagabalus, however, exposed an aspect of the praetorians’ self-definition 
that up to then had been fairly quiescent. Our sources revel in lurid physical descriptions of 
the emperor’s degenerate unmanliness. Elagabalus’ careful attention to his coiffure, his 
depilation of body hair and use of makeup were considered clear gender markers, as was his 
dancing, self-indulgence, wearing of women’s clothing (including a hair-net), and his hobby 
of working in wool like a woman.557 He referred to himself as wife, mistress, queen and 
corrected those who called him lord, and in describing the emperor’s wish to be castrated, 
Dio uses the Greek malakia, a word that directly corresponds to mollitia.558  
 
Elagabalus’ effeminacy extended to his sexual passivity. Like Messalina before him, Dio 
accuses him of acting as an imperial harlot and adulteress, allowing himself to be caught and 
beaten by his ‘husband’ Hierocles, who was himself a slave and charioteer.559 Although the 
emperor’s homosexuality was not necessarily problematic, male-male relations were 
founded on power inequalities and his role as the penetrated associated him with the 
feminine and servile. The fact that a slave dominated an emperor, who stood at the apex of 
 
555 Morgan (1994) 165. For definitions of disciplina and virtus, see Lendon (2005) 177-78, 312. 
556 Amm. Marc. 31.5.14, 14.6.10.  
557 Hair: Cass. Dio 80.14.4. Makeup: Hdn. 5.6.10. Removal of body hair and beard (acts ascribed to cinaedi):  
SHA Elag. 5.5; Cass. Dio 80.14.4. Dancing: Hdn. 5.3.8, 5.5.9; Cass. Dio 80.14.3. Clothing: Hdn. 5.5.4-5, 5.3.6. 
Hairnet and wool work: Cass. Dio 80.14.4. 
558 Cass. Dio 80.11.1 
559 Cass. Dio 80.15.1-4. 
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the social hierarchy was a blatant transgression of Roman masculinity and cultural norms.560 
As Catharine Edward’s work on the politics of immorality has shown, perceptions of 
effeminacy and submissiveness were enough to negate any ability that an emperor may 
have had as an acceptable leader.561 Caligula and Nero also allegedly shared Elagabalus’s 
penchant for acting, dancing, effeminacy, and homosexual marriages, and both lost the 
support of their troops. Allegations of mollitia also served to denigrate Otho as an 
inadequate ruler, and interestingly, the Historia Augusta claims that as an emperor 
Elagabalus imitated Otho and also Vitellius, both emperor killed by their troops.562 Soldiers 
had also recently expressed opinions on an emperor’s masculinity. Like Caracalla and 
Elagabalus, Macrinus wore a military-style tunic, but he adorned it with brooches and a 
bejewelled belt. ‘Such luxury,’ Herodian claims, ‘does not find favour with Roman soldiers, 
who consider it more appropriate for barbarians or women.’563 Macrinus’ dress-sense may 
not have been a catalyst for rebellion, but it would not have helped his already fractious 
relationship with his troops. Elagabalus’ behaviour went much further. His effeminacy was 
antithetical to the military identities and imagery that he so consciously cleaved to in his 
Caracallan presentation, and the source material makes it clear that it was through this 
pursuit of unmanliness that Elagabalus became hated by the soldiers.564 
 
 The emperor’s adoption of his younger cousin, Alexander Severus, in response to growing 
objections over his behaviour, only served to highlight his deficiencies in the eyes of the 
Guard.565 Alexander was intentionally presented by his backers as a traditional Roman youth 
shielded from the degenerate lifestyle of the emperor, and trained in the lessons of self-
discipline, wrestling, and other manly pursuits. The contrast between two versions of 
masculinity was made stark, and Alexander proved extremely popular with the praetorians.  
 
560 Edwards (1993) 68-97. 
561 Edwards (1993) 70; Bittarello (2011). 
562 SHA Elag. 18.4. For Otho, see Tac. Ann. 13.12, Hist. 1.13, 1.30; Suet. Otho 12; Juv. 2.99. In contrast to 
Elagabalus, Otho committed suicide after his defeat at Bedriacum; Tacitus (Hist. 3.50), Suetonius (Otho 12), 
and Plutarch (Otho 18.2) all present his death in a positive light as a result. See Bittarello (2011). 
563 Hdn. 5.2.4. 
564 Cass. Dio 80.17; Hdn. 5.8.1. 
565 Hdn. 5.7.1. He claims that Elagabalus’ mother Maesa urged the adoption as she ‘suspected that the soldiers 
were outraged by his eccentricities.’ 
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The blame should not all laid at Elagabalus’ door: Julia Mamea’s payment of a secret 
donative to the praetorians probably helped shift support to Alexander.566 However cynical 
this may appear, the precedent set down by Julianus and Caracalla meant such an approach 
would be well-received. At the same time, a closed regime was a vulnerable one. The 
process of preceding years whereby usual imperial allies had been demoted and repressed 
left Elagabalus, a teenager, at the mercy of his circle of advisors, who, with the benefit of 
hindsight, should have recognised the obvious disconnect between a powerful, elite military 
unit and a decadent boy-emperor.  
 
Alexander’s popularity with the praetorians unnerved Elagabalus, and he began plotting to 
remove his heir, which provoked an episode of collective claim-making by the Guard. Dio 
and Herodian’s descriptions of the emperor’s actions around this time are compressed, but 
the Historia Augusta provides a detailed timeline, and, given that this section is stylistically 
separate from the main body of the Life, the account is probably based on Marius Maximus’ 
work.567 The emperor ordered the Senate to strip Alexander of his title of Caesar, a demand 
that senators uncharacteristically tried to resist. At this point, no real harm had been done, 
but when Elagabalus ordered Alexander’s statues inside the praetorian camp defaced with 
mud in a sort of damnatio memoriae, the Guard responded by sending a contingent to fetch 
the emperor, his mother and grandmother while the rest began demonstrating inside their 
camp. A power shift was under way. 
 
Caracalla had earlier revealed that the castra was a powerful political space, and the 
summoning of the emperor and his familia spatially reiterated where the power lay. 
Caracalla of course, had taken himself to the praetorian camp voluntarily. This time, the 
soldiers did not petition Elagabalus at the palace or even invite him to visit, but physically 
carried him back to their power base, and the emperor’s acquiescence amplified the 
Guard’s powerful position, and was proof that both sides believed that the Guard had the 
upper hand. As with Caracalla’s dash, the reversal of the usual movement between the 
imperial palace and camp would have been visible to the rest of the city, who now 
witnessed an emperor acceding to a soldier’s summons. For the praetorians, their support 
 
566 Hdn. 5.8.3.  
567 Icks (2011) 77 n.68. 
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of an emperor who unashamedly played the woman reflected on their collective identity 
and constructions of hyper-masculinity. His unmanliness tainted them by association, and as 
a consequence, the praetorians enlarged their position as political actors. Instead of merely 
providing support and legitimacy, the Guard put itself in the position of moral authority. 
Their demands were unprecedented: the emperor had to comport himself more 
appropriately, hand over his ‘lewd’ companions to the soldiers, and to treat Alexander with 
the public respect and honour the Guard believed he was entitled to. Outnumbered and 
detained in hostile territory, Elagabalus was forced to agree, although he managed to save 
his favourite Hierocles with tears and wailing, a tactic not likely to garner any respect from 
hardened soldiers, but one that confirmed the soldier’s decision to offer leadership to the 
morally corrupt and feminine emperor.568 
 
The Guard’s assertive stance had a significant effect on political opportunity structures. As 
Dio warns: 
 
Thus it is that persons, particularly if armed, when they have once accustomed 
themselves to feel contempt for their rulers, set no limit to their right to do what 
they please, but keep their arms ready to use against the very man who gave them 
that power (80.17). 
 
It could be argued that the Guard exercised such contempt for imperial authority before, 
but summoning an emperor, and issuing a list of demands was not only a reversal of the 
usual power dynamic but also a protest on behalf of the unit, and a significant 
demonstration of politicised collective identity. The Guard was now operating as an 
independent centre of power, which, assuming that all other regime variables remained 
equal, offered the soldiers expanded opportunities to pursue future claims.  Previous 
support had been predicated on money and status, but the claims made against Elagabalus 
indicated that praetorians had shifted their view on what their role as political actors 
entailed, which now included defending traditional concepts of imperial (read ‘masculine’) 
 
568 Cass. Dio 80.19.2-4; SHA Elag. 14.2, 15.1-4. 
  158 
power. Elagabalus’ moves against Alexander merely created a pivot around which soldier’s 
grievances could be translated into justified action. 
 
Unfortunately, the emperor failed to grasp that the Guard now perceived itself as a moral 
watchman. Dio has Elagabalus complain to the Senate; ‘yes, you love me, and so, by Jupiter, 
does the populace, and also the legions abroad; but I do not please the praetorians, to 
whom I keep giving so much.’569 This stance could be interpreted as submissiveness, but 
Elagabalus followed Caracalla’s precedent in other respects. He was ruthless enough to 
persecute senators and execute potential challengers.570 Earlier, he had allegedly killed one 
of his initial supporters, Ganys, ‘since no one of the soldiers dared to take the lead in 
murdering him.’571 Even Dio admitted that Elagabalus at times could don a toga and give a 
credible performance as an elite Roman male.572  What the emperor did not understand 
was the importance of aligning his lifestyle to the military identity he espoused as 
Caracalla’s son, and that his not-so-private life hand threatened the principles and public 
image of praetorian masculinity. 
 
The creation of behavioural guidelines and demands for court reform put the Guard in an 
even more dominant position over the emperor. Their physical ability to legitimise or 
depose emperors was a powerful form of social control, but this new position of moral 
arbiter was a significant extension of such control. There were some parallels between the 
Guard’s attitude towards Elagabalus’ behaviour and that of Nero; both emperors ascended 
the throne as teenagers, and both became less receptive to the advice of courtiers as the 
years passed. The praetorian Subrius Flavus who was involved in the Pisonian conspiracy of 
65CE allegedly told Nero: ‘there was not a man in the army truer to you, as long as you 
deserved to be loved. I began to hate you when you turned into the murderer of your 
mother and wife – a chariot-driver, an actor, a fire-raiser.’573 However, the plan in 65CE was 
 
569 Cass. Dio 80.18.4. 
570 Cass. Dio 80.7.1-4. 
571 Cass. Dio 80.6.3; Kemezis (2016) 374, n.91: Dio at first uses the name Eutychianus, then after 79.38.3 
always uses the name Ganys. Nowhere in the surviving text are we explicitly told that Gannys and Eutychianus 
are the same person, but this is by far the most likely conclusion. 
572 Cass. Dio 80.14.3; Kemezis (2016) 384. 
573 Tac. Ann. 15.67. 
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to simply replace an unfit emperor with a more suitable candidate.574 In 222CE, the Guard  
were less inclined to replace Elagabalus than they were to constrain his behaviour and to 
manage imperial policy. The proactive stance of the praetorians also demonstrated once 
again how much influence political elites had ceded since the early imperial period. Where 
some senators and writers in earlier times had gamely tried to publicly assert philosophical 
and political anxieties while emperors grew more autocratic and repressive, the fact that it 
was only the Praetorian Guard who could draw a behavioural line in the sand for Elagabalus 
(and expect compliance), shows how little influence they had left as a social collective.  
 
Despite the Guard’s demands, Elagabalus could not bring himself to comply, leaving the 
praetorians with a choice: obey or oppose.575 The precipitating factor appears to have been 
the absence of Alexander in imperial ceremony.  On New Year’s Day 222CE, Elagabalus and 
Alexander were meant to appear in public together as joint consuls in one of the year’s 
most significant religious and state occasions. However, Elagabalus refused to perform the 
traditional ceremony with Alexander, forcing his praetorian escort to threaten him into 
begrudging participation. He began the procession with Alexander but then refused to go 
any further than the Curia, leaving the city praetor to assume the vows for the state and 
conduct the usual ceremonies.576 Elagabalus’ practical failure to comply with the 
praetorians’ demands regarding his private conduct joined with a pointed, public refusal to 
perform the agreed public script with Alexander tore at the public fabric of praetorian 
hegemony.577 It was a rejection of the Guards’ demands and a direct threat to their newly 
imposed domination. 
 
Weeks later, in a misguided attempt to gauge support levels, Elagabalus started a rumour 
that Alexander was near death. The praetorians once again began demonstrating at their 
camp, and refused to send their regular contingent to the palace for the emperor’s 
protection, demanding instead that Alexander be brought to the shrine dedicated to Mars 
 
574 In his description of the Pisonian conspiracy, Tacitus claims that the empire would be handed over to 
Seneca as a ‘consequence of his distinguished virtues:’ Ann. 15.65. 
575 Elagabalus divorced his patrician wife Annia Aurelia Faustina and remarried the Vestal Aquilia Severa, and 
his lover Hierocles appears to have regained his position as the emperor’s chief confidant. 
576 SHA Elag. 15.5-7. Coins issued in early 222CE that show the procession with the two consuls separate 
support this narrative. Icks (2011) 81. 
577 Scott (1992) 204. 
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inside the castra.578  The invocation of the god of war was an implicit threat of course, but 
the soldiers’ preference for Mars and Alexander as symbols of traditional Roman 
masculinity, could also be viewed as a deliberate rejection of their opposites Elagabal and 
Elagabalus. This second summons was also tinged with a measure of contempt and resolve. 
With their initial command, the Guard sent a contingent to Elagabalus, replicating the 
regular daily movement between the palace and camp. This time, however, they refused 
the emperor both their customary protection and a respectful escort. Also, members of the 
Guard would attend the emperor in person to receive their watchword. Their refusal to 
appear may have meant no new watchword was issued. Receiving a watchword was a 
transaction of subordinance, and a refusal to do so was further evidence that the Guard was 
determined to not only oppose the emperor’s will but to impose their own.579 
 
Indeed, when Elagabalus received the praetorian’s orders, he realised he had pushed his 
luck too far. He rushed to the camp with Alexander but was quickly put under arrest and 
executed the next day along with his mother, Julia Soemias.580 Both Dio and Herodian’s 
accounts suggest that the second round of rioting and Elagabalus’ execution were relatively 
spontaneous reactions that stemmed from the emperor’s failure to follow their instructions. 
As the emperor had publicly broken the promises made in response to the Guard’s first 
contentious performance, they were forced to defend their claim in order to reassert their 
authority.581 Further details in Herodian’s account suggest, however, that the Guard’s act 
was, in the immediate context, a defensive one. According to his narrative, when Caracalla 
and Alexander arrived together at the camp, the soldiers welcomed Alexander 
enthusiastically but ignored the emperor. Elagabalus responded by ordering the arrest and 
punishment of the guards who had openly cheered Alexander and subjected the soldiers to 
a night-long harangue. Considering the provocation ‘just’ and wanting to rescue their 
comrades, it was at this point that the praetorians decided to kill the emperor.582 Identity 
provided the impetus for the initial demonstration, but Elagabalus’ intransigence was the 
final straw.  
 
578 Hdn. 5.8.5. Cass. Dio only says that Elagabalus ‘again formed a plot against Alexander’ (80.20). 
579 Eaton (2011). 
580 Cass. Dio 80.20. 
581 The Historia Augusta (Elag. 16.5) claims the execution was a part of a pre-planned conspiracy.  
582 Hdn. 5.8.7-8. 
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Although the grievances that motivated the two camp demonstrations were a marked 
escalation of the contentious politics of Elagabalus’ reign, each adhered to established 
claim-making practices within the military. Each incident was essentially a mutiny, a 
conventional military repertoire that was, after all, a manifestation of their raîson d’étre. An 
army used physical violence to win a victory, and the height of manliness and military 
prowess was the exercise of virtus and disciplina. It may seem that a near riot was a text-
book example of ill-discipline. However, as past mutinous incidents in the imperial forces 
demonstrate, mutinies very rarely occurred in the face of a foreign enemy, but as well-
articulated contentious claims regarding benefits and living conditions.583 The Guard’s claim 
may had moved beyond issues relating to pay or the brutality of their commanders, but 
their behaviour still followed an established pattern.  
 
That both demonstrations and the subsequent execution of the emperor took place inside 
the castra is also noteworthy. In past instances of praetorian insubordination, soldiers used 
other spaces; the imperial palace for Pertinax, the Gemonian Steps for Vitellius, and the 
Forum for Galba. The employment of the camp as a site for demonstrations, the articulation 
of demands, and finally, an execution establishes that it was operating as a free space. At its 
most basic level, free spaces (like the Circus) were places where communication could occur 
without deference to authority, and as a site where soldiers both performed their official 
duties and interacted socially insulated from the control of other elites, the castra fostered 
collective empowerment and identity.584 The soldier’s angry response to Elagabalus’ orders 
to have the statues of Alexander defaced indicates that they considered it an infringement 
of their space and identity, and were prepared to defend both. Consequently, as a free 
space and independent centre of power, the praetorian castra allowed the praetorians to 
mobilise because it offered, in both spatial and social terms, an effective organisational 
structure. As Rao and Dutta argue, ‘free spaces enable mobilization by offering an 
alternative organizational infrastructure. Free spaces are not just associations, but instead 
 
583 One exception is the refusal of an army to embark from the north Gallic coast to invade Britain, led by 
Caligula: Coulston (2013) 45. 
584 Rao and Dutta (2012) 625. 
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embody schemas and routines that can be transposed into other settings and therefore can 
create political opportunities even when none might objectively exist.’585 
 
The events of 222CE exemplified the Guard’s position as guardians of the state and its 
cultural norms, including gender. Perhaps most importantly to the soldiers who had served 
abroad, their role included protecting the image Rome presented to its enemies, a position 
that can be viewed as a military expression of both virtus and disciplina. Elagabalus’ 
rejection of partnership and military oversight threatened the Guard’s position and made 
him the victim of a violent performance that was an intrinsic part of military identity. The 
Guard’s empowerment was a radicalisation of the collective as a result of Elagabalus’ 
actions, considered by them to not only be illegitimate, but antithetical to their identity and 
perhaps even ‘Romanness’ itself. Unquestionably too, the soldiers’ insistence that 
Elagabalus present himself in person provided praetorians with an antagonist, which in turn 
aided the articulation of their grievances, and aroused emotions that aided mobilisation for 
collective action.586 
 
This incident of praetorian collective claim-making was a critical development in contentious 
urban politics. Previous deeds including coups, assassinations, and demonstrations of 
support largely stemmed from the Guard’s claimed position as political actors and 
legitimators, and were, to a certain extent, motivated by the promise of benefits. The 
execution of Elagabalus, however, was a collective decision motivated by conceptions of 
identity. An underlying assumption in terms of collective action and identity is, the more an 
individual identifies with a collective, the higher the chances that they will take part in 
collective action on behalf of that group. Participation in collective action, meanwhile, will 
reinforce group identification.587 Not only did the Guard successfully make a claim against 
Elagabalus, but their contentious activity also reinforced the very identities that mobilised 
them in the first place, politicising the collective and making them a stronger and more 
 
585 Rao and Dutta (2012) 628. 
586 Benford and Snow (2000); Rao and Dutta (2012) 640. 
587 Klandermans (2014) 8-9. 
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cohesive political actor. Mutinies have often been precursors of wider political challenges to 
the status quo, and the Guard’s mutiny was a signal to other political actors.588 
 
(ii) Popular justice and de-legitimation: the disposal of Elagabalus 
 
Those who do not win the love of the Senate, the people, and the soldiers do not 
win the right of burial (SHA Elag. 17.7). 
 
For the Guard, the removal of Elagabalus was just, but what occurred at the camp could be 
misconstrued. As there was no extant legitimising strategy that provided the praetorians 
with disproportionately outsized influence, let alone the power to impose social standards, 
the execution of Elagabalus could be viewed by other actors as yet another military power 
grab. The politicised identity of the Guard was based on this precise role, and they launched 
their contentious claim with a clear awareness of the broader societal context. 
Consequently, the conflict itself needed to be legitimised and strategically reformulated in a 
way that it would also appeal to potential allies.589 The immediate execution of prominent 
members of the imperial court, including Elagabalus’ hated lover Hierocles, and the prefects 
Comazon and Antiochianus certainly framed the Guard’s deeds as yet another military 
coup.590 To avert this, the soldiers subjected the emperor’s body (and that of his mother) to 
a public ritual of popular justice. The heads of Elagabalus and Julia Soemias were cut off, 
and their bodies dragged through the city before the emperor was thrown into the public 
sewer (Herodian) or the Tiber (Dio).591 Aurelius Victor claims the soldiers dragged the 
emperor through the streets in the manner of a dog’s corpse, accompanied by the soldier’s 
chants of ‘indomitae rabidaeque libidinis catulam.’592 Dio similarly claims the emperor was 
dragged ‘all over the city,’ and he revels in Elagabalus’ new nickname of ‘The Dragged’ 
(Tractaticius). Alföldy argues that this appellation refers to the manhandling of Elagabalus’ 
 
588 Rao and Dutta (2012) 627. 
589 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 327, 329. 
590 Cass. Dio 80.21.1. 
591 Hdn. 5.8.9 states that the emperor’s body was thrown directly into the sewer; Cass. Dio 80.20 that it was 
thrown into the Tiber. SHA Elag. 17.1-3 gives the most detail, stating ‘since the sewer chanced to be too small 
to admit the corpse, they attached a weight to it to keep it from floating, and hurled it from the Aemilian 
Bridge into the Tiber, in order that it might never be buried.’ 
592 Aur. Vict. Caes. 157.6: ‘young bitch of unrestrained, raging lust.’ 
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live body, but since this occurred within the confines of the praetorian camp and not in the 
public eye, this seems unlikely.593  
 
This sequence of events differed greatly from the praetorian’s last imperial deposition. 
Then, Pertinax’s head was brandished on a spear and taken back to the praetorian castra in 
a semi-public display of sovereign military power. The hasta would have been an 
appropriate symbol again in terms of Elagabalus; like Pertinax, he could be considered a 
personal enemy of the Guard and thus subject to military punishment. Instead, the soldiers 
dragged the bodies of the emperor and his mother into the city’s streets, in full view of the 
city. The decision to subject Elagabalus to the rituals of popular justice suggests that the 
praetorians had aims beyond merely replacing their commander-in-chief. One reason why 
they employed the popular justice repertoire was to de-legitimise Elagabalus’ regime. David 
Beetham defines de-legitimation as the ‘process whereby those whose consent is necessary 
to the legitimation of government act in a manner that indicates their withdrawal of 
consent’ and this withdrawal must be advertised.594 Elagabalus’ behaviour was not merely 
deviant; he threatened the authority and status of the praetorians who were the backbone 
of his regime. Popular justice was a form of social control and confirmation that military 
intervention was necessary and legitimate, and the ritualistic treatment of the emperor’s 
body was thus a public withdrawal of their consent.  
 
Defining the usually present role that violence plays in the de-legitimisation process, Daniel 
Bar-Tal and Phillip Hammack Jr. argue that de-legitimisation includes the categorisation of 
an individual or group into an ‘extremely negative social category that excludes it, or them, 
from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or 
values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and 
therefore deserving maltreatment.’595 By dragging the emperor’s body through the streets 
in front of an assembled populace, the praetorians composed a visceral image of power 
reversal, symbolically stripping Elagabalus of his imperial dignity and thus absolving 
themselves and others of their social obligations towards him. In this way, the Praetorian 
 
593 Alföldy (1976). 
594 Beetham (1991) 209-210. 
595 Bar-Tal and Hammack Jr (2012). 
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Guard did not usurp Elagabalus. The emperor was punished for his criminal acts – the ‘just’ 
provocation that Herodian describes.   
 
This display of power, degradation, and justice had another goal: to draw in and win the 
approval of bystanders. Certainly, the dragging of bodies through the streets and their 
disposal in the Tiber was a ritual that was tailored for either the active or passive 
participation of crowds.596 Given the complicated relationship that existed between the 
city’s soldiers and civilians, framing Elagabalus’ murder as an act of popular justice was an 
acknowledgement of the increased use of this repertoire by the masses in recent years. The 
mutilation and murder of Vitellius at the hands of soldiers and the urban plebs in 69CE was 
the last time an emperor was subjected to the ‘righteous’ will of the people, but threats 
made against Commodus and Caracalla were textbook examples of popular justice. On the 
accession of Pertinax in 193CE, the Senate called for Commodus to be ‘dragged with the 
hook.’ An assembled crowd outside the Curia likewise demanded that they be able to drag 
the emperor’s body with a hook, tear it limb from limb and cast it into the Tiber.597 Dio 
describes how the crowd then took up familiar chants from the shows to curse the former 
emperor:  
 
No one called him Commodus or emperor; instead they referred to him as an 
accursed wretch and a tyrant, adding in jest such terms as ‘the gladiator,’ ‘the 
charioteer,’ ‘the left-handed,’ ‘the ruptured.’ To those senators on whom the fear of 
Commodus had rested most heavily, the crowd called out: ‘Huzza! Huzza! You are 
saved; you have won.’ Indeed, all the shouts that they had been accustomed to utter 
with a kind of rhythmic swing in the amphitheatre, by way of paying court to 




596 Nippel (1995) 44-45. 
597 Note similarities with a crowd’s shouts of ‘Tiberius to the Tiber’ and suggestions to use the ‘hook and stairs’ 
on the deceased emperor (Suet. Tib. 74). Caligula’s corpse and statues were also attacked after his 
assassination in 41CE: Cass. Dio 59.29.7, 59.30.1a.  
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Likewise, when news of Caracalla’s death reached Rome in 217CE, there was a public 
outpouring of nicknames, gossip, and subversive views. Echoing the spontaneous 
damnation of Commodus, ‘everybody’ gathered to speak evil of the deceased emperor. 
People recited lists of Caracalla’s bloody deeds and his victims, compared him to previous 
tyrants, and demands were made that that horse-race celebrated on his birthday should be 
abolished, and his statuary be melted down.598 Just as assembled crowds described 
Commodus as ‘the gladiator, the charioteer and the left-handed,’ crowds called Caracalla by 
his original name, Bassianus; others called him Caracallus, or Tarautas, from the ‘nickname 
of a gladiator who was most insignificant and ugly in appearance and most reckless and 
bloodthirsty in spirit.’599 In both cases, the shouted abuse and threats were performances of 
the city’s hidden transcripts. Through collective chants, the twin utopias of justice and 
revenge ordinarily marginalised in civic discourse were made public as collective claims.600 
Airing suppressed grievances strengthened feelings of solidarity and collective identity, and 
may have also started the process of politicising urban identities that would then bolster the 
degree of embeddedness of ordinary people’s identities within local social networks.601 
 
 By transferring the emperor’s body from the ‘private’ space of the castra to the streets and 
subjecting it to humiliation under the gaze of the public, the praetorians could elicit the 
support of the populus, who recognised their ‘own’ repertoire, and its associations with 
justice and legitimacy. Given that punishment of Roman criminals had long been a public, 
brutal and highly theatrical way to establish and display authority, gain consensus, and 
negotiate identity and social status, the mirrored use of space and violence elicited the 
same imagery and emotions.602 As Nicholas Terpstra puts it, public executions were, in 
essence, ‘theatrical lessons in public retribution and social order, and like any staged 
presentation, the drama had to be didactic, cathartic, and compensatory.’603 Hence, the 
disposal of Elagabalus was a further example of Roman political contention activating 
collective memory, and intentionally subverting institutional forms of authority. 
 
598 Cass. Dio 79.17-18; Hdn. 5.2.2. 
599 Cass. Dio 79.9. See also SHA Sev. 21.10. The gladiator Tarautas was very short, as was Caracalla. 
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The Guard’s degradation of the dead emperor tapped into latent grievances held by the 
wider public. Michel Foucault argues that public punishment was a political ritual that 
‘reactivated power’ and restored the absolute authority of the regime over the body of the 
victim. In this case, the praetorians were able to re-establish the claims of the people, by 
reminding them that they had the potential authority to correct the injustices of their 
superiors.604  For those who approved, the public display of repudiation offered them a 
chance to effect their own symbolic rout of the regime. Part of the equation was the instant 
opening up of political opportunity structures as a result of Elagabalus’ execution. The 
Guard had sanctioned the murder of an emperor and provided a template in terms of 
collective retribution. Their choice of ritual degradation drew in other actors, making 
Elagabalus’ execution a collective act of justice, rather than a usurpation. Accordingly, the 
performative aspects of the display had an ideological function in terms of collective 
identity, and the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide between soldiers and civilians was replaced, 
temporarily at least, with an alliance. With the threat of repression removed and the 
praetorians as allies, the people could make their own collective claim in the brief window 
of opportunity offered by the uncertain political environment. 
 
(iii) Corruption as a collective action frame 
Was there a popular claim to make against the imperial regime? There is little information 
regarding political contention of any kind during the majority of Elagabalus’ four-year reign. 
His regime was extravagantly generous with liberalitas distributions to the people, regular 
offerings of lavish shows and religious ceremonies, and the construction of new theatres 
and circuses.605 The emperor was therefore probably not as unpopular as the sources 
suggest, although, at some point before 222CE, derisory nicknames and opinions were 
circulating through the city.606  Elagabalus’ religious proclivities were also unlikely to have 
caused real outrage. As part of the many public festivities for his patron god Elagabal, the 
emperor distributed gold, silver, clothing and even animals to the assembled crowds, the 
gifts proving so popular that people were trampled or accidentally impaled on soldiers 
 
604 Beik (1997) 63; Foucault (1977) 32-69. 
605 Hdn. 5.6.7-9; SHA Elag. 21.6-22.4. 
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spears.607 Kemezis argues that, while any putative insult offered to Rome’s traditional 
pantheon by Elagabal’s introduction was potent material for hostile sources, it did not mean 
that it necessarily fostered active prejudices or grievances. He adds; ‘nothing points to a 
situation in which Elagabalus’ cult activities spontaneously outrage a pious traditionalist 
public such that it becomes impossible for them to tolerate him or for his handlers to 
continue using him as a figurehead and the latter are obliged to fall back on Alexander as a 
“Plan B”.’608 
 
We would expect, then, that the assembled city population would watch the rituals of 
degradation performed on Elagabalus, celebrate the accession of the popular Severus 
Alexander, then go home. What happened instead was that the people joined with the 
rioting soldiers and attacked prominent members of Elagabalus’ administration, subjecting 
them to the same rituals of popular justice. Among unnamed others, Dio claims that the 
emperor’s head of the fiscus, Aurelius Eubulus, and Fulvius, the praefectus urbi, were torn 
to pieces by a combined crowd of civilians and soldiers. Both men were well-known. Eubulus 
was so infamous for his lewd lifestyle and confiscations that his surrender had been 
demanded by the populace long before the riots (which suggests there was more 
contentious activity during Elagabalus’ reign than what the sources record).609 There is less 
information on Fulvius, but the prefect could be the senator and ex-consul Fulvius 
Diogenianus, whom Dio describes as ‘decidedly not of sound mind.’610 Significantly, the 
populace, not the Guard, lynched the men, nor does it appear that permission was sought. 
In earlier cases, victims were handed over by the higher authorities – Commodus and 
Vitellius handed Cleander and the urban prefect Sabinus respectively to a waiting crowd.611 
This time, participants used the opportunity offered by the praetorian’s use of popular 
justice to exact their own emotional and violent response to a perceived governmental 
disregard for popular judgment and justice.   
 
 
607 Hdn. 5.6.9-10. 
608 Kemezis (2016) 377. 
609 Cass. Dio 80.21. 
610 Cass. Dio 79.37: the text is very fragmentary here unfortunately.  
611 Sabinus: Tac. Hist. 3.74. 
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What Fulvius and Eubulus may have had in common was a role in an alarming increase in 
treason accusations and prosecutions. A rescript from the praetorian prefect Ulpian in 
223CE curtailing such charges indicates that this was an issue under Elagabalus. Since the 
urban prefect had jurisdiction over legal cases within 100 miles of Rome, and the head of 
the fiscus was in charge of confiscations and the use of informants, both men were probably 
viewed by the populace as corrupt and directly responsible for grave acts of injustice.612 In 
this vein, the lynching of Eubulus and Fulvius appears to have met the format for collective 
violence when employed against the most powerful. Wilfried Nippel states that ‘the Roman 
way of demonstrating that a killing was to be understood as popular justice was expressed 
in the formula that the victim had been ‘torn to pieces at the hands of the crowd’ (manibus 
discerpere). This is the label the sources applied to almost all lynchings of Republican and 
Imperial times.’613 Dio uses the verb διασπάω (to tear asunder), indicating that both men 
died in this manner.614  
 
Elagabalus’ private behaviour or religious policies do not seem to have been considered 
transgressive enough by the people to provoke any serious outrage before his death. 
Lynching was a relatively rare form of popular justice, and as the conditions that led up to 
the anti-Cleander riot demonstrate, complex factors made up collective action frames. One 
explanation is that perceptions that Elagabalus’ administration was decadent and corrupt 
propelled injustice discourse from a hidden transcript to a master frame at a point of 
political opportunity. These perceptions were not recent, but a product of the preceding 
years. Centralisation and closed regimes meant that emperors relied on power bases that 
were increasingly disconnected from the social hierarchy that kept others in their place.  
 
Widely held views of imperial corruption did not necessarily have to match corrupt practices 
in reality. The emphasis of the source material is on the changes in the social composition of 
imperial officials and favourites, and the increased political competition between regime 
factions; both factors that could taint a regime with accusations of corruption. Both 
 
612 The Digest (49.14.1) records that the fiscus received much via penalties and forfeitures, whereby informers 
would provide information to the office and were rewarded for their pains. 
613 Nippel (1995) 44.  
614 Cass. Dio 80.21. 
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Macrinus and Elagabalus were criticised for the unsuitability of some of their high-ranking 
officials. Oclatinius Adventus, whom Macrinus elevated to the position of senator, consul, 
and urban prefect had lower social origins than Macrinus himself.615 His two Praetorian 
Prefects, Ulpius Julianus, and Julianus Nestor, apparently lacked the right military or 
administrative experience, instead earning dubious reputations assisting Caracalla and his 
decadent pursuits.616 Macrinus, according to Dio, incurred the censure of ‘sensible people,’ 
for sending a previously exiled ex-slave and a common soldier to govern Dacia and Pannonia 
respectively.617 Dio’s social snobbery is manifest throughout his history in his negative 
characterisations of those of a lesser station, and some aspects of his descriptions should be 
taken with a pinch of salt. Herodian, though, takes a similar tone regarding Elagabalus’ 
administration:  
 
[Elagabalus] appointed all the actors from the stage and the public theatres to the 
most important posts in the empire... to charioteers, comedians, and actors of 
mimes he entrusted the most important and responsible imperial posts. To slaves 
and freedmen, to men notorious for disgraceful acts, he assigned 
the proconsular provincial governorships (5.7.6-8). 
 
One of his most high profile employees, Publius Valerius Comazon (also known as 
Eutychianus) was said to have originally been a dancer.618 It is notable too that the Historia 
Augusta repeatedly links episodes of Elagabalus’ sexual misconduct to references of 
corruption at court.619 Freedmen and slaves could gain admission to the emperor via 
informal means. The women of the Severan family meanwhile, also had considerable 
influence, as did other Syrian and Emesene courtiers. Senators and other grandees who 
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To a certain extent, the composition of Elagabalus and Macrinus’ courts was a pragmatic 
response to the nature of each violent regime change. New emperors need loyal supporters, 
and within a closed regime, those who do not possess close associations with elites are 
almost wholly dependent on the emperor for their position. In return, the imperial regime 
could continue to function without the usual co-optation with elites that was necessary for 
the smooth workings of government. In reality, both emperors had little choice but to 
promote their main supporters. Oclatinius Adventus was allegedly offered the throne before 
Macrinus and was powerful enough that the new emperor had to ensure his support by 
promoting him. Publius Valerius Comazon played a central role in the Syrian plot that 
propelled Elagabalus to the throne. His support, at least in the initial stages, helped to 
stabilise the post-conflict government of his charge. Nonetheless, these choices generated 
political competition from those who had been displaced, and accordingly, views that new 
power-holders were corrupt and uninterested in providing social goods.  
 
Herodian, Dio and the Historia Augusta all present a rather standard representation of 
Elagabalus’ regime as decadent, low-born, and ill-bred, which perhaps demonstrates the 
marked unease of elites with the failure of successive emperors to uphold the usual social 
hierarchies at court.620 The anxieties and gossip of courtiers was one thing, but whether 
their outlook influenced the wider public’s perception of imperial regimes was another. The 
closed nature of early-third century regimes and the increasing absences of emperors from 
Rome allowed rumour to supersede official information channels since rumours gain 
traction when people either do not receive or trust information from official sources.621 
Insiders from the imperial court were known to leak political snippets: the ‘sale of smoke’ 
for instance became a familiar abuse in the Antonine court.622 We can speculate that the 
role of circuli during this time was a critical one. As the lynchings of Eubulus and Fulvius 
demonstrated, groups were politicised and activated around political issues and acts of 
injustice, and the role of such rumours and views allowed the populace to construct 
alternative transcripts of power.623  
 
620 de Arrizabalaga y Prado (1999) 9-10. 
621 Shibutani (1966) 57–62. 
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Given the ongoing process of identity polarisation and boundary formation between urban 
political actors, the importance of rumour and other forms of unofficial communication 
increased for ordinary people. This is because rumour articulated and bounded identity, 
collective memory, and legitimate group social practices. As Sally Merry observes, the 
dissemination of such views made explicit the structural inconsistencies and areas of 
greatest tension and competition of any given social group.624 Henrik Mouritsen posits that 
imperial freedmen who acquired political power came to epitomise the erosion of civic 
freedom in general.625 The backlash against Cleander, for example, highlighted the fears of 
elite and non-elite alike that a regime that allowed ‘outsiders’ so much power did not 
respect the usual rules of engagement. Indeed, long-held stereotypes regarding greedy and 
dangerous imperial freedmen could easily be extended to cover the new ethnically and 
socially diverse component of imperial courts. For some of the urban populace, whose own 
place in the world had been altered by Caracalla’s Constitutio among other things, such 
stereotypes made sense of the shifting social environment.  
 
High levels of perceived corruption can, therefore, have a more significant social impact 
than corruption itself. Often, when people view a regime as corrupt, they will begin to 
distrust it. Institutional instability and the deterioration of the relationships among the 
regime and its political actors can result. Moreover, perceptions of government corruption 
are known to have a relationship with socioeconomic status: what was considered political 
competition by the elite was viewed as evidence of corruption by the less wealthy or 
educated.626 Rivalry between factions and the subversion of expected social hierarchies thus 
shaped narratives of corruption that emerged from within the imperial court. Reports that 
individuals suspected of abusing their positions for personal benefit rather than the 
common good encouraged opinions that Elagabalus’ regime, in particular, was corrupt and 
deficient. Collective action frames were also bounded by this discourse, as perceptions of 
corruption increased the potential for contention, while a growing sense of injustice 
undermined the legitimacy and credibility of the regime.627 This injustice framing could then 
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be linked with the practices of imperial officials who had a direct impact on the populace. It 
was a process rather than a reflex. After Caracalla’s death, Herodian claims that Rome was 
purged of the emperor’s informants, including senators, equestrians, imperial freedmen, 
prominent women, and slaves.628 Under Macrinus, crowds complained of the benefits 
unjustly flowing to the praetorians. The activities of Eubulus and Fulvius under Elagabalus 
were so unjust that a crowd decided them worthy of a lynching. That act of collective 
violence indicates that the emergence of a justice master frame constructed around issues 
of corruption in previous reigns was durable enough to enable participants to identify the 
issue at hand through the same lens and channel individual views and behaviour into 
patterned social action.629 When the opportunity arose to act, the discursive repertoires 
that had developed interactionally with their targets were able to be articulated as a fully 
functional frame essential to the cognitive processes necessary for orienting collective 
action against members of the imperial regime.630 The lynching of imperial officials as an 
extension of the praetorians’ public performance of popular justice also shows that a 
sequence of politicising events had transformed participants’ relationship with their social 
environment.  
 
The initial acts of the Guard and their attempt to involve the public in their power struggle 
turned the issue of justice into a matter of general interest. With new allies and identified 
targets, the crowd could join the struggle and exact their own measure of justice and 
withdrawal of consent for Elagabalus’ regime.631 Accordingly, the collective identities of the 
civilian participants were politicised as a result of the military’s own assertion of identity. 
Military identity and popular perceptions of corruption were two entirely separate issues. 
Both, however, were articulated by each group’s framing process that drew them together 
in the pursuit of similar outcomes. In many respects, the politicisation of separate civilian 
and military identities was an intensification of extant collective identities, since 
politicisation implies that a cognitive restructuring of the social environment has taken 
place, further differentiating groups into categories of either (potential) allies or opponents. 
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Although they were allies at this point, given the already contentious relationship between 
the two groups, the quantitatively stronger effects of politicised identity could impact future 
interactions between praetorians and civilians.632 With a new emperor on the throne and 
previous targets of military and civilian wrath gone, these identities would shift from being 
in alignment to open opposition, precipitating one of the most severe episodes of violent 
contention yet to occur in Rome. 
 
(iv) The spatial symbolism of popular justice 
One further aspect to the performance of popular justice was the incorporation of the 
Circus Maximus in the public degradation of Elagabalus. As Rome watched and participated 
in the ritual disposal of their former emperor, its public spaces became theatres of justice. 
In previous examples of political contention, one site was usually the location or the goal for 
claim-making. In this case, Herodian says the soldiers ‘gave the bodies of Elagabalus and 
Soaemias to those who wanted to drag them about and abuse them,’ and the Historia 
Augusta states that Elagabalus’ body was dragged around the Circus Maximus before it was 
thrown into the Tiber from the Aemilian Bridge.633 Unlike the Gemonian Steps or Forum, the 
Circus had never been used for executions or popular justice practices. There were almost 
certainly no races on that day, so participants made a deliberate choice to use the Circus as 
a parading ground for the emperor’s body, and as the news spread, others would have 
gathered there in anticipation, creating an audience.  
 
The inversion of imperial ceremonial is apparent here. Instead of heading an official 
procession and governing proceedings, Elagabalus’ presence was involuntary. He was 
passively part of the arena because his power and the space had been appropriated by the 
people. This behaviour, moreover, shows how protesters had progressively manipulated, 
defended, and subverted the Circus from the late second century. The demonstration 
against Cleander mirrored routine political life and utilised the symbolism and the vast scale 
of the Circus to legitimise popular claims against the regime. The occupation in protest 
against Julianus was a performative defence of the people’s right to withhold consensus. 
Likewise, the popular justice inflicted on Elagabalus was a deliberate subversion of power 
 
632 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 327, 329. 
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structures and spatial routines. This progression was only possible because the Circus had 
been converted from a free space for popular expression to a safe space where claimants 
could gather and perform acts of resistance. In other words, the Circus Maximus provided 
an opportunity structure for contenders, and symbolised, if only temporarily, the power of 
popular contentious politics. 
 
In contrast, the Tiber was an ancient site of ritual justice and purification. Mutilation, 
exposure, the use of a hook (i.e., dragging), and disposal via the river or the sewers that led 
to it had overt links with traditional execution.634 It was the final stage of a well-established 
and familiar ritual of abuse, vengeance, and damnation.635 It is telling that this space (and 
ritual) was reserved for Elagabalus alone, Julia Soemias’ body having been cast aside at 
some point during the collective abuse.636 The use of the Tiber may indeed have been the 
choice of both civilians and soldiers working in concert, but it is certain that ordinary people 
took up the Guard’s lead and executed popular justice in a manner that was symbolic and 
meaningful for them. These spaces were meaningful in terms of political contention for two 
reasons. First, space was not just a ‘container’ for claim-making. The urban environment 
constituted and structured social and cultural life, including contentious repertoires, and 
was central to scale-jumping strategies aimed at reversing power asymmetries between 
political actors.637 Also, the diffusion of locations and the selection of spaces that could 
accommodate large crowds of people allowed participants to scale-up their claim – 
effectively, by dragging Elagabalus’ headless body through the streets, participants had 
made Rome itself a claimant and recipient of the justice denied by the regime. 
 
 Secondly, the praetorians were violent specialists. One of their functions was to kill the 
enemies of the state. They had already assassinated Pertinax and Julianus, so their initial 
deed was neither particularly shocking nor surprising. Ordinary people, on the other hand, 
did not regularly participate in violence, and very rarely against their social superiors. The 
 
634 Examples of bodies dragged by hooks and thrown into the Tiber: Cass. Dio 61.35.4; Suet. Vit. 17. On Galba 
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popular justice process drew Rome’s inhabitants into a theatrical performance of symbolic 
violence, and by doing so, expanded the original claim against Elagabalus’ government. 
Resistance had shifted from the shouting of abuse against Commodus and Caracalla to the 
man-handling and degrading disposal of Elagabalus. Castra, streets, Circus and Tiber now 
were all contentious sites, which drew more of the city (in spatial and social terms), into a 
round of claim-making that was, in itself, a considerable escalation of violence. 
 
(v) Politicised identities: the riot of 223CE 
Alexander Severus was acclaimed by the praetorians the same day as Elagabalus’ execution, 
with the Senate following suit in subsequent days. Although the new emperor was only 
thirteen, his cultivated image as a temperate Roman, and his popularity with the Guard and 
people alike recommended a peaceful transfer of power. Still, the new emperor had two 
energised urban sectors to deal with and past violent transitions had proven that the 
immediate political environment would be unstable, offering multiple opportunities for 
challengers. It was clear, too, that Alexander’s supporters understood the nature of the 
praetorians’ grievances, for they would not have deliberately contrasted the young man’s 
public image to that of Elagabalus if the emperor’s life-style was palatable to the Guard. 
Besides, the formation of a civilian lynch mob also proved that hostility towards the regime 
went beyond the praetorian camp. Damnatio memoriae had been imposed upon 
Elagabalus, but Alexander’s dynastic claim was the same as that of his cousin. He needed to 
make an explicit break with the previous regime lest he be associated with its sins. Pertinax 
understood the need to cultivate new allies in the wake of Commodus’ demise and so too 
Alexander. Correspondingly, the new regime decided on an approach that would reduce 
underlying tensions. The message was simple: renewal and restoration, with an emphasis 
on precedent and tradition.638 
 
If perceptions of corruption and injustice bring into question the legitimacy of an emperor’s 
leadership and regime, then equally, good leadership supported by reliable and effective 
administrative structures will reduce perceptions of corruption and will, therefore, be more 
likely to be deemed to be legitimate in the eyes of its subjects.639 Alexander’s 
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administration, under the watchful eye of his mother Julia Mamaea and grandmother Julia 
Maesa, applied itself to this task, employing traditional practices and ideologies to win both 
the Senate and people as allies. Collective memory in the form of political myth often 
emerges as a legitimating device during times of social and political crisis and the regime’s 
use of memory to reanimate a unified urban identity and cultivate diffuse support was a 
crucial part of Alexander’s attempts to reconfigure the complex and by now  problematic 
relationships between Rome’s actors. As the new emperor already had a strong, albeit 
tainted, dynastic claim, his regime pursued a procedural legitimacy claim that recognised 
the roles and ideological expectations of each group. Recorded in the Feriale Duranum, the 
official religious calendar of a garrison based at Dura Europas, are two acclamation dates for 
Alexander: the 12th March 222CE when the praetorians acclaimed him, and the 14th March 
when the Senate voted him the imperial honours.640 This recognition of the Senate’s 
customary but ignored role as imperial legitimators was reinforced by the creation of a 
senatorial consilium of sixteen advisors, ‘who because of their age seemed most dignified 
and temperate in their conduct.’641 Neither act meant any actual increase in senatorial 
power, but the reciprocal relationship of respect and consultation that lay at the heart of 
the original Augustan settlement had been revived.642 
  
This new commitment to tradition, transparency and justice was also directed at the urban 
plebs. Jupiter was restored as the paramount god of the state religion. Elagabal’s temple 
was rededicated to Jupiter Ultor and the statues of evicted gods and goddesses returned to 
their temples. In the legal arena, Julia Mamaea persuaded Alexander to take up the 
emperor’s customary duty of personally dispensing imperial justice in the courts daily.643 
Many of Elagabalus’ corrupt and inexperienced advisors and favourites were replaced with 
qualified individuals, including the appointment of the jurist Ulpian as Prefect of the 
Annona, then Praetorian Prefect later that year.644 Under his watch, a massive number of 
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rescripts were issued, including the one issued on 11 April 223CE that dramatically restricted 
the number of accusations and prosecutions for treason that may have been a factor in the 
lynching of Eubulus and Fulvius.645 Alexander could not repopulate the entire imperial court 
nor purge all of Elagabalus’s administrators – a measure of continuity was present in all 
early third century reigns despite sharp shifts in regime policy – but he could demonstrate a 
new ethos.  
 
Together, the regime’s focus on justice, religion, and traditional concepts and hierarchies 
was meant, in part, to address the widening social space between competing urban 
identities. Years of irregular and escalating bursts of contentious activity built up a collective 
memory of polarisation and conflict, but Alexander’s administration attempted to build new 
solidarities – a consensus universorum – grounded in a new identity that reflected the 
shared roles and benefits accorded to the city’s main actors. The role of collective memory 
was vital, for it ‘exerts its influence both from the bottom up, as interpretations of the past 
affect the identities and understandings of political elites, as well as from the top down, as 
statements by public figures place certain events into the national consciousness while 
silencing or forgetting others.’646 If Rome could regain its sense of community, the regime 
could generate a strong base of diffuse support, that is, not only a shared understanding 
that the imperial system was legitimate, but that it could also be trusted to provide 
equitable outcomes, and that it conformed to ethical principles about what was just.647 Why 
the emperor would bother reconstructing a collaborative relationship with a Senate 
reduced to merely taking orders, or why he would stress the open and transparent nature of 
imperial justice when he had strong military support had more to do with creating 
perceptions than any real re-setting of the political environment.  
 
 
instructed to return to their previous status and occupation.’ Cass. Dio 80.21.2 claims there was one exception, 
a possible reference to Comazon who was reappointed as praefectus urbi in the place of Fulvius. Interestingly, 
Zoticus the former cook reappears as nomenclature a censibus, albeit with less power and profile than he held 
under Elagabalus. McHugh (2017) 92; Icks (2011) 21-22. 
645 96 rescripts in total. McHugh (2017) 106, 108. Even Dio admits that Ulpian ‘corrected many of the 
irregularities’ introduced by Elagabalus (80.2.2). 
646 Verovšek (2016) 529. 
647 Easton (1975). 
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Thus, with these initial moves, Alexander proclaimed a new beginning for urban political 
relations. Unfortunately, this public strategy was not able to repair the relationship between 
the populace and the Praetorian Guard. They may have been allies on the death of 
Elagabalus, but this rapprochement was only temporary. According to Dio, sometime in 
early 223CE: 
 
a great quarrel [arose] between the populace and the Praetorians, from some small 
cause, with the result that they fought together for three days and many lost their 
lives on both sides. The soldiers, on getting the worst of it, directed their efforts to 
setting fire to buildings; and so the populace, fearing the whole city would be 
destroyed, reluctantly came to terms with them (80.2.3). 
 
Zonoras’ epitome of what may have been a detailed account in Dio’s original is 
unfortunately vague.648 We have no clue as to what the ‘small cause’ was or who initiated 
hostilities, and neither Herodian nor the Historia Augusta mention any major conflict 
between soldiers and civilians. Pope Callixtus I was allegedly martyred during a popular 
uprising in Rome at around the same time, and the seventh century Chronicon Paschale 
records disturbances occurring in Rome over three successive days and nights in the same 
year, details that provide some credence to Dio’s account.649 Three days of rioting is an 
extended period of violent contention, and Dio’s description of hostilities mirrors Herodian’s 
account of the close quarters fighting between protestors and Commodus’ equites 
singulares in 190CE, and further back, the urban warfare of 69CE, and 42CE. As with the 
earlier cases, civilians used the city’s narrow streets and their own homes to their 
advantage. By barricading themselves inside their homes and throwing stones and tiles on 
 
648 Markov (2016) 58. The lack of clarity may be due to Dio’s distance from the city at the time; he was either in 
Africa where he filled the position of proconsul or his next posting in Pannonia Superior when events took 
place. At the beginning of Book 80 (80.1.2), Dio expresses some regret that he was unable to provide more 
detail about Alexander Severus’ reign because he spent too little time in Rome during that time. Equally, it is 
commonly thought that these were the years when the historian was actively working on his opus, so it is 
more likely than not that he was reproducing contemporary information and reports received from the city.  
649 Those who killed Callixtus may have used the rioting to settle their own grievances with the erstwhile pope, 
which may have culminated with his being thrown off the Aemilian Bridge à la Elagabalus. Chron. Pasch. ann. 
223; Honoré (2002) 32. For more on Callixtus and the reliability of the sources (including the Historia Augusta), 
see Handl (2014). 
 
  180 
tightly packed soldiers unable to manoeuvre effectively, the unarmed were able to gain the 
upper hand over their well-trained and armed opposition.  
 
The spatial shift of contention from politically charged public spaces to people’s 
neighbourhoods and homes suggests that the soldiers took an offensive stance, pursuing 
people into their neighbourhoods. What prolonged the conflict was the people’s refusal to 
submit, but there is also an interrelationship between the diffusion of collective violence 
into Rome’s streets the year before, and the fighting between soldier and civilian now. 
Where the acts of popular justice against Elagabalus were ritualised, and symbolic spaces 
used as performative locations, now the interaction between the two groups was informal 
and contested. Civilians were defending their dwellings, families, and free spaces from 
violent specialists, and the personal risk not just to those directly involved, but also to those 
in the vicinity of the violence was high. At the same time, the increased scope of potentially 
contestable locations as a result of the contention of 222CE went hand in hand with the 
diffusion of contentious performances, from demonstrations to inter-personal violence. The 
successful deployment of popular justice as a popular claim provided a line in the sand for 
civilians. Given the Guard’s outsized political role, easy capitulation could see their position 
strengthened at the expense of the populace, who could see their spatial rights to the city 
reduced as a result. The shift from public to private spaces in this instance was, therefore, 
reflective of the evolution of urban political relationships more generally. The progressive 
asymmetry of power relations meant that traditional contentious repertoires were 
becoming outdated. There were fewer incentives to communicate with the emperor directly 
or participate in consensus rituals at the spectacles because the regime was closed around 
powerful courtiers. Likewise, the threat of repression was ever-present and the availability 
of new allies had shrunk. As conventional means of political participation reduced, and 
diffusion of contention increased, opportunities to seek redress for grievances declined, 
pushing contentious behaviour towards the more transgressive and destructive end of the 
spectrum, and into new spaces.  
 
 One of the purposes of the regime’s return to traditional values was to recreate a political 
environment whereby the Senate, people, and soldiers would view themselves as members 
and beneficiaries of a shared political identity, rather than as opponents. No-one would 
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realistically expect the Guard to withdraw from the political scene, but Alexander’s more 
conventional approach may have created an expectation that the praetorians would adhere 
to the old rules of engagement. As we have seen, one of Pertinax’s more popular measures 
was his attempt to reign in the Guard after Commodus’ accommodation of their offences. 
An agreement between the praetorians, regime, and plebs regarding the Guard’s role was a 
key mechanism for producing healthy civil-military relations, and the overweening role of 
the military as an independent centre of power did not mesh with the new imperial 
narrative and its message of hope and renewal.650 As the contentious politics model 
predicts, no one grievance is enough to spark claim-making, and fundamentally, no ‘small 
cause’ would motivate ordinary people to expose their loved ones and possessions to the 
destructive power of a well-resourced militia unless deep-seated grievances and boundaries 
were activated. To make a comparison with the modern era, in 2019 alone, multiple 
instances of contention were motivated by seemingly minor issues: violent protests in Chile 
by an increase in metro fares; Lebanon a tax on WhatsApp calls; and Hong Kong a proposed 
extradition bill.651 A spark requires a precipitating factor certainly, but behind these were a 
matrix of grievances and anxieties related to issues of democracy, state repression, 
corruption, economic instability, and injustice. These issues combined with a definitive 
opening of political opportunity structures propelled ‘small causes’ into political contention. 
 
In the case of 223CE, the spark may have been competition between soldiers and civilians 
over scarce resources. When Ulpian received his promotion to the praetorian prefecture in 
December, Aurelius Epagathus, an imperial freedman who held important administrative 
roles under Caracalla, Macrinus, and Elagabalus, probably succeeded him as praefectus 
annonae.652 Dio names Epagathus as a protagonist in the disturbances, claiming Alexander 
sent him to Egypt (and later had him executed there) in order to prevent further violence if 
he was punished in Rome.653 John McHugh proposes that Epagathus deliberately hoarded 
 
650 Levy (2017) 193. 
651 McKenzie (2019). 
652 We can surmise this because since Alexander immediately sent Epagathus to Egypt after the riots to take up 
the prefect’s post there: this was the usual progression in the premier equestrian posts: PIR E 67. Cass. Dio 
78.21.2-3 mentions Epagathus in the same context as Theocritus; despite their lowly origins, both wielded 
great influence under Caracalla. 
653 Cass. Dio 80.2.4. P. Oxy. 2565 records the presence of Epagathus in Egypt in May/June of 224CE. ` 
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the public grain supplies, which drove up prices and triggered the riot.654 This was the same 
charge levelled against Cleander in Herodian’s narrative, and it appears there were 
problems with the food supply early in Alexander’s reign. Like Augustus, the emperor 
purchased grain at his own expense for the people, and the Byzantine historian Cedrenus 
also mentions a famine during Alexander’s reign, although no specific time-frame is given. 
Archaeological evidence that Alexander had horrea restored or expanded, and coinage 
advertising five different liberalitates to the people also suggests that the food supply was a 
priority issue.655  
 
Nonetheless, if there were food shortages in early 223CE, as the Cleander riots 
demonstrated, the praefectus annonae could have only manipulated public supplies with 
the assistance of a variety of people in the industry, and he would have needed to wait until 
stocks were low before the grain ships had arrived. Since we have no idea exactly when the 
rioting took place, there is no real way of knowing whether Epagathus had any real part to 
play in stoking the conflict. Even if the rioting was sparked by grain shortages, the target of 
the population’s wrath was not the emperor or the praefectus annonae, but the Guard who 
had no involvement in the grain market. McHugh suggests that Epagathus created the 
conflict so that the praetorians could destabilise the government, but this is doubtful. The 
Guard had already demonstrated its ability to legitimise and de-legitimise imperial regimes. 
If they wanted to act, especially so soon after a transition, they could undoubtedly do so 
without the need for a high-risk gamble by one imperial official.  
 
What a potential food crisis could do, however, was reanimate the boundary and social 
space that separated soldiers and civilians. If, as under Macrinus, the praetorians still 
received their free grain dole while civilians went hungry, old resentments could quickly 
ignite. By the 220s, there was a vast social distance between the two groups. Four 
dimensions of social space outlined by Roberta Senechal de la Roche, relational, cultural, 
functional interdependence, and inequality, explain the outbreak of extreme and prolonged 
violence between two groups. Relational distance relates to the degree to which people 
participate in each other’s lives. Cultural distance describes the difference between groups 
 
654 McHugh (2017) 110-11. 
655 SHA Alex. Sev. 21.9; Dodgeon and Lieu (1994) 28. 
  183 
in the expressive aspects of their social lives. Functional independence is a measure of the 
extent to which each group cooperates economically and politically. The fourth indicator, 
inequality, is related to functional independence. The praetorians viewed themselves as a 
distinct and privileged group, and their insular collective life contributed to both relational, 
cultural, and spatial distancing from urban inhabitants of the city. Praetorians and civilians 
were also unequal in terms of power, and status, and because each group occupied a 
different position in the political and social arena, they also had a sizable degree of 
independence from each other.656 Senechal de la Roche proposes that when such social 
polarisation increases, so do the likelihood and severity of collective violence, and 
specifically, the likelihood that rioting will be the repertoire of choice.657 There is nothing in 
the source material to indicate the factors that made up the social space between soldier 
and civilian had radically changed after Alexander’s accession, and a food crisis would only 
exacerbate an already present gap. Watching amply paid praetorians receive their 
frumentaria while ordinary people could not afford market prices may have been the straw 
that broke the camel’s back.  
 
This inequality, juxtaposed with the government’s professed return to traditional values, 
may have underlined the injustice of the Guard’s outsized share of resources. In an 
environment where the Senate had reclaimed its former socio-political position, the respect 
and agency functions of civilian collective identity by extension were also enhanced, 
motivating inter-group competition for power.658 Even though the rioting as far as we know 
was not accompanied by any specific claim or political demand, directly engaging the 
powerful Guard was the ultimate form of dissent by those who did not have equal access to 
power. Such violence is, in the view of the geographer Mustafa Dikeç, political not because 
it involved explicit political claims but because the participants were denied their perceived 
status as political actors and were suffering political inequality.659 Such contention in 
modern contexts usually occurs after events perceived as unjust, which supports the theory 
that the general behaviour or some unspecified action by at least some praetorians 
 
656 Senechal de la Roche (1996) 106, 108, 111. 
657 Senechal de la Roche (1996) 106, 116. 
658 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 322. 
659 Dikeç (2016); Pinto and Ericsson (2019) 16. 
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propelled members of the populace to mobilise on behalf of previously unarticulated 
grievances. Conceptions of injustice, then, may have been the frame that spurred 
contentious behaviour after Elagabalus’ death, as any social comparison between soldiers 
and civilians would have only heightened perceptions that the inequality between the 
groups was illegitimate. The imperial administration, purged of its corrupt officials, was no 
longer a target of shared grievances and adversarial attributions. Now, given their relatively 
disadvantaged social position, the urban plebs had more reason to support a politicised self-
identity than members of higher-status groups.660 
 
Fundamentally then, the conflict between the two groups was propelled by conceptions of 
justice and identity. Since the process of politicisation positively feeds back to and 
strengthens collective identity, the social space and boundaries between the two groups 
grew wider. Therefore, when the praetorians and civilians reverted from temporary allies 
back to opponents, participants were more willing to act on their biased perceptions and 
engage in hostilities to force their opponents to incur a heavy cost.661 The fact that those 
fighting were extremely reluctant to make terms with the soldiers demonstrates that 
whatever the underlying context was, it generated a sharp, emotional, collective response. 
Bonds of solidarity were flexed and reinforced as part of the contention, not just between 
family, friends, and neighbours, but between all those fighting the praetorians – a vast 
umbrella of collective identity that was one outcome of a build-up of latent grievances. The 
masculine identities of the Guard too, meant that they were less likely to capitulate to 
civilian aggression. These factors extended an initial confrontation into a street battle that 
threatened the homes and livelihoods of protesters, who nonetheless kept fighting until the 
collateral damage became too much to bear. 
 
At the core of the increasingly antagonistic relationship between praetorians and civilians 
were the power shifts of the previous half-century. Army, Senate, and people were, in 
theory, supposed to be partners. Together they conferred legitimacy upon an emperor and 
his regime. However, as the Senate’s influence declined and the Guard commandeered the 
majority of Rome’s political space, the constitutional rights of the people were squeezed 
 
660 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 326. 
661 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 327. 
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out. Although the cultural work done by Alexander’s regime promised much, it also likely 
provided the impetus for resistance, as Rome’s highly salient and oppositional urban 
identities posed a particular challenge to conflict management because of their entrenched 
and politicised positions.662 The product of the clash between civilian and military identities 
in particular was by definition, a societal security dilemma: one group’s actions, taken to 
strengthen its own identity, caused a reaction in the other group, resulting in a cycle of 
reactive measures taken by each side to strengthen and secure its identity, but resulting 
instead in the insecurity of both.’663 Subsequent events will demonstrate that security 
would join issues of identity as a site of political contestation. 
 
(vi) The death of Ulpian 
Amidst all the turmoil, there is no mention of Alexander and what, if any, measures he took 
to defuse the situation. Dio’s assertion that the praetorians and the populace negotiated 
their own terms suggests that the emperor did not intervene. Legio II Parthica had returned 
to its permanent garrison outside Rome with Elagabalus in 217/218CE and was available to 
restore order (the original reason why Severus had stationed them at Alba).664 Alexander 
also had at his disposal the two thousand strong equites singulares, and potentially the six 
thousand men in the urban cohorts and the vigiles, although, given the urban cohort’s past 
interventions on behalf of the people, it could have been risky to use them as a repressive 
force, and it appears that Alexander did not deploy either. The emperor and his advisors 
may have been caught off-guard by the scale and geographical spread of the violence, 
although in reality, Alexander had little control over either group. Coinage issued in 224CE 
with the legend LIBERALITAS AUGUSTI II advertised a congiarium, while another issue from 
the same year proclaimed FIDES MILITUM; a demonstration of the juggling act that was 
needed to keep the peace.665 The Guard and the populace may have agreed on a truce, but 
others viewed the urban crisis as an opportunity. Dio states that, after the fighting finally 
 
662 Kachuyevski and Olesker (2014) 305. 
663 Kachuyevski and Olesker (2014) 306. 
664 Legio II Parthica was considered an important force; it was probably under the command of the two 
praetorian prefects when stationed near Rome, and in the latter years of Elagabalus’ reign, the senator Seius 
Carus was accused of conspiring with some of the legions’ troops in a failed bid to topple the emperor. The 
plot was discovered, and Carus was tried in private by the emperor and executed: Cass. Dio 80.4.6; McHugh 
(2017) 58. 
665 Congiaria: RIC IV 569. Fides: RIC 319.  
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ceased, ‘many uprisings were begun by many persons, some of which caused great alarm, 
but they were all put down.’666  It was the praetorians who successfully seized the 
opportunity to make a claim. Alexander’s overtures to the Senate and urban plebs 
theoretically had little impact on their position as political actors (despite perhaps the 
differing perceptions of the urban plebs), but the appointment of Ulpian as praetorian 
prefect was a threat both to the unit and courtiers who had prospered under previous 
emperors.  When Ulpian became a prefect in December 223CE, there were already two 
prefects in place. Ulpian was given a supervisory role over them and civic affairs in general. 
When the battle raged between the Guard and the urban populace, Ulpian frantically tried 
to restore order in the city, and his first move once the immediate situation stabilised was 
to have his two subordinate prefects, Flavianus and Chrestus, executed, either for abetting 
hostilities or being ineffective in preventing the violence. The praetorians responded by 
attacking Ulpian during the night, who fled to the imperial palace and sought protection 
from Alexander and his mother. The soldiers killed him in front of the imperial pair, a tacit 
reminder of the Guard’s dominance.667 
 
In the past, the Guard had not been particularly loyal to their commanders. Only the year 
before they had killed both incumbent prefects. In this instance, Flavianus and Chrestus had 
the requisite military experience that would have appealed to the unit, and Zosimus 
describes the prefects as being offended with Ulpian’s oversight.668  Ulpian may have also 
attempted to impose stricter military discipline upon the Guard, which would have made 
him extremely unpopular with the rank and file. The jurist’s expansive authority, however, 
threatened the Guard’s independent power, and it appears that this was their core 
grievance. Killing the prefect in front of Alexander was a stunning invasion of the emperor’s 
private space. Only a short period of time had elapsed since the praetorians had executed 
Elagabalus. When they had intervened earlier, it was an open transaction: the emperor was 
summoned, then transported to the praetorian castra, where the unit could make a 
collective claim from a position and location of supreme authority. This time, the killing of 
Ulpian did not even warrant a contentious claim. The soldiers simply decided who would be 
 
666 Cass. Dio 80.3.1. 
667 Cass. Dio 80.2.2. 
668 Zos. 1.11.2. 
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allowed to be a member of the regime, a power they flexed again shortly afterwards. 
Alexander had promoted Dio to a second consulship with himself as a colleague, but as Dio 
himself states, ‘[Alexander] became afraid that they might kill me if they saw me in the 
insignia of my office, that he bade me spend the period of my consulship in Italy, 
somewhere outside of Rome.’669 The emperor’s inability to guarantee the safety of his 
choice for consul was a product of praetorian independence, but also of less visible power 
structures and relationships. Caracalla was twenty-three (and Geta twenty-two) on his 
accession; Elagabalus and Alexander were both fourteen. The traditional model whereby an 
adult emperor employed established social hierarchies to exert personal control over a 
stable regime had morphed into one where boy-emperors were the representative face of 
regimes where the military, courtiers, and bureaucrats wielded substantial authority.670 
Behind the scenes power-plays were not contentious politics as such since such claims were 
not public, but the concentration and redistribution of power within the imperial court 
affected political opportunity structures. In particular, the inherent instability of court 
politics made it structurally incompatible with the long-term existence of a stable elite.671 
The imperial court and the spaces in and around the Palatine palace complexes remained 
significant, albeit shadowy, political spaces, but once again, the praetorian camp remained 
paramount. Ulpian was not assassinated by a rival whom Alexander could punish, but by the 
Guard to whom the emperor was in reality, subordinate. Alexander’s dependence, in turn, 
provided political space for other actors to assert independent influence, and by killing 
Ulpian, the Guard had also demonstrated that its own collective identity and goals were 
paramount over those of the emperor they had sworn to protect and serve.  
 
The socio-political contests of that year were a reflection of how boundary formation, 
politicised collective identity, legitimacy claims, and justice framing affected popular 
mobilisation and repertoires of contention. Just as the Praetorian Guard employed physical 
intimidation and violence as a contentious claim, and popular justice as a de-legitimising 
ritual, ordinary people used a similar template as a response and antidote to the injustice of 
 
669 Cass. Dio 80.5.1. There were strong links between the Pannonian legions and the Praetorian Guard. de Blois 
(2007) 500, posits that messages were sent from the Pannonian soldiers to the Guard, who then pressured 
Alexander to send Dio away. 
670 Kemezis (2016) 370-371. 
671 Wallace-Hadrill (2011) 101. 
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the military’s dominance. As participants drew upon master frames to portray their 
perceived injustice in ways that fit the tenor of the times, their collective action implicitly 
legitimated the nature of their claim by aggravating the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide based on 
traditional collective identities and well-worn methods of popular agitation and self-help.672 
The Guard’s use of popular justice methods in 222CE turned their issue into a matter of 
public or general interest, which in turn aided the politicisation of civilian identities that 
were a fundamental driver of the riots of 223CE.673 However, the politicisation of military 
and civilian identities split the social environment. The boundary that demarcated potential 
allies and enemies was now clearly defined, leading to a strategic reformulation of the 
conflict between actors that resulted in widespread violence and destruction.674 
 
The nature of contentious politics in Rome had shifted substantially from the accession of 
Caracalla to that of Severus Alexander. Praetorian hegemony produced discourses that 
legitimated popular violence. From relatively passive opposition to Circus demonstrations 
and finally armed struggle, the intensification of contention in terms of scale and violence 
demonstrates the efficacy of framing, collective identity and boundary formation on the 
social and spatial diffusion and performance of contentious politics. The use of direct 
violence as an escalation of the protest repertoire also reveals the reciprocal adaptation and 
learning processes that took place between Rome’s political actors, and the competitive 
dynamics that intensified between and within groups as they made strategic choices on how 
to make claims with each other. This was to be expected as repertoires of collective action 
often change during protest cycles as the reaction of authorities produces a proportional 
increase in more radical forms of action. 675 
 
In the wake of the violence of 223CE, the fifteen-year-old emperor was left to manage a 
highly complex and volatile situation. His predecessor Septimius Severus was able to 
constrain contention through the establishment of robust, interlocking legitimacy claims, 
through adherence to long-held expectations of imperial moral economy, and by a tight 
 
672 Oliver and Johnston (2005) 4; Kelly (2013) 418. 
673 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 324-5. 
674 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 327. 
675 della Porta (2013) 81-82. 
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control of the state’s repressive capacity. Since then, the Praetorian Guard had entrenched 
themselves as an independent political collective, and their relationship with the urban 
populace had devolved into open conflict. Alexander was effectively caught between the 
two. In order to constrain contention and close political opportunities for challengers, the 
regime had to balance the interests of the two groups, no easy feat when they were so 
diametrically opposed. Yet, the capital remained calm for the remainder of Alexander’s rule. 
Although initial efforts to cultivate a sense of identity through the invocation of political 
myth and collective memory had been interrupted by the violence of 223CE, as Rome 
continued to shoulder significant economic and social stress, the regime intensified efforts 
to link the Alexandrian regime with the ‘golden past’ of moral economy and Augustan glory 
as a way of restoring a political equilibrium. 
 
Constraining contention: the urban programme of Alexander Severus  
 
Rome’s socio-political environment post-223CE was fraught. Long-term effects of the 
Antonine Plague, climate change affecting agricultural productivity, and a downturn in 
casual work as imperial building programmes were pared back heaped significant levels of 
economic distress upon the city’s inhabitants. The Colosseum was unusable because of the 
conflagration during the reign of Macrinus. Dio notes that the Tiber flooded the Forum the 
same day as the fire, inundating the streets with such violence that people were swept 
away.676 Food shortages, a debased currency, and its inflationary effects added to the 
privations experienced by the average citizen. As Kevin Butcher points out: ‘no modern 
account of the third century, be it a ‘crisis’ or a ‘transition to late antiquity,’ can avoid 
mention of the notion that there was financial and monetary chaos and economic 
dislocation in this period.’677 
 
 
676 Cass. Dio 79.25. 
677 Caracalla’s enormous military expenditure necessitated the introduction in 215CE of the double tariffed 
‘antoninianus.’ This move was so unpopular that Macrinus and Elagabalus whom both faced worsening 
imperial deficits issued antoniniani only in the first months of their reigns and Alexander Severus discontinued 
its issue altogether. According to its weight, the (mistakenly called) antoninianus should be regarded as 1.5 
denarii. However, the coin was probably accepted as a double piece. Caracalla also reduced the weight of the 
aureus by 10% in 215CE: Cass. Dio 78.14.4; Butcher (2015) 183, 185; Katsari (2002) 4. 
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 Hardship, the social effects of Caracalla’s Constitutio, even the visible power of half-
Romanised praetorians on the city’s streets may have also caused some fear of social 
slippage among the urban plebs. The Historia Augusta recounts an episode of conventional 
political contention when the populace petitioned Alexander for a reduction of the price in 
beef and pork.678 Meat was not a necessity foodstuff and would have been out of the reach 
of many, but high prices may have meant that those who could typically afford it now found 
themselves dropping down the rungs of the social ladder. Alexander’s response took over a 
year to produce a reduction in prices, which indicates the protest was more about the social 
issue of pricing than actual need. Despite these genuine social, political, and economic 
factors, Alexander was able to keep Rome in a peaceful state for thirteen years; an 
achievement almost entirely focused around his delivery of traditional social goods. Taking a 
leaf out of Severus’ book, he invested in an extensive building programme including work on 
the badly damaged Colosseum, a makeover of the ancient Theatre of Marcellus, the 
completion of the Baths of Caracalla, and the restoration of baths, temples, bridges and 
aqueducts and public spaces. Alexander was interested in urban reform and improvements, 
and the provision of clean water and access to bathing facilities appears to have been a 
focus: along with the Caracallan baths, balnea Alexandri were built in parts of the city not 
serviced by public baths. A new aqueduct was constructed which fed the Nymphaenum (a 
massive public fountain) as well as a succession of lesser fountains across the city bearing 
the emperor’s name where people could collect their water. The 17m high conical Meta 
Sudans was also restored.679 In addition, Alexander provided state-funded education for 
teachers, rhetoricians, doctors, architects, and other personnel, proof that the emperor 
understood that providing financial support to those who contributed to the provision of 
social goods contributed to his public standing.680  
 
The regime did not neglect the logistical side of the city’s food supply either. Stable pricing 
and supply of grain in the form of the frumentationes and the open market were still 
 
678 SHA Alex. Sev. 22.7.  
679 SHA Alex. Sev. 25.3-9. For the archaeological evidence of Alex’s building works, see McHugh (2017) 120-
123. 
680 Nind Hopkins (1907) 153. Alexander was not the first to do so: Vespasian funded salaries for rhetoricians 
(Suet. Vesp. 18; Zon. 11.17), and by time of Antoninus Pius, teachers and rhetoricians in Asia were publicly 
funded by the cities in which they taught. Alexander went further by providing decent (one would assume) 
training. 
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ongoing concerns for the regime. The stockpiles of grain left by Severus had long since 
evaporated, and a lack of imperial oversight and endemic corruption by administrators and 
industry middlemen may have impacted the market in the intervening years. Alexander 
went back to Severus’ template of centralisation and processing efficiency. Horrea were 
erected in each of the city’s fourteen regiones, and ‘very many great engineering works’ 
were initiated in what may have been a continuation of the Severan water mill project.681 
Like Claudius centuries earlier, Alexander also provided incentives for food merchants to 
bring their goods directly into the city for efficient and timely distribution.682 Strict controls 
on collegia within the food industry also appear to have been eased. Where a fragment of 
Marcianus’ Digest indicates that Severus confirmed the restrictions laid down by the Senate 
more than two centuries before, Alexander legalised collegia linked to the supply of food 
and essential services to Rome. These groups received special tax exemptions and publicly 
funded legal counsel presumably when needed.683 By increasing the capacity of centralised 
storage and processing infrastructure, Alexander could stabilise grain prices as a higher ratio 
of flour to raw grain reduced the ability of corrupt officials to stockpile grain and affect 
prices or supply.684 Expanded infrastructure also provided greater efficiency and 
transparency over the entire process from the docks to the city’s bakeries that operated 
under imperial oversight.685 Furthermore, archaeology suggests that the free oil 
distributions initiated by Severus were re-introduced, and the alimenta programme for 
orphans, terminated by Commodus in 184CE, resumed.686 There was another economic 
benefit at play. Alexander’s massive construction programme also provided paid work for 
the poor. The Baths of Caracalla, for example, employed up to 9,000 workers/day between 
211-216CE. The commencement of multiple large scale construction projects allowed the 
 
681 SHA Alex. Sev. 22.4. See McHugh (2017) 126 for an archaeological analysis of the water mill associated with 
the Baths of Caracalla that supports Alexander’s expansion of this infrastructure. 
682 SHA Alex. Sev. 22.1. 
683 Marc. Dig. 47.22.1 pr.1; de Ligt (2001) 346-7; Cary and Scullard (1975) 498; Boyd (1905) 80. 
684 Taylor (2010) 211. 
685 Weights and measures of bakeries were closely monitored: a specific collegia for those who supervised 
weights/measures (mensores machinarii frumenti publici) appears in the early Severan period, attested to in 
three inscriptions from Rome: CIL 6.85, 9626, 33883 (although only the first can be securely dated to 198CE). 
See Taylor (2010) 212. 
686 McHugh (2017) 126, 133. Analysis of amphorae shards from Monte Testaccio shows a steady decline from 
the time of Antoninus Pius until a recovery under Alexander. Shipwrecks mirrors this trend, although, under 
Alexander, there was a significant increase in shipwrecks with a singular cargo – oil – rather than the mixed 
cargos usual under previous emperors. 
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emperor to act as the city’s chief patron for those affected by the adverse economic 
conditions.687   
 
Alexander thus constructed a public image not only as the city’s patron, but also as a 
restorer of Roman mores, culture, and religion. His programmes and visual imagery harked 
back to the past and the glories of Augustus, Trajan, and his Antonine predecessors. Coarelli 
suggests that Alexander was responsible for the construction of the umbilicus urbis Romae, 
a monument that marked the centre of the Empire and from which all distances were 
measured. If this structure was connected with Augustus’ monumental milestone, the 
milliarium aureum, then Alexander was consciously creating connections to Augustus and 
collective memories of the past, as a continuation of past imperial policies to provide a 
comprehensive catalogue of social goods that symbolised and reinforced Roman collective 
identity.688 By reviving the major tenets of the imperial moral economy, Alexander 
reinvigorated the social contract between emperor and citizen by re-emphasising the 
reciprocal nature of the relationship that had become rather one-sided in recent years. 
Grievances that had festered since the death of Severus were cauterised by this recognition 
of the urban population’s privileges, a return to economic and political stability, and a more 
just distribution of imperial resources. The moral economy was not just restricted to 
material aid. Alexander’s regime produced the highest amount of rescripts for the third 
century.689 A focus on justice and traditional values including open cooperation with the 
Senate, and a willingness to personally hear petitions also demonstrated the regime’s 
understanding of the social values, norms, and obligations that made up the emotional, 
intangible side of moral economy.  
 
Collective memory is powerful and persistent, and the visual ideology of Alexander’s regime 
that was explicitly connected to traditional concepts of Roman identity and glory was a 
valuable political instrument for the emperors, and suggests that Alexander was more 
 
687 McHugh (2017) 120. 
688 Coarelli (1987) 433; Rowan (2013) 222. Regarding the milliarium aureum, Richardson (1992) 404 suggests 
that the two structures were connected since it is unlikely that two centres of Rome existed so close to each 
other at the same time. 
689 See Ando (2012) 195 for table. 453 rescripts under Alexander versus 269 for Gordian III (the next highest 
amount). 
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attuned to the issues and mechanisms that facilitated popular collective action of the time 
than has perhaps been realised. Modern scholarship’s accounting of the positive tradition of 
Alexander’s reign preserved in Herodian and the Historia Augusta more often than not 
focuses on the regimes’ gloss of tradition, and the restoration of senatorial prestige, even 
though this did not come with any corresponding renewal of political power.690  For all of 
Alexander’s vaulted conservative mores, it was the effects of his policies rather than the 
ideologies behind them that had a sizeable impact on popular political contention. The 
provision of food and clean water, jobs, the application of fair and transparent justice, and 
the recognition of essential social networks legitimised, to a certain extent, the free spaces 
and hidden transcripts of urbanites who had borne the social and economic consequences 
of war, corruption and the militarisation of the Principate. 
 
 Of course, Alexander had no real practical way to constrain the praetorian claims and 
identities that clashed with those of the wider populace (without risking their interference), 
but he could reconfigure the concept of justice in terms of providing previously withheld 
recognition to the urban plebs as a political actor. Reminding the city of the glory of their 
collective past, and explicitly recognising the cultural and practical importance of the moral 
compact between emperor and citizen was a perceptive way of diffusing some of the 
tension generated by the politicisation of civilian collective identities. A strong imperial 
moral economy also had the added effect of creating a base of resistance if the benefits and 
ideologies associated with the collective identities validated by Alexander’s regime became 
subject to attack by opposing identities and ideologies. Through these measures, Alexander 
earned the support of the population and the Senate. Stability thus constrained 
transgressive contention, and claim-making reverted to the conventional practices of 
consensus rituals. If we take the word of the Historia Augusta’s author (who claims to quote 
the Acta Urbis), the Senate had already delivered at least six formal and extremely long-
winded acclamations upon Alexander’s accession in 223CE, reflecting the development of 
ritualised consensus performances from the beginning of the third century.691  The 
 
690 Positive views on Alexander: Hdn. 6.9.8; Aur. Vict. Caes. 24; SHA Alex. Sev. 66.1-68.4; Oros. 7.18. Although, 
as Davenport (2011) 281 argues, the Historia Augusta’s view of Alexander in particular was ‘little more than a 
barely-disguised panegyric.’ 
691 SHA Alex. Sev. 6.3-7.6. There is, for example, a considerable development in formality and length from the 
senatorial acclamations directed at Severus in 205CE: Cass. Dio 77.6.2; Arena (2007) 323. For the different 
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acclamations of the people, however, were always a more voluntary and spontaneous 
performance. When Alexander left the city in 231CE to campaign against the Parthians, he 
was escorted on his profectio by a weeping Senate and people who both held the emperor 
‘in great affection’ for his moderate rule.692 When he returned to celebrate his Persian 
triumph in 233CE, the crowds carried him along the triumphal route for hours chanting 
‘secure is Rome, secure is the commonwealth, for secure is Alexander.’693 The joyous 
participation and acclamations of the crowds echo the shouts of 193CE: ‘With Pertinax in 
control, we lived secure, we feared no one!’694 When Alexander left the city shortly after to 
deal with the German threat, the Historia Augusta claims that the people were so unwilling 
to let him depart that they escorted him for over a hundred miles outside the city.695  
 
The polarisation of military and civilian identities between 211-235CE 
 
In the ten years since the death of Severus, political opportunity structures and framing 
revolved around some intangible but essential issues. The political and practical importance 
of the military and diminishment of the Senate under Severus intensified under Caracalla, 
who employed the advantages of might to frame imperial policy and close his regime 
around key insiders. Caracalla’s contempt for the Senate and heavy reliance on the military 
and court insiders in part paved the way for Rome’s first non-senatorial emperor, Macrinus, 
who fell victim to the power struggle between the army, equestrian bureaucracy, and 
imperial familia.696 Elagabalus’ lifestyle and public reluctance to meet the demands of the 
praetorians led to his downfall. His death, meanwhile, provided an opportunity for the 
populace to mobilise against regime members and soldiers who used their power with 
impunity. 
 
In the void left after Severus’ charismatic reign, new themes emerged. New and extant 
collective identities became mobilising structures for collective action. Popular identities 
 
interpretations on the accuracy of the Historia Augusta’s acclamations in the Life of Alexander, see Bertrand-
Dagenbach (1990) 92ff. 
692 Hdn. 6.4.2. 
693 SHA Alex. Sev. 57.5. For the senatorial acclamations on his return: SHA Alex. Sev. 56.9-10. 
694 Aur. Vict. Caes. 155.6. 
695 SHA Alex. Sev. 59.1. 
696 Scott (2008) iii.  
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became politicised due to power inequalities and perceptions of growing injustice. Military 
identities, meanwhile, politicised around the Guard’s position as regime legitimators and 
moral arbiters. These processes together caused the boundaries between the groups to 
harden, creating social space between them that led to further polarisation and violence. 
From a bottom-up perspective, the extension of collective action frames and the 
politicisation of collective identities was a primary driver of popular contention during this 
period. The military may have seized the power to legitimate an emperor and his regime to 
the detriment of the Senate and Rome’s urban population, but those political rights were 
remembered. Latent grievances became salient, creating political opportunities for 
collective claim-making. 
 
The adoption of more violent forms of contention by sectors of the urban population in 222-
223CE indicates that an element of radicalisation had taken place in terms of collective 
claim-making performances. The outcome of the competition between praetorians and 
civilians for political space was the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of popular 
contention. Negative contention predominated until the ability of Alexander to address the 
obligations of the imperial moral economy reversed some of the shift away from 
conventional modes of collective expression. Even though he could not resolve the 
fundamental grievances held by the populus against the Praetorian Guard, the emperor was 
able to demonstrate that he understood how crucial perceptions of justice were, in social 
terms at least, to the urban plebs as a collective political actor. Accordingly, Alexander was 
the first emperor since Marcus Aurelius, who managed to craft a long-lasting and authentic 
sense of goodwill with Rome’s political groups. In terms of the wider contentious cycle 
initiated after the death of Marcus Aurelius, the period between Caracalla’s accession in 
218CE and Alexander’s Parthian campaign hosted a diffusion of collective action from more 
mobilised to less mobilised sectors. The rapid pace of innovative contentious performances 
during the crisis of 193CE and the growing significance of justice collective action frames 
continued to have long-lasting effects on urban claim-making performances.697 
 
697 Tarrow (1998) 142.  
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Chapter 4: The beginning of crisis? Framing and identity processes 
between 235-238CE 
 
As David Potter recognised in The Roman Empire at Bay, the events of 238CE were among 
the most remarkable in the entire history of Rome. A local revolt in Africa encouraged a 
senatorial rebellion initially supported by the urban populace, who then forced the 
accession of their own candidate as Caesar, before besieging the Praetorian camp for days 
on end. The retaliation of the Guard left much of the city in ruins, and the two senatorial 
emperors dead in the street. 698 Most of the momentous events of the year took place 
between March and August in what was an extraordinarily compressed sequence of 
escalating contention. As far as we know, what the unravelled chronology tells us is that the 
seizing of a political opportunity by a small group of men in Africa with no army and few 
tangible resources mobilised geographically and socially distinct groups into taking direct 
action against the imperial regime and each other.  
 
It seems rather improbable that independent, city-based political actors would not only leap 
into action to expand their rights and claims based on the news of a small uprising, but also 
use the opportunity to engage in inter-factional warfare as the most qualified soldier ever to 
assume the imperial mantle marched his army on Rome. How and why the events of 238CE 
unfolded are complex, and were a culmination of the trends outlined so far in this study. 
Collective action framing, legitimacy claims, and shifts in opportunity structures all played 
vital roles in opening political space for new and independent centres of power. Continued 
social polarisation, the hardening of the oppositional boundaries that separated Rome’s 
political actors, and the steady diffusion and incorporation of innovative contentious 
performances all created a perfect storm of entrenched grievances and opportunity. 
 
Perhaps most crucially, the later years of Alexander’s reign introduced a new factor: the 
burgeoning influence and identities of provincial soldiers in terms of legitimacy claims and 
regime type. From 230CE, the Roman Empire had to deal with simultaneous incursions 
along many frontiers on an almost unprecedented scale. The need to campaign in Persia, 
 
698 Potter (2004) 170. 
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Mesopotamia, Syria, Germany, Dacia, and Sarmatia drew Alexander’s attention away from 
Rome, and it is here that the positive accounts of Alexander’s reign betray, in Clifford Ando’s 
words, ‘the yawning chasm that had opened up between the notional location of sovereign 
authority in a duly appointed ruler and the license of the soldiery – a chasm that an emperor 
still on the threshold of puberty was hardly fit to bridge.’699 The socio-political implications 
of such a rift could be managed in times of relative peace or even in the face of a single 
threat perhaps, but despite Alexander’s able urban leadership, exogenous factors during the 
later part of his reign provided clear political opportunities for challengers.  
 
From centre to periphery: military identity and political opportunity 
 
The beginning of Alexander’s troubles can be traced back to the campaign against the 
Parthians in 232CE. In the same year that Alexander celebrated his decennalia, the founder 
of what would become the Sassanian Empire, the Persian shahanshar Ardashir I, shifted his 
expansionist focus to the west. He attacked Roman possessions in Mesopotamia, the 
fortified desert stronghold of Hatra and the Armenian states, considered necessary buffers 
between the two realms. A resurgent Parthia was a serious threat. Alexander first employed 
diplomatic measures but was reluctantly forced to mount a full-scale campaign in 232CE.700 
The initiation of hostilities reinforced the continuing importance of the military, for the 
security of the Empire could only be preserved by armies, and as commander-in-chief, the 
emperor was expected to campaign with his men. Military qualities had always been an 
essential aspect of imperial representation, and Severus, Caracalla, and Macrinus all 
ensured that the relationship between the emperor and his troops was advertised widely: 
by the third century, over a fifth of all coin types featured militaristic themes. Some 
featured military victories or the emperor as commander-in-chief, commilito (or both). 
Others referenced the military directly, even specific units, which suggests that some 
coinage explicitly targeted soldiers, although the message that the emperor was a strong 
 
699 Ando (2012) 70-71. 
700 Hdn. 6.2.3-5, 6.3.1. Preparations had been underway since 230CE: road repairs were undertaken in Cilicia 
and Cappadocia in 230-231CE, and the coinage of 230CE shows a preponderance of military themes, including 
adlocutio Augusti: BMC VI. 75; Whittaker (1970) 96-7, n.2. 
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military leader was a universal one that had appealed to many, disparate audiences over a 
long period.701 
 
Interestingly, where Caracalla was most often depicted with a short beard, soldier’s haircut 
and a frowning visage, much of the surviving imperial portraiture of Alexander depicts him 
as boyish and not particularly martial in repose.702 Such a youthful appearance made sense 
if Alexander, as has been suggested, was deliberately styled like the youthful conqueror of 
the East, Alexander the Great.703 By the opening of hostilities with Parthia though, 
Alexander was around twenty-five years old and was no longer the young boy who had 
ascended the throne. He had not, however, been able to establish a comprehensive military 
reputation like either Severus or Caracalla in preceding years, and his boyish persona could 
have been interpreted by soldiers as one reflecting inexperience, and perhaps a little too 
close to the effeminate Elagabalus. Unfortunately, Alexander’s decision-making during the 
Parthian campaign did little to convince soldiers that he was a conquering general rather 
than a cultivated youth. At the same time, the army had been fractious in recent years. 
Several mutinies by Syrian and Egyptian troops who were looking to replace the emperor 
had to be put down.704 Dio, who retired to finish his opus in 230CE, warned that Rome’s 
armies were initially ‘in such a state that some of the troops are actually joining him 
[Ardashir] and others are refusing to defend themselves.’705 While pay had significantly 
improved from the beginning of the third century (thanks to Severus and Caracalla’s pay 
rises), military working conditions had deteriorated. From 230CE on, long marches, 
 
701 Manders (2012) 64. Kemmers has shown that some third century coinage displays geographically 
differentiated images of military themes, thus targeting specific audiences. The image of an emperor in a 
cuirass for example that had a long history in imperial coinage now became a dominant image. Kemmers 
(2006) 248-256. Also see Hekster (2008) 59. 
702 For Caracalla, see Kleiner (1992) 361–76. Alexander: the young emperor statue in the Capitoline Museum; 
Vatican Chiaramonti Museum, inv. 1481; Zanker (2016) 91-93). Many of Elagabalus’ statues complete with 
sideburns and facial hair were refashioned in Alexander’s likeness, and some of Alexander’s statues gained 
slight facial hair/moustache as he aged: See Varner (2004) 190-191.  
703 Alexander was an unusual throne name. Cass. Dio 80.17.2-18.3, claims that just before Alexander’s 
adoption by Elagabalus in 221CE, a daimon claiming to be Alexander appeared in Moesia and Thrace: Müller 
(2019) argues that the procession of the daimon was a staged event meant to confer Alexandrian prestige 
upon the young soon-to-be-emperor, and certainly, at least initially, an association between Alexander and his 
Macedonian predecessor was a feature of the emperor’s public image. 
704 Hdn. 6.4.7; Aur. Vict. Caes. 24.2. Whittaker notes that this may be a misplaced retelling of the 
aforementioned Mesopotamian mutiny, but acknowledges that Herodian’s account is in keeping with Dio’s 
claim that there were ‘many uprisings’ (80.3.1): Whittaker (1970) 107, n.3. 
705 Cass. Dio 80.4.1. 
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unhealthy conditions, and logistical issues made the lot of the common soldier a misery.706 
Military discipline was also a problem, particularly amongst praetorians. Ulpian had been 
butchered in front of Alexander in 223CE, and Dio experienced praetorian intransigence 
first-hand, complaining of their wantonness, licence, and lack of discipline. While governing 
Pannonia Superior around 226-228CE, the historian claims the praetorians stationed there 
even threatened him personally. The Greek indicates that the soldiers compared Dio’s strict 
discipline with that of Ulpian, but the prefect was long dead by this time. Tony Honoré 
reinterprets the text as a warning that Dio might suffer the same fate as the prefect if he 
tried to impose harsher discipline.707 
 
Perhaps with these issues in mind, Alexander felt the need to provide the military with 
additional benefits. For instance, he confirmed that soldiers could name anyone as heirs in 
their will, a right that civilians did not have. He also allowed soldiers to free their slaves in 
their wills, and safeguarded the rights of soldiers to their property when they were on 
campaign, including the protection of property acquired in or because of military service 
(the castrense peculium) from claimants, including family members.708 However, given that 
the military’s awareness of their political power had been substantially underscored by their 
involvement in the deposition of Macrinus and Elagabalus, it was more critical than ever 
that an emperor not only provided status and benefits, but also embodied the values and 
skills valued by the military collective. Such a sense of shared identity would be significant in 
terms of the contentious politics performed in Rome, for if military competence became the 
key criteria for determining an imperial candidate, the different expectations and values 
attached to urban civilian identities meant that those who associated strongly with this 
group could potentially consider themselves to be competition against representatives of 






706 de Blois (2018) 177. 
707 Cass. Dio 80.4.2; Honoré (2002) 33; Millar (1964) 23; Markov (2016) 59. 
708 Campbell (1984) 221, 224, 234, 239.  
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(i) Military failure and the rise of Illyrian identity 
Alexander’s Parthian campaign produced mixed results, with some tactical victories for the 
Romans, some defeats and roughly equal losses on both sides. Herodian, however, saw the 
campaign as a strategic defeat and blamed Alexander.709 Alexander may have celebrated 
with a triumph, but the fact that he did not take the title of persicus or parthicus maximus 
suggests that a Roman victory was not clear cut. It seems that while the campaign did 
preserve the past borders of the Roman empire, and halted Ardashir’s immediate plans for 
expansion into the west, an absence of any real decisive victory had the troops questioning 
the emperor’s leadership qualities.710 Furthermore, Alexander’s leadership did not endear 
him to his troops. His inability to stick to the plan made the army ‘absolutely furious,’ and 
his decision to withdraw to Antioch for the winter caused large numbers of casualties, which 
eroded his reputation among the soldiers.711 To make matters worse, shortly after the 
withdrawal, the emperor received word that German tribes had crossed the Danube and 
Rhine and were overrunning garrisons and villages. As with Persian aggression, a German 
incursion was a real problem for Rome. The Rhine-Danube was the empire’s longest border. 
If it fell, Illyria and Italy would be in imminent danger. Alexander arrived in Germany in late 
autumn 234CE, but winter meant no immediate progress would be made.  
 
The movement of large numbers of ‘barbarians’ across Rome’s borders was the result of a 
complex array of demographic factors – the same factors that affected the composition of 
the Roman army. As de Blois notes, in the hinterlands of the Danube border, plague, forced 
recruitment, deportations and warfare had reduced the numbers of productive people such 
as farmers in already thinly-populated areas.712 Meanwhile, manpower shortages from the 
army’s traditional recruiting grounds meant that more and more soldiers were recruited 
from these very areas in Illyria and the surrounding Danubian regions. By the third century, 
at least a third of Roman forces and their command positions were filled by Illyrians, 
 
709 Hdn. 6.5.10, 6.6.1, 6.6.3. 
710 SHA Alex. Sev. 55.1 actually labels Herodian’s version as contrary to what was contained in the state 
records; Eutr. 8.23 also claims that Alexander triumphed over the Persians. The early books of Ammianus 
Marcellinus do not survive, but he does provide a list of successful Roman commanders of the east in his 
preamble to his account of Julian’s invasion of Persia in 363CE, and there is no mention of Alexander, so his 
campaign cannot be said to have been considered an outstanding success: Pearson (2017) 67, 243. 
711 Hdn. 6.6.1, 6.6.3-4: Herodian notes that Alexander gave the army a generous donativum once back at 
Antioch to try and restore his popularity.  
712 de Blois (2007) 504. 
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including Pannonians, Dalmatians, Moesians, and Thracians.713 It was these same ethnic 
groups who dominated the Praetorian Guard after Severus’ reorganisation of the unit, as 
well as the equites singulares. The changing composition of the Roman army meant that 
identities based around ethnic bonds became more important. Fellow countrymen served 
together for long periods in the same unit, and ethnic cooperatives became formalised in a 
similar way to collegia, employing formal decision-making mechanisms, common funds, and 
internal structures and hierarchies. The strong collective bonds and the numerical visibility 
of the Danubian recruits introduced what would later be termed Illyriciani identity, a 
collective that would prove to be hugely influential in the following decades.714 While these 
troops may have viewed themselves as Roman, they were ethnically and linguistically 
distinct from Italian soldiers; there is evidence that many of these local troops did not 
understand Latin.715 Furthermore, their entrenched position on the empire’s borders meant 
that these units could form their own, distinctive frontier identity separate from those 
posted elsewhere in the empire.716  
 
Such structural change transformed these provincial collectives, tightly bound by their own 
ethnic identities, into new political actors. As they gained influence within the legions in 
which they served, they gained opportunities to make alliances and contribute as power-
brokers, and even as participants in the legitimisation of an emperor.717 Herodian relates 
that Illyrian soldiers had forced Alexander to break off the Persian campaign in 233CE 
because their province was being overrun by the Germans crossing the border.718 Such an 
action suggests that as a collective, Illyrian soldiers had enough power to influence the 
emperor’s military plans. In terms of foreign policy, the switch from Persia to Germany was 
significant: border areas were under threat, but Rome had a long history of political rivalry 
with the Persians. Alexander’s foray into Mesopotamia was essentially a prestige campaign 
 
713 Bruun (2007) 203-4; Lo Cascio (1991) esp. 710-716. Lee (2007) 84-5 proposes that the non-Roman 
component of the (Eastern) Roman army, at least in positions of command held at 1/3 or less during the fourth 
and fifth centuries.  
714 For the purposes of clarity, I am identifying those ethnic groups based in the Pannonian province as Illyrian 
given the use of this appellation in modern scholarship. Dzino and Kunić 2012 (106); Speidel (2016) 339-341.  
715 Cass. Dio 72.5 shows that Marcus Aurelius’ praetorian prefect did not understand the difference between 
good Latin and Greek.  
716 Bileta (2016) 28. 
717 Dzino and Kunić (2012) 108. 
718 Hdn. 6.7.2-5; SHA Alex. Sev. 63.5. Speidel (2016) 354. 
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linking his regime with collective memory and honeyed ideals of Roman expansionism; 
Danube-Rhine policy, however, was one about maintenance and almost always undertaken 
as a response to border violations by ‘barbarians.’ That Illyrian soldiers could dictate policy 
that affected the well-being of their families over the potential glory of Roman victory over 
Ardashir attests to the growing influence of the Empire’s peripheries at the expense of the 
centre. 
 
While the emperor’s decision to protect the Rhine-Danube frontier may have been viewed 
positively by the Illyrian contingents, the army still had to endure a harsh German winter. 
Harassed by raiding parties, and with firewood and food supplies running low, Alexander 
contacted the German tribal leaders and offered enormous sums of gold – the same 
strategy employed by Commodus with the Marcomanni and the Quadi in 180CE. For the 
Illyrian contingents whose morale was already low after suffering high casualties on their 
way back to Antioch, and whose homes and families were under attack by the German 
incursions, Alexander’s attempt to buy terms rather than risk battle incurred great 
resentment.719 Emperors were meant to dominate (and punish) non-Romans, and 
Alexander’s barbarian bribe was considered antithetical to military values. On a more 
fundamental level, the Illyrian soldiers wanted to punish the tribesmen who had despoiled 
their homes, not reward them, and the privileging of barbarian demands over the welfare of 
the soldier’s families and possessions personalised their grievances. Now citizens, auxiliary 
soldiers had long inhabited an ambiguous, second-class place in the Roman army, and 
Alexander’s treaty did little to disabuse provincial soldiers of this notion. The army was the 
basis of Severan success, and each emperor’s militaristic identity was an instrumental part 
of maintaining legitimacy with the troops. With the strong sense of identity forged in the 
reality of warfare, Alexander’s Illyrian collectives decided to select an emperor who, in their 
eyes, would be a more effective commander. It was around this time that, in one of the 
auxiliary camps along the Rhine, a soldier allegedly placed a purple cloak around the 
garrison’s commander, Gaius Julius Verus Maximinus Thrax, as onlookers acclaimed him 
imperator. Maximinus was perhaps the most exceptional soldier of his time, a celebrity 
among the troops for his enormous stature, physical prowess, and illustrious military 
 
719 Hdn. 6.7.9. For similar criticism of Commodus, see 1.6.9. Antioch: Hdn. 6.6.3. 
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career.720 His posthumous nickname ‘Thrax’ meant Thracian, an Illyrian people long 
recognised for producing fierce, skilled soldiers.721 Most recently, Maximinus had 
commanded legions in Mesopotamia during the Persian campaign where Alexander put him 
in charge of training recruits for the German expedition. He was, like Caracalla, also very 
popular with the troops who considered him a fellow soldier (συστρατιὠτης) and campmate 
(σύσκηνος).722  
 
Although Maximinus’ low social status and origins would horrify Rome’s elites, his ethnicity 
was crucial for his elevation, as it was a cooperative of Thracian, Pannonian, and Illyrian 
soldiers who catapulted him onto Rome’s main political stage.723 The Upper Moesian Legio 
III (Flavia S(everiana) A(lexandriana), for example, participated in the German campaign and 
was under Maximinus’ command in the days before the coup. The majority of the legion’s 
soldiers hailed from Moesia Superior, Thrace, and Illyria. Likewise, the legions X Gemina, 
XIIII Gemina, I and II Adiutrix also stationed in Germany were overwhelmingly composed of 
Pannonians, Illyrians, and Thracians.724 Their shared backgrounds meant that when the 
Illyrians moved to change their commander-in-chief, their Thracian and Pannonian brethren 
followed. Their mobilisation smoothed the way for Maximinus, whose next step was to 
quickly march on Alexander’s camp at Mogontiacum, knowing that his rebel group of 
Thracians, Pannonians and Illyrians would meet their counterparts in Alexander’s bodyguard 
of praetorians and equites singulares. Indeed, neither unit strongly defended Alexander, and 
the young emperor was butchered in his tent along with his mother.725 
 
 
720 Hdn. 6.8.2; SHA Max. 2.6-3.6. 
721 For descriptions of the Thracians, Pannonians, and Illyrians as ferocious and warlike, see Arr. Anab. 2.7.5; 
Veg. 1.28; Pl. Lg. 637d; Arist. Pol. 1324b; Livy 36.17.4; Tac. Ann. 4.46; Amm. Marc. 26.7.5. 
722 Hdn. 6.8.2-4: he was appointed prefect of the recruits (praefectus tironibus). However, as as Michael 
Speidel has now observed, the office of praefectus tironibus may be based on a modern fabrication of an office 
which is in fact otherwise unattested: Speidel (2016) 347-48). 
723 The emperor is introduced as Maximinus Thrax for the first time in the fourth century (Aur. Vict. Caes. 
25.1). This is now a generally accepted name for the emperor, even though it only appears once in the ancient 
texts. Both Herodian (6.8.1) and the Historia Augusta (Max. 1.5) state that his birth-place was Thrace. 
Although Maximinus initially refused the cloak and was persuaded to accept under ‘duress’ (which was likely a 
mere show of reluctance), Herodian was not so naïve to believe that the coup was anything other than well-
planned (6.8.3, 8.6.1). 
724 Speidel (2016) 352, 355. 
725 Hdn. 6.8.7. SHA Alex. Sev. 59.4-9 claims the murder took place in a village called Silicia (Britain or Gaul), an 
almost certainly incorrect proposition given the pressing military issues in Germany at that time. 
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Maximinus’ startling elevation by a small group of provincial soldiers was a sharp break from 
previous practice. Armies had acclaimed their commanders many times, and the principal of 
the ‘best man’ was a long-accepted criterion for picking an imperial successor, but in this 
case, the troops’ choice was reflective of their lived experience, collective identities and 
conceptions of masculinity, all developed far from Rome. The new emperor’s martial 
prowess and imposing physicality was a positive advertisement for Thracian might.726 
Herodian, who may have seen Maximinus in the flesh, claimed that the emperor compared 
favourably to the best-trained Greek athlete or barbarian warrior, an image corroborated in 
his coinage and statuary.727 We possess little, if any, evidence of Thracian conceptions of 
masculinity independent of the Roman lens, but we can infer that the hypermasculinity of 
Maximinus may have been a tangible representation of the identity of his troops: Herodian 
claims that the Pannonian recruits praised the masculinity of the emperor.728 Moreover, as 
the polar opposite of the well-born, mollycoddled urbanite Alexander, Maximinus and his 
strong-man, masculine persona were a strategy for creating not just legitimacy, but a 
scenario of power for the political actors he now directly represented. As Syme put it, 
Maximinus was ‘a symptom of social transformation, a manifestation of the potency now 
gathering among the Danubian military.’729 
 
The cultural component of political opportunity is evident here.  When the Praetorian Guard 
mobilised against Elagabalus according to their own set of collective values, they already 
had well-established access and importance as political actors. The Illyrian legions were 
almost entirely new actors to the imperial stage, and their contentious claim against 
Alexander’s regime introduced new factors to both the discursive and institutional aspects 
of the Roman political environment. The rebels who placed Maximinus on the throne 
opened up new access to the political system, which provided public visibility and political 
legitimacy for their claims and identities. Indeed, the localised support for Maximinus may 
 
726 McLaughlin (2015) 113. 
727 Hdn. 7.1.12; SHA Max. 6.8. For example, the eight-foot high statue of the emperor currently at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art. Based on the descriptions and material evidence, Harold Klawans, a professor of 
neurology, has proposed a diagnosis of acromegaly, a hormonal condition that causes heavy muscular and 
skeletal development that can result in giantism: Pearson (2017) ix-xx.  
728 Hdn. 6.8.3. 
729 Syme (1971a) 190. 
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have perhaps been less about pursuing a redistribution of political power than seeking to 
change dominant normative and cultural codes by gaining recognition for new identities.730  
 
Maximinus as the ‘barbarian Other:’ the mobilising effects of reactive 
nationalism 
 
Maximinus was not the first non-senator or non-Italian to ascend the throne. The difference 
with Maximinus was that he was low-born, perhaps not even a citizen at birth, and new 
rather than established political actors supported his elevation. In terms of the urban 
political environment, the imposition of ‘provincial’ identities and values clashed with the 
city’s expectations of who an emperor should be, and whose interests he was meant to 
represent. The army had, of course, acclaimed multiple candidates before, but all had at 
least some links with the city’s political networks, and all had attempted to portray 
themselves as a member, however artificial, of an ancient patrimony. In the eyes of Rome’s 
civilian population, Maximinus came to represent something far more dangerous than a 
military monarch: he was framed as the Other, a ‘barbarian’ who had no pre-set obligations 
to the city or its cultural institutions. He was not a Severan, nor wealthy, nor a member of 
any connected family or political network, and was acclaimed solely to fulfill the 
responsibilities of a field imperator. If the Praetorian Guard had become more detached 
from their fellow city-dwellers in recent years because of their own ethnic and political 
collective identity, a development that widened the social space between civilians and 
soldiers and gave rise to violent conflict, the new emperor was by association an outsized 
personification of that discord. For those who held such views, rule by a common soldier did 
not bode well.  
 
What the Praetorian Guard felt about a collective of non-elite soldiers independently 
acclaiming their own candidate is not discussed by our sources. On the one hand, the unit 
had been intimately involved in the majority of regime transitions over the past few 
decades, and the ability of a few provincial troops to hijack their expected place as 
legitimators may have rankled. On the other hand, Maximinus embodied the brute 
 
730 Polleta and Jasper (2001) 286. 
  206 
masculinities that Elagabalus (and to a certain extent Alexander) lacked. If Elagabalus’ 
effeminacy reflected badly upon the Guard’s identity, then the elevation of a soldier 
renowned for his physical strength and bravery could have been viewed by the unit as a 
positive step; after all, Caracalla was extremely popular with the troops in part because of 
his carefully constructed strongman persona. To a certain extent though, Caracalla’s claims 
of comradeship were play-acting – Maximinus was the real deal. And, since the Praetorian 
Guard had a sizeable Illyrian contingent, a sense of ethnic solidarity may have made the 
actions of the provincial troops more palatable. The elite unit had spent the majority of 
Alexander’s reign based in Rome, where they were viewed as outsiders by many civilians. 
Now, the emperor was an outsider himself, and a dedicated military man, attributes likely to 
assure praetorians that the new regime would safeguard their social and political positions. 
Indeed, any hopes in this direction would be confirmed by Maximinus’ initial policy 
decisions. 
 
Outside the military, resistance was muted. Alexander’s death was mourned, but Maximinus 
was still voted all the regular imperial honours by the Senate within a month of his 
acclamation.731 As with earlier regime transitions, the body had little choice. Aurelius Victor 
asserts that they confirmed Maximinus’ accession if only because ‘they considered it 
dangerous to resist him, as he was armed, while they were without arms.’732 However, 
without any pre-existing connections with the usual power players, Maximinus could either 
choose to provide social goods in order to build consensus with the city’s political actors or 
rely on the specific support of his troops. The emperor chose the latter. He immediately 
disposed of Alexander's friends, advisers, and others in senior administration, many of 
whom had powerful allies back in Rome.733 When Maximinus sent a delegation to the 
Senate demanding confirmation of his offices, it validated fears that the new military regime 
would not view governance as a respectful partnership, as under Alexander. In fact, while 
the Senate may have been relegated to a relatively minor role in the transitional process 
 
731 CIL 6.2001: Maximinus was recognised by the Senate by March 25th at the latest. Haegemans (2010) 81; 
Ando (2012) 103.  
732 Aur. Vict. Caes. 25.2; Haegemans (2010)  81. 
733 Hdn. 7.1.3. Some of Alexander’s images and inscriptions were also destroyed, but it does not appear that 
there was any formal abolition. Erasures: CIL 3.3327, 6.2001; P Oxy. 45.3244; P Ryl. 2.297; Haegemans (2010) 
82. 
  207 
and politics in general, the order’s collective identity was threatened by the new soldier-
emperor in a myriad of ways. 
 
First, the fear of physical repression was a threat many members could not easily brush 
aside. Memories of the purges ordered by Commodus, Severus, Caracalla, and Elagabalus 
created the defensive notion that the Senate was a moral community under threat, a 
concept that would strike up emotional solidarity among the elite. 734 Recent history 
counselled that the chances that Maximinus’ regime would have a detrimental impact on 
both individual senators and the collective were high. Second, Roman national identity was 
based around the very virtues that so-called barbarians lacked. Political elites occupied the 
top echelons of Rome’s social and economic ladders, and through the articulation and 
performance of imperial ideologies, and by agreements and partnerships with other political 
actors, they were vital contributors to the formation of national identities. Senatorial 
identity was thus closely intertwined with state identity, and the accession of a man who 
embodied the very opposite of ‘Roman’ identity broke the Senate’s link with their own 
glorious past. Finally, the Senate might consider that the markers of ‘eliteness’ – birth, 
connexions, landed wealth – would mean far less to a self-made Thracian soldier than 
previous emperors. Maximinus was an equestrian (like Macrinus), but it was made evident 
either by the man himself, his opponents or both, that his self-identity was that of a soldier 
and foreigner. The Senate’s social prestige was therefore as vulnerable as their political and 
individual rights. Together, this matrix of threats meant that elite resistance was inevitable, 
and it came in the form of a campaign of whispers and rumours representing Maximinus as 
a dangerous barbarian, a strategy aimed at undermining imperial authority among Rome’s 
urban populace.  
 
As John Evans argues, ‘the seed of Othering does not grow without the tender nurture of 
the political elites,’ and the creation of barbarian-emperor frame was a premeditated 
political tool designed to identify the nation, justify action on behalf of the nation, and to 
 
734 Honari (2018) 956. Commodus, Severus and Caracalla’s purges have already been noted. Dio tells us that 
Elagabalus executed senators at will and often without a trial. He records an instance where the emperor 
wrote a dismissive letter to the body stating that he would not bother to provide proof of two senator’s 
alleged plots, as the men were already dead (80.5.2).  
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influence political opportunity structures favourably for claim-making.735 The empire’s 
Illyrian soldiers had long been renowned for their physical prowess and courage, and though 
provincial troops had long protected Rome’s borders, the civilian population continued to 
view them collectively through the smoked glass of Graeco-Roman prejudice.736 Herodian 
has Macrinus deliver a speech to his soldiers concerning their Parthian opposition, noting 
their lack of disciplina:   
 
 Therefore let us take up our arms and our battle stations in the customary Roman 
good order. In the fighting, the undisciplined mob of barbarians, assembled only for 
temporary duty, may prove its own worst enemy. Our battle tactics and our stern 
discipline, together with our combat experience, will ensure our safety and their 
destruction. Therefore, with hopes high, contest the issue as it is fitting and 
traditional for Romans to do. (4.14.7, emphasis added). 
 
Barbarians were thus ill-disciplined and uncivilised, and unable to embody the qualities that 
made Rome great, and Thracians in particular were marked as war-mad, cruel and 
savage.737 Unsurprisingly then, given his background and occupation, Maximinus was quickly 
dubbed as a Thracian barbarian by the civilian population. Herodian describes the emperor 
as the son of mixobarbaroi. The Historia Augusta dubs him a semibarbarus; terms that had 
been used for hundreds of years to denote racial and cultural inferiority.738 Although Roman 
attitudes towards externae gentes were not as fixed as Greek attitudes, preconceptions 
based on the imagined immutability of character as determined by geographical origins are 
evident in the historiographical record. It was, at any rate, considered that foreigners were 
meant to submit to Rome’s masculine imperium, not the other way around – the very 
 
735 Evans 8.  
736 Bileta (2016) 26. 
737 E.g. Pompon. 2.16; Strabo 7.5.12; Tac. Ann. 4.46; Hor. Carm. 2.16.5; Ov. Tr. 5.7.10-20, 41-59 (on the Getae, 
a Thracian sub-group). Of course, just as elite Romans could characterise Thracians as stereotypical foreign 
savages, the stereotyped people themselves could manipulate the same imagery for their own advantage. 
When Alexander made terms with the German elite, the Illyrian soldiers bought into Roman stereotypes 
regarding barbarians. 
738 Hdn. 6.8.1; SHA Max. 1.5-7; Moralee (2008) 58, 60-61: in the seventh century CE, for example, the historian 
Theophylact Simocatta (Historiae Dialogus 4) twice refers to Phocas, another usurper of questionable origins, 
as a 'mixed-barbarian tyrant'  (mixobarbaros tyrannos), and in both cases calls him a centaur, the savage race 
of hybrids from the mythological past. For Herodian, the term mixobarbaros thus meant mongrel. 
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reason Alexander’s German policy was so ill-received.739 For Herodian in particular, 
Maximinus’ barbarian roots defined his character and approach to power. Scholarship has 
understandably questioned the veracity of Herodian’s portrayal, but it is significant that, 
despite the exaggeration of the emperor’s ethnicity in the source material, such stories 
were widely circulated at the time. Herodian claims that ‘everyone’ knew and spread the 
story about Maximinus’ early years as a Thracian shepherd, and as a consequence of his 
barbarian birth, the emperor had inherited the brutal disposition of his countrymen and 
would make his imperial position secure by acts of cruelty.740 The new emperor was also 
allegedly so unsophisticated that he could not understand menacing Greek verses recited by 
an actor during a play, and was easily appeased with a crude lie by his entourage.741 If we 
accept the Historia Augusta’s slightly breathless account, as rumours quickly spread 
regarding the emperor’s barbarian origins, crowds of senators, women, and children packed 
Rome’s temples to pray for redemption, terrified that they would be crucified, beaten with 
clubs and subjected to a harsh militaristic regime.742 Physical punishment and crucifixion 
were of course reserved for non-Romans, and this story perhaps reflects latent anxieties 
Romans had that the oppressed would employ the same treatment on them, given the 
chance.   
 
The quick reduction of Maximinus to a negative, barbarian stereotype shows this was a 
deliberate, public exercise in Othering, a concept that stressed the differences and 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ through the establishment and maintenance of social 
distance between groups.743 Making Maximinus the ‘barbarian’ Other served three main 
purposes. It made the new emperor a scapegoat for Rome’s problems both past and 
present. It affirmed the legitimacy and superiority of Roman collective identity.744 Most 
crucially though, it served as a delegitimising factor. So it was with the birther conspiracies 
spread about Barack Obama during his initial bid for the American presidency in 2008, 
 
739 Isaac (2004) 15-38. 
740 Hdn. 7.1.1-2. Herodian adds somewhat conversely that this was a calculated policy by Maximinus as he 
expected that he would be held in contempt by both the Senate and the populace for his lowly origins, thus 
deciding that aggression rather than conciliation would secure his authority. 
741 SHA Max. 9.5. 
742 SHA Max. 8.6-7. 
743 See, for instance, Spivak (1985); Hartog (1988). 
744 Evans 3.  
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rumours that the candidate was either a secret Muslim or born outside America worked to 
shape popular views about his regime and its policies, and also to delegitimise and identify 
the president as a moral threat to the country.745 The Othering of Maximinus worked 
similarly. As Rome was meant to be civilized and moderate, Maximinus was portrayed as the 
opposite, inciting wide-spread fear. The use of rumour set the agenda, not just what to 
think about, but how to think about it. Communities employ collective memories and 
identities in the shaping of their beliefs, and rumours based on prejudices or stereotypes are 
usually accepted even if false since rejection would challenge these long-standing views.746 
Thus, even if the stories about the new emperor were deliberately circulated or 
encouraged, they confirmed already-held preconceptions, creating and shaping the 
conditions for collective action.747  
 
For the few praetorians left in Rome – the majority had left to campaign with Alexander and 
remained with Maximinus in Germany – the Othering of the emperor may have put them in 
a difficult position. As a ‘barbarian,’ Maximinus was placed outside Rome’s traditional 
power structures, and the Guard was meant to be an integral part of those structures. 
However, their close connections to the emperor both politically and in ethnic terms made 
them the Other as well, and given that the urban populace had viewed them as 
stereotypical outsiders for many years, the whispering campaign further isolated the unit 
from the rest of the city, rendering the few soldiers present vulnerable. 
 
The threat posed by an ‘outsider’ on the throne energised collective identities that had 
previously been politicised in the face of other perceived threats.748 Construction of 
collective action frames rested upon this agenda-setting, and any actions undertaken by 
Maximinus’ regime would be refracted through this lens. By this point, the justice master 
frame was well articulated as a foundation for popular collective action, and extant 
barbarian stereotypes amplified this frame, since the ‘natural’ social order was reversed by 
 
745 See Tope et al (2017). 
746 Coast and Fox (2015) 222-24. 
747 Chen, Lu, and Suen (2016) 89. 
748 For example, Potter (2004) 167 has dismissed tales of Maximinus’ background as a shepherd as ‘wild 
slanders.’ For general discussions of Maximinus’ moral depiction in Herodian, see Burian (1988); Opelt (1998) 
2943-45; Haegemans (2010) 6-9. 
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‘barbarian’ rule. Expectations that Maximinus’ regime would be savage and unjust received 
a measure of confirmation by the administration’s use of informants, corrupt trials and 
confiscations. Governors and commanders were summoned to the emperor’s side, and 
tortured, insulted, exiled or executed in a reversal of social order and justice. Herodian’s 
tone in relating these events is unusually bitter, suggesting that someone he knew was 
caught in the net. He is quick to highlight the wrongness of an emperor attacking his 
subjects instead of the real enemy, asking his readers; ‘what profit was there in killing 
barbarians when greater slaughter occurred in Rome and the provinces?  Or in carrying off 
booty captured from the enemy when [Maximinus] robbed his fellow countrymen of all 
their property?’749 Even the death of the emperor’s wife, Caecilia Paulina (a member of an 
influential senatorial family) before his accession gave rise to rumours that Maximinus had 
killed her; a confirmation perhaps of fears that elite heritage counted for nothing in the new 
administration.750 In reality, most of these deeds were no more heinous than those of other 
infamous emperors, but where they were viewed as tyrannical and unjust, the Otherness of 
Maximinus coloured his actions as far more transgressive and threatening to cultural norms 
and Roman identity. 
 
What aroused the strongest reaction amongst the urban population, was despite the fact 
that there was no civil war, nor any enemy under arms anywhere (Maximinus had achieved 
Rome’s first definitive victory against a foreign enemy in forty years subduing German 
forces in the spring of 235CE), the city appeared to be a city under siege.751 Herodian’s 
description suggests that the praetorians who remained in the city, mostly older veterans, 
were more visible than usual. Extra soldiers may have been sent back to Rome to contain 
possible resistance, but given that Maximinus was still on campaign, it seems unlikely.752 
The appointment of Publius Aelius Vitalianus as Praetorian Prefect may be the reason for 
the tangible shift in administrative practice. A Maximinus loyalist, Vitalianus was the 
commander of the forces in Rome and was feared by the populace. If word on the streets 
posed a threat to his emperor, it is conceivable that the prefect would station his soldiers in 
 
749 Hdn. 7.3.1-4. SHA Max. 10.6 claims there were 4000 victims of Maximinus’ ‘justice.’  
750 Zonar. 12.16; Haegemans (2010) 86. 
751 Hdn. 7.3.6. 
752 See Hdn. 7.11.2. 
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and around popular meeting places in order to quell subversive circuli in the same manner 
that Severus had his troops occupy the city’s porticoes and temples in 193CE.753 Any 
conspicuous positioning of praetorians as a potential repressive force, a mere two years 
since the explosion of violence between civilians and the Guard, would have only confirmed 
the militaristic and foreign nature of the new regime, and the role of the praetorians 
themselves as ‘barbarian’ interlopers. Their visibility suggests that any despite perceptions 
that the Guard may have had regarding their potential vulnerability during the emperor’s 
absence from Rome, it did not compel them to keep a lower profile. On the contrary, 
Vitalianus’ aggressive stance likely confirmed to the soldiers who remained in Rome that 
they were vital members of a strong and cohesive regime. 
 
The praetorian prefect also received more expansive judicial powers at this time, so 
Vitalianus may not only have been in charge of surveillance and repression, but also the use 
of informants, confiscations and sham trials during this time. Not only did Vitalianus inspire 
fear, he also acted ‘very harshly and cruelly’ (τραχύτατα καὶ ὠμότατα); the exact language 
Herodian uses to introduce Maximinus at the opening of Book 7. His representative in 
Carthage, Capelianus, also employed the same transgressive and unjust methods that would 
be used in Rome in the emperor’s name.754 To be sure, Herodian shapes his narrative in 
order to present Maximinus as a barbarian and thus a corrupting force, but we should also 
read the real-time framing processes within his stylistic choices. A ruthless regime is bound 
to be unpopular, but since Maximinus had already been parsed as a non-Roman ‘barbarian,’ 
the deeds of his officials would be interpreted in the same way, reinforcing a sense that the 
regime was subverting important cultural norms.  
 
Two strands of injustice collide here. The Othering of Maximinus was intended to highlight 
the difference between the legitimate rule of an ‘authentic’ Roman emperor, and the 
illegitimate subversion of imperial authority by a ‘barbarian’ soldier from the periphery of 
 
753 During Maximinus’ absence from the city, the praetorian prefect was given more legislative power: Cod. 
Just. 1.26.2; Whittaker (1970) 199, n.1. 
754 Hdn. 7.9.10: He sacked temples, and robbed money from private and public sources alike. Andrews (2019) 
170-172; Haegemans (2010) 124-25. See Hdn. 7.6.4-5; Opelt (1998) 2944-45 for comparisons between 
Maximinus and Vitalianus. 
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the empire.755 Rome had been ‘invaded’ by a foreign regime, and perceptions that the 
regime was acting solely for the benefit of his soldiers were not helped by the disparity 
between military and urban benefits. The Chronograph of 354CE records that Maximinus 
gave out just one congiarium of 150 denarii per head during his three-year reign, a stark 
contrast to the vast amount of money expended on the troops.756 Balancing the books had 
been a problem for decades, and military expenditure was estimated to have been between 
286-370 million denarii per year under Alexander, excluding donatives, pensions, resources, 
and food for troops. Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax and Alexander resorted to selling off imperial 
possessions to make up the shortfall, but Maximinus went a step further:  
 
After [the emperor] had impoverished most of the distinguished men and 
confiscated their estates, which he considered small and insignificant and not 
sufficient for his purposes, he turned to the public treasuries; all the funds which had 
been collected for the citizens' welfare or for gifts, all the funds being held in reserve 
for shows or festivals, he transferred to his own personal fortune. The offerings 
which belonged to the temples, the statues of the gods, the tokens of honour of the 
heroes, the decorations on public buildings, the adornments of the city, in short, any 
material suitable for making coins, he handed over to the mints (Hdn. 7.3.5).  
 
Maximinus’ plundering of temple resources elicited a collective, and mostly non-elite 
response. This is made explicit by Herodian who uses terminology derived from δῆμος no 
fewer than six times in his brief account of events.757 Fundamentally, the appropriation of 
public money for the shows and presumably the funds for the grain dole was a clear breach 
of the moral contract between the emperor and urban plebs, although the breach of sacred 
space was particularly transgressive. 758 Religious activity was a fundamental way for 
ordinary people to frame, channel, and organise their social relations, and was a powerful 
framework for imagining community.759 The statues and dedications left by citizens in the 
 
755 Moralee (2008) 55. 
756 Mommsen (1892) 143-148. See also SHA Max. 8.2. 
757 τὰ δημόσια: money left for public gifts; νομὰς τῶν δημοτῶν: decorations on public buildings; εἴ τις ἦν 
κόσμος δημοσίου ἔργου, τοὺς δήμους: the people (all 7.3.5); a popular grief: πένθος τε δημόσιον; and 
resistance from some of the people: τινας τῶν δημοτῶν (7.3.6). Andrews (2019) 166-7. 
758 Politian translates ἀθροιζόμενα as ad annonam. Whittaker (1970) 173, n.3. 
759 Brubacker (2012) 6.  
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temples were given in good faith and meant to be permanent, and their seizure crossed a 
moral line, and may have affected longer-term social and spatial practices. For instance, 
Herodian’s claim that Maximinus’ agents robbed the gods of their honours likely included 
those of the imperial cult, that is, he not only took funds but removed the means by which 
people could worship the divi. The last emperor to receive his own state temple was Marcus 
Aurelius, and from the death of Commodus, there were few temples constructed to Roma 
or deified emperors. As Hekster argues, even if Maximinus did not explicitly curtail worship 
of imperial divi with his temple confiscations, his actions nonetheless reduced their status in 
comparison to other gods. The Historia Augusta describes the emperor Tacitus later building 
a temple to deified emperors, an act that makes sense only if the original temples in which 
these ‘good’ divi were worshipped had been closed at some earlier point.760  
 
Maximinus may have desperately needed money, but the plunder of the temples of the divi 
was an enormous mistake. Caracalla’s antoninianus may have been unpopular but removing 
goods from the temples was an assault on the imperial cult. State ritual had many purposes: 
it was the site of political allegiance, and thus part of the public transcript, but it was also 
part of a common cultural construct that formed part of the performative, reciprocal moral 
contract between emperor and subject. Worship of the divi ensured the pax deorum, and 
was a focus for many on the lower rungs of the social ladder whose participation in the 
rituals and offices of the imperial cult provided recognition and status.761 Collective 
memory, spatial routines, and Roman collective identity were, in one blow, attacked by the 
emperor himself. The state and its religion were interrelated models of authority, and 
temples were monumental symbols of Roman collective identity: as Roger Friedland puts it, 
‘religion partakes of the symbolic order of the nation-state.’762 If the initial rumour 
campaign was based around elite fears that Maximinus would not embrace traditional social 





760 Hekster (2008) 67-68; Gradel (2002) 363. 
761 Magyar (2009) 385, 389; Gradel (2002) 228–231. 
762 Friedland (2001) 125. 
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The reduction of the imperial cult and the blatant disregard for Rome’s religious community 
had a polarising effect that amplified the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ frame that posited Maximinus as 
non-Roman. Of course, this was not the first time an imperial regime had raided city 
temples. Caracalla instructed his praetorians to take their donative, and on his entry into 
the city in 193CE, Severus allowed his soldiers to occupy the temples and seize goods they 
did not pay for.763 Interestingly, Dio employed ethnic tropes to describe Caracalla, claiming 
that he ‘belonged to three races and… combined in himself all their vices; the fickleness, 
cowardice, and recklessness of Gaul were his, the harshness and cruelty of Africa, and the 
craftiness of Syria, whence he was sprung on his mother's side.’764 For the general 
population though, Caracalla was as ‘Roman’ as his father in dynastic and cultural terms. 
Also, Caracalla and Severus’s soldiers took money and goods—we do not hear of any 
religious offerings or items being plundered, so while their actions were an invasion of 
sacred space, they were not so much a direct attack on the core values that made up 
‘Romanness’ for urban dwellers, regardless of social or economic status.765 The raids did 
nothing to improve relations between civilians and soldiers either, and their participation 
only made the boundary between the two highly polarised communities more explicit. 
 
The state and its ‘injured gods’ had to be protected from a barbarian interloper, and 
mobilisation and a collective willingness to use violence occurred as a result.766 The 
opposition was such that the families of the soldiers who followed the emperor’s orders 
upbraided their relatives and other locals.767 Herodian, meanwhile, describes the rage of the 
populace: 
 
Some citizens, with angry shaking of fists, set guards around the temples, preferring 
to fall before the altars than to stand by and see their country ravaged (πεσεῖν ἤ 
σκῦλα τῶν πατρίδων ἰδειν)768  
 
763 SHA Sev. 7.1-3. 
764 Cass. Dio 78.6.1. 
765 Tarrow (1998) 110; Snow and Bedford (1992) 136. 
766 Hdn. 7.4.1: ‘People began praying and calling upon the injured gods.’ 
767 Hdn. 7.3.6. Herodian employs οἱ στρατιώται to describe the soldiers; this usually means the praetorians in 
his narrative when speaking of urban forces, but he is very brief here. Legio II Parthica was with Maximinus, so 
the troops involved had to be the remaining praetorians and perhaps some of the urban cohorts. 
768 Hdn. 7.3.6, emphasis added. 
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This is nationalistic language. Populist politicians and provocateurs today employ the same 
coded words of invasion, conquest, sacrifice, and defeat at the hands of the Other as ways 
to define self-identity or nationhood. While modern nationalism is more often than not 
constructed around questions of ethnicity, Roman self-identity was more fluid. Just as the 
collective practices, rituals, and symbols of nationhood, such as the imperial cult produced a 
measure of obligation towards the state, it could also mobilise resistance to any changes in 
these areas. As a ‘non-Roman,’ the actions of Maximinus were interpreted as multiple 
threats to Roman self-identity that in turn triggered a nationalistic response, for 
conceptions of nationhood and religion coalesce to differing degrees. Geneviève 
 Zubrzycki argues that ‘nationalism has roots not in religious decline . . . but rather in 
moments of religious fervour and renewal.’769 In other words, the defence of Rome’s 
temples reinforced the centrality of religion and the imperial cult to collective identity. The 
fusion of religious and national identities and goals had a powerful effect in terms of 
political contention, in that it privileged the urban populace as political actors, and fostered 
links between previously unconnected groups. Identities that were politicised during the 
contention of 222-223CE now had another issue around which mobilisation and social 
identification could take place, and it was one that included soldiers as co-antagonists.770  
 
At the same time, a nascent sense of nationalism had non-religious roots as well. The shift in 
state authority from the cooperative, collective model espoused by Alexander to a military-
focused and repressive regime saw power shift from the centre of the empire to its 
peripheries. The specific support and collective identities of a select group of provincial 
soldiers were now more influential than the identities and acceptance of urban Rome. 
Through the emperor’s dismissive approach to the city’s symbols of identity, memory, and 
belonging, individuals were able to locate and contextualise their personal experiences 
within the broader community, and the savage and violent imagery of the regime cued a 
vigilante response as an appropriate defence of Roman identity.771 In short, the collective 
guarding of Rome’s temples was a contentious performance of nationhood and an action 
directly undertaken to prevent Rome and its cultural values being ‘ravaged’ by an outsider. 
 
769 Zubrzycki (2006) 19. 
770 See Grzymala-Busse (2019). 
771 Githens-Mazer (2008) 44; Tarrow (1998) 2, 93. 
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What I am arguing here is that this enactment of nationalism was a political rather than 
demographic claim, as the physical defence of sacred space by ordinary people emphasised 
the performative aspect of Roman self-identity and facilitated the construction of 
solidarities between disparate groups. 772 The Othering of Maximinus enabled an extremely 
strong construction of Roman self-identity among urban residents, more so than past 
emotional responses to perceived injustice or grievances. Certainly, there was an element of 
conformation bias at play. The regime’s apparent contempt for cultural norms and moral 
economy confirmed pre-existing beliefs about barbarian behaviour, and if the city was 
under military control as Herodian claims, the contentious action around the city’s temples 
was not just a defence of sacred space but urban free space as well.  
 
This awakened sense of collectiveness in the face of a common enemy was a by-product 
both of military dominance and previous imperial policy. Caracalla had already 
demonstrated that a regime was willing to trample the rights of its subjects in order to 
preserve its repressive capacity. In fact, many of Maximinus’ moves were identical to that of 
his predecessor. The dismissal or execution of Alexander’s household was a re-enactment of 
Caracalla’s purge after the murder of Geta. Both men also surrounded themselves with 
soldiers to the exclusion of more traditional advisors. However, where a crowd had 
passively stood by as Caracalla’s praetorians raided the temples in 211CE, a force mobilised 
to take direct action twenty years later. Why this happened comes down to conceptions of 
identity. The circulation of rumours concerning Maximinus flourished because they 
reaffirmed dominant and established values of ‘Roman’ identity at the same time they 
excluded the ‘outsider’ emperor. The framing of Maximinus was successful because those 
who accepted the polarisation and politicisation of civilian collective identity already 
understood the clear dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Thus, as the defensive 
performance of these identities in previous years led to resistance and contention, when 
the populace believed their position was under threat from Maximinus, the stereotypic 
evaluation of the emperor as the ‘barbarian,’ only intensified extant prejudices, and 
generated a nationalistic response.773 Subsequent events in Rome will show that these 
nascent nationalist identities and conceptions of the Other would have a significant impact 
 
772 Brubaker (2010). 
773 Giry (2016) 2-3. 
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on how the city would respond to a new round of claim-making from a ‘real’ Roman 
challenger. 
 
From resistance to revolution: the coup of Gordian I 
 
By 238CE, the cycle of contentious politics was reaching its zenith. Collective violence had 
escalated in recent years and, in particular, the urban populace was becoming socialised to 
the notion of risky, interpersonal conflict. Physical repertoires such as rioting, and the 
occupation or protection of symbolic spaces, were replacing more passive forms of 
contention. Physical resistance bred political resistance, and, while the collective defence of 
Rome’s temples may not have prevented Maximinus from appropriating resources, it was 
illustrative of the rebellious mood of the city.774 Mobilisation strengthened collective 
identity among claimants, and anchored in the shared sense of ‘one-ness’ was a 
corresponding sense of collective agency. The arrival of news in early 238CE of a rebellion in 
Carthage offered a political opportunity for the expression of such agency. Maximinus’ 
African officials had been using confiscations and sham trials to extort money from the local 
wealthy classes. In response, a group of young aristocrats, probably members of the local 
collegia iuvenum, revolted.775 After killing the hated procurator and his officials, the rebels 
hailed the province’s proconsul M. Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus as their Augustus.776 
 
Gordian was a senior senator of consular status at the end of a long and distinguished 
career.777 He was a well-known figure in Rome, renowned for his long-term generosity in 
staging gladiatorial shows, spectacular hunts, and for distributing horses to the circus 
 
774 Hdn. 7.4.1: ‘For these reasons, and justifiably, the people were aroused to hatred and thoughts of revolt.’ 
775 In early 238CE tensions in Carthage were running high because it was time to arrange collection of the 
annual oil levy. An increase in the demand for shipments to the army would have been much resented as it 
was a tax-in-kind. Both the procurator and the provincial governor were present in the city to ensure 
compliance. There was no love lost between the two and the atmosphere of discord was probably exacerbated 
by the additional friction between government agents and the city merchants, landed aristocracy, and 
ordinary people: Pearson (2017) 123. 
776 Hdn. 7.4.2-7.5.7. 
777 According to the Historia Augusta (Gord. 4.1) Gordian held the consulship twice, although according to his 
coins, he was consul only once. Herodian tells us that he held many provincial commands, served in the 
highest public offices, and proved his ability by ‘important achievements’ (7.5.2). Inscriptional evidence 
suggests that he served as governor of Britannia Inferior in 216CE. After that, there is evidence that places him 
as governor, and then suffect consul, of Achaia. For Gordian’s consulship, see Syme (1971) 167-168; Pearson 
(2017) 125-6. 
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factions without bias. The African rebels may have picked a suitably reluctant Gordian 
because he was their senior provincial administrator, but his impeccably Roman credentials 
had broad appeal to those who viewed Maximinus as an interloper. As an aristocrat with 
family connections to Trajan and Antoninus Pius, Gordian was also linked to illustrious 
Republican names. He traced his descent from the Gracchi, and was acclaimed in Africa as ‘a 
new Scipio,’ with some comparing him to Cato, Mucius Scaevola, Rutilius Rufus, and Laelius 
Sapiens; all distinguished consuls from the 2nd BCE.778 Even Gordian’s height was considered 
‘characteristically Roman,’ and appreciation of the traditional civic obligation of providing 
lavish spectacles for the city was a stark contrast to Maximinus’ neglect of the shows.779 It is 
no accident either that Gordian took Romanus as one of his imperial names.780 If Maximinus 
was framed as foreign, Gordian by contrast was conspicuously  armed with impeccable 
‘Roman’ traits and values; an indication of just how effective the Othering of the current 
emperor had been. In order for the rebellion to succeed, Gordian had to win Rome, and 
presenting himself as the antithesis to Maximinus was a clever way to capitalise on 
discontent in the capital. Indeed, Herodian claims that those who implored Gordian to act 
did so because they thought that the Senate and Roman people would be glad to accept a 
traditional aristocrat as emperor, especially one who had risen to high office as if by a 
regular cursus.781  
 
Gordian’s initial strategy targeted the entire populace of Rome, power-brokers and plebs 
alike. He sent a group of centurions and soldiers to the city who were entrusted with three 
tasks: distribute letters to the leading men of the city, assassinate Maximinus’ hated but 
powerful praetorian prefect Vitalianus, and distribute Gordian’s message to the people, in 
which he promised redress for recent injustices and a return to traditional governance.782 
This was a shrewd approach. In his letters to influential senators, Gordian informed them of 
his unanimous support in Africa. This is the only time where Herodian uses the exact 
 
778 SHA Gord. 2.2, 5.5-7. Q. Mucius Scaevola: consul 95BCE; P. Rutilius Rufus: consul 105BCE; C. Laelius Sapiens: 
consul 140BCE. The author states that the Scipio acclamation was recorded by Junius Cordus (Gord. 5.6) 
779 SHA Gord. 3.5-8, 4.5, 6.1. 
780 Gordian I and II were officially known as M Antoninus Gordianus Sempronianus Romanus Africanus Pius 
Felix Augustus. 
781 Hdn. 7.5.2. 
782 Whittaker (1970) 192, n.1. Urgent news could travel directly between Carthage and Rome in two-three days 
during the summer sailing season (Plin. HN 19.1), but the season had ended, meaning a more indirect route of 
between seven-ten days was more likely.  
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translation of the Latin consensus in his narrative (συμπνοία), shaping Gordian’s local 
support as a sound legitimacy claim.783 Removing Vitalianus, meanwhile, would eliminate a 
major obstacle. Herodian claims that previously, no-one would openly rebel for fear of the 
prefect. Not only would his murder loosen Maximinus’ control over the city, but it would 
also symbolically strike a blow against the regime.784 Gordian also promised the praetorians 
‘more money than anyone had given them before,’ and pledged gifts and ‘moderation in all 
things’ to the plebs, in a pragmatic attempt to regain the political capital squandered by 
Maximinus. 
 
All three parts of the plan were to be enacted on the same day, and Herodian’s account of 
what transpired is so detailed and exact that he must have been a witness to some of the 
drama.785 Vitalianus was successfully stabbed before dawn during his salutatio matutina, 
after which the assassins ran down the Via Sacra, distributing Gordian’s letters to the people 
and delivering the prepared directives to key politicians.786 As people gathered in the 
porticoes and spaces where Gordian’s declaration was posted, rumours quickly spread that 
Maximinus was dead, a reasonable supposition given Vitalianus’ murder, and that a 
challenger’s manifesto was displayed in public. This was essentially an alternative public 
transcript directing the urban populace to support a new regime, and its aims and source 
were as ‘Roman’ as Maximinus was ‘barbarian.’ That rumours quickly circulated and were 
believed by many demonstrates that Gordian’s approach was in tune with the transcript 
that painted Maximinus as a foreign savage.  
 
As with the circulation of the earlier rumours regarding Maximinus, this new information 
generated a sharp emotional response. A recent psychological study has found that anger 
exacerbates existing biases and causes people to be more open to information that bolsters 
one’s current views.787 Even if the Gordians had deliberately spread the news that the 
emperor had been killed, attempts to control or manipulate opinion would have been 
 
783 Whittaker (1970) 193, n.2. 
784 Hdn. 7.6.4-5. 
785 Pearson (2017) 131; Whittaker (1970) 195 n.2. SHA Gord. 10.5 claims that Vitalianus was killed on the order 
of the Senate but this does not match Herodian’s account, and it is unlikely that they would have proactively 
had Vitalianus killed before ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or levels of support for the rebellion. 
786 Hdn. 7.6.9. 
787 Suhay and Erisen (2018) 
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useless because a planted rumour can only spread under the same conditions in which it 
would have developed spontaneously.788 Any news, official or otherwise, would be 
distorted, exaggerated, and simplified in accordance with people’s pre-existing beliefs and 
prejudices. Existing anger directed towards the construct of the barbarian emperor fuelled 
the circulation of rumours, almost as if people were willing the information to be true. As a 
validation of the hidden transcripts that maintained Maximinus’ role as the barbarian 
enemy of Rome and its national identity, the rumours of his death were enough to 
immediately weaken the administration’s hold on the city. Herodian asserts that ‘when 
these reports became known, the people milled about as if possessed’ (ὁ δῆμος ὥσπερ 
ἐνθουσιῶν διέθει πανταχοῦ).789  
 
It is telling that Herodian employs the same terminology here that he used to describe the 
people’s emotive response to both the accession and murder of Pertinax.790 Such an 
emotional response explains why the first actions of the crowd were not to acclaim Gordian 
but to attack the regime. In Herodian’s words, the ‘hatred which fear had 
hitherto suppressed now poured forth without hindrance, freely and fearlessly.’791 Crowds 
went through the city destroying the emblems of Maximinus’ power, including statues and 
the paintings of his battle victories displayed in front of the Curia. In what was now a well-
entrenched contentious repertoire, popular justice was meted out to those who were 
viewed as the instruments of Maximinus’ savagery. Informers, officials, judges and those 
who had brought undue lawsuits were killed, dragged around the city and thrown into the 
sewers.792 The enactment of this repertoire, as with earlier examples, reflected the gradual 
social and political change of the past fifty years. As the people’s involvement in the political 
process became more and more peripheral as occasions for consensus rituals were reduced 
and the emperor assumed greater individual power, the ability to punish the regime, its 
representatives and profiteers was one of the last remaining weapons that the populace 
 
788 Shibutani (1966) 199. 
789 Hdn. 7.7.1. 
790 Accession: πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἐνθουσιῶντι ἐοικὼς ἐξεβακχεύετο διέθεόν τε (Hdn. 2.2.3); murder: διέθεόν τε 
ἐνθουσιῶσιν (2.6.1). 
791 Hdn. 7.7.2. 
792 Hdn. 7.7.2-3. Location of the painting: 7.2.8; SHA Gord. 13.6-8; see also Max. 15.1. Herodian explicitly calls 
the crowd a lower-class mob twice (ὄχλοι κοῦφοι: 7.7.1; ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου: 7.7.3), but I agree with Whittaker in 
not reading too much into this regarding social composition – he views Herodian’s outlook as a ‘middle-class’ 
one: Whittaker (1970) 199, n.2. 
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could use to exact retribution. The performance of popular justice was, of course, an act of 
social dialogue with the regime. Since such violence needed opportunity, it is no surprise 
that the crowds who mobilised on the rumours of Maximinus’ death would use the political 
space available to make their collective voice heard.  
 
(i) Elite political opportunities: a senatorial revolution 
It was not only the people who seized the political opportunity presented by Gordian’s 
rebellion. The rumours and stereotypical framing of Maximinus, and the subsequent 
resistance to his regime symbolically reaffirmed the dominant values of the populace that in 
turn strengthened social conformism.793 Support for Gordian was an endorsement of 
traditional order, which would provide an opportunity for the Senate. The political elites 
had initiated the campaign of Othering Maximinus, and now the sheer scale of the rioting 
forced the Senate to meet before they could ascertain the accuracy of the reports of the 
emperor’s death. During the meeting, they proclaimed Gordian and his son and passed a 
decree deposing Maximinus and declaring him and his son as public enemies. Orders were 
sent to the provincial governors requesting support, and a council of twenty senators (xxviri 
reipublicae curandae) was created to look after affairs in the Gordians’ name.794 These were 
startling acts. The Senate had in the past acquiesced to regime change, but it had never 
deposed a legitimate emperor in this way; the only partial precedent being the deposition of 
Nero in 68CE. In that instance, as with Julianus, the Praetorian Guard had already 
abandoned the emperor, providing the Senate with the security to add their condemnation. 
This time, Maximinus had the support and physical possession of the praetorians and a 
sizeable portion of the army. Instead of joining the side that had the repressive capacity, the 
Senate was challenging it. Its proactive decree, then, was an innovative assertion of 
sovereign power. 
 
With the emperor and his troops absent from the city, the Senate had the advantage of 
numbers. Provincial soldiers may have established a visible power base amongst the fighting 
 
793 Giry (2016) 4. 
794 CIL 14.3902: XX viri ex senatus consulto rei publica; SHA Max. 32.3, Gord. 10.1.This may have happened 
later, but it likely occurred at the same time or very soon after the initial Senate meeting given how quickly 
decrees and orders from the new regime were issued. SHA Max. 16.1-7 details the by now ritualised 
acclamations (positive for the Gordians, negative for Maximinus) that followed the passing of the decree.  
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men of the military, but they had yet to establish a support base in Rome.795 There was a 
sizeable African faction within the body that would have supported the accession of the two 
Gordians, and far fewer who could be relied upon to support the authority of Maximinus. In 
his prosopographical study of the Senate during Maximinus’ reign, Karlheinz Dietz estimates 
that only 2% of senators were from the Danubian provinces, and only 12% from non-Italian 
Western regions. Italians still held the majority of the senatorial order, and most of these 
men had been elected to the consulship and were members of official priesthoods. Many 
senators, then, participated in, and identified with, the spatial routines and cultural norms 
that crowds had earlier mobilised to defend. It certainly appears that the Senate viewed the 
crowds outside as allies. The nationalistic fervour that resulted from the temple raids would 
have been a welcome demonstration of popular resistance, and the frenzied destruction of 
imperial symbols outside the Curia showed that the death or deposition of Maximinus was a 
cause for celebration.  
 
Not only did the Senate seize the opportunity offered by the rioting to make a bold new 
claim of their own, but they also used the newly energised collective identity of an assertive 
populace to confer legitimacy. The senatorial issue of orders to provincial governors and 
armies, for example, based its validity on the traditional authority of the people. According 
to Herodian, these letters urged the provinces to remain loyal to Rome, ‘where the power 
and authority from the beginning had been in the hands of the people.’796 The orders 
acknowledged the real power of a politicised populace, but the references to tradition and 
the past were perhaps more closely tied to the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy created around 
the public imagery of Gordian and Maximinus. Gordian represented the stylised 
components of collective memory, the ‘good old days’ when emperors cultivated a personal 
relationship with the city and its population and embodied expected civic virtues. 
Maximinus, on the other hand, represented a break with tradition and the past. The Senate 
exploited the nationalism that had gripped the city, making the people a ready ally, as well 
as presenting the rebellion as a just one, based on ancient traditions and rights.  
 
 
795 Dietz (1980) 314-341. 
796 Hdn. 7.7.5, emphasis added. 
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The acceptance of both groups, Senate and plebs, diffused a now shared claim across space 
and social sectors in an upward scale shift. Scale shift was achieved by invoking the plebs 
and their separate interests, and by introducing a new site of contention, the Curia, as a 
contentious space, thus opening up new potential alliances and different institutional 
settings for contention. The inclusion of the Curia (and its occupants) meant that any 
proceeding claim-making would have a higher chance of success. It also created 
opportunities for new co-ordination at a different level that had the potential to topple the 
entire regime.797 At the same time, a senatorial meeting that was independent from the 
emperor, was, in a small sense, indicative of a spatial shift in power. The praetorian castra, 
and to a slightly lesser extent, the imperial palace, had been the primary locations of power. 
The Curia was the traditional locus of authority, and the meeting was a reminder of the true 
meaning of SPQR and its association with libertas.798 
 
Undoubtedly, the assembled crowds recognised the significance of the Senate’s action. As 
covered in Chapter Two, scale shift can push contention either towards more transgressive 
or more contained forms of collective behaviour. As the involvement of the Senate widened 
the scope of contention in terms of political actors and spaces involved in claim-making, it 
also widened the scope of the protesters, who in this case, used more transgressive forms 
of action. The Historia Augusta cites Junius Cordus in claiming that although the senatorial 
decree was initially meant to be secret, news swiftly travelled to the crowds outside the 
Curia, who immediately turned from smashing statues to executing popular justice against 
the symbols and hated representatives of Maximinus’ regime. The rioters thus perceived 
the Senate’s offered alliance as an opportunity, and collective behaviour shifted from 
symbolic damage to physical violence as a result. However, before the city could receive aid 
from the provinces, the rebellion in Carthage was suppressed and the two Gordians were 
killed by Capelianus, the governor of Numidia. This information arrived at about the same 
time as news that Maximinus had mobilised his army and was preparing to march on 
Rome.799 A mere twenty-one days had elapsed since the accession of the Gordians and their 
 
797 Tarrow (1998) 205. 
798 In the sense that libertas under the imperial system was not a license to do whatever one wanted, but 
rather was reflective of accepted legal, social and political constraints. 
799 Hdn. 7.10.1; SHA Gord. 15.1-16.1. 
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demise, and the Senate quickly assembled for a second emergency meeting. To underline 
the seriousness of the situation, they met in the inner sanctum of the Temple of Jupiter 
Optimus Maximus. The choice of this temple rather than the Curia, was a symbolic and 
deliberate one. The only previous meeting there in imperial times took place on the 
assassination of Caligula in 41CE when the Senate discussed a return to a republican 
government.800 The Senate did meet at the Area Capitolina, the open space in front of and 
around the temple, on the first day of each consular year. The location, therefore, signalled 
senatorial independence, and the beginning of a new regime, but it is just as likely the 
venue was chosen as the traditional location for war preparations since everybody expected 
Maximinus to fight.801 As the opening session of a ‘revived’ Senate that intended to go to 
war with the deposed emperor, its members needed Jupiter’s blessing for what would lie 
ahead.802 Besides, Maximinus’ pillaging of the city’s temples (and the people’s defence of 
them) had made them contentious spaces. The Senate’s meeting in Rome’s principal temple 
was a reassertion of Roman sovereignty over its invaded sacred spaces, another implicit 
reminder of Maximinus’ status as an outsider. 
 
During this extraordinary meeting, the Senate went further than merely issuing a 
declaration of war. They elected two co-emperors from amongst the xxviri; Marcus Clodius 
Pupienus Maximus, a former urban prefect and military commander, and two-time consul 
and experienced administrator Decimus Caelius Calvinus Balbinus. The decision was an 
expedient one. The new government would need a military man in the field as well as 
someone who could keep the cogs of government turning during a civil war. It was 
constitutionally innovative, yet the idea of an aristocratic partnership harked back to the 
Republican method of electing two senatorial colleagues as co-consuls who could act as 
checks upon each other, a theory strengthened by the Senate’s declaration that the men 
would also share the office of pontifex maximus. To some extent, the new structure may 
 
800 Suet. Calig. 60. 
801 Weigel (1986) 333, 335. Security was also easier to manage at the Temple than elsewhere: Herodian tells us 
that the meeting was held behind closed doors, which probably meant the usual scribes, civil servants and 
slaves were not admitted (7.10.3). 
802 Hdn. 7.10.3. In their study of seating in the Roman Senate, Lily Ross Taylor and Russell T. Scott suggest that 
the Capitoline temple ‘was used primarily for meetings concerned with religion;’ a central component to both 
opening sessions and declarations of war. Taylor and Scott (1969) esp. 559-561, 564.  
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have been a compromise.803 The future was uncertain, and the city was highly agitated. At a 
time when Roman collective identities were reinforced through claim-making performances 
that appealed to old-style values, a less autocratic and seemingly traditional system could 
have been more readily accepted by the crowds outside than the arbitrary election of a 
well-connected senator. Doubtless, the use of a senatus consultum to bestow the imperial 
honours on Balbinus and Pupienus indicates that the Senate wanted to frame its 
assumption of power as within the bounds of precedent.804 Senatus consulta had a long 
history. In the Republican era, they were enacted by the consent of the Senate; they were 
not officially law but carried the auctoritas of the body. Under imperial law, senatus 
consulta were passed investing the emperor with his imperial powers. They were 
instruments of the emperors’ will, and from the reign of Hadrian came to be considered 
direct law.805 Although an emperor derived his general imperium from the acceptance of the 
troops, and the senatus consultum that invested each emperor with his imperial powers was 
merely a formal sign-off to a de facto situation, the Senate’s vote was still symbolically 
important, or emperors would not still have bothered to ask for their conferral of honours. 
With the assumption of sovereignty, senatorial decrees would now be the legal voice of the 
collective rather than the individual, and since the two emperors were, just as Republican 
consuls, members of the same institution, they relied on the body to legitimise their rule in 
the absence of the military’s acclamation. 
 
Accordingly, the need for the Senate and the two co-emperors to establish strong legitimacy 
claims was paramount, given the impending invasion of Maximinus and his troops. The well-
established dynastic and personalism claims that had sustained previous autocrats were 
redundant at this point. Instead, as their use of ‘proper’ process shows, the Senate was 
aiming to establish foundational myth, ideology and procedural-based claims modelled on 
the practices of bygone days. As part of the fabric of Roman identity, the Senate was a 
venerable, albeit faded, authority, and its role as a political actor went back to the earliest 
days of the Republic. The outward form of the regime reflected the past, one that seemed 
 
803 This is Lo Cascio’s take: (2008) 157. 
804 Hdn. 7.10.5: διὰ λόγματος. 
805 No inscriptions detailing a senatus consultum survive however; the only law on an emperor’s investiture 
that survives is the lex de imperio Vespasiani: CIL 4.930+31207=ILS24. 
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more glorious in collective memory than present lived experience. In the case of Maximinus, 
the replacement of his legitimacy claims with ones constructed on tradition and precedent 
was not just a rejection of the process that had allowed provincial troops to appoint an 
‘unfit’ emperor. It provided yet another contrast with the Otherness of a ‘barbarian’ regime. 
The best antidote for the ‘tyranny’ of Maximinus and his disregard for cultural norms was a 
return to the ‘good old days’ when Roman aristocrats set the socio-political agenda. 
 
The establishment of new legitimacy claims and the Senate’s acknowledgement of the 
mood (and power) of the urban plebs aside, the election of Pupienus and Balbinus was a 
bold attempt to radically re-shape urban power dynamics. Herodian states that the election 
of two men was meant to divide the imperial authority ‘so that the power might not be in 
one man's hands and thus plunge them again into autocracy.’806 Their stricture of 
collegiality allowed the Senate to act as the coordinating power and authority for both 
military and civil affairs as they threw out the established imperial model, a crucial part of 
the new structure since it brought the military back under senatorial command. By doing so 
in a legal rather than ad hoc way, the order was attempting to effect a political revolution. 
In Trotskyist theory, a political revolution is a process by which the government, or form of 
government is changed, but where usual social relations are left predominantly intact.807 
The Senate could attempt a political revolution because the rumours of Maximinus’ death 
had created a revolutionary situation, as the long-term shift of power from civilians to the 
military combined with the recent increase of popular discontent made it more likely for 
challengers to emerge and assume that the population will likely support their claims. A 
revolutionary moment arrives when an alternative body or group is perceived more 
favourably than the original government.808 In this case, a revolutionary situation was 
created by the external pressures of the frontier campaigns that caused Maximinus to make 
excessive demands upon Rome. The confiscation of social goods and breaches of legal 
process by an outsider were perceived as attacks on urban collective identities. Perceptions 
of injustice crystallised into widespread resistance. This resistance, in turn, offered an 
 
806 Hdn. 7.10.2. Note the parallel between Herodian’s comment and Livy’s description of the overthrow of the 
monarchy and the establishment of the Senate: Livy 2.8-11. Pearson (2017) 146. 
807 By comparison, a social revolution is one where old property relations are overturned. For what is still the 
best discussion of a political revolution, see Trotsky (2004). 
808 See Tilly (1993); Skocpol (1979) 3-42. 
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opportunity for the adoption of a new system of government that was innovative in 
approach but venerable in appearance. Furthermore, the situation that developed was 
directly connected to the character of the third-century imperial regime. The greater a 
regime’s capacity and inclusive democracy, the more difficult it is for revolutionary 
challengers to form, earn support from other quarters or commit to changing the status 
quo. Constant war reduced the regime’s capacity; in fact, repeated uprisings and incursions 
proved that the administration no longer commanded full control over the entire empire. 
With a drop in capacity, the conditions that would typically constrain such challenges were 
absent, allowing a revolutionary situation to occur, a conclusion supported by research on 
later European revolutionary periods.809 
 
Such events were not just a reaction to the threat posed by Maximinus, but the result of the 
widening separation between the Senate and emperor over the preceding decades. Theda 
Skocpol once argued that one of the most dangerous times for a regime was when the 
government and elite were separated from one another.810 The measure of respect and 
inclusion proffered by Alexander had been swiftly snatched away by Maximinus, and every 
senator understood how a triumphant march on Rome would further erode their position; 
Severus had amply demonstrated that in 193CE. The Senate’s attempt to reconfigure 
imperial governance was less about personal safety and more about reinserting themselves 
as regime members. Long-standing grievances concerning military supremacy could also be 
addressed with such a bold move. Ando astutely notes that Severus’ effective dismissal of 
the discursive and institutional structures by which traditional power relations had been 
channelled, controlled and disguised left no alternative methods within the existing 
framework for the construction of a social consensus.811 The only option was for consensus 
to be constructed outside this model. One other consequence of the upward scale shift that 
accompanied the constitutional reform of early 238CE was that it drastically changed 
political opportunity structures. Popular collective action and framing provided an initial 
opportunity to challenge the regime. Now that the Senate had altered governmental 
structure, the long-standing dimensions of the political environment that had previously 
 
809 Tilly (2006) 161.  
810 Skocpol (1979). 
811 Ando (2012) 46, 224. 
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constrained contentious politics also shifted. When the power of the regime visibly 
diminished in Rome in the wake of the Gordian’s initial revolt, groups that had previously 
complied with unfavourable demands acquired the opportunity to organize more open and 
widespread resistance to existing regimes.812 
 
(ii) When a legitimacy claim is contested: the accession of Gordian III 
Legitimacy confers authority, but it is also intrinsically related to changing political 
conditions and subjective perceptions as to which, if any, legitimacy claims should be 
accepted. Pupienus, Balbinus, and the Senate would have been confident that the regime 
change would be welcomed by most in the city, given the unpopularity of Maximinus. 
Herodian tells us that under Alexander, ‘the fact that the character of the imperial 
government was changed from an arrogant autocracy to a form of aristocracy pleased the 
people, the army, and especially the senators.’813 However, the unusual nature of the 
political landscape meant that the rules of the game were now unknown, and thus a degree 
of choice for contenders. The populace, thanks to the Senate’s original support, felt a 
collective sense of symbolic efficacy, and with it, the understanding that they could exact 
some change within the political arena. Such cognitive liberation opened further 
opportunities for popular mobilisation.814 The feelings of hope that propelled the Senate to 
assume a leadership role, and effect political change also informed the non-elite that they 
too, could have a hand in re-configuring their own levels of participation, and what the 
people were not happy with was an exclusively senatorial coup. James Scott states that, 
‘when the revolution becomes the State, it becomes my enemy again. That is why it matters 
greatly which methods are used in order to achieve power.’815 Pupienus and Balbinus were 
elected in secret, with no consultation with the people; their participation or even approval 
seemingly unnecessary. Yet, since the Senate couched their legitimacy claims in the 
procedures and myths of Rome’s collective past, the people’s role in that past could not be 
written out. There had been no privileged sphere in which only the Senate had authority, 
 
812 Tilly (2006) 173. 
813 Hdn. 6.1.2. 
814 See McAdam (1982). 
815 Ferron, Oger, and Scott (2018). 
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and its power relative to that of the people was contestable just as it was during the 
Republic.816 
 
Although the election of Pupienus and Balbinus ostensibly took place during a closed 
session, news leaked out in real time, and a vast crowd armed with stones and clubs 
occupied the Via Sacra near the Capitol. They had two main grievances. They were unhappy 
with the Senate’s unilateral action, and they were especially unhappy with the election of 
Pupienus, who had earned widespread enmity due to his harshness while urban prefect. 
Threats to kill both emperors were issued along with demands that another candidate be 
chosen from the Gordian family. In this case, the only available family member was Gordian 
I’s thirteen year-old grandson.817 The menacing reaction of the plebs exposed the vast 
divide between elite and non-elite. Senators had high confidence in Pupienus’ skill-set, in 
particular, his ability to control the city, but their preference for him demonstrated a 
fundamental misunderstanding of what the people wanted in a ruler, especially after the 
repressive actions of recent emperors.818 Aside from being leaked almost immediately (thus 
demonstrating the far from united position of senators), the secret vote made a mockery of 
the Senate’s claim to restore traditional practices. 
 
The crowd’s demands also demonstrate that the Senate’s legitimacy claims had not been 
wholly accepted. On the contrary, the public clamour for a Gordian was a call to retain a 
dynastic claim, probably centred around hopes that the imperial end of the moral economy 
would begin to function normally with a Gordian, a true ‘Roman,’ on the throne.819  On the 
surface, the clamour for a boy too young to be an effective leader in his own right or have 
the ability to check the machinations of his colleagues may seem like an odd choice. Rome 
had recently experienced a ‘bad’ boy-emperor in Elagabalus and a ‘good’ one with 
Alexander, and with both examples, the quality of the emperor’s advisors was crucial, an 
 
816 Steel (2015) 2-3. 
817 Hdn. 7.10.5-6; SHA Gord. 22.2. 
818 Herodian does note in a slightly earlier passage (7.10.4) that Pupienus enjoyed a good reputation for his 
understanding nature, his intelligence, and his moderate way of life, and he uses ὄχλος to describe both the 
people who admired these qualities, and those who hated his harshness as urban prefect. It may be that he 
was considered an upright and proper Roman, but also stern and unyielding – traits that may have been more 
acceptable at another moment in time. 
819 Haunss (2007) 166-7. 
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unknown at this stage. Although Gordian I (and his son Gordian II) had only reigned for a 
matter of weeks, the significance of dynastic ties with the broader populace should not be 
underestimated, for Gordian III represented the manifesto of his grandfather, which had 
been aimed at addressing the cultural anxieties of the urban plebs who were fearful and 
angered by a ‘barbarian’ regime. At a time when some may have viewed the rise of the 
military and Caracalla’s universal suffrage as examples of the Other receiving ‘their’ benefits 
(the rallying cry of populist politicians today), a Gordian III may have invoked hope that the 
‘old ways’ when traditional rights were respected would return.820 The Historia Augusta 
comments that the people loved Gordian III because his relatives had taken up arms on 
behalf of the Senate and Roman people and had both perished, the one by a soldier's death, 
the other through a soldier's despair: ‘so powerful among the Romans is the memory of 
noble deeds.’821 A combination of old fashioned Roman masculinity  and a dynastic claim 
was an effective way to invoke collective memory and thus instant legitimacy. Severus’ 
fictitious descent from the Antonines worked for him, likewise for Elagabalus. The dynastic 
bonds that tied Gordian III to his popular grandfather represented the consensus of the 
people who acclaimed Gordian I weeks earlier and therefore imbued the crowd’s demands 
with a sense of legitimacy. In contrast, the Senate predicated their claim around the dubious 
concept of senatorial authority, a claim that had far less potency than it did on the death of 
Caligula over two hundred years earlier. There just was not enough diffuse support for the 
Senate as a body given their greatly diminished role as a political actor.  
 
Thus, the same collective action frame that rendered Maximinus’ regime as unjust was also 
applied to the pre-emptive and secretive vote in the Temple of Jupiter. Rioting was 
employed as a delegitimating strategy to force the Senate to allow popular participation in 
the transitional process, and the calls for Gordian III were a way in which the people could 
insert themselves into the process initiated by the Senate, check its new-found authority, 
and have their legitimacy claims met. Initially, the Senate was unwilling to concede to the 
rioter’s demands. Pupienus and Balbinus tried to force an exit from the temple with an 
 
820 One of Augustus’ injunctions before he died was that the state should not enrol large numbers as citizens, 
so that there would be a marked difference between themselves and the subject nations: Cass. Dio 56.33.3. 
821 SHA Gord. 22.6, Max. et Balb. 9.5 
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armed guard but were beaten back by the crowd, Balbinus suffering blows in the process.822 
With their exit blocked, the senators finally summoned Gordian I’s grandson and 
acknowledged him as Caesar, a move that placated the hostile crowd, which allowed the 
imperial party to proceed to the palace.823 In terms of claim-making performances, the riot 
had been proven over recent years as a successful form of popular action, and this occasion 
was no different, since the threats of the hostile crowd pressured the Senate to modify their 
political revolution. The people ensured their candidate joined Pupienus and Babinus by 
taking advantage of the shift in political opportunity structures created by the upwards scale 
shift of the initial rebellion, a shift that constrained both the form and the content of 
available legitimation statements. In the most recent examples of popular contentious 
claims, it was either the emperor or Praetorian Guard who were the primary addressees. 
Now it was Rome’s political class who were the object of collective claim-making, a change 
in claimant-object pairing that in turn affected the choice of performances and repertoires 
that would be deployed.824 Past popular claims against the Senate were performances 
designed to pressurise a small group with threats of violence by a much larger group, and 
the relatively recent besieging of the praetorian camp in 193 and 223CE had demonstrated 
the success of such tactics. The Capitol riot was, therefore, an example of an ancient 
repertoire that was in some sense, reawakened by the innovative tactics of more 
contemporary protesters.825 
The revolutionary situation of 238CE was unusual for Rome, but the broad processes 
underpinning it are comparable to many of the revolutionary situations that developed in 
Europe between 16th-20th centuries CE. One recurrent factor of the more modern era was 
how the pressures of war caused rulers to issue excessive demands upon their subjects, 
subsequently generating widespread resistance. Moreover, when regimes made demands 
that threatened collective identities or violated rights attached to those identities, those 
who cleaved to such identities often formed alliances as part of their resistance.826 In 
 
822 Hdn. 7.10.7; SHA Max. et Balb. 9.3. 
823 Hdn. 7.10.7-9. 
824 Haunss (2007) 170. 
825 During the Late Republican turmoil, groups attached to populist politicians regularly threatened Senate 
meetings. For example, in 57BCE, a severe famine mobilised a crowd to threaten the Senate with murder by 
‘with their own hands, and later to burn them alive, temples and all: Cass. Dio 39.9.2. During the early imperial 
period, a ‘concursus plebis’ threatened the Senate with stones and fire as they debated the fate of Pedanius 
Secundus’ slaves: Tac. Ann. 14.42-45. 
826 Tilly (2006) 172. 
  233 
another persistent process, when the power of rulers visibly diminished in the presence of 
strong competitors, groups of ordinary people who had previously complied with regime 
demands acquired the opportunity to mobilise more open resistance to existing or new 
demands.827 Both scenarios are directly applicable here. The mobilising effect of collective 
identity is evident in the organised resistance to Maximinus. We can view the resistance to 
the Senate as a seizing of opportunity, not just because Maximinus and most of his troops 
were absent from Rome, but because the senatorial takeover of the Principate weakened 
the authority of the office. The Senate had no troops. Aid would take weeks if not months to 
arrive from the provinces, and a strong challenger still remained. For the people, this was 
their opportunity to extract concessions before the new regime had a chance to establish a 
commanding position. Hence, the events of 238CE, though Roman in context, nonetheless 
adhered to a revolutionary situation template. A revolutionary situation is one thing, but a 
revolutionary outcome is another. For that to happen, the new regime needed to not only 
have control of state apparatus, including possession of its armed forces, it also needed to 
neutralise troops loyal to the old regime, either by agreement or force.828 What occurred 
next forced the issue of where the Praetorian Guard would fit into the new political model. 
 
The civil war of 238CE 
 
Nasāʾih minna lil-yunāniyīn: Tubtak fi iydak, kimamtak ʿala wishak, khamirtak fi gibak 
wa illi yiʾulak al-maglis al-ʿaskari hayehmi al-thawra, qattaʿu. 
 
Advice from us to the Greeks: keep your stone in your hand, your scarf on your face 
and yeast in your pocket and kill anyone who tells you that the military will protect 
the revolution – Egyptian activist during Greek anti-austerity protests, 12 Feb. 
2012.829 
 
Almost overnight, urban political actors had initiated the most substantial rearrangement of 
the political environment since the Augustan revolution. Popular protest frames produced 
new possibilities for ordinary people to reimagine the contours of contentious Roman 
 
827 Tilly (2006) 172. 
828 Tilly (2006) 161. 
829 Ketchley (2014) 12. 
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politics. A sense of collective efficacy and identity had been stimulated among the 
population, and they were unwilling to give up their newly won gains. While our sources do 
not explicitly detail the social composition of the rioters, we have a few clues. Herodian 
describes those who defended the temples from Maximinus’ agents as the ‘lower classes’ 
(δημοτῶν). This was the same group explicitly afforded protection from soldiers in 
Pertinax’s decree of 193CE.830 Likewise, in the wake of the popular justice meted out to 
members of Maximinus’ administration, Herodian referenced this group’s proclivities for 
direct action. He notes; ‘every lower-class mob (ὄχλοι κοῦφοι) is quick to revolt,’ adding 
that the Roman people (δῆμος) comprised ‘a vast, heterogeneous conglomeration of human 
beings.’831 Herodian’s comments suggest that the participants were not one particular sub-
group but a representative mix of the city’s non-elite population. Given that the anti-
Maximinus and anti-Senate riots were a direct response to rumour rather than tangible 
evidence, neighbourhood social networks and structures like circuli were the most likely 
sources for information and subsequent mobilisation. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
enduring centrality of collegia and other localised social networks and associated spaces as 
structures that facilitated both identity formation and mobilisation for contentious purposes 
allows us to infer that these sub-groups likely played substantial roles during episodes of 
collective action. At the same time, those who involved themselves in the violence at the 
Capitol were undoubtedly those whose collective identities had been politicised by their 
previous interactions with the regime and its local repressive capacity.  
 
Simon and Klandermans argue that politicised collective identity unfolds through a 
sequence of three antecedent stages: an awareness of shared grievances, adversarial 
attributions, and involvement of society at large.832 The attention of the lower classes (who 
had little institutional access to political power) to the emergency senatorial meeting 
demonstrates that mobilisation was no knee-jerk reaction to elite activity. It was because 
those who had contended against Maximinus, by dint of their mobilisation, considered 
themselves to have a vested interest in any decisions the Senate would make. The reactive 
and potentially violent nature of those who would bear the brunt of adverse political 
 
830 Hdn. 2.4.1: δημότας. 
831 Hdn. 7.7.1. 
832 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 319. 
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conditions is unsurprising, since the process of politicisation turned ordinary people who 
shared an identity from ‘a group of itself’ into ‘a group of and for itself’ in the political 
arena.833 This realisation of a communal strength had ramifications for Rome’s other 
political actors, as the claims of the people, if realised, would affect the interests of other 
claimants. 
 
How the Praetorian Guard had reacted to events up to this point is unclear. The chronology 
of the events of 238CE is hazy, as the progression of events in each source is unable to be 
accurately reconciled with the others. Karen Haegemans’ timeline has the initial uprising in 
Africa taking place sometime in late March, with the news reaching Rome at the beginning 
of April. The Gordians’ deaths occurred in late April, which means the election of Pupienus 
and Balbinus and the accompanying riots would have taken place by mid-May.834 The 
compressed sequence of events along with a lack of official information from imperial 
headquarters would have left the unit feeling somewhat isolated. The last contentious 
encounter between the Guard and civilians had occurred twelve years earlier, and only a 
rump of older praetorians remained in the capital. Nevertheless, their presence was a 
reminder of a military autocracy that was at that moment assembling to retake Rome. As an 
institution that had been intimately involved in the accessions of Maximinus, Alexander, 
Elagabalus, and Macrinus, this was the first imperial transition without their direct 
involvement since Caracalla and Geta. As Herodian expresses on the accession of Pertinax, 
‘[the praetorians] were used to being the servile instruments of an autocracy, and they were 
practised in the arts of rapine and violence.’835 A threatened political actor was dangerous 
and the Guard remembered their treatment at the hands of Severus.  
 
Given their former influence and Maximinus’ popularity with the military, senators and 
civilians alike would have been anxious about where the Guard’s loyalties lay. Where there 
was uncertainty and fear that the new distribution of power would hold, political actors had 
to rely on their own constructions of reality. Groups of people made a habit of regularly 
 
833 Simon and Klandermans (2001) 323. 
834 Haegemans (2010) 27. 
835 Hdn. 2.2.5. 
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going to the Senate house to find out what was being planned and discussed.836 Men took 
to illegally arming themselves for protection, sometimes unconcealed, while on the street. 
Everyone expected a civil war, and many remained wary of the praetorians who remained in 
the city. The soldiers themselves were just as eager as the rest of the city for news on the 
expected war, and some had even taken to waiting in civilian dress with the crowds outside 
the Curia looking for information. 
 
The Senate as a whole had worked together to replace Maximinus, but the pro-Gordian 
faction needed to retain popular support to counteract the power of Pupienus and Balbinus. 
Two senators, Lucius Domitius Gallicanus Papinianus, and Publius Messius Augustinus 
Maecianus seem to have viewed the praetorian presence as an opportunity for political 
gain. Maecenas’ background is unknown, but Gallicanus was of Carthaginian descent and 
therefore almost certainly a partisan of the Gordians. Both decided to exploit the latent 
tensions between the people and a Guard temporarily rendered weak. According to 
Herodian, when two or three praetorians looking for information trespassed into the 
senatorial chamber, Gallicanus and Maecenas attacked and killed them.837 As the rest of the 
praetorians fled, Gallicanus stepped outside displaying his blood-stained dagger, and in a 
shamelessly populist appeal, urged the crowd there to pursue and kill the ‘enemies of the 
Senate and the Roman people.’838 Gallicanus’ manufactured outrage aimed to co-opt the 
support of the people by identifying a common enemy. The Guard was the last remaining 
representative of Maximinus’ power left in the city and the populace had independent and 
unresolved grievances with the unit.  
 
Predictably, the assembled crowd was ‘perfectly, easily persuaded’ by Gallicanus’ speech. 
They reacted immediately, hurling stones as they pursued the fleeing soldiers back to their 
barracks, killing some before they could reach the safety of their camp.839 What happened 
next was a significant escalation in the conflict between soldiers and civilians. Gallicanus 
 
836 Hdn. 7.11.1. 
837 Hdn. 7.11.2-3; SHA Max. 20.6, Gord. 22.7-8; Haegemans (2010) 180-181. Aurelius Victor in his account of 
events, calls Gallicanus, Domitius (Caes. 26.5). An inscription honouring a Domitius Gallicanus has been found 
at Vina, close to Carthage (ILAfr322). 
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assumed leadership over the agitated mob, persuading them to break into the public 
arsenals for arms, while he opened the gladiatorial schools as an added resource.840 Public 
armouries were mostly attached to the gladiatorial schools, but dedicatory weapons were 
also deposited in temples and displayed in public horti, shops, porticos, and public 
administrative buildings.841 The same spaces that groups had used to discuss current events, 
pray, and defend from the depredations of the emperor’s soldiers were all adorned with 
weaponry that advertised Rome’s martial glory. As the city’s temples were representative of 
collective identity and had become sites of contention in their own right, it is plausible that 
the crowds appropriated such symbols of the Roman sovereignty alongside the more 
practical weapons found in the gladiatorial schools as a way of reinforcing the legitimacy of 
their collective action. Cicero describes an occasion in 100BCE when Gaius Marius had arms 
distributed to the people from the sacred buildings and public armouries 
(ex aede Sancus armamentariisque publicis arma).842 On that occasion, the people were 
ordered to take arms to defend the state from the public enemy Lucius Appuleius 
Saturninus and his armed supporters. The symbolic importance of using public arms to 
defeat a public enemy was not lost on Cicero, and this may have been a factor in Gallicanus’ 
calculations, given the emotive and populist appeal of his earlier speech to the crowd.  
 
If this supposition is correct, the use of civic resources indicates a wide spatial diffusion of 
contention. Collective action began outside the Curia, close to the city’s major temples, 
while most of the larger gladiatorial schools were located near the Colosseum, close to the 
praetorian camp. We can presume that groups peeled off near their neighbourhoods and 
shops to gather additional weapons before re-joining the throng; Herodian claims that any 
tool the crowd could find was turned into a weapon.843 In short, what began as a localised 
incident in the Forum quickly became a city-wide affair, drawing in additional participants 
 
840 Hdn. 7.11.7-8. We don’t have a precise figure for the number of gladiators who were likely in the city at the 
time. Tacitus notes that Otho transferred 2000 into his army (Hist. 2.11); at various festivals, 1,200, 1,600, 
even 10,000 could appear. Based on these numbers, it is plausible that around 1,000 armed gladiators could 
have joined the siege: Whittaker (1970) 237, n.3. 
841 E.g. Plin. HN 35.4. See Randle (2015) 28-46 for a discussion on the public display of weapons in Roman civic 
spaces. Example of an armoury in a gladiatorial ludus: CIL 6.10164=ILS 5153 (run by a freedman). There was 
also an armoury connected with the Colosseum, associated in the Regionary Catalogues in Regio II with the 
Spoliarium and Samiarium. 
842 Cic. Rab. Post. 7.20. 
843 Hdn. 7.11.8. 
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and generating rumour. The inclusion of multiple contentious sites also amplified the role of 
emotional dynamics. Temples, public spaces, workplaces, and homes were all social sites, 
and the latter two examples were primary locations for the airing of hidden transcripts. 
Those who responded to Gallicanus’ call to arms bore long-standing grievances against the 
Guard in terms of their behaviour, grievances that were usually aired within the city’s free 
spaces. The fact that many protestors raided their homes and workshops for weapons 
shows that their public claim-making was closely tied to these spaces and the transcripts 
and emotions generated there. Many also distrusted the powerful, and Gallicanus’ speech 
directed popular anger away from the Senate and towards the praetorians.  
 
When people are induced to feel angry, they perceive less risk in collective action. Veena 
Das articulates how mutual feelings of fear and hate prolonged the fighting:  
 
the movement of images between emergent discourses of militancy and the diffused 
understandings of events in rumours circulated during crises…Such movements 
create the conditions under which social groups become pitted against each other in 
fear and mutual hatred, constructing images of self and other from which the 
subjectivity of experience has been evacuated. In this social production and 
circulation of hate, the images of perpetrator and victim are frequently reversed, 
depending upon the perspective from which the memories of traumatic events and 
of everyday violence are seen and re-lived. These images…suggest, that we need to 
bear in mind that in the phenomenology of panic, aggressors can experience 
themselves as if they were victims.844 
 
Herodian uses the same verb ἐνθουσιάω (‘possessed’) to describe the behaviour of the 
crowd collecting arms as he did to describe the demeanour of the crowds pulling 
Maximinus’ statues down.845 This suggests that Herodian intended the reader to understand 
the symbolic relationship between the two events, moreover, if he was in Rome at the time, 
his narrative reveals his appreciation of the role emotions played in the formation of a 
collective solidarity and sense of purpose for participants. Emotions, especially anger are 
 
844 Das (1998) 109. 
845 Hdn. 7.11.8. 
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inextricably intertwined with identity, and the emotional dynamics generated in the process 
of collecting arms, and movement through Rome’s public and private spaces contributed to 
the mobilisation of large numbers of people for violent action.846  
 
Communal conflict caused by symbolic provocations predicated on a sense of moral outrage 
has had a long history in diverse cultures, but the framing of discontent into the vocabulary 
of moral outrage was a relatively new claim-making method by elite Roman actors.847 In a 
series of small group experiments in the 1990s, the prominent American sociologist William 
Gamson demonstrated that when people witness a transgressive act by an authority figure, 
they tend to have strong emotions of suspicion and anger, while blame waits to be allocated 
through cognitive processes. Gallicanus managed to shift emotions from dread and 
suspicion to outrage and anger by implying that the praetorians were traitors to a new 
regime that the people had a direct hand in shaping. Of course, Gallicanus was only able to 
channel these emotions because they already existed. The Guard had, through their close 
association with the emperor and his urban policies, been Othered along with Maximinus, 
and the long antagonistic relationship between soldiers and civilians provided context for 
their recent actions. As representatives of Maximinus’ power, and simply as members of the 
military, they were doubly condemned.  
 
With the attribution of blame by a collective action entrepreneur, those feelings of outrage 
channelled potential participants towards collective action against their targets via injustice 
framing.848 Through his performance as a tyrant-slayer and defender of the people, 
Gallicanus successfully brokered a new alliance between two weakly connected groups. 
Power does not necessarily depend on the intrinsic characteristics of political actors but on 
network location and social structure. The Senate was, for the time being, both politically 
and socially powerful, and Gallicanus’ leadership deactivated the boundary between elite 
and non-elite, decreasing the salience of the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ distinction separating the 
two groups, and re-energising the boundary between praetorians and non-praetorians.849 
 
846 Yang (2000) 593. 
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We can also speculate that this shared sense of anger and injustice joined with feelings of 
optimism that the opportunity afforded by the new regime, large numbers, and resources 
provided via scale shift and elite brokerage would result in victory. The main fighting 
component of the praetorians, the equites singulares, and Legio II Parthica were absent 
from Rome, which lessened the fear of wide-scale repression, and the crowd’s success in 
forcing the Senate to acclaim Gordian III was tangible evidence of the people’ ability to 
affect change.   
 
Gallicanus may have provided the torch, but popular feelings of resentment and hostility 
towards the Guard had long smouldered. Those factors drove the plebs to besiege the 
praetorian camp throughout the day, despite the protection that the high castra walls and 
training provided the soldiers. As dusk was falling, the exhausted populace decided to 
withdraw, but the praetorians, who resented not just the attack but the arrogance in the 
way they people turned their backs on the camp and confidently retreated, poured out of 
the camp and counterattacked, killing the gladiatorial squad and many of the besiegers.850 
The men who defended the camp were older soldiers who would have remembered the 
siege of 223CE. All would have been cognisant of the political standing they held as a 
collective. It was one thing for the Senate to appropriate power; it was another to let the 
people treat them as enemies and outsiders. The pleb’s attack was a direct threat to the 
praetorian’s sense of collective identity and version of justice in the same way that Pertinax 
and Macrinus’ respective reforms were, not to mention Elagabalus’ effeminate behaviour.  
 
Herodian’s narrative encapsulates the now vast social distance between the two sides, 
commenting that the people were infuriated by the Guard’s refusal to surrender to a 
numerically superior force. The Guard, on the other hand, was enraged that had to endure 
barbaric indignities at the hands of Romans (ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὡς ὑπὸ βαρβάρων).851 The 
soldier’s sense of outrage seems slightly ironic considering the people viewed the Guard as 
members of a barbarian regime, and less Roman than themselves. The Guard likely felt that 
the hostility directed towards them was unjust; Herodian blames the violence on the 
paranoia of senators rather than the soldiers who waited for news unarmed and in civilian 
 
850 Hdn. 7.11.9. 
851 Hdn. 7.12.3. 
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dress.852 In reality, given the close relationship between the Guard and Maximinus and the 
populace’s attitude towards them, while the political situation was still undecided, the 
praetorians took care not to exacerbate tensions after the senatorial takeover. Collectively 
the Guard had little choice but to defend themselves, for their own military identity as 
Rome’s premier military unit meant that they could not back down in the face of the 
aggression of amateurs. At the same time, although there were some links between 
praetorians and civilians (family members who berated soldiers who raided the temples for 
instance), the social and spatial distance between the two groups, and the politicisation of 
collective identities meant that the Guard had become stigmatised. For civilians, being a 
praetorian was a spoilt identity, while soldiers had long treated the urban populace with 
aggression and contempt. Both sides were now so polarised that the urban prefect and one 
of the praetorian commanders were killed trying to control the violence, proving that at this 
point, identity outweighed the usual chains of command and authority on either side.853  
 
Interestingly, after the three days of fighting in 223CE, the populace and praetorians made 
reluctant terms with each other, in part because of the damage caused. Rationality won the 
day when the initial emotions propelling the violence had been exhausted. This time, the 
fight-back from the Guard enraged the Senate and people, spurring a more concerted and 
organised plan of attack. Undoubtedly, both groups understood that a praetorian stand 
threatened their political revolution, especially since Maximinus was at that moment 
marching towards Rome. The situation needed to be dealt with immediately, so the Senate 
selected commanders and recruited volunteers from all over Italy, including youth 
groups.854 Herodian does not elaborate on the specifics (he describes the groups as ἥ 
νεολαία), but the formal recruitment of extant social networks was an intelligent idea. The 
Gordian rebellion was assisted in no small way by local youth-associations (iuventutes), who 
were almost certainly one of the first mobilisers of the initial revolt at Carthage.855 Rome 
was host to various sodales, iuvenes, iuventutes and collegia iuvenum, including an 
 
852 Hdn. 7.11.4. 
853 Hdn. 7.7.4 and SHA Gord. 13.9 place the death of the urban prefect Sabinus three weeks earlier during the 
initial violence. Pearson thinks this is an error: Aurelius Victor (Caes. 26) says Sabinus died in a riot instigated 
by a ‘Domitius’. If this man is Domitius Gallicanus, the riot is probably the one described here. There could 
have been two Sabinuses, but unlikely. See Whittaker (1970) 201-3, n.3, 236 n.1; Pearson (2017) 254 n.10. 
854 Hdn. 7.12.1.  
855 Hdn. 7.4.3. 
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equestrian bodyguard of youths whom Balbinus and Pupienus used as bodyguards during 
the Capitol riot.856  Youth organisations were a place for young men to learn and perform 
Roman conceptions of hegemonic masculinity, and their recruitment allowed male citizens 
to embrace the nationalistic fervour created by the barbarian framing of Maximinus. A wide 
array of modern case studies have shown that there is a distinct link between nationalism 
and aggression, primarily because it is a powerful, primordial basis of cultural and political 
identity. Likewise, the concept of loyalty to the state reinforces solidarity and represents 
one of the strongest factors behind collective mobilisation. 857 Although the deployment of 
collegia iuvenum may have been used as a way for the Senate to redirect control back to 
their own social class, the ability to use nationalist framing to deploy energised youth 
networks meant the emotions generated by the conflict with the praetorians could be 
channelled back into an effective defence of Rome.858  
 
Herodian states that these youth-groups were called up and equipped with whatever 
weapons could be found or cobbled together. Most then went on campaign with Pupienus 
to fight Maximinus, while a contingent stayed behind to guard the city and aid those still 
fighting the Guard. With a boost in numbers, the people made frequent assaults on the 
praetorian castra over several days. The prolonged violence eventually forced Balbinus to 
issue an edict begging the people to call a truce and promising amnesty for the soldiers. 
Unsurprisingly, neither side gave way. When the attacks on the walls made no headway, the 
generals in charge of the civilian assault decided to block off the water supply to the camp, 
at which point the soldiers counterattacked once more, pursuing the attackers into ‘all parts 
of the city.’859 In an almost exact parallel of the street fighting that broke out during the 
riots of 190CE and 223CE, people retreated from the well-armed soldiers, locked themselves 
in their shops and homes and threw broken pots, stones and tiles upon the soldiers below. 
To stem their heavy losses, the praetorians set fire to houses that had wooden balconies 
just as they did in 223CE, this time sparking a colossal inferno that claimed the lives of those 
 
856 These equestrian bodyguards were perhaps the same young men who had previously acted as court pages  
(νεανίσκοι): see Hdn. 7.10.7; Suet. Galba 10; Whittaker (1970) 231, n. 1, 241, n.2. 
857 Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) 123, 79. 
858 Although such collegia were socially mixed, they included a high percentage of young men from an upper-
class background: de Ligt (2001) 355. 
859 Hdn. 7.12.1-4; SHA Max. et Balb. 10.5. 
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unable to escape. Herodian claims that the area destroyed by the fire was greater in extent 
than the largest intact city in the empire, suggesting that at least 100,000 people were made 
homeless, the worst conflagration since the Great Fire of 64CE.860 In 223CE, the praetorians’ 
arson quickly put an end to the violence. Why the conflagration was so devastating this time 
is unclear. It may have been accidental. However, given that both sides had ignored the 
instructions of their officials and continued to attack each other, it is probable that the 
enormity of the fire was down to a communal intransigence generated not just by the 
immediate conflict, but by decades of contentious interaction. The aggrieved praetorians 
may have simply wanted to burn the homes of every resistant civilian they could find. 
Equally, the people may have continued to attack even as soldiers were setting fire to their 
homes: the civilian population had already fought for days despite suffering heavy losses. 
Success in battle demands that participants choose to fight as a collective. Each individual 
decision to fight depends on whether they believe their friends and family will do the same. 
Thus, it is likely that the collective identity of the civilian participants was so cohesive that 
surrender was not considered as an option.861  
The political assertion of popular communal identities spawned the most severe episode of 
urban warfare to date between competing political actors, yet the violence committed by 
the urban population went beyond mere opportunism. In previous circumstances, the 
Praetorian Guard was empowered by the incumbent regime to monitor, contain, and on 
occasion repress collective claim-making. Not only that, they also used coercive means as 
legitimators and de-legitimators of imperial regimes. Although the political situation was far 
from settled, Maximinus had lost his direct authority over the city, and by extension, the 
Guard, meaning that the confrontation took its shape from the character of the power 
struggles that lay at the heart of past instances of violent and non-violent action between 
soldiers and civilians in the city.862 The creation of a nationalist urban identity in response to 
rumours and the actions of Maximinus was the basis for the plebs’ strong sense of 
solidarity. Redefining the people as the nation’s defenders symbolically elevated them to 
the position of an elite; it was the Guard and Maximinus’ barbarian army who were the 
undesirables, the savage and uncivilised. This symbolic shift both reflected and reinforced a 
 
860 Hdn. 7.12.7.  
861 Lehmann and Zhukov (2017) 1. 
862 Tilly (2000a) 9. 
  244 
significant change of attitude, as many members of the non-elite and elite willingly 
identified with each other against a common enemy.863  
 
Earlier, the actions of the Senate had threatened the crucial connecting structures between 
these two groups who were ostensibly on opposite sides of a boundary. The actions of 
Gallicanus and others in the pro-Gordian faction, though, reshaped those structures by 
providing some semblance of an alliance by creating a common threat. Finally, the active 
mobilising agency of emotion and collective identity decreased the capacity of authorities to 
police existing boundaries, and contain individual aggression that facilitated cross-boundary 
opportunities, including retaliation for earlier slights and injustices.864  Social polarisation 
between soldiers and civilians meant that collective violence was always going to be the 
most likely form of claim-making between the two groups.  As this chapter’s opening quote 
from modern-day protesters in Egypt shows, distrust and hatred for a regime’s instrument 
of repression had the ability, once political opportunity structures shifted to facilitate 
collective claim-making, to mobilise large numbers of ordinary people to engage in risky 
collective violence against a dangerous and much better-resourced opponent. A new social 
order was sought, a new structural reality where neither the Guard nor a barbarian emperor 
would be in charge. 
 
(i) Revolution or status quo? The execution of Balbinus and Pupienus 
The aftermath of the civil war of 238CE was remarkably similar to that of 223CE: a 
stalemate. Unlike the former event, this outbreak of collective violence ended with the 
destruction of large sections of the city. At a time when the empire’s financial situation was 
already dire, and an invasion loomed, the social and economic ramifications were serious. 
The new regime already had trouble paying for the war against Maximinus as well as the 
customary largesse, although they did manage to bestow a congiarium of 250 denarii, more 
than Maximinus’ earlier offering of 150 denarii.865 Pupienus and Balbinus were, however, 
forced to re-issue the unpopular antoninianus in order to contain rampant inflation, a move 
 
863 Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) 80. 
864 Tilly (2000a) 9. 
865 This congiarium was immortalised in coinage minted that year displaying the three emperors seated on 
thrones accompanied by a soldier and the personification of liberalitas, while a citizen mounts the dais to 
receive the largesse: Drinkwater (2005) 33. 
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that both Maximinus and Alexander were able to avoid.866 Fortunately, the new 
administration began to rule the city sensibly and efficiently. Herodian asserts that both 
emperors enjoyed a deluge of popularity as ‘patriotic and admirable rulers.’867 The Historia 
Augusta adds that Pupienus and Balbinus were able, in a short amount of time, to institute 
law, personally dispense justice and plan new military campaigns against the Parthians and 
Germans: output that could justify a political revolution.868 
 
The arrival of May brought news that the soldiers of Legio II Parthica had executed 
Maximinus. Trapped in a demoralising siege of Aquileia, the emperor was subsequently 
blockaded by senatorial forces. With no real communication reaching imperial 
headquarters, Pupienus’ forces circulated rumours that Rome and all of Italy were armed 
and united in opposition. For Legio II Parthica, whose families were based in Rome and who 
were themselves mostly Italian by birth, the dire siege conditions combined with news that 
the Senate had declared Maximinus an enemy of the state was motivation enough for them 
to move against the emperor despite his protection of the military’s primacy.869 For Rome, 
Maximinus’ death heralded the largest outpouring of positive contention since the 
accession of Pertinax. Pupienus ordered the heads of Maximinus and his son be sent to 
Rome post haste. A separate messenger was sent ahead and arrived first whilst games were 
on, allowing Balbinus and Gordian to theatrically inform the audience of the former 
emperor’s death.870 The next day, the main delegation arrived, displaying the heads of 
Maximinus and his son upon a spear. In Herodian’s words, Rome took on the appearance of 
a festival, as the city responded with the same type of emotional outpouring that 
accompanied the death of Vitalianus and the siege of the praetorian camp: 
 
No words can describe the rejoicing in the city on that day. 
Men of all ages rushed headlong to the altars and temples; no one remained at 
home, but, like men possessed (ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶντες), the people congratulated 
 
866 The antoninianus would soon drive the single denarius out of circulation: the last denarii were minted in 
240CE.  
867 Hdn. 8.8.1. 
868 SHA Max. et Balb. 13.4. 
869 Hdn. 8.5.5-6; Pearson (2017) 168. 
870 SHA Max. 25.3. 
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each other and poured into the Circus Maximus as if a public assembly were being 
held there. Balbinus sacrificed a hecatomb, and all the magistrates and the entire 
Senate shouted with joy, each feeling that he had escaped an axe suspended over 
his head (8.6.7-8). 
 
A two-step mobilisation process is apparent here. When rumours circulated regarding 
Maximinus’ death earlier in the year, the news was eagerly seized upon and crowds quickly 
congregated and celebrated. This time, however, there was a space of a day between the 
first reports of the emperor’s death and actual confirmation. Until definitive evidence 
arrived in the form of the severed heads of Maximinus and his son, the city deferred its 
celebrations, proof that the hopes and fears of the city hung on the emperor’s complete 
defeat. Herodian’s use of ἐνθουσιάω once again to describe the emotional response of the 
crowd links their visible solidarity and purpose to the other significant contentious events of 
his narrative: Pertinax’s accession and murder, the rioting that broke out on news of 
Maximinus’ alleged death, and the people’s collecting of arms before besieging the 
praetorian camp. Each instance was a momentous performance in terms of crowd size, 
impact, and the use of innovative and transgressive behaviour. Herodian’s use of the word 
‘possessed’ then, may tell us more about the evolution of collective action, and how the 
multiplicities of space in terms of scale, networks, mobility and positionality affected third 
century contentious politics than an initial reading may suggest. 
 
Unquestionably, the rush to the altars and temples in thanksgiving reflected the people’s 
investment in the power struggle. The assassination of the emperor by the army would not 
normally be good news for Rome: in previous instances, such events usually left a power 
vacuum that provided an opportunity for soldiers to appropriate more power. However, this 
time, the civil war was over before it reached Rome, and a new government was already in 
place. Thanksgiving and mourning rituals had always been incorporated into the spatial 
landscape of contention, but as spaces recently used for frantic supplication, and 
collectively defended from the depredations of the regime, it is no surprise that temples 
were the first place that people congregated together in celebration. Maximinus had 
invaded sacred space, and with his death, the people reclaimed these spaces as a 
restoration of just and natural order. 
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Just as the temples were a medium and outcome of social and political action, so too the 
Circus Maximus. Of course, the sheer size of the crowds made it a suitable choice in terms of 
logistics. Herodian’s phrasing that the rush of people into the Circus was like a public 
assembly (ὥσπερ ἐκκλησιάζοντες) is interesting, however. The atmosphere was certainly 
festival-like, but here Herodian shapes the flow of people as purposeful and almost formal; 
the space and its audience imbued with political power. In many ways, the choice of the 
Circus for celebratory location was the culmination of decades of political contention there. 
It symbolised popular resistance and sovereignty, and its scale, connections with popular 
culture, and spatial arrangement all validated the role of the plebs as a political actor.  
Ammianus Marcellinus’ comment that the Circus was the ‘plebs’ temple, home, meeting-
place and source of hope’ seems almost tailor-made for this occasion.871 
 
Celebrations still mingled with the last of the city’s anti-barbarian fervour. The Historia 
Augusta, which claims to use the eyewitness account of an Aelius Sabinus, describes a 
crowd throwing the corpses of Maximinus and his son into ‘running water,’ and burning 
their heads on the Campus Martius.872 Burning the heads of the deceased emperor and his 
son was a powerful statement by the populace. Usually, emperors would be cremated on 
the Campus on a funeral pyre (ustrinum), as a ritualised cremation was an essential part of 
the apotheosis and divinisation processes.873 The subsequent deification of the deceased 
was also considered an act of pietas that reconciled the new emperor with the gods. 
Maximinus did not treat Alexander well in this regard and in return the crowds treated him 
like a criminal, not just denying him the respect afforded to their pater patriae, but by 
separately disposing of his head and body.874 Displaying the heads of political enemies and 
executed noxii was a well-worn tradition, and the parading of the emperor’s head through 
 
871 Amm. Marc. 28.4.29: templum et habitaculum et contio et cupidorum spes omnis.  
872 SHA Max. 31.5-32.1. The author adds the rather gory details from Aelius that the head of the son’s face, 
although ‘black, and dirty, shrunken, and running with putrid gore, seemed still the shadow, as it were, of a 
beautiful face.’ We have no details on who Aelius Sabinus was, unfortunately. 
873 Imperial pyres could be temporary structures designed to burn away, or more permanent features. The 
ustrinum domus Augustae, for example, located on the Campus near Augustus’ mausoleum, was an enclosure 
made of travertine with a metal grating. There may have also been an Antonine pyre located near the Campus: 
Davies (2004) 10.  
874 Maximinus used the title pater patriae on both his coins and inscriptions from the beginning of his reign: 
BMCRE VI, 222-44; RIC IV.2, 138-9, 142-4, 150-1. 
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the city allowed it to be viewed and abused by onlookers.875 For instance, after defeating 
Clodius Albinus in 197CE, Severus ordered ‘all but the head to be cast away, but sent the 
head to Rome to be exposed on a pole.’876 The display and subsequent burning of 
Maximinus’ head went beyond advertising a victory over an enemy of the state however. 
Distancing the head from the corpse meant the emperor would be denied peace in the 
afterlife. As with Elagabalus, the disposal of Maximinus’s body into running water, 
presumably either the Tiber or a nearby sewer, was not just a denial of burial, but it also 
purified the city from the contaminating effect of the ‘barbarian’ emperor, and was a ritual 
restoration of order and thus an emphatic rejection of his regime.877 Maximinus may have 
been defeated, but a regime framed as non-Roman, cruel, and transgressive was such an 
injustice and threat to collective identity that it needed expiation. Burning the head of the 
emperor was retribution against an outsider and a public display of solidarity founded in the 
emotional and nationalistic collective response to his regime. This group-based revenge, 
then, was a collective claim against the burgeoning power of new political actors as much as 
regime policy and methods. It was a demonstration of the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ boundary, and 
the people had firmly located  Maximinus in the latter. 
 
Why the crowds pulled themselves away from their celebrations to administer popular 
justice to two putrefying corpses had something to do with opportunity: the Senate and 
people were, at that point, nominally in control since the death of Maximinus was a political 
blow to the Praetorian Guard. Certainly, on this occasion, the crowd was able to control all 
aspects of the ritual. As we have seen, when contention is a deliberate act of conflict, those 
who engage in such action are likely to try and manipulate, defend or subvert places which 
contain symbolic meanings for them or those they are contending against. For example, 
Dio’s description of Augustus’ funeral where the emperor was transported on a bier through 
the Campus Martius and his body consumed on a funeral pyre with all of Rome in 
attendance, was the proper use of space and ritual.878 Maximinus, on the other hand, 
received the subverted version. He too, was burnt with the city in attendance, but the 
 
875 Also see Livy 2.19.1; App. BC 1.71, 1.94, 3.26, 4.20; Suet. Iul. 85, Aug. 13; Tac. Ann. 14.57, 59; Cass. Dio 
60.16.1. See Kyle (1998) 220. 
876 Cass. Dio 75.7.3. 
877 Kyle (1998) 221, 227. 
878 Cass. Dio 56.42.2. 
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method and aim was far different; there would be no apotheosis for the deceased emperor. 
And where the Circus had been a site of recent conflict and violence, it was reclaimed as a 
site for popular festivities. Both locations were utilised as free space, as it was the people 
who had control over the space and the contentious politics performed there. 
 
While Rome was celebrating, the praetorian contingent who had campaigned with 
Maximinus made their way back to the city where the reformed collective almost 
immediately started discussing their options. Unsurprisingly, they were unhappy with the 
late emperor’s demise, in particular, the ‘Pannonians and barbarian Thracians’ (ὁι Παίονες 
καὶ βάρβαροι Θρᾳκες), who made up a significant component of the praetorian ranks.879  
Herodian lists three main issues that formed the nucleus of the praetorians’ grievances: 
popular support for the regime, the elite background of the emperors, and the fact that it 
was the Senate who had chosen the emperors in the first place. As the historian 
summarises; ‘the majority [of the praetorians] were resentful and privately angry that their 
own choice of emperor had been destroyed, while the senatorial choices were in power.’880 
All three grievances were interconnected. Fundamentally, the problem was the new 
constitutional shape of the imperial regime, and its cooperation with the popular uprising 
against the praetorians. The unit was despised by the population, and under Maximinus its 
power was derived directly from the emperor, that is, outside the usual power structures in 
which they usually operated. Where the Guard would fit in this new polity was an unknown, 
and there were hints that the new environment would not be as conducive to the military as 
it was under Maximinus. First, while the traditional adlocutio and promise of a donativum 
were delivered to the troops by Pupienus, instead of delivering reassurances, the emperor 
gave a speech reiterating senatorial authority and the importance of the sacramentum, the 
oath the Guard made to protect the interests of the Senate and people of Rome.881 Second, 
the ritualised order whereby the emperor would be acclaimed first by the praetorians 
followed by an official investiture by the Senate, then popular acclamations, had also been 
 
879 Hdn. 8.6.1. 
880 Hdn. 8.8.1, 8.7.3; SHA Max. et Balb. 13.2-3. Herodian says the soldiers disapproved of the noble birth of the 
emperors; although Balbinus was a patrician, Pupienus was more likely a novus homo who had received 
patrician status during his lifetime. It is more likely that the soldiers were unhappy that the emperors were 
chosen from within Rome’s traditional elites, rather than nit-picking on birth as such. See Whittaker (1970) 
301, n.2 for details on the lineage of Pupienus, Balbinus (and) Gordian III. 
881 Hdn. 8.7.4-6. Still, Pupienus was astute enough to distribute a generous donativum.  
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altered. Instead of being the first group to have the opportunity to offer their acclamations, 
they were now the last. Finally, the arrival of a new German bodyguard for the co-emperors 
posed a real threat. German tribes had sent representatives to accompany Pupienus on his 
way back to Rome in appreciation of his able governance of the province years earlier. The 
new bodyguard was distinct, both ethnically and spatially from the praetorians, and the 
soldiers took the presence of an independent military force as a hostile gesture.882  
 
These developments raised questions as to what role the Guard would play in the new 
political environment. If the Senate could legitimise an emperor without the explicit 
approval of the military, and if a regime could rely on another, separate elite force as their 
repressive (and defensive) capacity, it was unclear how the Praetorian Guard could retain 
their independence or power as the dominant political actor in the city, especially since 
both factors were interlinked. Certainly, at least some praetorians viewed the changes as a 
zero-sum equation: Herodian notes that the soldiers explicitly recognised the parallel 
between their current circumstances and 193CE when Severus cashiered and replaced the 
entire Guard.883 Aside from the threat posed to the praetorian collective, the Illyrian troops 
who had stood behind their Thracian emperor were threatened by a new urban consensus 
that would marginalise their own newly politicised identity and relegate them once again to 
the empire’s periphery. Many of these troops had marched with Maximinus against the new 
regime and watched as Legio II Parthica mutinied and killed their commander, just as they 
themselves had killed Alexander. The return of these contingents to Rome after Pupienus’ 
victory may have bolstered the collective identity and solidarity of a Guard that may have 
acquiesced to the new regime given that their former commander was dead and his forces 
defeated. At the same time, the Guard had gradually expanded its role as a political actor. 
They did not just see themselves as the repressive capacity of a regime. They also viewed 
themselves as playing a crucial role in setting and maintaining suitable imperial policy (and 
behaviour), and perhaps saw themselves as the most qualified to decide who was fit to be 
emperor in a military monarchy. The fact that their issues with Pupienus and Balbinus were 
not restricted to their potential policies or perceived lack of benefits, but their background 
and sources of support show that for the praetorian collective, any emperor who was not 
 
882 The Germans had quarters outside the city: SHA Max. et Balb. 14.8; Hdn. 8.6.6. 
883 Hdn. 8.8.2. 
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beholden to the unit, their identity or guidelines was unacceptable.  It was these 
considerations that prompted the Guard to launch a counter-revolution.  
 
Irrespective of the immediate situation, the Guard still remained in a strong position despite 
their relative social isolation from the rest of the city. As noted earlier in the chapter, in 
order for a revolutionary situation to become a revolutionary outcome, a regime needs to 
neutralise troops loyal to the old regime, either through negotiation or by force.884 Yet 
Pupienus and Balbinus neither attempted to negotiate favourable terms nor did they have 
the capacity at that time to subdue the Guard by other means. Instead, with the civil war 
out of the way, a rivalry sprang up between the co-emperors. The German bodyguard had 
been able to thwart some potential opportunities, but two emperors at variance provided 
an opening.885 As with the assassination of Commodus, the relaxed festival atmosphere of 
the Capitoline Games was used as a cover for a coup d’état. Whilst the streets were empty, 
praetorians entered the imperial palace and attacked the two emperors, whose recent 
antagonism meant that Balbinus refused to send the German contingent to his colleague, 
assuming it was a ploy to snatch sole power. While they were still arguing via messenger, 
the praetorians seized both men and hauled them from the palace, dragged them through 
the city towards their camp, subjecting them to degradation, insults, and mutilation, before 
eventually killing both men in the street to avoid a confrontation with the advancing 
German corps.886  
 
This was a public performance of traditional military justice and a reconfirmation of the 
Guard’s power. Soldiers had previously attacked emperors in private settings, but as with 
the assassination of Commodus, they were not acts of political contention per se but 
internal coups. Although the praetorians administered public justice to Elagabalus’ body, he 
was executed within the confines of the praetorian camp in what was a semi-public act of 
military justice for a soldier audience. It is possible that Pupienus and Balbinus were 
supposed to meet a similarly ignominious end inside the praetorian castra, but the threat of 
 
884 Tilly (2006) 161. 
885 SHA Max. et Balb. 13.5-14.2; Hdn. 8.8.4. 
886 Hdn. 8.8.6; SHA Max. et Balb. 14.5-6. Aur. Vict. Caes. 27.6 and Eutr. 9.2, however, state that Pupienus and 
Balbinus were killed in the palace. 
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the German bodyguard required improvisation. Then again, the mutilation and execution of 
both men in the street echoed the death of Vitellius 170 years earlier, and the public 
degradation of Cilo and others under Caracalla. As with the execution of Vitellius, the 
emperors were dragged into public space and tortured so their agony and degradation 
would be both witnessed and prolonged. Certainly, as with more intricate popular justice 
rituals, the praetorian’s goal was to implicitly legitimate the nature of their claim by framing 
the episode as an act of justice whilst simultaneously subjecting their victims to public 
infamy. Performing the executions in public demonstrated that the praetorians had nothing 
to hide; those who witnessed the violence could either object or essentially become 
complicit. The sheer brutality shown by violent specialists to acknowledged emperors would 
dissuade any individual response by members of the crowd, and given the cohesion and skill 
demonstrated by the Guard during the siege, we could assume that many ordinary people 
decided that the risks associated with dissention were simply not worth it. 
 
A political revolution had been stopped in its tracks.  The praetorian’s public claim against 
Pupienus and Balbinus was a delegitimating device, not just against Balbinus and Pupienus 
but the new regime they represented. In 68CE, the Senate declared Galba emperor whenteh 
Guard agreed to abandon Nero in return for a donative but when this was not paid, the 
praetorians declared for Otho and Galba was murdered. What happened in 238CE bore 
some similarities. The Senate had reassumed, and indeed stretched its long-dormant 
powers, but the Guard quickly reclaimed its position as legitimators and delegitimators 
based around diagnostic framing that attributed responsibility to the co-emperors who 
became the focus for their collective claim. This attribution took the form of a public 
statement of legitimation that involved the construction of an injustice action frame 
separate from the framing that had mobilised the wider public. Pupienus and Balbinus may 
not have done anything concrete to warrant a tyrant’s death, but to the soldiers, they were 
symbols of a senatorial tyranny that threatened their identity and political position. In this 
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The strength of military identities was a crucial factor in driving praetorian violence in 
238CE. To be sure, the senatorial political revolution and the body’s alliance with a 
population that had been long hostile towards the force were substantial threats to the 
Guard’s dominant position, but at the same time, their firmly held identity shaped their 
reaction to the threats posed by a mobilised city. A collective praetorian identity was 
reinforced by their profession, privilege, and close spatial and social proximity to each other. 
In many respects, their lived experience mirrored that of their antagonists who also lived 
and worked together in close conditions, and like their opposition, a distinct identity 
allowed the Guard to project power and provided them with the ability to demand rights in 
the name of the group. It did, however, make it difficult for them to incorporate new 
identities or adapt to a changing political climate. Fixed identities not only prevent 
adaptation and reinterpretation, they also do not fit lived experience very well.887 Legio II 
Parthica turned against Maximinus because their families in Rome were threatened by 
unfolding events, an acknowledgement that a soldier’s identity could clash with his other 
identities. Thracian, Pannonian, Illyrian and other ‘barbarian’ ethnicities within the unit 
added complexity: their families were part of Rome’s melting pot, but as soldiers, they were 
collectives within a collective. Identity was thus both complicated and fluid, but, given the 
threats emanating from multiple political actors, praetorians had little choice but remain 
united.  
 
Those who may have felt slightly cynical about their identity or viewed themselves as more 
than mere soldiers would have had to acquiesce with the opinion of those who strongly 
believed in the Guard as a powerful political actor. Susan Hekman warns that identity 
formation leads to the creation of a new political truth that becomes fixed. She adds that an 
identity that has been ‘constructed as a site of resistance is reified and fixed, stripped of 
ambiguity, fluidity and individuality.’888 The component of a collective identity that lends 
itself to action becomes more important when what the group stands for is self-relevant, 
and their security and prosperity are viewed as under threat. So, those who may not have 
ordinarily cleaved to the image of the omnipotent praetorian strongly identified with those 
 
887 Jasper and McGarry (2015) 4. 
888 Hekman (2000) 297; Jasper and McGarry (2015) 4. 
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who could remove or buffer the threat.889 The unit had already demonstrated that its 
constructions of hypermasculinity shaped its views on what was deemed acceptable 
behaviour by an emperor. Ethnic identities compelled members to support an outsider as 
emperor. Now the political and social history of the Guard dictated a collective, violent 
response to the dual threat of a hostile populace and Senate, just as they acted together in 
war against a common enemy. The civil war of 238CE, therefore, brought into stark focus 
the conflict between military and civilian collective identities as each group sought their 
own version of justice.  
 
(ii) The renegotiation of regime power dynamics 
After the public execution of Pupienus and Balbinus, the Guard’s acclamation of Gordian III 
was a move that, in theory, all the city’s political actors could compromise on. Framing their 
deed as one that recognised popular will, the praetorians announced that they had always 
supported Gordian III and had only executed men whom the people did not choose.890 In 
any case, the Guard’s initial physical possession of Gordian stymied any possible opposition: 
if the crowds attacked, the soldiers could kill the boy. With no other obvious imperial 
candidate, the status quo was better than any other alternative. Additionally, a major 
portion of Rome lay in ashes, and many had been killed, wounded, or ruined. Neither 
civilians nor soldiers could risk another outbreak of violence. There also had to be some 
agreement brokered with the Senate, given that Gordian was only thirteen and needed a 
team of advisors to help him govern. The Historia Augusta is extremely muddled, but it does 
state that peace was confirmed between the populace and the soldiers when Gordian was 
given a consulship.891 As Paul Pearson opines, a peace conference may have been held, ‘and 
it seems reasonable to suppose that high on the agenda would have been [a] repeal of the 
constitutional innovations of the rogue Senate of early 238, especially to emphasise that 
there should be just one emperor and the Senate did not have the power to appoint and 
depose emperors.’892 The former emperors were not given divi status, which suggests there 
 
889 Hogg and Adelman (2003).  
890 Hdn. 8.8.7. 
891 SHA Gord. 23.1. 
892 Pearson (2017) 220. 
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was an informal agreement made that the senatorial regime was to be henceforth 
considered as illegitimate.893 
 
The Senate had no choice but to bow to military pressure. In return, Gordian III ‘restored’ 
the body’s rights and privileges, although this would have been a symbolic gesture designed 
to defuse tensions. His new administration was comprised mainly of men who had 
participated in the rebellion (but also some of Maximinus’ former supporters), providing a 
sense of continuity. These senators and equestrians aimed to re-establish the monarchy as 
it had existed under Alexander. To that end, they sought to rectify some of the justice and 
legitimacy issues that had plagued Maximinus’ reign. Lavish spectacles resumed, the Senate 
passed legislation to suppress informers and defend the freedom of individuals and 
communities, and efforts were made to reduce the tax burden.894 Thus, as under Alexander 
and Severus, the fulfilment of certain value expectations provided legitimacy and relative 
stability despite the military rejection of an amplified popular or senatorial sovereignty. 
Realistically though, Gordian, like Alexander, could do little to control the military. Gordian’s 
response to a petition from the inhabitants of a small town in Egypt who complained of the 
depredations of soldiers is markedly different from the unequivocal condemnation of the 
same activities by the prefect of Egypt in the edict issued in the mid-second century. In the 
latter case, Gordian declined to intervene, and merely referred the matter back to the 
governor.895 
 
In terms of the urban political environment, other developments constrained opportunities 
for contention. The rise of the praetorian prefect C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus 
checked any unresolved aspects of the power struggle between the Senate and the Guard. 
Timesitheus’ talent and almost singular power provided the regime of the teenaged Gordian 
 
893 There are a few examples of damnatio memoriae carried out against Pupienus and Balbinus, but it does not 
appear to have been a systematic revision. For instance, Pupienus and Balbinus’ names were removed from 
some milestones in Cappadocia, and the victory inscription at Aquileia as well. Likewise, the honourary titles 
Pupiena and Balbina that had been included in the title of Legio I Adiutrix were erased from a milestone found 
in Odiavum in Pannonia Superior: Haegemans (2010) 232. Balbinus’ sarcophagus was not intentionally 
mutilated, an indication that the erasures were not official policy as such: Varner (2004) 204. We can speculate 
too that if Maximinus’ regime was rehabilitated, officially at least, his statue may have been returned (if it had 
been taken down) to its place in the horse guard barracks: it was still there at the time of Milvian Bridge. See 
Pearson (2017) 220. 
894 Drinkwater (2005) 33-34; SHA Gord. 23.3. 
895 For the mid-second century edict, see Pg. 98. Gordian: CIL 3.12336. 
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with solid foundations, modelled not on the policies of Maximinus, but Alexander.896 The 
closed nature of the imperial regime swung political opportunity away from the people, and 
other independent centres of power as the connection between the regime and its 
repressive capacity was re-established. As with the close partnership of Severus and his 
prefect Plautianus, the Gordian-Timesitheus regime was able to stabilise the political 
environment through renewed regime capacity and competent urban administration. In 
terms of the Guard, incursions from the Goths, and rumblings from Africa, Germany, and 
Parthia forced Gordian to campaign with his praetorians, reducing the city-based contingent 
once again to a rump of older soldiers, whom it appears did nothing overt to antagonise the 
population. As such, although Herodian’s account ends with Gordian’s sole accession, Rome 
seems to have been relatively peaceful during his six-year reign. The emperor, and by 
default his administration, was popular with Senate, soldiers, and the populace.897 
 
The simplest and most probable reason why contention quietened down, however, is simply 
exhaustion. We can view the events of 238CE as its own, smaller cycle of contention within 
the larger contentious cycle of the late second and early third centuries. Initial mobilisation 
occurred when the populace defended the temples from Maximinus. Increased information 
flows between social networks heightened political awareness. Politicised collective 
identities facilitated the effectiveness of rumour and subsequent mobilisation around the 
tenets of popular justice. Contention escalated as the people challenged the Senate, and 
new centres of power, albeit temporary, developed, convincing challengers that they were 
helping to advance the collapse of injustices, producing what was an unlikely alliance 
between elite and non-elite.898 Consequently, the massive personal and economic costs of 
the praetorian-civilian battle and the instalment of a new regime led to weariness and 
disillusionment. The participation of the lower classes in the contention of 238CE is 
referenced time and time again by Herodian, and it was those people who would have 
suffered the after-effects the most. To continue collective action at a time when sourcing 
food, shelter, and job opportunities were more pressing issues would have been counter-
productive and too risky for many ordinary people. Meanwhile, the smooth transfer of sole 
 
896 Drinkwater (2005) 34; Potter (2004) xxx. 
897 See SHA Gord. 31.4-7. 
898 Tarrow (1998) 144-146. 
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power to Gordian III and the return of political stability reduced opportunities for 
contention. The salvaging of some sense of senatorial participation renewed elite cohesion, 
whilst the deceleration of the pace of political change, a dwindling of available allies, and 
the closing of the regime around Timesitheus and other insiders proved a threat to any 
would-be challenger. 
 
The acceleration of contentious politics during 238CE reflected the rapidly changing political 
opportunity structures of that year. In such a time of uncertainty, recurrent innovation and 
frequent misapprehension among parties to contention occurred, especially in the case of 
popular challenges to power-holders. Each new round of claim-making threatened the 
interests of other political actors who seized their own opportunities, culminating in an 
attempted political revolution. Competing and increasingly politicised collective identities of 
Rome’s political actors played crucial roles in the intensification of contentious politics.  
The accession of Maximinus was a triumph of provincial, military identities, but these 
clashed with urban identities and conceptions of behavioural norms. The constructed 
contrast between soldier and civilian, ‘barbarian’ and Roman led to an outpouring of hidden 
transcripts and violent contention once an opportunity opened for resistance. In the space 
between opposing identities where only one group could emerge victorious, each claimant-
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Chapter 5: What to make of it all? The contentious cycle of 180-
238CE 
 
The riot as a contentious repertoire  
 
The events of 238CE demonstrate that urban claim-making shifted substantially during the 
fifty-year period between the reign of Commodus and the sole accession of Gordian III, from 
mostly contained contention to entirely transgressive forms of collective action. As 
collective violence emerged from, and bore the stamp of, broader patterns of contentious 
politics, the contentious cycle of the late second and early third centuries was the crucible in 
which such violence was tempered into a more permanent component of urban Roman 
repertoires.899  A confluence of endogenous and exogenous factors contributed to these 
developments. As the socio-political environment changed in response to regime type, 
political actors bargained over access and rights. Repertoires shifted towards the more 
violent end of the spectrum as negotiation processes became increasingly contentious. 
Identities became more fixed and polarised, and the emergence of new claimant-object 
pairs introduced innovation and the adaptation of previously stable repertoires. On the 
popular side of contentious politics, it was the riot that became the predominant form of 
claim-making. It is important to note that rioting was an ancient and persistent form of 
Roman collective action. They were, however, fairly infrequent despite the lurid emphasis 
that our sources often put on such encounters.900 For example, there were only four 
recorded riots in Rome between 70-221CE, but at least seven in the sixteen years between 








899 Tarrow (1993) 286. 
900 Tilly (2006) 121. 
901 See Appendix. The only recorded riot between 70-221CE that falls outside the parameters of this study is 
the food riot that occurred sometime during Antoninus Pius’ reign ( Aur. Vict. Caes. 152.9). 
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The increase in rioting can be attributed to the cycle of contention initiated by a shift in 
political opportunity structures, and increased social pressures during the reign of 
Commodus. A slowly unfolding spiral of contention ensued as each round of claim-making 
threatened the interests of some actors and provided new opportunities for others.902 A rise 
in contention was, therefore, to be expected, especially as political opportunities rapidly 
changed after the death of Alexander.  
 
Why rioting became the most dominant form of popular collective action is not necessarily 
explained by the cyclical nature of contention, but rather by three related processes: the 
declining frequency of imperial consensus rituals, the autocratic, closed and militaristic 
nature of early third century regimes, and changes in claimant-object pairs. Years before the 
current hegemony of rational-choice thought in political science, Tilly put it simply: ‘When 
faced with resistance, what did rulers do? They bargained…out a set of understandings 
concerning possible and effective means of making collective claims within the regime.’903 
 
902 Tilly (2006) 111. 
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Formerly, consensus rituals at the spectacles and imperial ceremonies were the 
performative aspects of a relationship that tolerated and privileged contained, non-violent 
contention over transgressive behaviour. However, the closing of imperial regimes, constant 
war, and the need for emperors to closely monitor the military and its interests meant that 
opportunities for urban consensus rituals declined from the beginning of the third century 
onwards. Indeed, growing beliefs that the early third century emperors were 
underperforming as leaders of Rome’s urban population were in part due to this inability to 
participate in the face-to-face communication that had long been the performative heart of 
the moral economy. For instance, Caracalla, like many emperors before him, was 
passionately devoted to his circus faction, but he did not encourage free communication 
with its audiences, and appointed freedmen to run his games instead of presiding over the 
festivities himself. Macrinus never attended the games during his brief tenure, and although 
Elagabalus built theatres and circuses, he appears to have little interest in the ritualistic 
aspects of the games.904 The Historia Augusta posits an almost certainly apocryphal story of 
Elagabalus letting snakes loose as people assembled for the games before dawn, causing 
injury and panic.905 Even if the story is false, it reflects perceptions that early third century 
emperors were unable or unwilling to devote enough time to their expected public 
responsibilities. Even Alexander, aside from his profectio and triumph ceremonies, provided 
few opportunities for the public to express their mandated consensus to him in person.  
 
Without the emperor’s frequent attendance, imperial regimes had few ways to defuse 
tension or detect criticism. Accordingly, the spectacle repertoire was loosened from its 
moorings as a site of consensus. These locations had functioned as free spaces 
intermittently over the early imperial period, but the public transcript predominated. Spatial 
and social control however, can only be sustained by continuous reinforcement, 
maintenance, and adjustment. When the ritual performance of consensus – the public 
transcript – faltered, hidden transcripts took their place. It could be argued that the 
emperors of the time did not have to be as invested in the ritualised performance of 
consensus at the games as they once were since they received practical legitimation from 
the army, but without the active participation of the emperor in regular consensus rituals, 
 
904 Caracalla: Cass. Dio 78.10.1. Elagabalus: Hdn. 5.6.6. 
905 SHA Elag. 23.2.  
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Rome’s spectacle spaces operated more as free political spaces than they did as sites of 
imperial power. These spaces associated with hidden transcripts (the Circus, streets, and 
other free spaces) became the dominant locations of contentious discourse for ordinary 
people. Thus, rather than affirming acceptance and legitimation, third century circus chants 
became an outlet for grievances instead. Of all the incidents of verbal contention at the 
spectacles recorded between the reigns of Severus and Elagabalus, virtually all were 
negative.906 The Circus Maximus had become symbolic geography, a space whose scale 
dramatised the demands made there, and as a consequence transformed the site’s political  
significance.  
 
As symbolic geography and as an intriguing microcosm of Roman contentious politics, the 
Circus embodied multiple spatialities: scale, place, networks, mobility and socio-spatial 
positionality. Where scale is primarily a measure of capacity, we can also conceptualise it as 
a relational, power-laden and contested construction that political actors could strategically 
engage with, to either legitimise or challenge existing power relations.907 Creating a sense of 
place requires assigning meaning, symbolism and power to space, that in turn provides cues 
that signal appropriate and inappropriate behaviours.908 As social constructs, places are 
dynamic, fluid, and internally diverse with permeable and contestable boundaries even 
when they express a collective cultural image.909 They are also dependent and reflective of 
the identities and memories of those who attach their own cultural input upon that 
location. Collegia, neighbourhood groups, friends, families, and racing fans were all 
networks that helped developed shared identities, and linked the private and public, hidden 
and public transcripts. Finally, unequal power relations were part and parcel of socio-spatial 
positionality, and we should view Roman positionality as a relational concept, through the 
connections and interactions people have those in different social positions.910  Where 
other places and time-spaces in Rome reproduced existing positionalities, the scale, sense of 
place, and availability of social networks at the Circus allowed the relational aspects of 
 
906 When news of Caracalla’s murder became known in Rome, crowds shouted their support for their new 
emperor Macrinus, one of the few instances during this time period where the performance of the traditional 
positive acclamatory repertoire at the shows is recorded: Hdn. 5.2.3. 
907 Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto (2008) 159. 
908 della Porta, Fabbri, and Piazza (2016) 28. 
909 Agnew (2002) 22; Gieryn (2000) 465.  
910 Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto (2008) 163. 
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positionality to function there, and its physical lay-out combined with free or cheap 
entrance and frequent race-days provided ample mobility. Together, these elements had an 
enormous impact on how contentious politics was performed on a mass scale in Rome, 
since successful political contention needs participants to simultaneously draw on the 
multiplicities of space, strengthening feelings of solidarity and identity, while also increasing 
the ease with which claim-makers could communicate, organise, act, and evade 
repression.911 
 
The socially embedded networks that generated resistance and subversion were relatively 
opaque to authorities and indispensable to sustained collective action. Over time, the 
modes of collective action attached to hidden transcripts become part of popular culture, 
and, as Scott explains, the urban riot becomes something ‘like a scenario, albeit a dangerous 
one, enacted by a large repertory company whose members know the basic plot and can 
step into the available roles. Anonymous mass action of this kind is thus entirely dependent 
on the existence of a social site for the hidden transcript, a site where social links and 
traditions can grow with a degree of autonomy from dominant elites. In its absence, nothing 
of the kind would be possible.’912 A side effect of the symbolic and practical importance of 
the Circus as a contentious space meant that performances mostly consisted of mass 
crowds, a scale that lent itself well to demonstrations and riots, and understandably, such 
forms of collective action became an established and successful way of demanding justice 
from those with greater power, access, and resources. 
 
Dwindling opportunities for consensus rituals also coincided with a growing imbalance in 
the imperial moral economy. Emperors had to find the right balance between extracting 
resources from the population and giving back enough in terms of expected social goods. 
Tangible, cooperative, and just outcomes were still expected, especially because of the 
collective burden imposed by administrations dealing with the economic impacts of war, 
inflation, corruption, and natural disaster. Even as opportunities to acclaim the emperor in 
person at Rome dwindled, the sheer number of requests by individuals and cities including 
the recording of city acclamations verbatim on inscriptions and coinage shows that the 
 
911 Tilly (2000) 144. 
912 Scott (1992) 151-2. 
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emperor was still considered to be the ultimate font of justice throughout the Empire.913 
Consequently, how the regime cleaved to entrenched expectations of justice and the 
complex conceptions that made up Roman collective identities influenced urban hidden 
transcripts, and thus the potential for mobilisation and resistance. 
 
Secondly, the long-term effects of military autocracy are apparent in the unfolding events of 
238CE. Severus’ decision to promote the army at the expense of the Senate set a pattern. 
Dio blamed the emperor for ‘making the city turbulent through the presence of so many 
troops and for burdening the State by his excessive expenditures of money, and most of all, 
for placing his hope of safety in the strength of his army rather than in the goodwill (eunoia) 
of his associates.’914 The emperor’s preference for a closed regime of loyal supporters, and 
the continued promotion of equestrian administrative posts alienated and divided the 
Roman elite. This process had its origins in Commodus’ closed regime and policy of 
senatorial repression, but Severus entrenched these divisions, and the army’s ability to 
dominate Roman politics created insecurity and fear. Given the state of the urban political 
environment at the time of Gordian III’s accession, Marcus Aurelius’ maxim that subjects 
bound to their emperor through eunoia would not rebel unless driven to by ‘violent, 
arrogant treatment’ seems startlingly insightful.915 The supremacy of the military affected 
which claimant-object pairs and repertoires would also dominate contentious urban politics. 
When the public transcript held sway, the performative aspects of the emperor-people 
relationship occupied centre stage. However, as the Praetorian Guard assumed greater 
powers, their relationship with the people became just as important, if not more so, than 
the usual regime-subject pair that formed the basis of almost all previous contention in the 
city. When emperor-subject claim-making made up most contention, prevailing contentious 
performances were inextricably bound to the expectations and obligations inherent in the 
imperial moral economy. Soldiers, on the other hand, had no set obligations towards the 
population, and standard verbal performances could not and did not work against an object 
that regularly transgressed the boundaries of acceptable urban behaviour. The hardening of 
boundaries and social space caused polarisation between the two groups, and as civilian 
 
913 Roueché (1984) 185-6; Hekster (2008) 62. 
914 Cass. Dio 75.2.3. See also the Maecenas speech that references these very concerns: 52.19.1-3, 52.33.3. 
915 Hdn. 1.4.4-5.  
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and military identities became increasingly more politicised, the people made more 
frequent claims against the troops as a political actor.  
 
Furthermore, the political environment had become more violent and more contentious 
because of the military’s takeover as primary legitimators and de-legitimators. From a 
functional perspective, repertoires of contention correspond to the overall political and 
institutional circumstances.916 Since the assassination of Commodus, only Severus had died 
a natural death. From that point, each transition was a violent one, almost always aided by 
the praetorians or the broader army. Limited opportunities to directly influence the formal 
political sphere through traditional consensus rituals meant that individuals and 
communities were pushed more towards direct action. As repertoires and collective action 
frames can be interpreted as consolidated legitimating and de-legitimating strategies, their 
change over time reflects changes in the objects of legitimacy, as well as changes in the 
patterns of legitimation.917 The increase of riots can be linked to the military’s violent 
legitimation methods, and the shift towards the Guard as a primary legitimator, drawing 
popular action away from an emperor to his protectors instead. To put it another way, the 
intensity of collective violence was dependent on the relationship between the Guard as 
violent specialists, the regime and its subjects.918 
 
Competition for scarce resources and regime tolerance of the unjust and violent behaviour 
of well-equipped soldiers elicited a corresponding response from those victimised. 
Maximinus was the third emperor in less than forty years to double the pay of praetorians, 
and as he debased the coinage and had his agents ruthlessly enforce tax collections and 
confiscations, soldiers became the obvious target for claims against the regime and its 
policies. Thus, in the long-term, popular violent collective action was predicated on the way 
the Roman political system apportioned power and responded to grievances. One additional 
factor was also in play during 238CE: a civil war scenario raised the stakes as to who would 
win or lose from the new power structure. Violence rose accordingly, but the conflict that 
broke out between soldiers and civilians in 238CE was on a much larger scale in terms of 
 
916 Haunss (2007) 163.  
917 Haunss (2007) 156-172. 
918 Tilly (2006) 121. 
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spatial diffusion, intensity, organisation, and numbers than previous encounters. Three 
processes were at least partially responsible for the scale shift. The brokerage work of 
political entrepreneurs in activating, connecting, and representing the interests of social 
groups aided the widening of social space between opposing groups, and the gravitation of 
previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward extremes. The work of Gallicanus, 
competing senatorial factions, individual praetorians and local community leaders as 
entrepreneurs undoubtedly played a role in the escalation of contention between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ groups. As a result of such brokerage, polarisation, politicisation and uncertainty rose 
across boundaries, as those on either side possessed less reliable information concerning 
the possible actions on the other side.919  
 
Moreover, the collective identities that induced mass mobilisation were strong enough to 
force people to take substantial risks against better-resourced opponents. The framing of 
Maximinus as the ‘barbarian’ Other, and the unjust methods of his regime and those before 
him produced a nationalist frame that justified and legitimised transgressive forms of 
contention. It is significant that the enactment of popular justice rituals also increased 
alongside episodes of rioting. Both often occurred at the same time and in the same spaces, 
demonstrating that the same master frames were mobilising different forms of behaviour 
by the same people. Repertoires and space were also closely interlinked, and where claim-
making occurred affected the probability and intensity of collective violence. The 
breakdown of the public transcript opened up contentious space elsewhere – temples, the 
praetorian castra, the Curia, the streets, and people’s homes and neighbourhoods. As 
claimants employed new sites of contention, the importance of place, scale, networks, and 
socio-spatial positionality was elevated.920 Scale and place worked together. The high walls 
of the praetorian camp, and the symbolic importance of temples, and other sites 
necessitated the scaling-up of violence and participant numbers to ensure success. Scaling 
of collective action frames also influenced violence levels. The nationalistic response to 
Maximinus made contention a city-wide claim, which meant that more people got involved 
and were prepared to push the boundaries further than they may have for a more specific 
claim. Also, the soldiers and civilians who were involved in the urban violence of 238CE 
 
919 Tilly (2006) 127, 130-131. 
920 Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto (2008) 157-172. 
  266 
were defending their homes, that is, the spatial representation of their lived experience and 
identity. The inclusion of ‘private’ space raised the stakes for participants, and so the scale 
of contentious activity.  
 
Finally, social networks and positionality worked synergistically to increase the chances that 
violence would occur. Rumour and unofficial communication had repeatedly played a 
primary role in mobilising people for claim-making. Where people within these networks 
positioned themselves in terms of social hierarchy, collective identity, and lived experience 
framed their ontological and epistemological stance.921 For the ‘lower classes’ (Herodian’s 
dêmotai), violence and hardship were a more regular feature of their lived experience than 
other groups. With limited access to the corridors of power and a greater vulnerability to 
regime repression, social positionality provided a starting point for action as people will, 
when pushed, employ the tools and performances used against themselves. Of course, who 
was the claimant and who was the object also influenced behavioural choices. Chanted 
acclamations or petitions, for example, were not going to work on praetorians, but rioting 
was an effective way to apply pressure to a small number of senators or well-armed 
soldiers. The multiplicities of space, though, augmented the latent potential for violence, as 
these new locations for contention became spatial representations of collective identities 
now polarised and politicised. 
 
238CE: evidence of a popular social movement? 
 
A cyclical theory of political contention explains the almost unprecedented scale of urban 
violence in 238CE. As a protest cycle progresses, contentious activity increases as conflict 
heightens across the social system, and collective action diffuses into different spaces, social 
groups, and forms. Claims made by the populace, Senate, and soldiers during that year all 
confirmed that social and spatial diffusion occurred, alongside intensified political 
interactions between both established and new political actors. We can, though, delve 
deeper into this form of analysis. Within the field of contentious politics, a sizeable 
proportion of the literature focuses on the formation and nature of social movements. If we 
refer back to the discussion in Chapter One, social movements are collective challenges by 
 
921 Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto (2008) 163. 
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people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites and 
authorities. As social movements usually encompass people who lack access to the formal 
political sphere (if they had access, there would be no need to launch challenges 
repeatedly), contention is often disruptive as claimants seek to assert the rights of ordinary 
people to hold power and limit the actions of power-holders.922 
 
Although social movement analysis is a modern concept well suited to the multi-national, 
mass-media environment of today, the close relationship between protest cycles and 
movement formation during the phase of intense collective activity of 238CE makes it a 
useful tool to analyse the structural components of that year’s events as they unfolded. 
According to Tilly and Tarrow, contentious politics assumes the form of a social movement 
only in the presence of six indicators: ‘a plurality of independent political centres; a degree 
of opening of the political systems to the entry of new actors; unstable alliances; the 
availability of influential allies to support claims originating outside the system; a level of 
repression that is not too high; and decisive changes provoked by earlier cycles of 
mobilisation.’923 These six indicators were undoubtedly present by the beginning of 238CE. 
Maximinus’ accession added new political actors and centres of power to the political stage. 
The succession of popular contentious performances demonstrating the population’s unity, 
numbers, and commitment were evidence of a sustained challenge to powerholders by 
those excluded from the corridors of power. Meanwhile, the emperor’s prolonged absence 
from the capital and his unpopular administrative policies provided an opening for new 
actors and potential alliances. Finally, the very regime that Maximinus embodied was an 
almost natural culmination of the military-centric policies of his predecessors. Similarly, the 
sequence of that year’s events also corresponds to the four stages of social movements 
identified by Herbert Blumer. The ‘social ferment’ stage corresponds with the widespread 
discontent that marked the initial years of Maximinus’ reign, followed by a ‘popular 
excitement’ stage whereby discontent became focalised and collective, recognisable in the 
organised temple demonstrations. The next stage, ‘formalisation,’ describes senatorial 
claim-making and the organised collective violence that resulted from brokerage between 
elite and non-elite. The fourth stage, ‘decline,’ was a combination of praetorian repression, 
 
922 Tilly (2006) 182. 
923 Tilly and Tarrow (2015) 11; Caruso (2015) 3. 
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exhaustion, and even feelings of partial success since the sole rule of Gordian III was 
peacefully backed by all parties. 924 
 
Maximinus’ regime, therefore, produced a stream of issues, events, and governmental 
actions around which a social movement could rise.925 The events of 238CE occurred 
because collectively, an aggrieved urban population recognised and collectively defined its 
situation as unjust and susceptible to change through group action.926 Extant social 
networks that drew on legitimate, collective action frames were able to be sustained even 
during contact with powerful opposition. Actors seized political opportunities to launch 
claims, and perhaps most importantly, collective identities had become highly politicised 
and polarised. The spiralling effects of constant regime change, conflicting legitimacy claims, 
a loosening of the emperor-plebs relationship, identity clashes, and new claimant-object 
pairings brokered a short-lived social movement born of the identities and solidarities that 
had been coalescing and strengthening over the past decades of contentious politics. As 
Alberto Melucci articulates, conflict is key, as it forms the basis for the consolidation of 
collective solidarity, rather than shared interests.927 In other words, the foundations of 
cultural framing and identity, grievance and opportunity, and collective memory meant the 
timing was right for a sustained campaign of popular claim-making.  
 
Although political opportunity structures are a primary driver of protest cycles, I have also 
argued that the mobilising functions of collective identities had a significant effect on 
Roman contention. During a protest cycle, people see themselves as ‘part of a broad and 
rapidly expanding political-cultural community fighting the same fight on a number of 
related fronts.’928 At the height of a protest cycle, a community emerges where previously 
disparate groups form links or alliances with each other. To this end, social movements are 
also born in communities with associational and informal networks. Melucci sees social 
movements as networks of small groups that share a common culture and collective 
 
924 Blumer (1969). Since his early work, scholars have refined and renamed these stages but the underlying 
themes have remained relatively constant. Today, the four social movement stages are known as: emergence, 
coalescence, bureaucratisation, and decline. See Christiansen (2009) 1-3.  
925 Tilly (2006) 186. 
926 McAdam (1982) 48-49. 
927 Melucci (1995) 47-48. 
928 McAdam (1995) 236. 
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identity. Likewise, Mario Diani argues that social movements should be defined as a 
network of informal interactions between people engaged in a political or cultural conflict 
on the basis of a shared collective identity.929 The notion that social movements emerge in 
response to the culture of a protest cycle, rather than just political opportunities is 
significant, as it provides further insight as to why Rome’s urban population mobilised in 
such numbers at that specific point in time. It was not just because political opportunities 
opened up, but also because communities and identities had formed around long-term 
socio-political grievances. Those communities, in turn, provided organisational and tactical 
opportunities for risky claim-making. The community basis of social movement theory also 
explains why contention dwindled after the praetorians executed Pupienus and Balbinus, 
since the community forged in the early months of 238CE as Senate and people worked 
together to reshape the political environment essentially lost its place at the bargaining 
table. Rioting as a repertoire created political space when dealing with the Senate, but only 
attrition resulted when dealing with the Praetorian Guard.930 
 
The social movement of 238CE can be defined, then, as a collective, sustained struggle by 
ordinary people against the emperor, Senate and finally, the Praetorian Guard. Their aim 
was justice in its varied fashionings: access to the political stage, an acknowledgement that 
they were practical rather than theoretical members of the polity, and redress for the 
injustice of the Guard’s political and social behaviour. All these claims related to broader 
values and debates that had existed much longer than the movement itself.931 Social 
movements and collective violence are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the ability of 
the masses to refuse obedience and to physically resist the authorities was and will always 
be a powerful disruptive mechanism. The power of a social movement like the one that 
briefly flourished in 238CE was its ability to exercise leverage through violent mobilisation 
and by the withdrawal of the cooperation rendered in usual socio-political exchanges.932 
Although almost every definition of a social movement reflects the view that it is 
intrinsically bound to social change, popular claims were not oriented at any real drastic 
 
929 Melucci (1984) 829; Diani (1992) 13; Staggenborg (1998) 181-2. 
930 Staggenborg (1998) 183. 
931 See Klandermans and van Stekelenburg (2013) for a good discussion on the link between social movements 
and grievances. 
932 Fox Piven (2016) 25-26.  
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change. Contention was more about reasserting dormant popular rights and advocacy for 
minor change; in other words, a reformative type of social movement.933  
 
The dividing of Rome’s population into politicised collectives based on ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
categories also had spinoff effects. After the fire, Herodian describes criminals and the 
lower class (δημοτῶν) mixing with soldiers to loot the houses of the wealthy.934 The 
cooperation of those who had very recently been trying to kill each other may seem 
unfathomable, but there was an enormous socio-economic gap between Rome’s have and 
have-nots. Soldiers had also spent years taking what they wanted from Rome’s inhabitants; 
here was an opportunity for the have-nots to ape the behaviour of those they despised 
against a common enemy. As we have seen with the enduring nature of popular justice 
rituals, polarisation between rich and poor in Rome was not new. There are numerous 
examples of elite sneers at the speech and customs of the lower classes, although perhaps 
unsurprisingly, far fewer examples in our sources of the poor attacking the symbols and 
behaviour of the elite.935  It is not inconceivable that, after years of economic hardship, the 
chaos created by the fire and prolonged street battle provided an opportunity for those who 
did not have wealth or privilege to effect revenge against those who represented acceptable 
notions of inequality, and thus injustice. The coming together of pleb, soldier, and criminal 
as looters may have been a symptom of the breakdown in norms and relationships that 
polarisation causes, but the act itself was not directly tied to the identities and aims of the 
wider social movement.936 
 
The role of collective identity and framing in early 3rd century CE contention 
 
 Collective identity, justice framing, rumour, and shifting claimant-object relationships were 
all integral components of the transgressive contention of 238CE, but, if we step back and 
examine the broader context, the year’s events reflected the evolution of contentious 
 
933 David Aberle (1966) described four types of social movement including: alterative, redemptive, reformative, 
and revolutionary social movements, based upon what the movement is attempting to change and how much 
change is being advocated. 
934 Hdn. 7.12.7. 
935 E.g. Amm. Mar. 28.4.30. For an excellent discussion of the fear and hostility of Roman elites towards ‘lower-
class’ language and customs, see O’Neill (2001). 
936 Simiti (2016) 133. 
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performances since the late second century. The cumulative effect of diffusion, extension, 
imitation, and reaction among political actors generated collective action frames. 
Innovation on the fringes of established repertoires was tested, information flows and 
interaction increased, and new centres of power arose. As the cycle widened, opportunities 
opened for challengers to make demands that may have seemed foolhardy in earlier years; 
when previously had the people successfully forced the appointment of their own imperial 
candidate without support from other quarters?  Indeed, as Tarrow points out, ‘the 
widening logic of collective action leads to outcomes in the sphere of institutional politics, 
where the challengers who began the cycle have less and less leverage over its 
outcomes.’937 It may have been court insiders and senators who initiated the contentious 
cycle of the late second-early third century, but in 238CE, those same actors had little 
influence or control over how, where, and who performed contentious politics. 
 
Certainly, the role of framing processes was more acute in 238CE than in earlier years. The 
rise of a so-called Thracian to the imperial purple delineated the line between an acceptably 
Roman emperor and one not Roman enough. Macrinus may have been a mere equestrian, 
and Elagabalus’ effeminate self-presentation may have placed him along the abnormal and 
‘bad’ end of the spectrum of Roman masculinities, but in the case of Maximinus, his 
professional status as a common soldier, and perceived barbarian Otherness clashed with 
the cultural identities of Rome’s urban population in large part because of the polarisation 
and politicisation of civilian-military identities over previous decades. As the hidden 
transcripts of the early third century suggest, the populace had moved from feeling like 
insiders to a group estranged from the political institutions, values, and leaders who were 
meant to represent them.938 Fergus Millar’s famous adagium: ‘the emperor was what the 
emperor did’ was still clearly applicable to the third-century political environment.939 In this 
light, the popularity of Gordian III can be seen as symptomatic of a collective yearning for 
the good old days when dynastic claimants cultivated the eunoia of their subjects. 
Unfortunately for Rome’s inhabitants, senator and tradesman alike, emperors were now too 
dependent on military support, and too occupied with multiple crises elsewhere. Indeed, it 
 
937 Tarrow (1998) 24. 
938 Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and Sniderman (1975) 3. 
939 Millar (1992) 6. 
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is notable that, despite Rome being the epicentre of the collective violence of August of 
238CE, it was the empire’s peripheries that provided the spark for the conflict. As outlined 
in Chapter Two, it was uncertainty and instability generated from a combination of 
endogenous and exogenous factors that provided opportunities for claim-making as such 
pressures threatened established political actors, leading to increased competition for 
political space.  
 
The Antonine Plague had a significant impact, not just on Rome’s populace, but on the 
wider Empire. Its economic and demographic effects in part fuelled a rise in insurrection and 
instability on Rome’s borderlands as the third century progressed. The endogenous results 
of these processes: a decrease in regime capacity, the formation of hostile group identities, 
and collective action framing, contributed to increased conflict among urban actors. Of 
course, internal and external factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive: both capacity 
and opportunity suggest the existence of a climate-conflict relationship. Certainly food 
supply issues, inflation, and natural disaster affected both the fiscal capacity of imperial 
regimes and the wealth of ordinary people, especially in contrast to favoured groups like the 
praetorians.940 Overall, however, the confluence of endogenous and exogenous factors 
explains how a cycle of contention began, and why there was such a competitive escalation 












940 Couttenier and Soubeyran (2015) 25. For modern empirical evidence, see 26-27. 
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Conclusion 
 
In his mid-third-century letter to Demetrianus, Cyprian of Carthage bewailed the times, 
claiming that as ‘wars continue to be even more frequent, sterility and hunger heighten 
disquiet, ghastly illness ravages men’s health, the human race is devastated by rampaging 
decay.’941 His pessimistic tone matched the earlier warnings of Dio and Herodian that the 
Empire had never faced so many systemic calamities. At the same time, both historians 
maintained that two of the most severe instances of mass violence in Rome were sparked 
by ‘small causes.’942 So, was it relatively trivial endogenous issues or wider exogenous 
factors that caused an escalation of conflict, and a breakdown in imperial authority and 
relations between Rome’s main political actors? Hopefully, as I have made clear, the answer 
was both. Of course, whether an issue or grievance was really a small matter or something 
more substantial is a question of perspective and relativity. For those who lived in Rome 
between 180-283CE, the issues facing them were grave enough to generate a substantial 
upswing in collective action compared to previous decades.  
 
The aim of this study was to quantify the structures, processes and mechanisms that 
facilitated the escalation of collective action in Rome using contentious politics theory. The 
arbitrary, and (for the non-elite) restrictive nature of imperial politics meant that claim-
making by Roman political actors relied primarily on three key mechanisms of political 
contention: political opportunity structures, contentious repertoires, and the formation of 
collective identities and frames. Whether actors mobilised successfully for contentious 
purposes was dependant on the opening up or closing of political opportunity structures. 
Whether they mobilised at all was dependant not merely on grievances, but on how 
situations and issues could be framed as unjust and liable to change.943 Notably,  
each contentious performance, and the interactions and bargains struck as a result, 




941 Cyprian: Ad Dem. 253, 255. 
942 Hdn. 7.4.1; Cass. Dio 80.2.3. 
943 Van Stekelenburg and Klanderm (2009) 28. 
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Political opportunity structures were impacted by the closing of imperial regimes to all but a 
few insiders; through an increasing division between elites and emperors, and because of 
rising instability due to frequent regime transitions. Repression and pace of change in each 
category provided multiple opportunities for political actors to make claims against the 
government. The impact of exogenous factors on political opportunity structures should not 
be underestimated. Both the short and long term demographic effects of the Antonine 
Plague along with the economic burden of persistent war made it harder for emperors to 
balance the interests of Rome’s main political actors. As a consequence, the uncertainty 
that resulted from the inability of a regime to deal with simultaneous issues undermined 
imperial authority, allowing political space for claim-making, and increased competition 
between actors.944 Learned modes of communication and consensus, and legitimacy claims 
were the heart of the relationship between the emperor, urban plebs, Praetorian Guard, 
and Senate. Intergroup power relations had never been symmetrical, but as the degree of 
asymmetry changed, relations between the groups – Flaig’s parallelogram – became a 
source of intense conflict and competition. Likewise, legitimacy claims functioned best when 
all actors accepted them and their own role in upholding the political structure. But, when 
some political actors increased their power and independence, they adapted their own 
conceptions from whence legitimacy was founded. Also, as successive emperors become 
younger and unable to prove their military and political prowess before ascending the 
throne, they could be viewed as mere figureheads for these constituencies, providing an 
ever less convincing appearance of dynastic continuity and legitimacy.945 
 
These coded cultural modes provided the basis for a cycle of contention. This cycle was 
initiated by early risers under Commodus as regime change, food shortages, plague, elite 
repression and the rising prominence of the Praetorian Guard shifted political opportunity 
structures, allowing mobilisation around a variety of grievances held by different groups. 
The turmoil of 193CE introduced a new conflict between popular conceptions of justice and 
legitimacy and the flexing of an augmented state capacity that led to diffusion and 
innovation of contentious performances. Severus re-established stability, and constrained 
contention through a careful cultivation of multiple legitimacy claims, moral economy, and 
 
944 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2002) 66. 
945 Kemezis (2016) 370-371. 
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state capacity. His reliance, however, on the military, and his disavowal of the discursive and 
institutional structures by which traditional power relations had been channelled, controlled 
and disguised sowed the seeds for conflict in the absence of strong leadership.946 His son 
Caracalla consequently was unable to maintain any remaining semblance of balance among 
Rome’s political actors. As the imperial regime became an overt military monarchy, 
traditional hierarchies, norms and identities were threatened, and as a result, became more 
salient in contentious politics. 
 
 The politicisation of civilian and military collective identities had its roots in the burgeoning 
‘us’ vs ‘them’ boundaries between civilians and soldiers that was exacerbated by praetorian 
privilege. The injustice of an unequal distribution of resources that codified the imperial 
moral economy framed these developments as unjust for ordinary people and worth 
contending against. For the praetorians whose power resided in their close 
interdependency with the emperor, Elagabalus’ behaviour impacted their own identities, 
pushing the unit to evolve from a specific-issue political actor to a moral arbiter capable of 
not just merely toppling a regime, but de-legitimising it as well. What justice meant to 
different people was, thus, complex. John Lonsdale articulates the nub of the matter, 
arguing that injustice is as much moral as material fact: ‘moral economies are stubbornly 
disjunctive, historical bargains between informed people, not the theoretical construct of a 
trained mind. […] Inventively remembered rights show what is at stake.’947 Pietas was a 
concept that articulated the link between justice and moral economy; eunoia was the result 
when it all functioned well. The idea that justice, morality and collective memory were all 
interwoven is verified by the outbursts of popular justice in the later stages of the protest 
cycle. When popular justice rituals were exacted upon symbols or even members of imperial 
regimes, they were effectively a public challenge to state institutions that left injustice 
unpunished. Citizens therefore referenced the moral practices and moral insecurity that 
remained inside their communities, and in so doing, highlighted the growing gap between 
the regime’s conception of justice, and that of its constituents.948  
 
946 Ando (2012) 46. 
947 Lonsdale (1992) 352. 
948 Grazioli and Di Pierro (2016) 188-189, 194. 
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Alexander’s ‘return’ to a more traditional and cooperative model of governance validated 
and strengthened urban collective identities threatened by a military dictatorship, yet his 
reconstruction of political stability was laid bare by the exigencies of war. A vulnerable 
Empire needed a victorious general, and it was provincial military identities that helped 
elevate the first common soldier and so-called barbarian to the imperial throne.  
Conflicting notions of military, civilian, ‘barbarian’ and ‘Roman’ identities led to an 
outpouring of hidden transcripts and violent contention as control of Rome’s political 
system became a zero-sum game for plebs, soldiers, and Senate. The events of 238CE 
should be seen, therefore, not as a clear break with the past, but as an almost inevitable 
result of longer-term constructions and perceptions of legitimacy, moral economy, identity 
and collective action frames. On a purely chronological basis, then, the progression of a 
contentious cycle between 180-238CE is clear. The initial mobilisation of one constituency 
encouraged others to mobilise to make claims. Over a half-century, the process of diffusion 
into new spatial and social spaces and innovative forms of violence progressed. A 
subsequent creation and modification of collective action frames and discourses, and 
increased interaction between challengers and authorities followed. Finally, institutionally 
oriented activism and extreme political violence predominated, after which political 
opportunities reduced as the Guard assumed effective control of the city’s political 
environment, leading to containment and de-escalation.  
 
The breadth of participants and the reactions of the elites and other groups to each wave of 
claim-making was the lever that either constrained or facilitated further contention. Both 
Severus and Alexander were able to mostly limit contention to contained, non-transgressive 
formats (the riot of 223CE excepted). Their policies were, however, closely tied to their own 
persona: it is significant that despite the continuity of what was a robust political structure, 
grievances and opportunities were closely intertwined with each political actor’s views of an 
individual emperor. Regime transitions cleared the playing field so to speak, and each new 
incumbent had to emphasise or construct legitimacy claims by which he could claim a 
universal consensus. I am not saying this was an arbitrary system – far from it – but the 
increasing succession of coup d’états, violence, and conflict reveals the transitory nature of 
imperial authority from the late second-century onwards. To put all these strands together, 
the spiralling effects of constant regime change, conflicting legitimacy claims, polarisation 
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and politicisation of urban collective identities, and new claimant-object pairings fuelled 
grievances and opportunity, and framing and identity processes that brokered a short-lived 
social movement born of the identities and solidarities that had been forming and 
strengthening over the past decades of contentious politics. 
 
Aligned with the weakening of traditional power centres (and the rise of others) during the 
late second and early third century protest cycle, the contentious politics theories employed 
in this study also offer further insight into the broader mechanisms and structures that 
propelled these processes. This study has identified key Roman repertoires that indicate a 
remarkable continuity and flexibility of urban contentious performances. Tarrow observed 
that repertoires are not simply ways of doing things, but learned cultural creations that 
result from the history of struggle, and it is contentious cycles that are the crucibles in which 
‘moments of madness’ are tempered into the permanent tools of a society's repertoire of 
contention.949 The power of massed crowds and aural displays had long been at the heart of 
popular Roman political participation. Acclamations, popular justice rituals, and contention 
at the spectacles all had antecedents in the Republican past, and all three forms would 
continue to be employed by various groups in later periods. The contention that intensified 
in Rome from the time of Commodus set patterns of conduct that worked profound 
damage, not just in the capital city but in nearly every part of the empire.950 For example, 
the rituals of popular justice that characterised the urban life of the Roman Empire in the 
fourth and fifth centuries CE shared characteristics with the punishment meted out to 
Cleander, Elagabalus, and various members of imperial administrations.951 Those rituals 
along with the destruction of statues and other symbols of imperial authority retained 
virtually the same forms as the popular justice meted out to Vitellius in 69CE and Republican 
politicians decades earlier. We can also draw clear parallels between the political role of the 
circus factions in Byzantium/Constantinople and the contentious performances launched at 
Rome’s spectacle spaces in earlier centuries. Indeed, just as in Rome, the role of the 
hippodrome as a medium for face-to-face communication between the people and emperor 
 
949 Tarrow (1996) 592; Tarrow (1993)284. 
950 Ando (2012) 224. 
951 See Magalhães de Oliveira (2012). 
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made the space a focus of imperial politics in the fifth and sixth centuries, and its factions 
came to hold a comparable status to the military and the clergy as regime legitimators.952  
 
The continuity of key performances underlines how important and enduring cultural norms 
and learned modes of behaviour were despite substantial social and political change. Thus, 
the identification and quantification of Roman repertoires allows us to reassert the primacy 
of material conditions, shared identities and beliefs, social relations, memories and 
experiences, collective interaction, and the reordering of power over mere reconstructions 
of historical events; these are the building blocks that ensured the continuity and flexibility 
of Roman modes of contention. As Roman regimes became more autocratic and repressive, 
rioting remained a useful option to contend against the state in the absence of alternative 
methods for the construction of a social consensus. As with other repertoires, rioting had 
long been a well-established, if relatively rare, method of popular claim-making, but the 
intensified relationship between the urban populace and the Guard in the early third 
century elevated the riot as a contentious performance. Consequently, when the frequency 
of imperial consensus rituals declined, this repertoire had a distinct advantage over more 
contained methods, providing a successful template for future political actors to follow.  
 
Likewise, the formation and politicisation of collective identities was vital in packaging 
issues in a way that facilitated contention. The more politicised identities were, the better 
they functioned as structures through which contention could occur. In the case of the 
Praetorian Guard, their political identity coalesced around lived experience and their 
evolving role as regime legitimators. For the urban plebs, justice framing was a way to 
articulate and interpret events that inspired and legitimated collective action. And as social 
space between soldiers and civilians broadened, each side’s identities became oppositional. 
The cumulative effect of corruption, a closed autocratic regime, repression, and badly 
behaved soldiers undermined the concept that the emperor was the font of justice and 
authority in the empire. When legitimacy claims faltered and opportunities opened, 
resistance in the form of hidden transcripts replaced contained forms of contention; a 
development that underlines how important rumour, conspiracy theories, and unofficial 
 
952 See Cameron (1976); Main (2013) 50. 
  279 
information were in the mobilisation of subaltern social networks. What all this means is 
that the expectations and obligations of the imperial moral economy remained vitally 
important despite substantial social and political change. One important implication of 
Severus’ incorporation of the military as the principal arm of his regime that has perhaps 
been overlooked was that it created competition for the social goods that Rome’s subjects 
had long viewed as a fundamental right. It was the basis around which consensus and 
legitimacy, identity and frames were all ultimately based. If competition for resources and 
access increased over a finite pool of resources, so did contentious activity. 
 
The findings of this study have to be seen in light of some limitations. Negotiating the 
historiography of Dio and Herodian is quite different to parsing media biases or conflicting 
news reports in modern contentious political analyses. It is true that the ancient historians 
shaped their narratives to suit a moral purpose, and to reflect their own social viewpoint. 
But, as Dio and Herodian both explicitly make clear, they tried to tell the truth as they 
understood it.953 Where Dio provided one assessment of events, and Herodian another, 
each converged on specific aspects of the same political conflicts. Graham Andrews rightly 
points out that we should view ancient historiography as reactive rather than objectively 
descriptive.954 The contrasting portraits of Pertinax and Maximinus in the source material 
for example may not be entirely accurate, but where Andrews views the contrast as a 
deliberate rhetorical device, I argue that they were real-time frames not merely aimed at 
convincing the reader, but were the distilled product of the contemporary environment of 
each historian. Perceptions were just as important, if not more so, than the truth in terms of 
contentious politics, and the perspectives of our sources must join ranks with Rome’s 
rumours, news, and hidden and public transcripts. The accuracy of each may vary, but all to 
an extent capture how certain sectors viewed issues and events, which was vitally important 
in terms of performing and reacting to contention.   
 
Additionally, the spatial components of Roman contention have only had a brief treatment. 
Each episode of contentious politics had to take place somewhere and, as the constant 
employment of symbolic spaces for collective action demonstrates, the cultural implications 
 
953 For a good discussion of these issues in Latin historiography, see Lendon (2009). 
954 Andrews (2019) 208. 
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of space and place had an important role to play. An adequate study of how space enabled, 
supported and shaped political processes and social relations of the time should be a study 
in its own right. Luckily, the ‘spatial turn’ is gaining more attention in the social sciences and 
humanities, and there is huge scope for spatiality as a fundamental element of analysis in 
the fields of classics and ancient history in particular. As the evolving political and social 
significance of the Circus Maximus between 180-238CE has shown, multiple spatialities – 
scale, place, networks, positionality and mobility – were implicated in and shaped Roman 
contentious politics, and claimants frequently drew on several at once.955 
 
Ultimately, in terms of the bigger picture, this study has hopefully provided a fresh 
perspective of Rome’s urban power dynamics. The evolving political position of the Senate 
and military has been well identified in scholarship, but not the reasons why individuals 
from each group, as well as ordinary people, would make risky claims against regimes that 
held substantial repressive capacity. Where the sources provide us with little or no 
explanation as to why collective activity occurred, the contentious politics framework 
employed in this analysis allows us to fill in the gaps so to speak, and offer plausible 
structures, processes and mechanisms by which urban collective action took place. Crisis of 
ideology, of norms, and lived experience should not be dismissed in favour of macro politics. 
We can argue that a military and political transformation or crisis took hold from the 240s at 
least, but in social terms, there is less clarity.956 Lukas de Blois wisely suggests that any sense 
of crisis should be understood as ‘an escalation of problems into an insoluble, complex, 
many-sided malfunctioning of the existing system, which [resulted] in changes in 
administration, power relations, and social structures applies to the contentious politics of 
the period.’957 The word crisis may be too much perhaps for some scholars in an Empire-
wide sense, but what happened in Rome during this period had serious import. As the 
capital, Rome was the ultimate landscape of power, and as such represented a social, 
political and moral yardstick for all who lived under its aegis.958 A denial then, of a third-
 
955 Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto (2008) 157. 
956 Hekster (2008) 85. 
957 de Blois (2006) 25. 
958 Therborn (2006) 518, 521. 
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century crisis in urban and social terms, disregards the capacity of a regime to deeply affect 
the lives of ordinary people and communities. 
 
This study also links Roman politics with the wider historical context. Contentious politics 
has existed forever, but its forms vary over time and space. Not only can a study of Roman 
contentious politics provide a greater understanding of ancient Rome, it also contributes 
context to modern studies within the field, as we can use the past to test our assumptions 
of the present. After all, as Tim Hitchcock persuasively argues, ‘the lessons of history are 
very seldom about ‘how we got here’ with all its teleological assumptions, but more 
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Appendix 
 
The database of Roman contentious performances between 78BCE-238CE that underpins 
this study was collated in part from episodes of collective action gathered by Vanderbroeck 
(1987), and Courrier (2014) that was then sorted according to the definition of contentious 
politics (that at least some of the collective action adopted non-institutional forms, at least 
one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and the claims 
would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants).960  
 
Recorded episodes of political contention between 180-238CE 
 
Date Source Type Where Detail 
182CE Hdn. 1.8.4-6 
Cass. Dio 73.4.2-5 
SHA Comm. 4.1-4 
Physical Colosseum Assassination attempt on Commodus 
184CE Hdn. 1.9.18 Verbal Odeon ‘Philosopher’ harangues Commodus 
about Perennis 
185CE Hdn. 1.10.1, 10.5-7 Physical Hilaria-Via Sacra Assassination attempt on Commodus 
185-187CE? Cass. Dio 74.4 Verbal Circus Maximus Opposition to Commodus by partisans of 
the Blues faction 
190CE Hdn. 1.12.5 Verbal Theatres Audiences shout insults concerning 
Cleander 
190CE Hdn. 1.12.7-13 




Villa of the 
Quintili 
Rome 
Circus demonstration against Cleander, 
followed by a march to the emperor’s 
villa. Street fighting between imperial 
cavalry and civilians. 
190CE Cass. Dio 73.13.6 Physical Streets Popular justice-parading of Cleander’s 
body and execution of associates by 
crowd. 
191-2CE SHA Comm. 13.2  Written Rome Libels circulated about Commodus 
 
960 Tilly (2006) 121; Vanderbroeck (1987) 218-267; Courrier (2014) 745-916.  
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192CE Cass. Dio 73.20.2 Physical Colosseum Refusal to attend Commodus’ two week 
long festivities for the Plebeian Games 
193CE 
(night) 
SHA Comm. 17.4, 
20.4-5, Pert. 6.3  






Demands for popular justice on the 




Hdn. 2.2.3 Verbal Temples 
Altars 
Capitol 
Thanksgiving at temples and altars for 




Hdn. 2.2.4, 2.2.9 Physical Praetorian camp March to praetorian camp by crowd to 
protect the accession of Pertinax 
193CE 
(night) 
Hdn. 2.2.10 Physical From camp to 
palace 
Crowd of civilians accompany the 
traditional praetorian escort for Pertinax 
to the imperial palace  
193CE Aur. Vict. Caes. 155.6 
Also SHA Pert. 14.6 
Verbal Streets Pro-Pertinax acclamations after 
accession of Didius Julianus 
193CE Hdn. 2.6.12-13 
SHA Did. Iul. 4.6 
Verbal 
 
From camp to 
palace 
Crowd shouts curses and insults at 
Julianus and his armed escort 
193CE Cass. Dio 74.13.3-4 
Hdn. 2.7.2 





Crowd shouts and throws stones at 
Julianus while conducting a sacrifice. 
Attempts made to block his way from 
Curia. 
193CE Cass. Dio 74.13.5 
SHA Did. Iul. 4.7 
See Hdn. 2.7.3 
Physical 
Verbal 
Circus Maximus Crowd occupies Circus overnight and 
following day in protest. Calls for 
Pescennius Niger to save Rome 
195CE Cass. Dio 76.4.2-6 Verbal Circus Maximus Anti-war chants 
203CE? Cass. Dio 77.2.2-4 Verbal Circus Maximus Chants mocking Plautianus 
212CE Cass. Dio 78.4 
 
Verbal Via Sacra Crowd and urban cohorts protest the 
public beating of Cilo 
213CE Cass. Dio 78.10.3 
Hdn. 4.6.4-4.7.1 
Verbal Circus Maximus Protests against Caracalla’s regime, and 
violent repression by Praetorian Guard 
  284 




Rome Anti-Caracalla chants after his murder. 
Popular justice exacted against officials 
and informers 
217CE Hdn. 5.2.3 Verbal Rome-games? Crowds call for Macrinus after murder of 
Caracalla 
217CE Cass. Dio 79.20 
SHA Macr. 14.2-3 
Verbal Circus Maximus Anti and pro-Macrinus chants in Latin 
and Greek 
217CE SHA Macr. 11.3-7 Written Forum Verses written about Macrinus 
217CE SHA Macr. 12.9 Verbal Circus Maximus Shouts for Diadumenianus (anti-
Macrinus) 
 
222CE Cass. Dio 80.21.1 Physical From camp to 
streets 
Praetorian Guard drag Elagabalus’ body 
into the streets after his execution 
222CE Cass. Dio 80.20-
21.1 
SHA Elag. 17.3-9 
Aur. Vict. Caes. 157.6 
Physical Circus Maximus 
Tiber/sewer 
Crowd drag Elagabalus’ body around 
Circus before throwing it in the Tiber 
Lynching of imperial officials 
223CE Cass. Dio 80b.2.2-3 Physical Streets 3 day battle between the populace and 
the Praetorian Guard 
225CE? SHA Alex. Sev 22.7 Verbal Rome Crowd petitions Severus Alexander for a 
reduction in meat prices 
237CE Hdn. 7.3.6 Physical Temples People set up a collective guard around 
Rome’s temples 





Rioting on rumours of Maximinus’ death 
Statues and portraits pulled down, 
informers killed 
238CE Hdn. 7.10.5-9. Physical Capitol Crowd riots, throw stones and threaten 
Senate 
238CE Hdn. 7.11.6-7.12.7 Physical Praetorian camp 
Streets 
Soldiers killed by senators and civilians 
Populace besieges praetorian camp 
City-wide battle between the two groups 
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238CE Hdn. 8.6.7-8 





Spontaneous thanksgiving on 
confirmation of Maximinus’ death 
238CE SHA Max. 31.5 Physical Campus Martius 
Tiber/sewer 
Desecration and destruction of the 
bodies of Maximinus and his son 
238CE Hdn. 8.8.6-7 
SHA Max. et Balb. 
14.3-8 
Physical Streets Praetorian Guard kidnap and publicly 
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